Khaira v. Ghumman, 2022 ONSC 7165

COURT FILE NO.: FS-19-009799

DATE: 20221220

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

BALKIRAN KAUR KHAIRA

Applicant

– and –

AJEET SINGH GHUMMAN

Respondent

Poroshad Mahdi, for the Applicant

James Herbert, for the Respondent

HEARD: May 24, 26, 30 and 31, 2002 and June 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 22, 28 and 30, 2022

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

A.A. SANFILIPPO J.

Overview

[1] Balkiran Kaur Khaira and Ajeet Singh Ghumman began a relationship in 2002 while university students. They married on May 19, 2007, while Ms. Khaira was continuing post-graduate study in Calgary and Dr. Ghumman was about to embark on a three-year program in orthodontics in New Jersey. They separated on June 1, 2016, with no children. Their dispute was focused on the economic issues arising from their marital break-up.

[2] Ms. Khaira claimed a payment in equalization of family property, spousal support, and a share in the post-separation increase in value of the matrimonial home, which was taken in title solely by Dr. Ghumman. She alleged that she supported Dr. Ghumman in his years of training to be an orthodontist, and that she contributed monetarily to the acquisition and maintenance of the matrimonial home.

[3] Dr. Ghumman denied that he owed any amount in net family property equalization to Ms. Khaira and claimed that she owed an equalization payment to him based on three contested positions. First, Dr. Ghumman denied that Ms. Kharia had a beneficial interest in the matrimonial home and alleged that she should not share in its significant post-separation increase in value. Second, Dr. Ghumman alleged that the two orthodontic practices that he had at the date of separation had zero value at that time, while Ms. Khaira’s expert business valuator testified that they had a value of $675,000. Third, Dr. Ghumman claimed as deductions in the equalization analysis sums totaling $1,884,160 that he claimed were loans provided to him from 2002 to 2016 by his parents. These consisted of principal amounts totaling $864,700 as increased by interest of 8%-10%, compounded monthly. Ms. Khaira denied that these were loans, or that they require repayment.

[4] On the issue of spousal support, Dr. Ghumman claimed that Ms. Khaira should receive none, submitting that Ms. Khaira could not establish an entitlement to spousal support on either a compensatory or needs basis. He contended that she is intentionally under-employed and is under-utilizing her postgraduate degree in education.

[5] On the basis of the reasons that follow, I find that: (i) Ms. Khaira did not establish a basis for a beneficial interest in the matrimonial home and shall share in its equity only to the date of separation; (ii) the value of Dr. Ghumman’s two orthodontic practices at the valuation date total $675,000, with disposition costs of $82,000; (iii) Dr. Ghumman established that he had loans to his parents at the date of separation in the amount of $864,700, plus accrued compound interest, which I have reduced to 10% for the purpose of deduction in net family property equalization. Based on these determinations, Ms. Khaira is entitled to a net family property equalization payment of $606,728.60 payable by Dr. Ghumman. I have found, as well, that Ms. Khaira has established an entitlement to monthly spousal support in the amount of $2,228, for a duration of four and one-half years. And last, I order that Dr. Ghumman provide Ms. Khaira with two days to remove her personal belongings and furniture from the matrimonial home, that she will schedule on 14 days’ notice to Dr. Ghumman.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

[6] I will set out the factual background to the parties’ dispute, constructing this background with facts that were not in dispute or that I have found on the evidence. I will also highlight areas of factual dispute that I will return to when determining the issues raised by the parties.

[7] Ms. Khaira and Dr. Ghumman began dating as students at the University of Calgary in 2002. They were hometown university students, with families in Calgary. They were engaged in December 2005, with neither yet having completed their educational pursuits. They planned to marry on May 19, 2007. Ms. Khaira had by that time completed a double major (B.A. (Sociology) and B.Sc. (Biological Studies) and was about to begin her post-graduate study in education (M.Ed.). Dr. Ghumman had graduated from the University of Calgary (B.SC. (Biological Studies, 2002), had completed a degree in general dentistry at Howard University (D.D.S., 2006) in Washington D.C., and was in the process of completing a General Practice Residency at Hartford Hospital, in Connecticut. He was scheduled to begin a three-year program in orthodontics at the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey.

[8] At the time of their marriage on May 19, 2007, neither of the parties had held a full-time job. Ms. Khaira testified that her engagement ring was a gift from Dr. Ghumman, paid for with $8,000 given to him by his mother, who travelled to India, along with other family members, to buy wedding clothes and jewelry. The wedding reception was held at the Calgary Westin with some 500 guests. Ms. Khaira testified that her parents agreed to pay one-half of the wedding expenses and did so, and she believed that Dr. Ghumman’s parents, Mr. Harbhajan and Mrs. Amarjeet Ghumman, would pay for the other half.

[9] The parties spent the first few months of their marriage apart. Ms. Khaira was a graduate student in Calgary and Dr. Ghumman was in Connecticut completing his general practice residency. Ms. Khaira would visit. When Dr. Ghumman moved to New Jersey in September 2007, Ms. Khaira assisted him with the move, but she returned to study in Calgary from September to December 2007. Ms. Khaira moved to New Jersey in January 2008, where she would hold part-time jobs and complete her Master’s degree on-line while Dr. Ghumman completed his orthodontic program.

[10] The parties cohabited in New Jersey from March 2009 to July 2010 for a total of about 16 months. When Dr. Ghumman graduated with his Certificate in Orthodontics in 2010, the parties moved to Calgary. According to Dr. Ghumman, the parties cohabited from August 2010 to May 31, 2012 in Calgary while Dr. Ghumman began to work as an orthodontic associate. During this time, Ms. Khaira was employed as a teacher of English as a Second Language (“ESL”). The parties agreed that Dr. Ghumman’s declared income increased from $39,294 in 2010 to $179,928 in 2011, while Ms. Khaira declared income of $34,916 for 2011.

[11] Dr. Ghumman’s goal was to open several orthodontic clinics, develop them and then sell the practices. To this end, in 2011, Ms. Khaira enrolled in a Human Resources Management program at the University of Calgary, graduating with a Certificate in 2013. She testified that she pursued this study to support Dr. Ghumman with his objective of establishing several orthodontic clinics in which she would act as office manager.

[12] Dr. Ghumman worked as an orthodontic associate in Calgary with Dr. Tarun Mehra and then with Dr. Walinder Dohl from 2011 to 2012. Ms. Khaira found employment in Calgary in 2011 as a client retention specialist with a telecommunications company. Dr. Ghumman stated that he wanted to practice in Toronto, whereas Ms. Khaira wanted to remain in Calgary to be close to family, or alternatively, to move to Vancouver. She did not want to move to Ontario.

[13] Ms. Khaira testified that Dr. Ghumman told her by text message in February 2012 that he had bought an interest in an orthodontal practice in the Greater Toronto Area (“GTA”). She testified that she was very upset by this, disappointed that her request to remain in Western Canada had been ignored, and angered that Dr. Ghumman had taken this step “behind her back”. Dr. Ghumman denied that he notified Ms. Khaira by text message of his purchase of a practice in the GTA, or that this saddened or angered her. I prefer Ms. Khaira’s evidence on this point because this was an inflection point, after which the parties began marriage counselling to address issues in their relationship. After the marriage counselling, Ms. Khaira agreed that she would move to Ontario once she completed some commitments in Calgary. However, Ms. Khaira would not move to live with Dr. Ghumman full-time in Toronto until over a year later.

[14] Around May 2012, Dr. Ghumman, together with Dr. Sunny Dhingra, purchased the practice of Dr. Bohak Mehdi, who had been operating the practice for about 10 years at a location in Maple, Ontario (the “Maple Clinic”). The parties agreed that the purchase price of the Maple Clinic was $1,230,000, and that it was generating revenues at that time of $1,324,000. Dr. Ghumman and Dr. Dhingra took equal 50% shares in the Maple Clinic.

[15] In the period after May 2012, Dr. Ghumman travelled between Calgary and Toronto, working at times with Dr. Dohl in Calgary and at times in the Maple Clinic with Dr. Dhingra. While in Calgary, Dr. Ghumman resided with Ms. Khaira in a house leased from Ms. Khaira’s brother. When in Ontario, Dr. Ghumman resided mostly with his sister, Kirandeep Kaur Ramesh, and her husband Prashant Ramesh.

[16] In 2012, the parties searched for a home in the GTA. Ms. Khaira testified that the house was to be close to her employer’s Toronto office, where she could continue work upon moving to Ontario, and near her husband’s practice in Maple. Ms. Khaira travelled to Ontario to view and inspect properties and did so with the assistance of a real estate agent related to Dr. Dhingra.

[17] While Ms. Khaira was in Calgary, Dr. Ghumman located a townhome known municipally as Unit 13, 44 Claritrell Road, North York, which he would agree to purchase through an Agreement of Purchase and Sale executed August 16, 2012, in the amount of $870,000 (the “Matrimonial Home”). Ms. Khaira did not see the Matrimonial Home prior to acquisition but swore that Dr. Ghumman sent her photographs of this property, and that she discussed it with him and agreed to its purchase. I accept this evidence, weighed in the totality of the evidence of this case, over Dr. Ghumman’s testimony that he only sent Ms. Khaira images of the property after he had contractually committed to its purchase.

[18] The acquisition of the Matrimonial Home was completed on or about September 26, 2012, supported by a mortgage loan obtained by Dr. Ghumman from his parents in the amount of $700,000 (the “Matrimonial Home Loan”). Dr. Ghumman took title to the Matrimonial Home, and became indebted under the Matrimonial Home Loan, alone.

[19] Ms. Khaira testified that she regularly travelled from Calgary to Toronto in the period after the acquisition of the Matrimonial Home to purchase appliances and furnishings, to attend to its maintenance, to outfit the home and to prepare for move-in. Dr. Ghumman minimized these contributions, but I find that they occurred. In Calgary, Ms. Khaira prepared the parties’ possessions for transport to Ontario. Ms. Khaira testified that she delayed moving to the Matrimonial Home to assist with the organization in 2013 of her brother’s wedding in Calgary. Ms. Khaira did not join Dr. Ghumman in the Matrimonial Home until the Fall of 2013, although she would travel there periodically in the interim.

[20] On August 22, 2013, Dr. Ghumman and Dr. Dhingra incorporated corporations by which they would own and operate a second orthodontic clinic in Brampton, Ontario, which began operations in July 2014 (the “Brampton Clinic”). Additionally, in 2014, Dr. Ghumman and Dr. Dhingra renovated the Maple Clinic.

[21] Ms. Khaira testified that from March 2011 to the Fall of 2013 she had been consistently promoted in her employment with a telecommunication company and accepted a position as a customer loyalty specialist upon her move to Ontario in November 2013. In September 2014, she would receive a further promotion in what would become an eight-year career.

[22] Ms. Khaira testified that she thought that she would become the office manager of the Maple Clinic upon it being established in 2012, and that this prompted her to stray from pursuing a career in education and obtain a Certificate in Human Resource Management. Ms. Khaira testified that when she was ready to transition from employment with the telecommunications company to work in her husband’s orthodontic practice, Dr. Ghumman told her that there was no position for her as an office manager in the Maple Clinic. He explained that he and Dr. Dhingra already had an office manager familiar with the operation of the clinic. Ms. Khaira testified that she later learned that Dr. Ghumman was having a romantic relationship with the office manager.

[23] The parties drifted apart and began to live separate and apart within the Matrimonial Home. They informed their families of their separation on June 1, 2016 and agreed that this would be the valuation date, for the purposes of the equalization of their net family property. The parties would co-exist in the Matrimonial Home, speaking only of the terms for a separation agreement, living behind locked doors. Ms. Khaira conceded that she stopped making any payments toward the carrying costs of the Matrimonial Home on the date of separation.

[24] The parties attempted to resolve the economic issues arising from their marital breakdown through negotiation, without success, and with increasing friction. Ms. Khaira stated that the parties were close to a separation agreement in 2017, but then “all these loans popped up”, leading Dr. Ghumman to state, according to Ms. Khaira, that she would be leaving the marriage with “the clothes on her back”.

