Antonio Conte

The plaintiff, Pylon Paving (1996) Inc., initiated a lien action for an unpaid balance of $20,200.85 for asphalt paving work.

The defendants, Arrow Lofts Inc. et al., counterclaimed for $175,000, alleging breach of contract and express warranty due to the plaintiff's failure to install 50 mm of asphalt and seeking full replacement.

The court found that the specified asphalt thickness could not be achieved due to underlying design flaws and the defendants' prior knowledge of these issues.

The defendants' counterclaim was dismissed as statute-barred and for failure to prove damages or present reasonable repair alternatives.

The plaintiff's claim was reduced by $10,000 due to its failure to document its concerns about the underlying deficiencies in writing, resulting in a judgment for $10,200.65.

The plaintiff sued former employees and related entities for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and misuse of customer relationships in the computer memory resale business.

The court held that a restrictive covenant signed after employment began was unenforceable for lack of fresh consideration, but upheld a separate six-month non-solicitation clause binding on the other employee.

The court further found that the senior salesperson was a key employee owing a limited post-employment fiduciary duty not to solicit former customers, and that both brothers worked in concert to solicit customers before the consent order issued.

The court rejected the claim that post-order responses to customer requests for bids constituted solicitation.

Damages of $132,581.00 plus prejudgment interest were awarded.

A general contractor moved to discharge a supplier’s construction lien, cancel or reduce the security posted to vacate the lien, and discharge a subcontractor’s separate lien.

The court held that the supplier’s lien was properly perfected despite the contractor not being named as a defendant, because the Construction Lien Act does not require joinder of a contractor lacking contractual privity with the lien claimant.

The court also refused to reduce the lien bond posted under s.44, finding the owner’s holdback liability exceeded the lien amount and therefore the full security remained appropriate.

The subcontractor consented to discharge of its lien if the bond was not reduced.

The court discharged the subcontractor’s lien but otherwise dismissed the motion.

The appellant lien claimants appealed an order refusing to confirm a Master's report under the Construction Lien Act.

The Master had found that the lien claimants were entitled to the full value of their claims from security posted by a mortgagee to vacate the liens, rather than just the deficiency in the holdback.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Master erred in principle by ignoring binding precedent (stare decisis) which limits recovery from posted security to the holdback deficiency.

The Court also upheld findings that the mortgagee was not an 'owner' at the relevant time, that holdbacks must be calculated individually for direct contractors rather than pooled, and that certain funds were not 'advances' made prior to the liens being vacated.

The appellant purchased a second mortgage as an investment, but the mortgagor fraudulently misrepresented the balance of the first mortgage.

After the property was sold under power of sale, leaving no funds for the appellant, she sued the mortgage broker for negligence and breach of contract, and the title insurer for coverage.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment dismissing the action.

The court found the title insurance policy did not cover the loss, and the claim against the broker was statute-barred because it was discovered more than two years before the action was commenced.

The court clarified that the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002 applied, rather than the ten-year period under the Real Property Limitations Act, because the claim was based in negligence and contract rather than an interest in land.

Following a prior endorsement concerning priority disputes under the Construction Lien Act, the court clarified issues arising during preparation of the formal order.

The court held that holdback deficiencies relating to certain claimants with untimely or invalid liens could not be included in calculating amounts payable to successful lien claimants, relying on authority confirming that amounts relating to invalid liens cannot expand statutory priority.

The court also rejected attempts to pool funds posted to bond off unsuccessful liens in order to increase the priority recovery of successful contractors beyond the statutory 10 percent holdback.

Costs issues from a reference before the Master were reconsidered, with the court setting aside the Master’s costs order and directing that each side bear its own costs of the reference while recognizing shared “carriage costs” among successful lien claimants.

Additional clarification was provided regarding allocation of motion costs and the structure of the distribution chart for priority payments.

Following the granting of summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s action against both defendants, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs relying on Rule 49 settlement offers and the complexity of the litigation.

The court reviewed the governing principles under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including proportionality, the result obtained, the conduct of the parties, and the offers to settle.

Although the defendants had made settlement offers and were fully successful, the court found no reprehensible conduct by the plaintiff warranting substantial indemnity costs.

Exercising its discretion, the court fixed costs payable by the plaintiff at $30,000 to one defendant and $18,000 to the other.

The defendants and an added party sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from an order permitting the plaintiff to add additional defendants to an action despite the expiry of the limitation period.

The moving parties argued the order conflicted with other jurisprudence and raised issues of general importance concerning the effect of limitation periods on motions to add parties.

The court held that the decision under appeal properly followed binding Divisional Court authority holding that the relevant date for limitation purposes is the service of the motion to add a party, not the date the motion is argued.

Finding no conflicting authority, no reason to doubt the correctness of the order, and no issue of general importance, the court refused leave to appeal.

The moving party, a mortgagee, opposed the confirmation of a Master's report regarding a reference under the Construction Lien Act.

The Master had found that the mortgagee, by posting security under s. 44 to vacate liens, lost its priority over the liens and was liable for the full amount of the lien claims rather than just the holdback deficiencies.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the Master committed several palpable and overriding errors of law by failing to follow binding precedent, including decisions of the Divisional Court.

