Andrew A. Sanfilippo

The applicant, Shazad Adam, sought to be appointed as guardian of the person for his father, Shyam Mohamed Adam, who sustained a head injury and whose capacity to manage personal care was in dispute.

Shazad also sought to remove Shyam's spouse, Bibi Hasena Hanuman, and daughter, Selena Shazela Hasena, as attorneys for personal care under a 2019 Power of Attorney.

The court granted leave for the application, declared Shyam incapable of personal care, found Bibi neglectful and in breach of a court order, and removed Bibi and Selena as attorneys.

Shazad was appointed as guardian of the person for one year, subject to a revised guardianship plan.

Costs were awarded to the Public Guardian and Trustee and Shyam's s.3 counsel from Shyam's property, and partial indemnity costs were awarded to Shazad against Bibi.

The applicant, Ulana Olha Gorgi, as sole Estate Trustee, sought to rectify the Last Will and Testament of John Ihnatowych to limit the beneficiaries of the residue and grandchildren clauses to his biological children, Ulana and Markian, and their children, thereby excluding Alexander Erik de Berner and his children, who claimed to be the deceased's biological issue and grandchildren.

The court found that the drafting solicitor failed to accurately reflect the testator's clear instructions, which consistently indicated an intent to benefit only Ulana and Markian and their children.

The application for rectification was granted, and the Notice of Objection filed by the de Berner Respondents was removed.

This endorsement addresses the costs of a dismissed summary judgment motion in a medical malpractice action.

The plaintiffs, having successfully resisted the defendant's motion for summary judgment based on a limitation defence, were entitled to costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The court significantly reduced the plaintiffs' claimed costs of $49,295.22 to $12,000.00, finding the hours billed excessive and disallowing certain disbursements, including the cost of an expert medical report deemed necessary for the main action rather than the specific motion, and unverified copying and computer search fees.

An adult child sought dependant's relief from their deceased mother's estate under the Succession Law Reform Act, claiming inadequate provision for support.

The court found the applicant was a dependant, as the deceased had systematically provided ongoing support, including food, shelter, and financial assistance, due to the applicant's inability to support themselves.

While the deceased's testamentary framework of providing an income stream was deemed appropriate, the amount was found inadequate to meet the applicant's accustomed standard of living.

The court ordered an increase in monthly support, adjusted annually for inflation, and required the applicant to vacate the deceased's condominium, denying a claim for past rent credit.

This endorsement addresses issues arising from a prior trial judgment, specifically concerning the calculation of Net Family Property (NFP) equalization, the form of judgment regarding pre-judgment interest, and the timetable for cost submissions.

The court found an arithmetic error in the NFP equalization calculation, agreeing with the respondent that both principal and compound interest of "Parental Loans" should be included as discounted debts.

The court also clarified that the judgment should include pre-judgment interest as per the Courts of Justice Act.

A revised timetable for cost submissions was agreed upon by the parties.

This application concerned whether an "Aviva Bond" valued at $123,558.64 formed part of a deceased's estate or was a gratuitous inter vivos gift to two of her daughters.

The applicant, one of the deceased's four daughters and a co-estate trustee, sought a declaration that the bond was an estate asset and an order for its repayment.

The respondents, including the two daughters who received the bond, argued it was a gift.

The court found strong evidence that the deceased intended the bond as a gift, thereby rebutting any presumption of resulting trust.

The application was dismissed, and costs were awarded against the applicant, with a blended cost order for the responding estate trustee.

The parties sought to settle the judgment following a jury trial in a personal injury action.

They disagreed on the wording of a consent reduction for a past loss of housekeeping award and the applicable prejudgment interest rate for non-pecuniary damages.

The court determined the wording of the order to reflect that the reduction was made pursuant to Rule 52.08 on consent.

Applying MacLeod v. Marshall, the court exercised its discretion under s. 130 of the Courts of Justice Act to reduce the prejudgment interest rate on non-pecuniary damages from the presumptive 5% under Rule 53.10 to 1.3%, finding that 5% would overcompensate the plaintiffs given historical market rates.

The parties separated after a nine-year marriage with no children.

The applicant sought an equalization of net family property, spousal support, and a share in the post-separation increase in value of the matrimonial home, which was titled solely in the respondent's name.

The court found the applicant did not establish a beneficial interest in the matrimonial home and was only entitled to share in its value up to the date of separation.

The court valued the respondent's orthodontic practices at $675,000 and determined that funds advanced by the respondent's parents were loans, but discounted them to 10% of their face value due to the low likelihood of repayment.

The respondent was ordered to pay an equalization payment of $606,728.60 and spousal support of $2,228 per month for four and one-half years.

The defendant surgeon brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' medical malpractice action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff suffered a ureter injury following a colon resection in 2012, but only discovered severe kidney damage in 2016, prompting the 2017 lawsuit.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues requiring a trial regarding whether the kidney damage was a new, distinct injury or an inevitable progression of the ureter injury, and when a reasonable person would have known that a legal proceeding was an appropriate means to seek a remedy.

The respondent law firm brought a motion to quash a Registrar's Order for Delivery and Assessment obtained by its former client.

The client had certified in a requisition that he had requested the firm's accounts but had not received them.