[25] Ms. Khaira’s statement that “all these loans popped up” was part of her testimony that Dr. Ghumman raised during their settlement negotiations – for the first time, she says - that his father had loaned him money prior to, and during their marriage. This money totaled some $864,700 which, with 8-10% compound interest, had grown to the amount of $1,884,160 by the date of separation. Ms. Khaira swore that she had no previous knowledge of these alleged loans. She conceded that she knew that Dr. Ghumman’s father had routinely provided him money, and she admitted knowledge of the Matrimonial Loan, but Ms. Khaira steadfastly claimed that she had no knowledge that there was an expectation of repayment. Dr. Ghumman testified that Ms. Khaira knew about the loans.

[26] Dr. Ghumman produced to Ms. Khaira eight loan agreements that he signed with his parents including for repayment of items that she thought had been gifts: such as her engagement ring; the parties’ wedding reception; and the use of a family car. I will explain later why I find that Ms. Khaira had not previously seen these loan agreements. This was the first time that she learned that the cost of her mother-in-law’s trip to India to buy clothes and jewelry for the wedding was said to be a loan to Dr. Ghumman requiring repayment. Ms. Khaira denied that these alleged loans should have any role in the equalization of net family property.

[27] Ms. Khaira began this Application on May 7, 2019. In February 2020, Ms. Khaira abandoned the Matrimonial Home. She was in Calgary when the Covid pandemic was declared and remained there, working remotely. When Ms. Khaira attempted to remove her personal belongings from the Matrimonial Home on July 25, 2021, the Toronto Police were summoned. In May 2022 the parties, through their lawyers, agreed on terms by which Ms. Khaira would remove her personal belongings with the supervision of the Toronto Police. Ms. Khaira was able to remove some, but not all her personal belongings due to a disagreement regarding Dr. Ghumman’s last-minute requirements, including that she sign “a paper”, relinquish her keys and remove only the items that he authorized.

II. ISSUES TO BE DETERMINED

[28] As the parties had no children, their disputes were entirely economic in nature.

[29] The Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal have provided guidance on the approach to determination of economic disputes between spouses in matrimonial litigation. A court must determine the issues affecting net family property equalization before any analysis of a party’s claim for spousal support. In Greenglass v. Greenglass, 2010 ONCA 675, 99 R.F.L. (6th) 271, at para. 44, the Court of Appeal explained that the amount of the equalization payment, and its potential income-generating potential, will have an impact on the support analysis, and therefore must be calculated before any determination of spousal support.

[30] Regarding the determination of net family property equalization under the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 (“FLA”), the Supreme Court explained that the court should follow a three-stage approach. The first step is to determine the ownership interests of all assets claimed by the spouses, including any trust claims: Rawluk v. Rawluk, 1990 CanLII 152 (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 70, at p. 93, as applied in McNamee v. McNamee, 2011 ONCA 533, 106 O.R. (3d) 401, at para. 57; Korman v. Korman, 2015 ONCA 578, 126 O.R. (3d) 561, at paras. 25 and 29. Section 10(1) of the FLA authorizes a court to determine issues of title between spouses, including whether the legal title reflects beneficial ownership: Korman, at para. 25. In Rawluk, at p. 90, Justice Cory explained that the effect of ss. 4 and 5 of the FLA is to require the court to “determine individual ‘ownership piles’ and then equalize the spouses’ assets by ordering the spouse with the larger ownership pile to pay money to the spouse with the smaller pile.”

[31] The second step is to complete the equalization calculations, which in this case requires: (i) determination of the value of Dr. Ghumman’s orthodontic clinics on the date of separation; (ii) the value of property that he retained; and (iii) whether Dr. Ghumman can deduct from the value of his property the amount of $1,884,160 that he claims were loans requiring repayment to his parents. The third step is to assess, under s. 5(6) of the FLA, whether the equalization is unconscionable and thereby calls for adjustment.

[32] Mindful of this guidance regarding the proper analytical framework, I will determine the issues raised by the parties in this trial in the following order:

1. The Matrimonial Home Issues:

A. Did Ms. Khaira Establish a Beneficial Interest in the Matrimonial Home, Giving Rise to an Entitlement to Share in its Post-Separation Increase in Value?

B. Is Ms. Khaira Entitled to Occupation Rent Post-Separation?

2. The Property Valuation Issues Affecting Net Family Property (“NFP”) Equalization:

A. What Are the Values of Dr. Ghumman’s Interests in his Orthodontal Practice on the Date of Separation?

B. Should Dr. Ghumman be Allocated $50,000 in “General Household Items”?

3. The Propriety of Deductions:

A. Are The Funds Provided to Dr. Ghumman by his Parents Prior to Separation a Loan or a Gift for Equalization Purposes?

B. If the Monetary Advances Constitute Loans, are they Deductible, in Whole or in Part, for the Purpose of NFP Equalization?

4. NFP Equalization Calculation

A. What is the Computation of the NFP Equalization?

B. Did Ms. Khaira Establish an Entitlement to an Unequal Division of the NFP?

5. Spousal Support

A. Did Ms. Khaira Establish an Entitlement to Spousal Support?

B. If so, What Amount of Spousal Support was Established?

6. Recovery of Personal Belongings

[33] I will turn first to the issues pertaining to title to the Matrimonial Home.

III. MATRIMONIAL HOME ISSUES

A. The Equal Share to the Matrimonial Home on the Valuation Date

[34] The parties agreed, in my view correctly pursuant to Part I of the FLA, that Ms. Khaira is entitled to share equally in the value of the Matrimonial Home as of the valuation day. The parties agreed that the fair market value of the Matrimonial Home on the valuation day was $1,170,000. The parties agreed, further, that the amount outstanding on the Matrimonial Home Loan as at the date of separation was $717,402.63. Ms. Khaira agreed that the Mortgage Home Loan was a good and valid loan owed to Mr. and Mrs. Ghumman.

[35] The dispute between the parties focused on whether Ms. Khaira had a beneficial interest in the Matrimonial Home that entitled her to share in its post-separation increase in value.

B. Did Ms. Khaira Establish a Beneficial Interest in the Matrimonial Home?

[36] There was no dispute that the Matrimonial Home escalated in value post-separation. The parties agreed that the appraised value of the Matrimonial Home on April 1, 2022 was $1,730,000, representing a $560,000 increase in value from the date of separation to the time approaching trial, considering the parties’ agreement that the value of the Matrimonial Home on the date of separation was $1,170,000.

[37] Dr. Ghumman submitted that Ms. Khaira is not entitled to share in the post-separation increase in value of the Matrimonial Home because he, alone, holds title to the Matrimonial Home. He further submits that Ms. Khaira did not contribute to the cost of acquisition or maintenance of the Matrimonial Home. Ms. Khaira contended that she has a beneficial interest in the Matrimonial Home based on a “resulting and/or constructive trust, unjust enrichment, or quantum meruit”.

[38] Dr. Ghumman impugned Ms. Khaira’s claim for a beneficial interest in the Matrimonial Home on the ground that Ms. Khaira amended her Notice of Application to add these claims on November 29, 2021, some 30 months after starting her Application and only six months prior to trial. Dr. Ghumman thereby suggested that these claims were an afterthought or an opportunistic product of increase in real estate values. I was not persuaded that this submission was material to my determination of these claims.

[39] As I will explain, each of the legal doctrines on which Ms. Khaira bases her claim to a share in the post-separation increase in value of the Matrimonial Home requires that Ms. Khaira establish that she contributed financially to the Matrimonial Home. I will now determine whether Ms. Khaira proved that she did so and, if so, in what amount.

(a) Did Ms. Khaira Contribute Financially to the Matrimonial Home?

[40] Dr. Ghumman was the only purchaser to execute the Agreement of Purchase and Sale on August 17, 2012 for the acquisition of the Matrimonial Home (the “2012 Purchase Agreement”). The purchase price of $870,000 was payable by a $40,000 deposit with the remainder due on closing, as adjusted.

[41] To enable the purchase of the Matrimonial Home, Dr. Ghumman entered into the Matrimonial Home Loan, whereby he borrowed the amount of $700,000 from his parents, bearing interest at 6% for a five-year term, with monthly payments of a minimum of $3,000.00 and up to $4,000.00. Ms. Khaira was not a party to the Matrimonial Home Loan, which was not secured by registration against title to the Matrimonial Home at any time up to the date of separation. Ms. Khaira did not execute either the 2012 Purchase Agreement or the Matrimonial Home Loan. She was not required to consent to the Matrimonial Home Loan encumbering title to the Matrimonial Home as the Matrimonial Home Loan was not registered against title: at least not before separation: FLA, s. 21(1): “No spouse shall dispose or encumber an interest in a matrimonial home unless, (a) the other spouse joins in the instrument or consents to the transaction…”.

[42] This meant that to complete the purchase of the Matrimonial Home, Dr. Ghumman was contractually required to pay the amount of $130,000, as adjusted, on the closing date of September 26, 2012, in addition to payment of the $40,000 deposit. The parties referred to the total of these amounts - $170,000 as adjusted – as the “Down Payment”. Dr. Ghumman testified that Ms. Khaira made no contribution to the Down Payment. Ms. Khaira disagreed. She had the burden of proving that she made a monetary contribution to the Down Payment.

[43] Ms. Khaira testified that the $40,000 deposit was paid either from the parties’ joint bank account with the Royal Bank of Canada ending in ***0393 (the “Joint RBC Account”), or from Dr. Ghumman’s professional corporation, identified as Ajeet Ghumman Professional Corporation (“Ghumman Professional Corporation”). In cross-examination, Ms. Khaira was questioned on the Joint RBC Account statement for August-September 2012 and conceded that the Joint RBC Account statements do not show a withdrawal of $40,000 at or about the time that the deposit was paid. Ms. Khaira conceded that the $40,000 deposit was not paid from funds in the parties’ Joint RBC Account. On Ms. Khaira’s admission, I find that the $40,000 deposit was not contributed by the parties jointly from funds in the Joint RBC Account.

[44] Dr. Ghumman testified that the Down Payment was paid from money transferred from the account of Ghumman Professional Corporation. I am satisfied that this was established by the evidence, as I will now explain.

[45] Dr. Ghumman tendered into evidence four bank drafts, payable to Mr. Fariborz H. Jou, the real estate lawyer that he retained to act in the closing of the house purchase. These bank drafts were in amounts totaling $894,735.03: consisting of bank drafts in the amounts of $40,000, dated August 18, 2012; $150,000, dated September 22, 2012; $24,735.03, dated September 24, 2012; and $680,000, dated September 23, 2012. Dr. Ghumman testified that these funds were drawn on two sources. First, the amount of $700,000 was advanced to him by his parents further to the Matrimonial Home Loan. Second, the remainder – the Down Payment – was paid from funds drawn from the account of Ghumman Professional Corporation.

[46] Ms. Khaira did not dispute that Dr. Ghumman received funds totaling $700,000 from his parents, or that the Matrimonial Home Loan was a valid and binding loan agreement. No other conclusion was possible on the evidence. The Joint RBC Account statements show a withdrawal on September 24, 2012, of $680,000 after deposits totaling $700,000: specifically, deposits in the amount of $60,300 on August 27, 2012; and $230,000 and $409,700 on September 19, 2012. This evidence was uncontradicted by the Applicant, and I thereby find that the amounts advanced by Dr. Ghumman’s parents were applied in the purchase of the Matrimonial Home together with the funds obtained from the account of Ghumman Professional Corporation to complete the purchase transaction. On Ms. Khaira’s admission, I find that the Matrimonial Home Loan was a good and valid loan.

[47] In assessing Dr. Ghumman’s categorical evidence that Ms. Khaira did not contribute to the payment of the Down Payment, I took into consideration the testimony of Dr. Ghumman’s uncle, Mr. Bakhtawar Basra, who is also his Alberta-based Certified Public Accountant. Mr. Basra swore that Dr. Ghumman consulted with him in August 2012, at the time of his purchase of the Matrimonial Home and that, to his knowledge, Dr. Ghumman paid the Down Payment without any contribution from Ms. Khaira. In cross-examination, Mr. Basra testified that Ms. Khaira was an equal 50% shareholder along with Dr. Ghumman in Ghumman Professional Corporation (in her case as a non-voting shareholder), and offered his view that Ms. Khaira was as entitled to “money in the bank account of Ghumman Professional Corporation” as was Dr. Ghumman.