The court held that a mortgagee can post security under s. 44 without losing its priority under s. 78(2), that the mortgagees did not become statutory owners at the relevant time, and that the holdback deficiencies must be calculated based on the individual contracts of the lien claimants.

The Master's report was ordered to be revised accordingly.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court judgment ordering them to pay $25,000 to the respondents.

The respondents had loaned $35,000 to a deceased family member, and the appellants had signed a written acknowledgment to repay the loan from the proceeds of a house sale.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the action was not statute-barred due to the written acknowledgment and the date of discovery.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding of a constructive trust over the sale proceeds and concluded that the trial judge's interventions during the self-represented trial did not amount to bias.

The plaintiff brought a motion under rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to add a former employee and a corporation as defendants after the expiry of the two‑year limitation period.

The motion to add one proposed defendant had been served within the limitation period but was adjourned and not argued until after the limitation period expired.

The court held that a motion to add a party need only be served within the limitation period; it need not also be argued and determined before the limitation period expires.

With respect to the corporate defendant, the issue of discoverability was a question of fact and the plaintiff was permitted to add the corporation with leave for the defendants to plead the Limitations Act.

The motion to add both parties was granted subject to procedural timelines.

In a reference under the Construction Lien Act, multiple contractors sought to enforce their claims for lien against the owner and mortgagees of a townhouse development.

The owner had defaulted, and a subsequent mortgagee posted security under s. 44(1) to vacate the liens and facilitate the sale of the remaining units.

The court determined the timeliness and quantum of the various lien claims.

The court held that because the mortgagee chose to post security under s. 44(1) rather than s. 78(10), the liens ceased to attach to the premises and instead became a charge on the posted security in full, rather than being limited to the holdback deficiency.

Alternatively, the court found the mortgagee had acted as an 'owner' under the Act by taking over the completion and sale of the project.

The defendant moved for security for costs under Rule 56.01(1)(a) and (e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure on the basis that the plaintiffs were non-residents of Ontario and allegedly lacked assets in the jurisdiction.

The court found the claim—alleging an improvident sale of property at auction for substantially less than a prior offer and appraised value—was not frivolous or vexatious.

Although the plaintiffs asserted that assets in Texas owned through a corporation were sufficient to satisfy any costs award, the court concluded that enforcement against those assets would not be straightforward because the property was owned by a non-resident corporation rather than the plaintiffs directly.

The court therefore ordered security for costs with conditions designed to preserve the corporate shares and underlying property as potential security for any future costs award.

The plaintiff consulting company sued for unpaid contingency fees under a contract to prepare and submit claims for research and development tax credits.

After an initial meeting with a CRA reviewer, the defendant company lost confidence in the plaintiff and proceeded directly with CRA without the plaintiff’s involvement, eventually receiving reduced tax credits.

The court held that the contract required the defendant to allow the plaintiff to represent it in audits and to remain involved in the claim process.

By excluding the plaintiff and continuing the claim process independently while still benefiting from the credits, the defendant breached the contract.

The plaintiff was therefore entitled to the agreed percentage fee calculated from the credits ultimately received.

The appellant contractor abandoned a parking lot expansion project after the respondent owner refused to pay the second instalment.

The appellant registered a construction lien for the full unpaid balance of the contract and sued for quantum meruit.

The trial judge found the respondent breached the contract but held the appellant liable under s. 35 of the Construction Lien Act for filing a grossly excessive lien, ultimately awarding a net judgment and $55,000 in costs to the respondent.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on breach, quantum meruit, and s. 35 liability, noting the appellant failed to elect damages for breach of contract.

However, the Court set aside the trial costs award, finding it disproportionate given the appellant's success on the central issue of breach, and ordered no costs throughout.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding the respondent lawyer unpaid legal fees.

As a preliminary matter, the appellants sought to introduce fresh evidence, alleging the respondent committed perjury and fabricated documents at trial.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for fresh evidence, finding the respondent's explanations plausible and corroborated.

On the main appeal, the court applied the Housen standard of review and found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings regarding personal liability and the quantum of fees.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $10,000 due to the serious but unsubstantiated allegations of fraud.

The appellants appealed the judgment of the Superior Court of Justice, arguing the trial judge erred in refusing to re-open the trial and in interpreting the contract.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion or interpretation of the contract.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $3,500.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision dismissing her complaint that her union breached its duty of fair representation under s. 74 of the Labour Relations Act.

The Divisional Court applied the patent unreasonableness standard of review.

The Court found that the Board was fully cognizant of the relevant facts and legal principles, and its decision was not patently unreasonable.

The application for judicial review was dismissed with no order as to costs.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding the bankruptcy of Carnese Hardware Limited, raising issues of insolvency, the replacement of a general security agreement, and the transfer of two vehicles to the appellant and his wife.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in her findings, which were supported by the evidence.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding fraud and awarding damages.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's finding of fraud, noting the appellant falsely represented that a $123,000 deposit had been paid.

The court also found no palpable and overriding error in the valuation of the equipment.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part to correct an error in the interest calculation, reducing the judgment amount to $18,533.43.

The appeal and cross-appeal were otherwise dismissed.