Annette Casullo

The plaintiff successfully defended a summary judgment motion brought by the City of Barrie, which sought to dismiss the claim due to late notice under the Municipal Act.

In this costs endorsement, the court considered the plaintiff's request for partial indemnity costs and the City's submission to reserve costs to the trial judge.

Citing the principle that costs may be reserved when issues raised on the motion remain live, the court found it just to reserve the costs of the motion to the trial judge, as the issue of prejudice to the City from late notice still needed to be determined at trial.

The plaintiffs sold their property but were not paid the full purchase price, leaving a balance of $340,000.

The property was subsequently transferred to the defendant McCracken, who assumed the previous owner's debts and placed several mortgages on the property.

The plaintiffs remained on the property rent-free for eleven years.

The court found the plaintiffs were entitled to a vendor's lien for the unpaid purchase price, which took priority over the mortgages placed by McCracken because she had notice of the unpaid debt.

The court dismissed claims for occupation rent and punitive damages, and ordered the funds held in court to be distributed according to the determined priorities.

The plaintiff was struck by a vehicle while riding his bicycle and sued the driver and the municipality, alleging the intersection was dark due to burnt-out streetlights.

The municipality moved for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiff failed to provide notice of the claim within 10 days as required by s. 44(10) of the Municipal Act.

The court found the plaintiff had a reasonable excuse for the delay, as the municipality's potential liability was not discoverable until the police file was released months later.

However, the court concluded that whether the municipality was prejudiced by the delay remained a genuine issue requiring a trial.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The applicants, who are the sole beneficiaries of the deceased's estate, brought a motion to pass over the respondent, the named estate trustee, and to be appointed as estate trustees themselves.

The respondent had refused to honour a holograph codicil and exhibited hostility toward the applicants.

The court found that the respondent's conduct and misunderstanding of the law regarding holograph codicils demonstrated she was not the proper party to serve as estate trustee.

The court passed over the respondent, appointed the applicants as estate trustees, and dispensed with the requirement for them to post a bond.

The applicant, a dangerous offender serving an indeterminate sentence, sought a writ of habeas corpus after his request to be transferred from medium to minimum security was denied.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the refusal to lower an inmate's security classification does not constitute a deprivation of residual liberty.

In the alternative, the court held that the Assistant Commissioner's decision to maintain the medium security classification was reasonable given the applicant's high risk for violent recidivism and dangerous offender status.

The appellant, Robert Strmota, appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 mg, arguing that his s. 9 Charter right to be free from arbitrary detention was violated when he was stopped in a private parking lot during a R.I.D.E. program.

The trial judge had dismissed the Charter application, finding the stop lawful for sobriety checks, even on private property, based on common law powers and road safety concerns.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, affirming that police officers have common law power to detain motorists for sobriety checks, even on private property, without reasonable suspicion, particularly in the context of a R.I.D.E. program aimed at road safety.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action, which sought to set aside a Declaration and Deed of Gift and declare an oral agreement for property sale.

The plaintiff alleged an oral agreement to sell property for $700,000, with annual interest payments, despite a written deed of gift stating "no consideration other than natural love and affection" and an adjusted cost base payment.

The court found genuine issues for trial, particularly concerning the existence of the oral agreement, the nature of a $35,000 payment, and the timing of an invoice, all of which raised credibility issues.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed, as the court was not confident it could fairly decide the dispute without a full trial and oral evidence.