[48] The Applicant relied heavily on Mr. Basra’s statement that Ms. Khaira is a 50% non-voting shareholder in Ghumman Professional Corporation in her submission that the Down Payment was contributed jointly by Ms. Khaira and Dr. Ghumman as parties of equal beneficial interest in Ghumman Professional Corporation.

[49] I accept, on Mr. Basra’s uncontradicted evidence, that Ms. Khaira was an equal 50% shareholder in Ghumman Professional Corporation. I have purposefully used the past tense because the parties’ financial statements show that by the time of the parties’ separation in 2016, Ghumman Professional Corporation had no role in the net family property equalization. Indeed, Ghumman Professional Corporation is not even listed on the Respondent’s chart of corporations in which he held an interest on the valuation date. This allows for the inference that it no longer existed by June 1, 2016.

[50] And I accept, because it is established by the banking records, that the Down Payment was paid from the funds of Ghumman Professional Corporation, as suspected – but not known - by Ms. Khaira and as confirmed by Dr. Ghumman.

[51] I do not accept, however, that Ms. Khaira has established that by reason only of her 50% beneficial interest in Ghumman Professional Corporation as an equal shareholder that the funds advanced by Ghumman Professional Corporation to fund the Down Payment were jointly contributed by Ms. Khaira along with Dr. Ghumman. I will explain why.

[52] First, while I accept that Mr. Basra could provide admissible fact evidence of the parties’ equal shareholding in Ghumman Professional Corporation, considering that he provided accounting services for that company, Mr. Basra could not provide an opinion on which of the parties “owned” money in the bank account of Ghumman Professional Corporation. This was a question of law in regard to which Mr. Basra was not admitted to testify and not qualified to do so. I have thereby disregarded Mr. Basra’s opinion on the ownership of the funds held by Ghumman Professional Corporation.

[53] Second, Ms. Khaira had the burden of establishing that she contributed to the purchase of the Matrimonial Home, and thereby had the burden of establishing that the funds advanced by Ghumman Professional Corporation were contributed jointly by Ms. Khaira and Dr. Ghumman. The Applicant did not adduce sufficient evidence to allow for such a finding. Beyond establishing that Ms. Khaira had a beneficial interest in Ghumman Professional Corporation, the Applicant did not tender any evidence that would allow for a determination that the funds advanced by Ghumman Professional Corporation constituted a joint monetary contribution by both parties. Mr. Basra stated in re-examination that he was not able to testify to the Articles of Incorporation of Ghumman Professional Corporation or any Shareholder Agreement; whether the funds advanced by Ghumman Professional Corporation were by resolution; or whether there were any shareholder loans affecting the funds advanced. The Applicant did not tender any evidence regarding the money advanced by Ghumman Professional Corporation through any other witness, or any other evidence.

[54] Apart from her contention that she had contributed to the Down Payment, Ms. Khaira testified that she contributed to the carrying costs of the Matrimonial Home from its acquisition in September 2012 to the date of separation in 2016. Ms. Khaira testified, and Dr. Ghumman agreed, that for these four years the carrying costs of the Matrimonial Home were paid from the Joint RBC Account. The parties also agreed that Ms. Khaira’s employment income was directly deposited into the Joint RBC Account, from which household expenses were paid, including the following: bi-weekly loan payments of $1,600 to Dr. Ghumman’s parents for the Matrimonial Home Loan; property taxes; condominium fees; and utilities. And there was no disagreement that Dr. Ghumman routinely deposited funds into the Joint RBC Account to cover shortfalls.

[55] Considerable trial time was expended in Dr. Ghumman’s contention that the employment income deposited by Ms. Khaira in the Joint RBC Account was not used in payment of carrying costs of the Matrimonial Home but rather on personal expenses which, according to Dr. Ghumman, exceeded the amount of her income. To prove this point, Dr. Ghumman and his father laboriously prepared a detailed and lengthy spreadsheet that meticulously set out to account for each deposit made into the Joint RBC Account during the parties’ marriage, and to attribute withdrawals from the Joint RBC Account to each of the parties. They attempted to match financial contributions with expenditures to show that Ms. Khaira spent more than she earned.

[56] I was not persuaded by this evidence from Dr. Ghumman and his father. Their spreadsheet analysis had four fatal flaws. First, it assumed that the employment income deposited by Ms. Khaira was first allocated to her personal expenses, and only secondarily to household carrying costs. There was no evidentiary basis for this assumption. Second, the spreadsheet analysis allocated to Ms. Khaira some common household expenses that were incurred for the parties’ joint benefit. Third, there was no doubt that Dr. Ghumman deposited more money into the Joint RBC Account because he earned more income, but there was no basis to allocate Dr. Ghumman’s deposited income primarily to the carrying costs of the Matrimonial Home. Fourth, the spreadsheet was necessarily incomplete, as its objective of auditing the minutia of expenditure of spouses over four years was not exhaustive or, in my view, reliable. The parties’ lived experience of melding their income to pay joint expenses could not be unwoven by the amateur audit conducted by Dr. Ghumman and his father.

[57] I find, on Ms. Khaira’s evidence, which I have accepted, and indeed from factual entries in the Respondent’s spreadsheet analysis, that Ms. Khaira contributed to the household expenses during the marriage through deposit of her employment income to the Joint RBC Account. However, the Applicant did not show, or even make submission on any precise quantification of the amount of Ms. Kharia’s contribution to the property expenses during the marriage. On the evidence that I have accepted, I find that Ms. Khaira’s monetary contribution to the Matrimonial Home during the marriage was modest, particularly when compared to the monetary contribution by Dr. Ghumman.

[58] Last, I find, based on the Applicant’s admission, that Ms. Khaira has not contributed to the carrying costs of the Matrimonial Home since the date of separation.

(b) Analysis - The Applicant’s Equitable Relief Claim

[59] Ms. Khaira relied on the statutory presumption of proprietary resulting trust contained in s. 14 of the FLA, which provides that “[t]he rule of law applying a presumption of resulting trust shall be applied in questions of the ownership of property between spouses, as if they were not married”. There are two exceptions to this principle in s.14, but they are not material to my analysis. Ms. Khaira submitted that her contribution to the purchase of the Matrimonial Home entitles her to a proprietary interest by resulting trust. Alternatively, Ms. Kharia submitted that she has established the three-part test necessary for a claim in unjust enrichment, seeking either a proprietary interest through constructive trust or a monetary remedy.

(i) Claim in Resulting Trust

[60] The Supreme Court explained in Kerr v. Baranow, 2011 SCC 10, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 269, at para. 16, that the underlying notion of the resulting trust is to return property to the person who gave it and is entitled to it beneficially. This builds on the Supreme Court’s finding in Pecore v. Pecore, 2007 SCC 27, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 795, at para. 20, that a resulting trust arises where the property is in one party’s name, but impressed with an obligation to return the property either because the holder is a fiduciary or gave no value for the property.

[61] Justice Cromwell explained in Kerr at paras. 16-19, that resulting trusts may arise in domestic situations where one partner gratuitously transfers property to another partner or, more pertinent to this case according to Ms. Khaira, where both spouses contribute to the acquisition of real estate but title is taken only in the name of one spouse. The principle underlying resulting trust was that “contributions to the acquisition of a property, which were not reflected in the legal title, could nonetheless give rise to a property interest”: Kerr, at para. 2.

[62] The Supreme Court made clear, at paras. 24-29 and 184, that the “common intention resulting trust”, which did not require any financial contribution to the contested property, had no further role in the resolution of domestic cases. Accordingly, the first step in the resulting trust analysis is the determination of whether the party claiming the resulting trust has established that a financial contribution was made. When this burden is discharged, the onus shifts to the spouse who received the contribution to demonstrate that a gift was intended: Kerr, at para. 19; Korman, at para. 30. This analysis turns on the actual intention of the non-titled spouse: Kerr, at para. 18: “[I]n these gratuitous transfer situations, the actual intention of the grantee is the governing consideration”, quoting Pecore, at para. 44: "[t]he trial judge will commence his or her inquiry with the applicable presumption and will weigh all of the evidence in an attempt to ascertain, on a balance of probabilities, the transferor's actual intention". [Emphasis in original.] Also, Korman, at para. 27, citing Pecore, at paras. 43-44; Schwartz v. Schwartz, 2012 ONCA 239, 349 D.L.R. (4th) 326, at paras. 41-42.

[63] Ms. Khaira relied heavily on the Court of Appeal decision in Gionet v. Pingue, 2018 ONCA 1040, 22 R.F.L. (8th) 55, submitting that it is directly applicable in support of her claim for a beneficial interest in the Matrimonial Home. In that case, the trial judge found that the spouses were jointly involved in the purchase, fixing and sale of real estate. However, their matrimonial home was held in title solely by Ms. Pingue, who claimed that her former husband was not entitled to share in any post-separation appreciation in value of the matrimonial home. The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s determination that since the funds to purchase the matrimonial home came from joint sources, Mr. Gionet had an equal beneficial interest in the matrimonial home notwithstanding that he was not a titled owner.

[64] In my view, the Applicant’s claim for a resulting trust fails on my finding that Ms. Khaira did not prove that she made any financial contribution toward purchase of the Matrimonial Home at the time of its acquisition in September 2012. The Applicant’s submission that she is entitled to a resulting trust because she contributed toward the carrying costs of the Matrimonial Home for four years during the marriage fails because it is wrong in law. The relevant time for assessment of a claim for a proprietary interest through resulting trust is at the time of the property acquisition: Kerr, at para. 25: “The final doctrinal problem is that the relevant time for ascertaining intention is the time of acquisition of the property. As a result, it is hard to see how a resulting trust can arise from contributions made over time to the improvement of an existing asset, or contributions in kind over time for its maintenance.” The contributions that Ms. Khaira made during the marriage may be material to her claim in unjust enrichment, which I will turn to shortly, but not to her claim for a proprietary interest through resulting trust.

[65] Although I dismiss the Applicant’s claim for a resulting trust on my finding that Ms. Khaira did not make any contribution to the purchase of the Matrimonial Home, I will explain why I would have denied the Applicant’s claim for a proprietary interest through resulting trust even had I found that the parties jointly contributed to the Down Payment through the funds advanced from Ghumman Professional Corporation. Had the Applicant established this financial contribution, I would have found that Dr. Ghumman held the contributed funds on Ms. Khaira’s behalf on her intention that they be returned to her, but not for the purpose of conveying a proprietary interest in property. I reach this conclusion for two reasons.

[66] First, the amount of the Applicant’s contribution would have constituted only 9.77% of the purchase price. This is unlike the equal contribution found in Gionet and is too small to give rise to a proprietary interest. I will explain how I calculate the contribution at 9.77%. Ms. Khaira is not a party to the Matrimonial Home Loan, which was not registered as a mortgage against title to the Matrimonial Home at any time prior to the separation date. Ms. Khaira has never provided spousal consent to this loan encumbering the title to the Matrimonial Home. In my view, Ms. Khaira is not bound to repayment of the Matrimonial Home Loan, and it is incapable of enforcement against her. As Dr. Ghumman is, alone, responsible for repayment to his parents of the Matrimonial Home Loan, the amount of the Matrimonial Home Loan must be credited as part of Dr. Ghumman’s contribution to the purchase of the Matrimonial Home. Ms. Khaira’s financial contribution would have been no more than $85,000 (one-half of the Down Payment), representing 9.77% of the purchase price ($85,000/$870,000).

[67] Second, unlike in Gionet, the Applicant did not show that Ms. Khaira intended that the funds be held on her behalf for the purpose of taking title to property in Ontario jointly with Dr. Ghumman. The evidence established that both parties proceeded on the basis that Dr. Ghumman would purchase this property, alone, as I will now explain.

