Annette Casullo

The plaintiff homebuilder, Leanne Homes Limited (LHL), brought a motion for an interim interlocutory injunction against the defendant, Avtansh Singh, to prohibit him from selling his property or, alternatively, to have the sale proceeds held in trust.

LHL sought this relief in the context of a main action for damages arising from the defendants' breach of an agreement of purchase and sale for a new home.

The court applied the three-part test for injunctions from RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General).

While a serious issue to be tried was found, the motion failed on the irreparable harm branch, as LHL did not quantify its damages or demonstrate that any judgment would be hollow, especially given the $170,000 deposit it held.

The balance of convenience also favoured the defendant.

The motion for an interim injunction was dismissed.

The offender was found guilty of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and two counts of failing to comply with release conditions.

The court considered the offender's difficult upbringing, the impact of anti-Black racism, and his strict bail conditions as mitigating factors.

The court also found a breach of the offender's s. 11(b) Charter rights due to a 27-day post-verdict delay, reducing the sentence by two months.

The offender was sentenced to a total of 26 months' imprisonment.

J.B., convicted of multiple sexual assault charges, applied to reopen his judge-alone trial before sentencing to admit fresh evidence from the complainant's Victim Impact Statement (VIS) and sought a mistrial.

The new evidence concerned alleged inconsistencies between the VIS and trial testimony regarding physical injuries and school incidents.

The court applied the Palmer test for fresh evidence and the additional considerations from R. v. H.S. for VIS-based applications.

The court found a lack of due diligence by the defence and determined that the new evidence, even if admitted, would not have affected the outcome or B.B.'s credibility, as there were no plain and obvious inconsistencies.

The application to reopen the trial was dismissed, and the conviction stood.

The defendant, Thomas Nsiah, was charged with possession of cocaine and fentanyl for trafficking and possession of property obtained by crime.

The court found that a strip search conducted by police at the detachment violated the defendant's section 8 Charter rights, as it was unreasonable and unauthorized, lacking proper grounds or procedure.

Applying the Grant analysis, the court excluded the drug evidence obtained from the vehicle.

In the alternative, the court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had knowledge and control of the concealed drugs, given the lack of forensic evidence linking him to the hidden compartment and the vehicle's non-ownership by the defendant.

The applicant sought a declaration that title to a property ("Thorah") be restored to her as a joint tenant, or alternatively, that the respondents were unjustly enriched due to her contributions.

The court determined that the property was held as tenants in common, not joint tenants, applying the presumption under the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, as the conveying will did not explicitly state an intention for joint tenancy.

Consequently, the deceased's one-half interest fell into her estate.

The court dismissed the primary claim for joint tenancy restoration.

Regarding the unjust enrichment claim, the court ordered that carrying costs and a joint line of credit be apportioned between the applicant and the deceased's estate based on their respective contributions and usage, without requiring a formal reference.

Each party was ordered to bear their own costs due to the ambiguity in the original will.

The Corporation of the City of Kawartha Lakes moved to stay or dismiss the action against it, alleging abuse of process due to the plaintiffs' delayed disclosure of a cooperation agreement with co-defendants.

The plaintiffs concurrently moved for court approval of this agreement.

The court examined the disclosure obligations for partial settlement agreements that alter the litigation landscape.

It found that while immediate disclosure is generally required, the moving party had sufficient prior knowledge of the agreement's essential terms to avoid "litigation by ambush." Consequently, the motion to stay was dismissed, and the plaintiffs' motion to approve the cooperation agreement was granted.

A separate consent motion to dismiss the action against The Dominion of Canada General Insurance Company and John Doe was also granted.

The plaintiff, Christine Upton, brought a motion for default judgment against the defendant, Christopher Carson, seeking damages for sexual assault.

The defendant had been found guilty of sexual assault in criminal proceedings, and his defence in the civil action was struck, leading to a noting in default.

The court assessed general and aggravated damages, loss of competitive advantage, and future care costs, awarding a total of $486,137.90 plus pre-judgment interest and substantial indemnity costs.

The defendants, Basil Dixon and Nathan Brown, were charged with conspiracy to import cocaine following a large-scale police investigation ("Project Southam").

The trial, heard by a judge alone, relied heavily on intercepted communications and surveillance.

The court found that voice identification evidence from a detective constable was unreliable due to limited exposure and lack of formal training.

However, based on circumstantial evidence, including intercepts and surveillance footage, the court identified Dixon as "B" and Brown as "R" in the communications.

Applying the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule, the court found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Dixon conspired to import cocaine from Guyana (Count One) and that both Dixon and Brown conspired to import cocaine using a pilot (Count Three).

The plaintiffs, Donald Klees and Julie Kent, commenced an action against State Farm Insurance, Desjardins Insurance, and Keith G. Jupp, alleging breach of contract related to a life insurance policy and its conversion.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims, finding the 1992 and 1994 claims time-barred under the Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1990, and the 2018 claim lacking damages and demonstrating a failure to mitigate losses by rejecting a reasonable offer from Desjardins.

The motion for summary judgment was granted.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of cannabis for distribution, and failure to comply with release conditions.

Following a surveillance operation, police conducted a high-risk takedown and arrested the accused for breaching his recognizance.

A subsequent search of his vehicle revealed a kilogram of cocaine and a pound of cannabis.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging breaches of his ss. 8 and 10(a) rights.

The court found a technical s. 10(a) breach but declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2).

The court found the accused guilty of the cocaine and breach charges, relying on constructive possession, but acquitted him of the cannabis charge due to insufficient evidence of a purpose of distribution.

