Annalisa S. Rasaiah

Multiple motions and appeals arose from child protection proceedings involving the society and the parents.

Motions were brought by the Office of the Children’s Lawyer, the father, and the mother seeking, among other things, permission to introduce fresh evidence on appeal.

On consent of all parties, the court issued procedural directions governing the scheduling of the motions, filing of factums and records, and the handling of proposed fresh evidence.

The court ordered that the motions would be heard on a specified date and scheduled the society’s appeal followed by the parents’ appeals.

Directions were also given regarding sealed filings and the sharing of materials across the related appeals.

The appellant appealed a child support order arising from a motion to change that fixed his income at $80,000 and awarded retroactive child support to the date shortly after the parties’ separation.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred by imputing income without considering financial disclosure already filed and by refusing to consider additional evidence after imposing procedural conditions the appellant could not meet.

The court held the motion judge misapprehended the evidentiary record, failed to consider existing financial statements, and did not analyze the legal framework governing retroactive support under S. (D.B.) v. G. (S.R.).

The court also found the hearing process unfair to a self‑represented litigant who was effectively prevented from presenting relevant evidence.

The order was set aside and the matter remitted for a new hearing before a different judge.

The moving party sought an order under the Partition Act compelling the sale of a matrimonial home following separation.

The responding spouse opposed the sale, arguing that competing claims regarding ownership and the validity of two marriage contracts created substantial rights that could be prejudiced by an immediate sale.

Evidence suggested the responding spouse, an elderly individual residing in the home with a permanently disabled adult child, would suffer hardship if required to relocate before trial.

The court held that while co-owners have a prima facie right to partition and sale, the discretion under the Partition Act allows refusal where hardship or oppression would result.

Given unresolved issues regarding ownership and the potential prejudice to the responding spouse’s rights under family law claims, the motion for sale was dismissed.