[68] The parties’ undisputed evidence is that from 2010 to 2012 they lived in a rented house in Calgary, and that after Dr. Ghumman’s purchase of the Maple Clinic in May 2012, he began travelling between Ontario and Alberta while Ms. Khaira remained in Alberta. Dr. Ghumman resided initially with his sister and brother-in-law, Mr. Prashant Ramesh, while working in Ontario. I accept the evidence of Mr. Ramesh, who I found to be a reliable and credible witness, that he dissuaded Dr. Ghumman from his search for a rental property in the GTA and urged his consideration of a condominium townhouse as a good investment opportunity. I accept Mr. Ramesh’s evidence that he was involved in persuading the father, Mr. Harbhajan Ghumman to loan funds to Dr. Ghumman to purchase the property, and that he and his wife accompanied Dr. Ghumman to the viewing of the Matrimonial Home. I accept, as well, that all these steps took place in Ms. Khaira’s absence.

[69] I accept Ms. Khaira’s evidence that she toured properties in the GTA with a real estate agent with the objective of locating a property close to her anticipated place of employment. I also accept that she assisted in the outfitting of the property after its acquisition. However, there is no dispute that Ms. Khaira had no role in arranging or committing to the Matrimonial Home Loan; did not inspect the Matrimonial Home before its purchase; and was not involved in the purchase or closing of the Matrimonial Home. I accept Dr. Ghumman’s evidence, corroborated by Mr. Ramesh, that Ms. Khaira had little involvement or interest in the acquisition of the Matrimonial Home. And it is not disputed that Ms. Khaira did not move into the Matrimonial Home, on a full-time basis, until November 2013: over a year after its purchase.

[70] For these reasons, in the unique circumstances in this case, even if I had found that Ms. Khaira had financially contributed to the purchase of the Matrimonial Home, I would not have concluded that she had an intention to jointly own the property and would not have been satisfied that a proprietary remedy was appropriate.

[71] I turn next to the determination of Ms. Khaira’s claim based in unjust enrichment.

(ii) Claim in Unjust Enrichment

[72] To establish a claim in unjust enrichment, the Applicant must prove three elements: (i) an enrichment; (ii) a corresponding deprivation; and (iii) the absence of a juristic reason for the enrichment: Peter v. Beblow, 1993 CanLII 126 (SCC), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 980, at p. 987; Kerr, at para. 32; Pettkus v. Becker, 1980 CanLII 22 (SCC), [1980] 2 SCR 834, 117 D.L.R. (3d) 257, at p. 848. The Supreme Court has instructed that a “straightforward economic approach” can be taken to the first two elements of the test for unjust enrichment: Peter, at p. 990.

[73] Ms. Khaira submitted that Dr. Ghumman was enriched during the marriage in two ways. First, by her contribution of funds to the purchase of the Matrimonial Home. Second, by her contribution to the carrying costs of the Matrimonial Home during the marriage, and her work in outfitting and repairing the property. Of these two areas of alleged enrichment, I found that Ms. Khaira made financial contributions, through her employment income, to the carrying costs of the Matrimonial Home during the marriage. In terms of quantification, Ms. Khaira’s contributions were modest, always less than the amount of Dr. Ghumman’s contributions. He earned a higher income and paid a higher percentage of the expenses. Ms. Khaira’s contributions were for only four years. I accept, as well, that Ms. Khaira contributed time and effort to the ongoing maintenance and upkeep of the Matrimonial Home but, again, in a modest and sporadic manner, considering that she resided in Calgary during the first year of home ownership.

[74] I do not accept that these contributions rise to the level of enrichment on the part of the Respondent. First, I have found that the Applicant’s contributions to the carrying costs, maintenance and upkeep of the Matrimonial Home were modest. Second, they are largely undefined and unspecified. Dr. Ghumman led voluminous, detailed evidence in support of his position that the monetary contribution by Ms. Khaira during the marriage was de minimis or non-existent, and while I did not accept the conclusion of this analysis – that Ms. Khaira spent more than she contributed - this evidence showed that Dr. Ghumman’s monetary contribution outweighed that of Ms. Khaira. And as Ms. Khaira did not lead any meaningful evidence, and certainly no accounting of the value of her monetary contribution during the marriage, her contribution is incapable of quantification on a quantum meruit basis.

[75] I adopt and apply the reasoning by Justice Monahan in Manchanda v. Thethi, 2019 ONSC 1749, aff’d 2021 ONCA 127 (Manchanda (OSCJ)). Justice Monahan found that a non-titled spouse had made significant contributions to the matrimonial home, including contributing $50,000 to repayment of the mortgage as well as ongoing home maintenance and upkeeping and dealing with tenants. However, Justice Monahan determined that the applicant failed to establish a claim for unjust enrichment, and thereby failed to prove entitlement to a constructive trust, because the parties’ joint contributions during the marriage were joint contributions that are recognized through the spouses’ entitlement to an equalization payment equal to 50% of the net value of the property on the separation date: Manchanda (OSCJ), at paras. 49 and 53. This finding was upheld by the Court of Appeal: Manchanda v. Theti, 2021 ONCA 127 (Manchanda (CA)), at para. 18: “In any case, any unfairness that might otherwise arise out of unequal contribution could adequately be addressed by the equalization of net family property.”

[76] This principle was affirmed recently by the Court of Appeal in Li v. Li, 2021 ONCA 669, 159 O.R. (3d) 216, at para. 64: “claims of unjust enrichment are rarely appropriate to address financial issues after the breakdown of a marriage and a court would, in all likelihood, find that equalization of all net family properties under the legislation would provide a full remedy to any unfairness that would otherwise arise from different contributions to family assets.”

[77] On the same analysis as set out in Manchanda (OSCJ), Manchanda (CA), and Li, I conclude that Ms. Khaira’s contributions to the carrying cost, maintenance and upkeep of the Matrimonial Home during marriage are too modest to support a claim in unjust enrichment and are, in any event, subsumed in the equalization of net property provided for by the FLA. The claim for either a monetary remedy or a proprietary remedy (constructive trust) through unjust enrichment is thereby dismissed.

[78] I would have reached the identical conclusion had the Applicant established a claim in unjust enrichment for the monetary contributions said by the Applicant to have been made in this case. In McNamee, the Court of Appeal stated that it is rare that a finding of unjust enrichment will give rise to a remedy in a matrimonial case between spouses governed by the FLA. This is because “in the vast majority of cases, any unjust enrichment that arises as the result of a marriage will be fully addressed through the operation of the equalization provisions under the [FLA]; the spouse who legally owns an asset will ordinarily share half its value with the other spouse as a result of the equalization provisions under the [FLA]:” McNamee, at para. 66.

[79] In Martin v. Sansome, 2014 ONCA 14, 118 O.R. (3d) 522, the Court of Appeal explained, at para. 66, that where “unjust enrichment as the result of a marriage has been found and it has been determined that monetary damages can suffice, the aggrieved party’s entitlement under the equalization provisions of the FLA should first be calculated.” The purpose is to determine whether the unjust enrichment arising out of the marriage is addressed through the operation of the equalization provisions set out in the FLA.

[80] Had I found that the Applicant had established unjust enrichment, I would have considered whether the appropriate remedy would be a monetary remedy for payment for services rendered on a restitutionary and quantum meruit basis or, where a monetary award would be insufficient, a proprietary interest in the Matrimonial Home through a constructive trust: Peter, at p. 988. The Supreme Court instructed that “in order for a constructive trust to be found, in a family case as in other cases, monetary compensation must be inadequate and there must be a link between the services rendered and the property in which the trust is claimed:” Peter, at p. 999. The onus is on the Applicant to establish that a monetary remedy would be insufficient: Kerr, at para. 52.

[81] Applying these principles, I would have determined that the Applicant’s monetary contributions to the household were appropriately remedied by a monetary award with the result that I would not have awarded Ms. Khaira a proprietary interest in the Matrimonial Home. I would have reached the same conclusion even if I had found that the Applicant contributed one-half of the funds transferred from Ghumman Professional Corporation constituted a joint contribution by Ms. Khaira along with Dr. Ghumman. Even if I had found that this constituted an unjust enrichment, I would have found that Ms. Khaira was entitled to a monetary remedy: not a proprietary remedy in constructive trust. I would then have concluded that Ms. Khaira’s monetary remedy was addressed through the operation of the equalization provisions in the FLA as the entire value of the Matrimonial Home – inclusive of the Down Payment – is equalized between the spouses in my calculation of the Applicant’s entitlement under the equalization provisions of the FLA.

[82] Below, I explain my calculation of the Applicant’s entitlement under the NFP equalization provisions of the FLA. I conclude that, in the circumstances of this case and on the evidence that I have accepted, the Applicant’s contributions to the carrying costs of the Matrimonial Home, and its maintenance and upkeep, are addressed through the operation of the equalization provisions and reflected in the Applicant receiving one-half of the value of the Matrimonial Home at the date of separation, which includes its increase in value during the marriage

[83] Last, I will summarize why Ms. Khaira’s admission that she did not contribute to the cost of the Matrimonial Home post-separation is fatal to her claim for a share of the post-separation increase in value on the basis of unjust enrichment. The first requirement for unjust enrichment was established, because Dr. Ghumman is enriched by the post-separation increase in value. However, as Justice McLachlin commented in Rawluk, at p. 110, this alone cannot support an unjust enrichment claim where the increase in value was caused by market conditions that existed after the date of separation and where, like here, the spouse claiming unjust enrichment made no contribution to the carrying costs, maintenance, or upkeep of the Matrimonial Home after the date of separation.

[84] Since Ms. Khaira made no contribution to the Matrimonial Home after the date of separation, either monetarily or through services, she did not sustain any detriment connected with Dr. Ghumman’s enrichment through the post-separation increase in value. Accordingly, the Applicant failed to establish any claim in unjust enrichment that would entitle her to share in the post-separation increase in value of the Matrimonial Home.

(c) Conclusions – The Applicant’s Claim for Beneficial Interest in the Matrimonial Home

[85] I conclude that the Applicant has not established the basis for a beneficial interest in the Matrimonial Home, either in resulting trust or in unjust enrichment. Ms. Khaira did not establish the basis for a claim to a proprietary interest through resulting trust. The monetary contributions that Ms. Khaira made during the marriage are encompassed in the equalization afforded by the FLA. Ms. Khaira did not establish any unjust enrichment after the date of separation as she did not contribute toward the ongoing maintenance and carrying costs of the Matrimonial Home after that date.

B. Is Ms. Khaira Entitled to Occupation Rent Post-Separation?

[86] Based on my determination that Ms. Khaira did not establish an entitlement to a proprietary interest in the Matrimonial Home, there is no basis for her claim for the Respondent to pay occupation rent, post-separation. The claim by Ms. Khaira for occupation rent is thereby dismissed.

IV. THE PROPERTY ISSUES AFFECTING NET FAMLY EQUALIZATION

[87] After determination of ownership of property issues, the value of the property at the valuation date must be determined, followed by determination of relevant deductions and exclusions: Rawluk, at pp. 92-93; McNamee, at para. 63; Hamilton v. Hamilton, 1996 CanLII 599 (ON CA), [1996] 92 O.A.C. 103 (C.A.), at paras. 25-26.

[88] The parties agreed on most of the property values relevant to the equalization of net family property at the valuation date, including the value of the Matrimonial Home ($1,170,000). The property values that remained in dispute were:

(a) The value of Dr. Ghumman’s “Business Interests”, being the values of his interests in his Orthodontal Practice on the date of separation.

(b) Whether Dr. Ghumman should be attributed $50,000 in “General Household Items” in place of Ms. Khaira being able to remove personal belongings and household goods in which she claimed an interest.

[89] The parties agreed on all the relevant deductions and exclusions except whether the funds that Dr. Ghumman received from his parents totaling $864,700, as increased with compound interest to the date of separation to $1,884,160, were loans, and thereby could be deducted as debts for purposes of net family property equalization.

[90] I turn first to the property valuation issues and will then analyse whether Dr. Ghumman has established that the funds advanced by his parents are loans, and thereby deductible.