In a historical sexual abuse prosecution, the court assessed the complainant’s adult testimony about repeated abuse allegedly committed by the accused parent over a six- to seven-year period beginning in childhood.

Applying the reasonable doubt standard and the W. (D.) framework, the court held that inconsistencies on peripheral details were expected given the passage of time and the complainant’s age during the events, and did not undermine the coherence of the core allegations.

The court rejected the accused’s denial as not credible, relied in part on email and text evidence as contextual admissions and evidence of a family secret, and found the complainant credible and reliable on the central acts.

Verdicts of guilt were entered on all charged counts.

The Crown applied to revoke A.H.'s bail post-conviction for criminal harassment and attempted abduction, pending sentencing and a potential dangerous/long-term offender application.

The Crown argued for revocation on secondary (public safety) and tertiary (public confidence) grounds, citing an outdated threat assessment and the gravity of the offences.

The defence contended the threat assessment was stale and that revoking bail would impede A.H.'s ability to prepare for upcoming legal proceedings.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding no new facts to justify revocation, noting A.H.'s consistent compliance with strict bail conditions for over two years, and reiterating that post-conviction bail revocation is an exception, not the rule.

This ruling addresses the costs arising from the dismissal of the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.

The defendant, as the successful party, sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis or, alternatively, partial indemnity.

The court found the plaintiff's conduct did not warrant substantial indemnity costs and awarded partial indemnity costs to the defendant, considering the complexity and importance of the motion to both parties.

The plaintiffs moved to strike the jury in a motor vehicle collision trial, alleging a breach of the rule in Browne v. Dunn by the defence.

The defence cross-examined the plaintiffs' medical experts on an alleged inconsistent symptom (fluid leaking from the ear) reported by the plaintiff to the Mayo Clinic, without having put this specific inconsistency to the plaintiff during his cross-examination.

The court found a serious breach of the Browne v. Dunn rule, which impaired trial fairness and the jury's ability to assess credibility.

The court determined that neither a correcting instruction nor recalling the plaintiff would remedy the damage, and therefore granted the motion to strike the jury.

Premier Implementation Solutions Canada Inc. sought an urgent interim injunction against Unifor, Local 222, to prevent obstruction of ingress and egress at Del Monte Fresh Produce (Canada) Corp. premises during a lawful strike.

Premier argued that Unifor's actions constituted unlawful picketing and nuisance, causing irreparable harm due to spoilage of fresh produce and potential loss of clients.

Unifor challenged the motion on grounds of union suability, failure to name individuals, and Premier's standing.

The court granted the injunction, finding a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm to Premier and Del Monte, and that the balance of convenience favored Premier, as the injunction only prevented unlawful obstruction, not lawful picketing.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application to introduce evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct in a domestic violence case involving charges of assault, assault with a weapon, uttering threats, sexual assault with a weapon, and sexual assault causing bodily harm.

The defence opposed, arguing the prejudicial effect outweighed the probative value.

The court applied the test for admissibility of prior discreditable conduct, finding three of the four proposed instances relevant and admissible to provide narrative context and demonstrate animus, with limiting instructions to the jury.

One instance, the "bathtub incident" was excluded due to its highly inflammatory nature and potential for reasoning prejudice.

Following a high-speed rear-end collision that propelled the plaintiff's vehicle into a rollover in a ditch, the court found the plaintiff sustained an mTBI, post-concussion syndrome, dizziness and balance-related impairments, adjustment disorder, and aggravated knee injuries.

The defence theory that the plaintiff fabricated or exaggerated symptoms was rejected, and the court strongly preferred the plaintiff's treating and vocational experts over the defence neuropsychiatric and neuropsychological evidence.

Applying the but for causation test, the court held the collision caused the plaintiff's permanent impairments and rendered him unemployable in the film industry or any competitive employment.

The plaintiff recovered general damages, past and future income loss, future care costs, special damages for treatment at the Mayo Clinic, and the spouse recovered damages under s. 61(2)(d) of the Family Law Act.

In a judge-alone criminal trial arising from alleged abuse within a household, the court convicted one accused of sexual assault, sexual interference, forcible confinement, assault, assault with a weapon, and choking, and convicted the other accused of assault with a weapon, choking, forcible confinement, and assault.

The central issue was whether the complainant's evidence, given years after the events and marked by delayed and incremental disclosure, was credible and reliable.

Applying the reasonable doubt standard and appellate guidance on assessing adult testimony about childhood trauma, the court held that peripheral inconsistencies, recovered memories, and delayed disclosure did not undermine the core reliability of the complainant's account.

Corroborative evidence from siblings and other witnesses supported the pattern of abuse, and the defence evidence was rejected where it minimized the incidents.

The Applicant Mother brought a motion to set aside a separation agreement, alleging it was signed under duress and without adequate financial disclosure from the Respondent Father.

She also sought interim child and spousal support, and further disclosure.

The court found triable issues regarding the agreement's validity under the Miglin analysis, particularly concerning the conditions of negotiation and the Respondent Father's lack of financial disclosure.

The court granted interim child and spousal support based on an imputed income of $150,000 for the Respondent Father and ordered him to provide outstanding disclosure.

The Applicant Mother was deemed wholly successful on the motion.

The defendant, Valeria Dye, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action by the plaintiffs, Augustine D’Souza and Cedric D’Souza.

The plaintiffs claimed damages for breach of contract, fiduciary duty, trust, and negligence, alleging that $86,000 was transferred to Dye's trust account and improperly released.

The court found that the facts were hazy and in dispute, raising genuine issues requiring a trial.

The motion was dismissed, with the court emphasizing a cautious approach when dealing with self-represented litigants and noting that informal evidence could be sufficient to defeat summary judgment.