The court found that the firm had in fact delivered all accounts to the client at or about the dates they were rendered.

Because the requisition was factually incorrect, the court quashed the Registrar's Order, without prejudice to the client bringing an Application for an order directing the assessment of the accounts under section 4 of the Solicitors Act.

The moving party, an estate trustee, brought a motion to add her sister as a respondent to two consolidated applications: an application to pass accounts and an application for the removal of the estate trustee.

The sister and her daughter opposed the joinder.

The court found that the sister was an interested party who had demanded an accounting and was a possible beneficiary of the estate.

Applying Rules 5.03 and 9.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court concluded that the sister was a necessary party whose rights could be affected by the outcome.

The motion was granted, and the sister was ordered to be added as a party to both applications.

The moving party sought to set aside or vary an ex parte order that required her to file an application for a certificate of appointment of estate trustee or be deemed to have renounced.

The court found that the responding party failed to make full and fair disclosure of material facts on the ex parte motion, specifically omitting that the moving party's counsel had responded and sought production of the drafting lawyer's file.

The ex parte order was set aside under Rule 39.01(6).

However, the court declined to grant the moving party's requested variation to compel production of the file, finding it overly broad for a motion to vary.

Costs of $2,000 were awarded to the moving party.

The plaintiff succeeded on a motion to refer a construction lien action to an Associate Judge for trial.

The plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, arguing the defendants defended the action disproportionately.

The defendants argued no costs should be awarded as the motion raised a novel point of law.

The court found the issue was not novel but declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding no reprehensible conduct.

Costs were fixed on a partial indemnity basis at $4,975.00.

The Haudenosaunee Development Institute (HDI) brought a motion to be added as a party and appointed as a representative of the Haudenosaunee Confederacy in an action commenced by the Six Nations of the Grand River Band of Indians against Canada and Ontario.

Following case conferences, the parties and HDI consented to a timetable for the motion and terms for providing notice to potentially interested non-parties.

The court issued an order on consent setting out the timetable and the specific notice requirements.

A trial management conference was held to determine the procedures for an upcoming trial regarding an estate application.

The court directed that the trial proceed as a hybrid hearing, with most participants attending in person and one witness testifying virtually.

The court also issued procedural directions regarding the use of CaseLines, the marking of exhibits, and the preparation of a joint document brief.

The plaintiff brought a motion under s. 58(1) of the Construction Act to refer a construction lien action to an Associate Judge for trial.

The defendants opposed, arguing that because the claim amount fell within the monetary jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court, the court was mandated to refer the matter to the Small Claims Court.

The court rejected the defendants' statutory interpretation, holding that s. 58(1) confers discretion to refer the action to either an Associate Judge or the Small Claims Court.

Applying the principles of proportionality and timeliness, the court exercised its discretion to refer the action to an Associate Judge.

The plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action against two radiologists for failing to detect a lung lesion on three chest x-rays taken between April 2012 and June 2013.

The court found that both radiologists breached the standard of care by failing to identify the abnormality.

On causation, the court held that 'but for' the first radiologist's failure to detect the lesion in April 2012, the plaintiff would not have required adjuvant chemotherapy, suffered a recurrence of his lung cancer, or experienced the associated psychological harm.

However, the court found that the second radiologist's failure to detect the lesion in October 2012 did not cause the plaintiff's outcome, as the cancer had already progressed to a stage requiring the same treatment.

The first radiologist was found liable for the agreed-upon damages, and the action against the second radiologist was dismissed.

Following a 25-day medical malpractice jury trial, the plaintiffs were awarded damages of $1,918,491.96.

The defendant had made a pre-trial offer to settle the issue of damages for $2,150,000, which the plaintiffs rejected.

The defendant argued for a distributive costs award, seeking costs for the portion of the trial dedicated to damages.

The court held that an offer to settle only damages does not trigger the strict cost consequences of Rule 49.10(2) and declined to make a distributive costs award.

However, applying Rule 49.13 and Rule 57.01, the court reduced the plaintiffs' costs by 30% to reflect their divided success and the unnecessary lengthening of the trial on the damages issue, awarding the plaintiffs $800,000 in partial indemnity costs.

This post-verdict motion concerned the deductibility of long-term disability (LTD) and pension contribution benefits from a jury's award for past income loss in a medical malpractice action.

The defendant sought to deduct these benefits to prevent double recovery by the plaintiff.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the LTD benefits were an indemnity and the plaintiff did not prove direct contribution, the City's contractual right to reimbursement for any overcompensation negated the concern of double recovery.

The pension contributions were also found not to be an indemnity and thus not deductible.

The appellant, C.B., appealed two decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board: one confirming a Community Treatment Order (CTO) and its Community Treatment Plan (CTP), and another confirming his incapacity regarding treatment with antipsychotic medications.

The court upheld the Board's finding of incapacity for antipsychotic medication, applying the correct legal test and finding no palpable and overriding error.

The appeal regarding the CTO and CTP was dismissed as moot because the May 2021 CTO had expired, a new CTO was issued based on a fresh capacity assessment, and this new CTO was subsequently confirmed by the Board.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot issues, citing a change in the evidentiary basis of the dispute and judicial economy.