A. What Are the Values of Dr. Ghumman’s Interests in his Orthodontal Practice on the Date of Separation?

[91] On the date of separation, Dr. Ghumman held the following business interests, related to his orthodontal practice:

(a) 100% ownership in Ghumman Dentistry Professional Corporation. This was Dr. Ghumman’s holding company (the “Ghumman Holding Company”).

(b) 50% ownership in Ghumman Dhingra Dentistry Professional Corporation. This is the corporation by which Dr. Ghumman and Dr. Dhingra jointly purchased, in May 2012, the practice of Dr. Bohak Mehdi, who had been operating the Maple Clinic for some ten years in Maple, Ontario. I will refer to this corporation as the “Maple Corporation”.

(c) 50% ownership in Dhingra Ghumman Dentistry Professional Corporation. This is the corporation by which Dr. Ghumman and Dr. Dhingra jointly established, on August 22, 2023, an orthodontic practice in Brampton, Ontario, which began operations in July 2014, as the Brampton Clinic. I will refer to this corporation as the “Brampton Corporation”.

[92] The parties agreed that Dr. Ghumman’s interest in Ghumman Holding Company was $305,000 on the date of separation less disposition costs (tax liability) of $44,000 for a net value of $261,000. The parties agreed that both these values would be entered into Dr. Ghumman’s side of the NFP equalization statement. Additionally, I accept Mr. Miles’ evidence that there are two shareholder loans from the Ghumman Holding Company balance sheet, in the amount of $237.00 and $7,558.18, that must be attributed to Dr. Ghumman as “Business Interests” for purposes of NFP equalization.

[93] This left for determination the values of Dr. Ghumman’s interest in the Maple Corporation and the Brampton Corporation on the date of separation. Each party tendered expert opinion evidence on the valuation of these business interests.

(a) The Expert Business Valuation Opinion Evidence

[94] The Applicant tendered Mr. Darren Miles, who obtained a university degree in administrative and commercial studies in 1995, and has been a member of the Canadian Institute of Chartered Business Valuators (“CICBV”) since 2007. Mr. Miles’ practice experience includes the conduct of over 100 mandates for valuation of dental practices, and 34 evaluations of orthodontic practices.

[95] The Respondent tendered Mr. Matthew Krofchick, whose professional qualifications are similar to Mr. Miles. Mr. Krofchick obtained a university degree in administrative and commercial studies in 2005, and has been a member of the CICBV since 2010. Mr. Krofchick’s practice experience involves business valuations and income valuations.

[96] The Respondent did not challenge the admissibility of expert opinion evidence by Mr. Miles, and the Applicant did not challenge the admissibility of Mr. Krofchick’s opinion evidence. They agreed on the experts’ permissible scope of testimony. I nonetheless assessed the admissibility of opinion evidence by them in accordance with the two-stage test set out by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Abbey, 2017 ONCA 640, 140 O.R. (3d) 40, applied in Imeson v. Maryvale (Maryvale Adolescent and Family Services), 2018 ONCA 888, 143 O.R. (3d) 241, which drew on the test set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v. Mohan, 1994 CanLII 80 (SCC), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9, and White Burgess Langille Inman v. Abbott and Haliburton Co., 2015 SCC 23, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 182. I was satisfied that Mr. Miles and Mr. Krofchick’s expert opinion evidence satisfied the criteria for threshold admissibility.

[97] Mr. Miles and Mr. Krofchick were both admitted to provide opinion evidence as expert business valuators, within the permissible scope of provision of “opinions on the valuation of the Maple Corporation and the Brampton Corporation”. In addition, Mr. Krofchick was admitted to provide expert opinion evidence on the valuation of Dr. Ghumman’s income, which I will return to later when considering Ms. Khaira’s claim for spousal support.

[98] Mr. Miles provided the opinion that the Maple Corporation had an enterprise value on the valuation day of $2,150,000. After deduction of net financial liabilities and net working capital deficit, Mr. Miles found that the equity value of Maple Corporation was $1,160,000. Dr. Ghumman’s 50% interest in the Maple Corporation was 50% of this amount, or $580,000.

[99] Mr. Krofchick provided the opinion that the Maple Corporation had an enterprise value of between $827,913 and $984,123 on the valuation date. After deducting interest bearing debt of $969,833 and a “one-time investment in capital expenditure of $163,000”, Mr. Krofchick concluded that the fair market value of Dr. Ghumman’s shares in the Maple Corporation was “nil”.

[100] In regard to the Brampton Corporation, Mr. Miles provided the opinion that the Brampton Corporation had an enterprise value on the valuation day of $1,130,000. After deduction of net redundant liabilities and net financial liabilities, Mr. Miles found that the equity value of the Brampton Corporation was $188,469. Dr. Ghumman’s 50% interest in the Brampton Corporation was 50% of this amount, or $95,000 (rounded).

[101] Mr. Krofchick provided the opinion that the Brampton Corporation had an enterprise value of between $281,360 and $360,950 on the valuation date. After deducting debt of $814,679, Mr. Krofchick concluded that the fair market value of Dr. Ghumman’s shares in the Brampton Corporation was “nil”.

(b) Analysis – Business Valuation

[102] The experts explained that Ghumman Holding Company was the corporation used by Dr. Ghumman to receive practice fees from the Maple Corporation and Brampton Corporation. As they agreed on its value on the date of separation, the experts set out to value the Maple Corporation and Brampton Corporation using unaudited financial statements, income tax returns and available financial information. On the date of separation, the Maple Corporation had been increasing in revenue since its acquisition by Dr. Ghumman and Dr. Dhingra from Dr. Mehdi in May 2012 for $1,230,000, and the Brampton Corporation had similarly been growing since it began operations in July 2014.

[103] The difference in valuation opinions by Mr. Miles and Mr. Krofchick on the Brampton Corporation was not the product of a different valuation methodology. Both experts valued the Brampton Corporation using the “discounted cash flow analysis”. This involved estimating future net discretionary cash flow on a year-by-year basis and discounting the cash flow estimates to their present value using an appropriate rate of return.

[104] Regarding the Maple Corporation, Mr. Miles again used the discounted cash flow analysis whereas Mr. Krofchick used the “capitalization of cash flow approach”, which involved multiplying the after-tax, normalized cash flow from operations by a capitalization rate. Mr. Krofchick stated that this was the more appropriate valuation method for a mature business with less potential for future growth. Mr. Miles stated that the discounted cash flow method is the standard for valuation when the revenue trend shows a progression for potential future growth. I prefer, on the evidence in this case, Mr. Miles’ use of the discounted cash flow analysis for valuation of both corporations but, as I will explain, this did not account for the difference in valuation opinion between the experts.

[105] The difference in the experts’ valuation conclusions was not caused by different methodology, or difference in analysis of the historic data relied on, or any meaningful difference in the assessment and deduction of the corporate debt. There was no contest that the Maple Clinic had a bank loan of $833,333 and bank indebtedness of $136,500 as of May 31, 2016, and that the Brampton Clinic had a bank loan of $703,125 and bank indebtedness of $111,554 as of May 31, 2016. There were minimal differences between the experts in the numerous economic and company-specific risk factors that went into their determination of “weighted average cost of capital” (the weighted average of the after-tax costs of different sources of capital).

[106] Put simply, both experts agreed that, on the valuation date, both the Maple Corporation and the Brampton Corporation were “going-concern”, profitable businesses that had value, which the experts referred to as “enterprise value”: the company’s total value. No other conclusion was possible considering that both clinics were functioning, growing orthodontic practices at that time. Gross billings at the Maple Clinic had increased 14.6% from 2014 to 2015, and a further 5.1% in 2016. Gross billings at the Brampton Clinic had increased 137.8% from 2015 to 2016.

[107] The contest between the experts was their difference in valuation of the enterprise value of the corporations. Once the enterprise value was determined, there was little difference in the deductions for debt, and then just a simple arithmetic computation to determine equity value shared equally by Dr. Ghumman with Dr. Dhingra as equal owners of 50% interest of both companies.

[108] Mr. Krofchick helpfully explained that there was a single, determinative factor that accounted for the difference between his opinion and that stated by Mr. Miles of the enterprise value of the Maple Corporation and the Brampton Corporation: the cost attributed to associate fees. The associate fees constituted the remuneration paid to the dental practitioners whose service was required to staff the practices. Mr. Krofchick used, in his valuation, higher costs for associate fees than the cost attributed by Mr. Miles for associate fees. The higher the cost of associate fees, the lower the discretionary cash flow and the result is a lower enterprise value of the corporation. While there were other, modest differences in valuation, the debate on the value to be attributed to associate fees was the fulcrum on which the disagreement between the experts on valuation would be determined.

[109] Mr. Krofchick stated that the associate fees in the Brampton Clinic do not include any amounts paid to Dr. Ghumman and Dr. Dhingra for 2016. Mr. Krofchick thereby based future associate fees on those paid in the Maple Clinic, which accounted for approximately 37.4% of revenues. Mr. Krofchick also replaced the amounts the Maple Clinic paid to Dr. Dhingra and Dr. Ghumman with a market wage for their services which was based on amounts that Dr. Ghumman had previously charged a third party for his services ($1,250 per day). This caused Mr. Krofchick to reach a total estimate of future associate fees of 38.8% of expected revenues. Mr. Krofchick did a similar adjustment in the associate fees charged to the Maple Clinic, by deducting a market wage at the rate of $1,250 per day, based, again, on the amount that Dr. Ghumman previously charged a third party for his services.

[110] Conversely, Mr. Miles set the associate fees at 20% of the value of the collections for both the Maple Clinic and the Brampton Clinic. He did so based on: (i) his experience in orthodontic practice transactions whereby the assumed rate of compensation to the orthodontic provider used by the large corporate buyer groups is set at 20% of collections; (ii) his understanding that this level of compensation is used as the metric to compensate an associate when they enter into an associate agreement with the buyer of a dental practice to provide services post-transaction.

[111] On the issue of associate compensation, and on the resultant business valuation conclusions, I prefer the expert opinion evidence of Mr. Miles over the opinion evidence of Mr. Krofchick. I will explain why.

[112] First, Mr. Miles’ approach to associate fees connects associate fees as a percentage of the revenues (20%). Mr. Krofchick’s approach to associate fees presumes and applies a per diem cost, unconnected to the associate’s revenue generation. Mr. Krofchick derived “expected future associate fees” by replacing actual amounts paid by the Maple Corporation and the Brampton Corporation to Dr. Dhingra and Dr. Ghumman with a market wage that was based, in part, on what Dr. Ghumman stated that he had previously billed a third party for his services before starting his own practice. I find that the assumption made by Mr. Krofchick in formulating associate fees was not established in the evidence at trial. Mr. Krofchick’s approach thereby had the potential to overstate the cost of associate fees, with resultant impact on the reliability of the valuation because it is not based on proven production of associate revenue.

[113] Second, Mr. Krofchick’s use of a per diem associate fee presumed 250 days per year of associate production in clinical orthodontic days. This assumption was not reasonable considering the evidence of the experience in the Maple Clinic and the Brampton Clinic. For example, Mr. Krofchick’s use of a per diem of $1,250 per day over a total of 250 workdays produced a higher associate compensation than Dr. Ghumman earned in any year under analysis except one. The 20% value for associate fees used by Mr. Miles removed the variability of number of clinical days and fluctuating revenues and allowed for a more stable and predictable allocation of compensation as a component of the revenues.

[114] Third, Mr. Krofchick’s per diem associate fee relied heavily on evidence provided to him by Dr. Ghumman regarding associate compensation. I do not give weight to this evidence as I find it unreliable when considered with the totality of the evidence provided by Dr. Ghumman regarding the operation of the businesses. I will have more to say later about the reliability and credibility of Dr. Ghumman’s evidence but raise one example at this time that is pertinent to the issue of valuation. Mr. Krofchick admitted that he relied on Dr. Ghumman’s statement that, on the date of separation, the Maple Clinic required capital investments in new dental chairs, x-ray units, computers and printers, a vacuum and compressor, furniture, and leasehold improvements in the amount of $169,358. Once applied by Mr. Krofchick, this expense had a role in reducing Mr. Krofchick’s valuation of the equity in the Maple Clinic to zero. However, the trial evidence showed that Dr. Ghumman did not make these capital investment improvements in the Maple Clinic in 2016, or at all, and that the failure to do so did not impact the operation of the Maple Clinic. I thereby attributed less weight to any of Dr. Ghumman’s evidence regarding issues affecting business valuation, including associate fees. Conversely, Mr. Miles analysis was not based on assumptions drawn from evidence provided by Dr. Ghumman.

