Ismail Idowu Salih

The condominium corporation applied for injunctive relief to prohibit a unit owner from continuing disruptive and objectionable conduct, including profane verbal abuse and banging on walls.

The unit owner brought a cross-application alleging oppression and seeking to refer the matter to mediation/arbitration.

The court preferred the corporation's evidence, finding the unit owner's complaints about cannabis smells and stalking to be unsubstantiated.

The court granted the corporation's application, maintaining the interim injunction, and dismissed the unit owner's cross-application for oppression.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded to the corporation.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision of Harris J. dated August 19, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving parties to pay costs of $5,000 to the municipal respondent and $5,000 to the county and individual respondents.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing his action against his father for the repayment of his student loans.

The appellant argued his father was liable under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, claiming his father promised to repay the loans if he studied engineering.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusions that the appellant failed to prove the content of the representation, detrimental reliance, or damages.

This endorsement addresses the costs of a dismissed summary judgment motion in a medical malpractice action.

The plaintiffs, having successfully resisted the defendant's motion for summary judgment based on a limitation defence, were entitled to costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The court significantly reduced the plaintiffs' claimed costs of $49,295.22 to $12,000.00, finding the hours billed excessive and disallowing certain disbursements, including the cost of an expert medical report deemed necessary for the main action rather than the specific motion, and unverified copying and computer search fees.

The defendant surgeon brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' medical malpractice action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff suffered a ureter injury following a colon resection in 2012, but only discovered severe kidney damage in 2016, prompting the 2017 lawsuit.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues requiring a trial regarding whether the kidney damage was a new, distinct injury or an inevitable progression of the ureter injury, and when a reasonable person would have known that a legal proceeding was an appropriate means to seek a remedy.

The applicant, previously declared a vexatious litigant, applied for leave to continue three existing actions and to rescind the vexatious litigant order.

The court found that the applicant failed to demonstrate reasonable grounds for the proceedings and that continuing them would be an abuse of process, noting a history of unpaid costs orders and failure to advance litigation.

The court also declined to rescind the vexatious litigant order, finding the applicant had not learned from past mistakes and continued to exhibit abusive litigation behaviour.

The application was dismissed in its entirety.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated March 14, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $3,000 to the responding party.

The tenant brought a motion under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside an order of a single judge of the Divisional Court, which had quashed his appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board eviction order.

The tenant argued he was entitled to withhold rent because the landlord failed to provide its address under s. 12 of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The Divisional Court panel dismissed the motion, finding no error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact in the single judge's decision that the issue was one of mixed fact and law.

The court noted the tenant had lived rent-free for 16 months and owed over $40,000 in arrears.