M. Whiteley

The applicants purchased a property under a power of sale, but due to a technical error by the vendors' lawyer, the transfer of title was not registered before the underlying mortgage was discharged.

As a result, the respondent (the defaulting mortgagor) retained unencumbered title to the property.

The applicants sought a vesting order and other relief.

The court found that the respondent was unjustly enriched and imposed a constructive trust, vesting legal title in the applicants.

The court also held that writs of execution against the respondent did not attach to the property and applied equitable subrogation to give the applicants' mortgagee first priority.

The applicant vendor sought specific performance of an option to buy back a property after the respondent purchaser failed to construct a building within the agreed timeframe.

The applicant also sought to discharge second and third mortgages placed on the property by the respondent.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to strictly comply with the option's notice terms, which included a 'time is of the essence' clause, and failed to tender the purchase funds.

The court also held that the presence of the subsequent mortgages did not prevent the applicant from exercising the option.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to strike portions of the defendants’ Statement of Defence that referenced allegations of sexual assault involving a non‑party.

The plaintiffs argued the allegations were irrelevant and scandalous.

The defendants maintained that the timing of the criminal complaint and the civil claim was relevant to the existence of an alleged trust agreement over shares in a corporation operating a retail business.

The court held that the circumstances surrounding the reporting of the alleged assault and the timing of the civil action could be relevant to the credibility of the plaintiffs and the existence of the alleged trust.

Applying Rule 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and guidance from appellate authority, the court found the impugned allegations were not of marginal probative value and did not unfairly prejudice the plaintiffs.

The defendants, who were also plaintiffs by counterclaim, sought a confidentiality order requiring certain disclosed materials to be designated “for counsel eyes only.” They argued the information concerned confidential technical, marketing, customer, and financial data of a developing technology company and that disclosure could cause irreparable competitive harm.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that a discovery plan without confidentiality restrictions had already been executed and that the evidence of harm was speculative.

The court held that the existence of parallel Federal Court litigation with even stricter confidentiality protections justified comparable safeguards in the Superior Court proceeding.

The motion was granted and a confidentiality order issued.