[115] Fourth, I do not accept Dr. Ghumman’s submission that Mr. Miles made an error in calculation of the terminal value of both the Maple Corporation and the Brampton Corporation. Mr. Miles showed that his use of the five-year discount rate was in accordance with the prevailing principle that the present value should be determined using a present value figure that is the same as the last year of the forecast period.

[116] Fifth, Mr. Miles’ opinions regarding business valuation of the Maple Corporation are more consistent with the lived experience of Dr. Ghumman and Dr. Dhingra in their May 2012 acquisition and operation of the Maple Clinic. Dr. Ghumman and Dr. Dhingra acquired the Maple Clinic for a purchase price of $1,230,000. The Maple Clinic was at that time generating $1,324,000 in revenue. Four years later, on the valuation date, the Maple Clinic generated revenues of $2,050,935 following years of steady growth but Mr. Krofchick provided the opinion that it had decreased in enterprise value to between $827,913 and $984,123 and had “nil” fair market value. Mr. Krofchick did not provide sufficient explanation why the value of the Maple Corporation would plummet from $1,230,000 to zero after four years of growth, renovations to the practice and the addition of orthodontia. Mr. Miles’ equity value of $1,160,000, based on an enterprise value of $2,150,000 was, in my view, a more reliable valuation.

[117] Although these reasons were sufficient for my acceptance of Mr. Miles’ valuation over the valuation provided by Mr. Krofchick, Ms. Khaira urged that I take into consideration another ground. Some two years after the valuation date, by Share Purchase Agreement dated July 24, 2018, Dr. Ghumman purchased Dr. Dhingra’s 50% interest in the Maple Corporation for $1,077,742 and purchased Dr. Dhingra’s 50% interest in the Brampton Corporation for $463,147 (the “2018 Transaction”). Ms. Khaira submitted that Dr. Ghumman’s decision to purchase Dr. Dinghra’s 50% interest in the Brampton Corporation and the Maple Corporation for equity values totaling $1,540,889 – the same 50% interest valued by Mr. Miles and Mr. Krofchick - support the reasonableness of the assumptions used by Mr. Miles in his business valuation that produced an equity value of $675,000 for both corporations and cast doubt on the reasonableness of the assumptions used by Mr. Krofchick that led to his opinion that these corporations had “zero” equity on the valuation date.

[118] The Respondent objected to the use of the evidence of the 2018 Transaction on the basis that it is “hindsight evidence” and thereby inadmissible in accordance with the principles set out in Debora v. Debora (2006), 2006 CanLII 40663 (ON CA), 83 O.R. (3d) 81 (C.A.). The Applicant conceded that, in accordance with Debora, the evidence of the 2018 Transaction was inadmissible to establish value of the corporations on the valuation date but submitted that it is admissible to test the assumptions used by the business valuators, in accordance with the exception set out in Debora at para. 46: “An exception to this principle is that hindsight, or the actual results achieved after the valuation date, may be compared against the projected or forecasted corporate results made by the valuators and used to test the reasonableness of the assumptions made by those valuators.” The Court of Appeal continued, at para. 51, that: “[H]indsight information is not admissible on the question of whether that assumption was correct but … it can be used to test whether that assumption was reasonable.”

[119] In Debora, at para. 47, the Court of Appeal referred to the statement in Woeller v. Woeller, 1988 CanLII 8616 (ON SC), [1988] O.J. No. 728, 15 R.F.L. (3d) 120, at para. 31 (Dist. Ct.), that although evaluating the fair market of a business through hindsight evidence is inappropriate, “one cannot entirely ignore events which followed [the valuation date] in assessing the fundamental assumptions underpinning the opinions expressed by [the experts].” Dr. Ghumman submitted that I should accept that his 50% interest in the Maple Corporation and the Brampton Corporation had zero value on the valuation date, June 1, 2016, and ignore that he paid Dr. Dinghra $1,540,889 for the same 50% interest some two years later, on July 24, 2018. I do not accept that I should entirely ignore this evidence.

[120] I accept that the valuation agreed to by Dr. Ghumman with Dr. Dhingra in the 2018 Transaction is inadmissible to my determination of the value of the Brampton Corporation and the Maple Corporation on the valuation date. The valuation of these corporations must be based on the knowledge available at the valuation date. However, the evidence of the 2018 Transaction is admissible to test the reasonableness of the assumptions made by Mr. Miles and Mr. Krofchick. Considered solely for this purpose, the 2018 Transaction supports my finding that the assumptions relied on by Mr. Krofchick in his valuation analysis were not reasonable, and thereby further supports my acceptance of Mr. Miles’ valuation opinions over those of Mr. Krofchick.

(c) Disposition Costs of the Business Interests

[121] In their submissions, and through their NFP statements, each party invited me to consider the question of disposition costs on the Maple Corporation and the Brampton Corporation. Disposition costs reflect the cost of monetizing Dr. Ghumman’s business interest in the companies comprising his orthodontic practice, and include legal, accounting and broker fees that would be incurred in any transaction disposing of the business interests.

[122] The consideration of disposition costs is, in my view, consistent with the finding in Sengmueller v. Sengmueller (1994), 1994 CanLII 8711 (ON CA), 17 O.R. (3d) 208 (C.A.) at para. 33 that, disposition costs would be deducted, before arriving at any equalization payment, “except in the situation where ‘it is not clear when, if ever’ there will be a realization of the property.” Here, Ms. Khaira testified, and I find, that Dr. Ghumman’s plan is to develop and then sell his orthodontic clinics. Also, Mr. Ghumman testified that his son intends to sell his orthodontic clinics to pay the loans that Mr. and Mrs. Ghumman stated are owing to them. And the parties agreed to apply disposition costs ($44,000) to the business interest valuation of Dr. Ghumman’s ownership of Ghumman Holding Company. On these reasons, I am satisfied that it is fair that the costs of disposition be shared equally in the NFP calculations.

[123] Mr. Miles testified that there would be disposition costs associated with the sale of the Maple Corporation and the Brampton Corporation, and that these costs would be an expense that could be deducted against the equity value of these companies. Mr. Miles explained that, in his experience, the disposition cost of the sale of a business interest would be 2.5% of the enterprise value of the corporation, which in this case would be $53,750 in disposition costs for the Maple Corporation ($2,150,000 x 2.5% = $53,750) and $28,250 for the Brampton Corporation ($1,130,000 x. 2.5% = $28,250).

[124] Mr. Krofchick did not provide an opinion regarding the disposition costs of the Maple Corporation and the Brampton Corporation because he attributed to them no value. Mr. Krofchick provided a thorough explanation of the basis for computation of the $44,000 in disposition costs attributed to the business interest value of Ghumman Holding Company, including to account for tax liability, to which Mr. Miles agreed. The Respondent submitted, in argument, that if Mr. Miles’ opinions are accepted, and the companies comprising the orthodontic practice have value, then a disposition cost of 14% of the business value should be applied to each corporation. The disposition rate of 14% was derived from the rate of disposition shown in relation to the Ghumman Holding Company: $44,000 (disposition cost) / $305,000 (business interest value) = 14%. This would result in disposition costs of $81,200 in relation to the Maple Corporation ($580,000 x 14% = $81,200) and disposition costs of $13,300 in relation to the Brampton Corporation ($95,000 x 14% = $13,300).

[125] I did not see a dispute between the business valuation experts that disposition costs would be incurred in monetizing Dr. Ghumman’s business interests. Their dispute was in quantifying the amount of the disposition costs. I accept Mr. Miles’ evidence in relation to the calculation of the disposition costs of the Maple Corporation and the Brampton Corporation because the model presented of 2.5% of enterprise value was not challenged or contradicted by Mr. Krofchick. I reject the Respondent’s submission that disposition costs should be extrapolated from the accepted evidence in regard to the Ghumman Holding Company because this approach was not supported by expert testimony and was not shown to be transferable or adaptable from the computation of the disposition costs in relation to the Ghumman Holding Company.

(d) Conclusions – Business Valuation of the Orthodontic Practice

[126] On the basis of these reasons, I conclude that the business values of the corporations comprising Dr. Ghumman’s orthodontic practice are as follows, for the purposes of NFP equalization:

(a) On the parties’ agreement, Dr. Ghumman’s business interest in Ghumman Holding Company was $305,000 on the date of separation, and the disposition cost was $44,000.

(b) Dr. Ghumman had amounts owed to him from the Ghumman Holding Company balance sheet that must be attributed as “Business Interests” for purposes of NFP equalization: shareholder loans in the amount of $237.00 and $7,558.18.

(c) Dr. Ghumman’s business interest in the Maple Corporation was $580,000 on the date of separation and the disposition cost was $53,750.

(d) Dr. Ghumman’s business interest in the Brampton Corporation was $95,000 on the date of separation, and the disposition cost was $28,250.

B. Should Dr. Ghumman be Allocated $50,000 in “General Household Items”

[127] The Applicant claimed that Dr. Ghumman has prevented her from retrieving her personal belongings from the Matrimonial Home. The Applicant produced a list of household contents that set out furniture, small appliances, linens, cookware, and electronic equipment that, according to Ms. Khaira, totaled $89,507 in cost of acquisition. The Applicant did not tender into evidence any invoices or receipts supporting these values.

[128] The Applicant “suggested’ that the current-day discounted value of these used items is $50,000. The Applicant did not tender any evidence in support of this position. There was not a single estimate of value of any of the items on Ms. Khaira’s list.

[129] The Applicant submitted that as it is unlikely that Dr. Ghumman will cooperate in her retrieval of personal belongings, the amount of $50,000.00 should be added to Dr. Ghumman’s list of “General Household Items” for the purposes of NFP Equalization. I do not accept this submission, for two reasons. First, the Applicant has not proven the value of the general household items that Dr. Ghumman has improperly kept from her. The list tendered into evidence by the Applicant contains no supporting evidence of either the purchase price of the items or their current-day values. Second, I will order that Dr. Ghumman provide Ms. Khaira with the opportunity to identify and remove her personal belongings from the Matrimonial Home.

[130] I turn next to Dr. Ghumman’s claim that the amounts that were provided to him by his parents from 2002 to 2014 were loans.

C. Are The Funds Provided to Dr. Ghumman by his Parents Prior to Separation a Loan or a Gift for Equalization Purposes?

[131] Dr. Ghumman submitted that he should be allowed to deduct from his net family property debts that he claimed were owed to his parents on the valuation date. Section 4(1) of the FLA defines “net family property” as the value of all property, except that described in s. 4(2) of the FLA, that the spouse owned on the valuation date, after deducting, among other things, “the spouse’s debts and other liabilities”.

(a) The Alleged Loans

[132] Dr. Ghumman testified that from July 29, 2002 to the date of marriage, May 19, 2007, his parents, Mr. Harbhajan Ghumman and Mrs. Amarjeet Ghumman, provided him with money totaling $336,000. Dr. Ghumman stated that they advanced further amounts totaling $528,700 after the date of marriage to the date of separation, June 1, 2016, for a total of $864,700. Dr. Ghumman swore that all these amounts were advanced as loans, required to be repaid to his parents with interest, mostly at 10% but in some instances at 8%, compounded monthly.

[133] Dr. Ghumman’s testimony that these funds were intended as loans was corroborated by his father, Mr. Harbhajan Ghumman. Mr. Ghumman is a former engineer who testified that he and his wife, Mrs. Amarjeet Ghumman, financially supported the Respondent and his only sibling, Ms. Kirandeep Kaur Ramesh, with their first university degree, but nothing more. He testified that all other money provided to their children was as loans, with some exceptions, such as engagement or marriage, where they would provide, as their gift, a discount of the amount loaned.

[134] Mr. Ghumman explained that he and his wife began to loan money to their son on July 29, 2002 to assist with his expenses while studying at Howard University. The provision of money to Dr. Ghumman from his parents continued to the date of separation and, in fact, thereafter. In total, eight loan agreements were implemented to document his son’s loan obligations to the date of separation. Mr. Ghumman drafted each loan agreement, initially with the input of his brother-in-law, Mr. Basra, an accountant. Mr. Ghumman calculated the conversion of the loan amounts into Canadian currency when U.S. currency had been advanced, and calculated compound interest.

[135] I will now explain the amounts that Dr. Ghumman and his father swore were advanced further to the loan agreements.

(i) The May 2006 Loan Agreement

[136] Mr. Ghumman and his wife advanced $27,305.75 (USD)[1] to Dr. Ghumman in 2002 to assist with his study at Howard University. They advanced a further $32,596.50 (USD) in 2003; $19,980 (USD) in 2004; $29,000 (USD) in 2005; and $26,100 (USD) in 2006. Dr. Ghumman testified that these were loans to support his study at Howard University during the period from 2002-2006. Mr. Ghumman converted these funds, totaling $134,982.25 (USD) into Canadian currency of $185,000.

[137] Mr. Ghumman testified that, in the four-year period from 2002 to 2006, he provided his son with a further $151,000, itemized as follows:

(a) The estimated amount of $15,000 to reduce credit card debt, and the estimated amount of $10,000 for uncharacterized expenses.

(b) The cost of a 2006 Honda vehicle, in the amount of $36,000.

(c) The amount of $80,000 to be used for investment through Dr. Ghumman’s trading account.

(d) The amount of $10,000 to fund expenses in relation to Dr. Ghumman’s engagement to Ms. Khaira.

[138] No loan agreement was implemented between Dr. Ghumman and his parents from July 29, 2002 until May 17, 2006: after Dr. Ghumman and Ms. Khaira were engaged in December 2005. Dr. Ghumman testified, corroborated by Mr. Ghumman, that he executed a loan agreement with his parents on May 17, 2006, during convocation week upon his graduation from Howard University (the “May 2006 Loan Agreement”). This agreement confirmed that he borrowed $336,000 and that he promised to begin repayment “around July 2007”, with interest at 10% per year, compounded monthly. At the date of marriage, the amount owing under the May 2006 Loan Agreement had increased, through compound interest, to $371,184.

(ii) The May 2007 Loan Agreement

[139] On May 17, 2007, two days before his marriage to Ms. Khaira on May 19, 2007, Dr. Ghumman executed a loan agreement by which he confirmed that he owed his parents $60,000 as the estimated amount for anticipated wedding expenses, and promised to begin repayment “around August 2011”, with interest at 10% per year, compounded monthly (the “May 2007 Loan Agreement”).

(iii) The December 2007 Loan Agreement

[140] Dr. Ghumman testified, and Mr. Ghumman corroborated, that from June 20, 2007 to December 28, 2007, he received from his parents five bank drafts totaling $52,346.00 (USD) which his father converted to $57,600. Dr. Ghumman stated that these funds were needed for his educational and living expenses in his program in orthodontics at University in New Jersey. He testified that his father also funded his automobile insurance premium in the estimated amount of $2,000.

[141] Mr. Ghumman testified that after the wedding, he prepared a detailed spreadsheet in which he meticulously accounted for the expenses that he funded for the wedding in painstaking detail, including trips to India; cash gifts to family members; the wedding invitations; and the parties’ honeymoon vacation. Mr. Ghumman testified that these expenses totaled $57,859 which he and his wife discounted to $52,000 to provide their son and daughter-in-law with a wedding gift of $5,859.

[142] The amounts set out in the May 2006 Loan Agreement ($336,000) and the May 2007 Loan Agreement ($60,000) were thereby consolidated in a loan agreement dated December 14, 2007, wherein Dr. Ghumman confirmed that he had borrowed from his parents the amount of $448,000, that he promised to begin repaying “around July 2011” with interest at 10% per year, compounded monthly (the “December 2007 Loan Agreement”).

(iv) The March 2009 Loan Agreement

[143] Dr. Ghumman testified, and Mr. Ghumman corroborated, that from January 30, 2008 to October 17, 2008, he received from his parents 10 bank drafts totaling $84,490 (USD) which his father converted to $92,100. Dr. Ghumman stated that these funds were needed for his educational and living expenses in his program in orthodontics at university in New Jersey. He testified that his father also funded his automobile insurance premium in the estimated amount of $2,000, and provided him with $40,000 to add to the $80,000 provided earlier for investment in his trading account. These additional amounts advanced totaled $134,100, which Mr. Ghumman rounded to $134,000.00.

[144] These further amounts totaling $134,000 were added to the $448,000 set out in the December 2007 Loan Agreement and consolidated in a loan agreement dated March 20, 2009, wherein Dr. Ghumman confirmed that he had borrowed from his parents the amount of $582,000.00, that he promised to begin repaying “around July 2011” with interest at 10% per year, compounded monthly (the “March 2009 Loan Agreement”).

(v) The November 2009 Loan Agreement

[145] Dr. Ghumman testified, and Mr. Ghumman corroborated, that from December 31, 2008 to November 14, 2009, he received from his parents 11 bank drafts totaling $93,861.00 (USD) which his father converted to $109,817.00. Dr. Ghumman stated that these funds were needed for his educational and living expenses in his program in orthodontics at university in New Jersey. He testified that his parents also funded his automobile insurance premium in the estimated amount of $1,500.00. These additional amounts totaled $111,317.00 which Mr. Ghumman rounded to $111,000.00.

[146] These further amounts totaling $111,000.00 were then added to the $582,000.00 set out in the March 2009 Loan Agreement and consolidated in a loan agreement dated November 20, 2009, wherein Dr. Ghumman confirmed that he had borrowed from his parents the amount of $693,000.00, that he promised to begin repaying “on or before July, 2011” with interest at 10% per year, compounded monthly (the “November 2009 Loan Agreement”).

(vi) The August 2010 Loan Agreement

[147] Dr. Ghumman testified, and Mr. Ghumman corroborated, that from December 29, 2009 to May 7, 2010, he received from his parents five bank drafts totaling $47,951 (USD) which his father converted to $50,800.00. Dr. Ghumman stated that these funds were needed for his educational and living expenses in his program in orthodontics at university in New Jersey. He testified that his father also funded his automobile insurance premium in the estimated amount of $1,500.00. These additional amounts totaled $52,300.00.

[148] These further amounts totaling $52,300.00 were then added to the $693,000.00 set out in the November 2009 Loan Agreement and consolidated in a loan agreement dated August 7, 2010, wherein Dr. Ghumman confirmed that he had borrowed from his parents the amount of $745,300.00, which he promised to “pay back with an interest at 10%/yr. (compounded monthly) by July 2020” (the “August 2010 Loan Agreement”).

(vii) The December 2012 Car Loan Agreement

[149] The parties testified that when they returned to Calgary from New Jersey in 2010, they began to rent a home from Ms. Khaira’s brother, at a favourable rent. They had the 2006 Honda vehicle purchased in 2006 (with funds listed in the May 2006 Loan Agreement) but needed a second vehicle. The parties agreed that Mr. and Mrs. Ghumman provided them with the use of one of their vehicles: an Audi, or a Pontiac Torrent.

[150] Mr. Ghumman testified that he charged his son a lease amount for use of their vehicle, at $400.00 per month, for a total of 30 months from June 2010 to December 2012 for a total of $12,000.00. Mr. Ghumman stated that he provided a $500 discount to his son and treated the $11,500.00 as a loan for the lease of a vehicle.

[151] When Dr. Ghumman began to work in Ontario in the period after February 2012, he required a vehicle. Mr. Ghumman testified that he and his wife loaned his son the amount of $64,200.00 to purchase a 2012 BMW. He testified that they also loaned their son $4,000.00 to pay for car insurance. The amounts for use of a vehicle ($11,500.00), purchase of a vehicle ($64,200.00) and car insurance ($4,000.00) totaled $79,700.00.

[152] By a loan agreement dated December 22, 2012, Dr. Ghumman confirmed that he had borrowed from his parents the amount of $79,700, which he promised “to pay back with interest at 8%/yr. (compounding monthly) before Dec. 2020” (the “December 2012 Car Loan Agreement”).

(viii) The October 2014 Loan Agreement

[153] Mr. Ghumman testified that in October 2014, his son told him that he would need more money for use in the event of an emergency. Mr. Ghumman stated that he agreed to provide his son with “emergency funds” in the amount of $100,000.

[154] By a loan agreement dated October 31, 2014, Dr. Ghumman confirmed that he had borrowed from his parents the amount of $100,000.00, which he promised “to start paying back with an interest at 8%/yr. (compounding monthly) before Dec. 2020” (the “October 2014 Loan Agreement”).

(ix) The Consolidation of the Alleged Loans

[155] To summarize, Dr. Ghumman swore that he had three categories of loans to his parents at the date of separation, as follows:

(a) The personal loans, wherein the funds were used for education and living expenses, wedding costs and investments funds. These personal loans had various repayment dates, none of which was met, but were eventually consolidated, or “rolled into” the August 2010 Loan Agreement, in the principal amount of $745,300.

(b) The car loan, for the purchase of a 2012 BMW and the rental of the parents’ car, represented by the December 2012 Car Loan Agreement in the principal amount of $79,700.

(c) The “emergency funds” loan in the principal amount of $100,000, as documented by the October 2014 Loan Agreement.

[156] None of these alleged loans were repaid on their due dates. I will later explain my finding that Dr. Ghumman did not make any payment on any of the loans until October 28, 2021, more than 19 years after the first advance, on the eve of an earlier trial date in this action.

[157] Dr. Ghumman and his father testified that on December 28, 2018 (some 2.5 years post-separation), they entered into a Consolidated Loan Agreement that purported to consolidate the amounts owed under the August 2010 Loan Agreement, the December 2012 Car Loan Agreement, and the October 2014 Loan Agreement (the “2018 Consolidated Loan Agreement”). Mr. Ghumman calculated that with compound interest, the aggregate amount owed by his son on December 28, 2018 was $2,422,840. Dr. Ghumman promised to repay this amount, with interest at a rate of 6%/yr. (compounded monthly), “by the end of year 2023”.

[158] Dr. Ghumman swore that since executing the 2018 Consolidated Loan Agreement, he has repaid $20,000 through equal monthly payments of $2,500 beginning in October 2021 and continuing to May 2022. Mr. Ghumman testified that as of the date of trial, Dr. Ghumman is indebted to his parents under the Consolidated Loan Agreement in the amount of $2,779,584.

(e) The Limitation Issue

[159] I will briefly address the Applicant’s submission that the limitation period for collection of certain of the loan agreements have expired, with the result that they are statute barred and thereby not valid and collectible loans. While the Applicant wrote in both her written opening and closing submissions that “the limitation period for many of these loans has elapsed”, no authority or analysis was presented in either written submission. The Applicant did not speak to this issue in oral closing submissions.

[160] There is no merit to the Applicant’s position that the limitation period for the collection of the amounts advanced has expired. The time for payment or initiating payment under the loan agreements was continuously and routinely extended before their due date, and then merged (rolled into) the 2018 Consolidated Loan Agreement, which does not require payment until “end of year 2023”. Ms. Khaira did not establish that the loan agreements between Dr. Ghumman and his parents are limitation barred.

(f) Applicable Legal Principles Regarding the Alleged Loans

[161] Dr. Ghumman bears the onus of proving any debts that he claims for deduction in NFP equalization, in accordance with s. 4(3) of the FLA: “The onus of proving a deduction under the definition of “net family property” or an exclusion under subsection (2) is on the person claiming it.” Also, Barber v. Magee, 2017 ONCA 558, 139 O.R. 78 (Barber OCA), at para. 5; McNamee, at para. 22.

[162] The analysis of whether an advance of funds from Dr. Ghumman’s parents to their son is a loan or a gift begins with the factors identified by Justice Fitzpatrick in Barber v. Magee, 2015 ONSC 8054, at para. 42 (Barber OSCJ), as affirmed by Barber OCA, at para. 4:

(a) Whether there were any contemporaneous documents evidencing a loan;

(b) Whether the manner for repayment is specified;

(c) Whether there is security held for the loan;

(d) Whether there are advances to one child and not others or advances on equal amounts to various children;

(e) Whether there has been any demand for payment before the separation of the parties;

(f) Whether there has been any partial repayment; and

(g) Whether there is an expectation or likelihood of repayment.

[163] Should Dr. Ghumman successfully establish that the amounts advanced are loans, and not gifts, there is an additional analytical step. As Justice McSweeney stated in Elbahr v. El Hadi, 2020 ONSC 5176, at para. 107: “Even if funds are determined to be a loan and not a gift, a trial judge may find that a discount should be applied to the value of the debt where there is a reduced likelihood of repayment in the context of the particular facts.” Also, Poole v. Poole, 2001 CanLII 28196 (ON SC), [2001] 16 R.F.L. (5th) 397, at para. 35: “Even though a debt may have a specified face value, if the evidence indicates that it is unlikely that the promissor will ever be called upon to pay the debt, the value of the debt should be discounted to reflect that reality.”

[164] In Cade v. Rotstein, [2002] O.T.C. 899 (Rotstein OSCJ), the trial judge discounted loans to 5% of their value in the equalization analysis based on the determination that the loans were unlikely to be repaid. This finding was upheld by the Court of Appeal: Cade v. Rotstein, [2004] 50 R.F.L. 280 (Rotstein OCA) at paras. 7-8. On similar reasoning, in Elbahr, the value of the debt was discounted to 5%, and in Poole the value of the debt was reduced to 10%.

[165] I will apply these principles to facts as I find them after assessment of the reliability of the evidence tendered at trial, and consideration of the weight to be attributed to the evidence: Chao v. Chao, 2017 ONCA 701, 99 R.F.L. (7th) 281 at para. 56.

(g) Assessment of Evidence on Alleged Loans

(i) Ms. Khaira’s Evidence Regarding the Alleged Loans

[166] Ms. Khaira testified that she did not know about the alleged loans during the marriage. She knew that Dr. Ghumman was receiving money from his parents to support his post-graduate education and attendant living expenses, but understood, throughout, that these were gifts. She thought that Dr. Ghumman’s parents were keeping track of the amounts for the purpose of ensuring equal gifting to their daughter, Ms. Ramesh. Ms. Khaira was never told, or made aware that there was any expectation that the money would have to be repaid. She stated that if she had understood that they were loans, she would have budgeted for their repayment during their marriage, just as she did with her student loans and other expenses.

[167] She swore that she first heard of the alleged loans when engaged in discussions with Dr. Ghumman post-separation to resolve their economic issues, and only saw the loan agreements and spreadsheets said to support them during the pre-trial discovery process. She stated that she was unsettled by this discovery.

[168] Ms. Khaira stated that she was shocked about some of the expenditures said by Dr. Ghumman to constitute loans from his family, as opposed to gifts. Her husband told her that her engagement ring was a gift, not funded by a loan to be repaid after marriage. She could not believe that Dr. Ghumman and his parents would state that gifts provided to relatives on their side of the family at the time of the wedding were loans from the parents to Dr. Ghumman. She found it incredible that Dr. Ghumman was suggesting that he was contractually required to repay his mother for her airfare to travel to India, and also to repay the cost of the wedding clothes and jewelry that were bought during that vacation.

[169] Ms. Khaira unwaveringly denied that Dr. Ghumman told her, at the period leading to marriage, that he owed his parents some $336,000.00 in debt, requiring repayment during the marriage. She adamantly denied that the cost of the wedding would add to this indebtedness. Ms. Khaira stated that Dr. Ghumman and his parents misled her and her parents, who believed that the wedding expenses were shared equally by the parents. Ms. Khaira stated that had she known that there was any suggestion that the wedding expenses would have to be repaid, she would never have agreed to have a reception in the Westin ballroom, which was far beyond the reach of her and Dr. Ghumman in May 2007.

[170] Ms. Khaira swore that Dr. Ghumman’s parents bought him the 2012 BMW just as they bought their daughter, Ms. Ramesh¸ a Mercedes Benz. And she adamantly denied that anyone told her that her use of her father-in-law’s spare car was pursuant to a lease agreement and subject to a monthly payment of $400.00. She thought that it was just family help.

[171] Ms. Khaira testified that she had no knowledge that Dr. Ghumman was “loaned” the amount of $120,000.00 as part of his education in investments and stock trading under the requirement that the funds be repaid. And, she posited, in my view effectively, why would Dr. Ghumman borrow money at 10% interest to place into investments that earned less than 10%? She swore that she knew that Dr. Ghumman’s parents had provided him with $100,000.00 in 2014 as uncharacterized funds, to be used at his discretion, but stated that she urged her husband to return the funds to his parents if there was any notion that they were required to be repaid.

[172] Most critically, particularly to my determination of credibility, Ms. Khaira adamantly denied that her husband, or any member of his extended family, ever involved her in the execution of the loan agreements. Ms. Khaira testified that she was excluded from each instance in which a loan agreement was signed and from any discussion leading to their execution. She swore that her husband never told her – in real time - that he had signed any of the loan agreements, and certainly never shared with her the amounts that he claimed to be borrowing.

(ii) Dr. Ghumman’s Evidence on the Alleged Loans

[173] Dr. Ghumman testified that he could not complete his post-graduate studies and residency in orthodontics without his parents’ financial support. He denied that the funds provided to him by his parents from 2002 to 2010, while studying at Howard University and then in New Jersey, were gifts, but rather loans.

[174] Dr. Ghumman swore that he told Ms. Khaira about his indebtedness to his parents at the time of their engagement, and that he explained to her that for them to marry he would have to borrow more money from his parents for the wedding expenses. Dr. Ghumman testified that he then routinely told Ms. Khaira that he was entering into loan agreements with his parents each time that he did so. Dr. Ghumman did not explain why no loan agreement was implemented in the years 2002 to 2005, even though he had by then received hundreds of thousands of dollars, and did not explain why the first loan agreement was implemented only after his engagement.

[175] Dr. Ghumman stated that he signed the May 2006 Loan Agreement just before the convocation ceremony at Howard University, in Washington D.C. He admitted that while Ms. Khaira was present for the graduation, she was not part of the signing of the loan agreement. Dr. Ghumman signed the May 2007 Loan Agreement just two days before his wedding, and admitted, again, that Ms. Khaira was not present when the document was signed. And so, with each of the six loan agreements that followed, a consistent pattern emerged: Dr. Ghumman would find a space and time to sign the loan agreement with his parents and arranged witnesses, without Ms. Khaira being invited to be present. Dr. Ghumman and his father emphasized that the loans were between him and his parents. Dr. Ghumman had no specific recollection of discussions his wife about the further indebtedness but in each case, according to Dr. Ghumman, “she knew about it”.

[176] Dr. Ghumman did not provide any explanation why he borrowed $120,000.00 from his parents to learn about stock trading, and did not explain what happened to these funds. He did not explain why his income as an orthodontist, combined with his wife’s income did not allow him to repay any of the indebtedness during the nine-year marriage. Dr. Ghumman did not say that he ever shared with his wife any of the loan agreements during the marriage, and did not explain why his wife learned of the eight loan agreements only post-separation.

(iii) Other Witness Testimony on the Loan Agreements

[177] Dr. Ghumman’s parents, Mr. Harbhajan Ghumman and Mrs. Amarjeet Ghumman, both swore that they executed each of the loan agreements on the dates specified and that the loan amounts were, in each case, fully advanced. Both testified that they did not speak with their daughter-in-law about any of the loans or loan agreements. They conceded that Ms. Khaira was not present when any of the loan agreements were executed because, as Mr. Ghumman stated, the loan agreements “did not involve her”.

[178] Dr. Syed Rahman, Dr. Ghumman’s classmate, testified that he witnessed Dr. Ghumman’s execution of the May 2006 Loan Agreement during graduation week at Howard University, and saw Dr. Ghumman’s parents sign at the same time. He deposed that Ms. Khaira was “present during signing” but clarified in cross-examination that she was “in and around the area” where the loan agreement was signed and that he could not say for certain whether she was present for its execution.

[179] Mrs. Amarjit Parihar is a long-time friend of Mr. and Mrs. Ghumman. Mrs. Parihar testified that, together with her late husband, Achmar Parihar, she witnessed the execution of all the loan agreements except the May 2006 Loan Agreement. She testified to the authenticity of execution of each of these loan agreements.

[180] Dr. Ghumman’s sister, Ms. Ramesh, testified that she witnessed the execution of the October 2014 Loan Agreement and the 2018 Consolidated Loan Agreement. Ms. Ramesh explained that she borrowed approximately $95,000 from her parents for her education expenses and paid the loan back within a year of graduation from her program in optometry. She testified that she “was not friends” with Ms. Khaira during her marriage to her brother, and explained that Ms. Khaira was not invited to the room where these loan documents were signed because “only the pertinent people required at that time were invited into the room”.

(iv) Credibility Assessments

[181] Dr. Ghumman and Ms. Khaira gave divergent and irreconcilable evidence on the development and implementation of the loan agreements. Only the evidence of one could be accepted. This provided fertile grounds on which to assess their credibility as witnesses.

[182] In doing so, I was guided by Chief Justice McLachlin’s statement in R. v. Marquard, 1993 CanLII 37 (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 223, at p. 248: “Credibility must always be the product of the judge or jury’s view of the diverse ingredients it has perceived at trial, combined with experience, logic and an intuitive sense of the matter”. In R. v. White, 1947 CanLII 1 (SCC), [1947] S.C.R. 268, at p. 272, the Supreme Court explained factors that are pertinent to weighing a witness’s credibility: “The general integrity and intelligence of the witness, his powers to observe, his capacity to remember and his accuracy in statement are important. It is also important to determine whether he is honestly endeavouring to tell the truth, whether he is sincere and frank or whether he is biased, reticent and evasive.”

[183] I have also assessed the interests and motives of Ms. Khaira and Dr. Ghumman, whether questions are answered in a forthright and frank manner, whether their testimony was impeached in cross-examination whether they prevaricate or vacillate, whether they evade or argue or quibble, or whether they readily and candidly provide a response without focus on its implication to their position. I have considered whether their evidence is plausible, following the statement by Justice O’Halloran in Faryna v. Chorny, 1951 CanLII 252 (BC CA), [1952] 2 D.L.R. 354 (B.C.C.A.), at p. 357, that: “In short, the real test of the truth of the story of a witness in such a case must be its harmony with the preponderance of the probabilities which a practical and informed person would readily recognize as reasonable in that place and in those conditions”. I am also assisted by the criteria applied by Justice Cameron in Prodigy Graphics Group Inc. v. Fitz-Andrews, [2000] O.T.C. 237 (S.C.).

[184] I have assessed the credibility and reliability of the witnesses by referring to facts proven by others independently, and by considering whether their evidence is contradicted or corroborated by the evidence of other credible witnesses. I have considered how the witnesses’ evidence fits into the entirety of the evidence presented at the trial.

[185] In applying these elements, I found that Ms. Khaira was a reliable and credible witness. She provided her testimony in a sincere and forthright manner, readily conceding points that were contrary to her interests and thoughtfully providing her evidence without hesitation, without exaggeration or overstatement.

[186] I was troubled by Dr. Ghumman’s testimony, which seemed permeated and punctuated by contemplation of the anticipated impact of his evidence – prompting some impromptu ‘time-outs’ for reflection – as opposed to offering his testimony spontaneously without advance analysis of its effect on his litigation position. I reject Dr. Ghumman’s sworn testimony about discussing the loans with Ms. Khaira prior to engagement, as I found that it was implausible that he would frame his proposal for marriage with his requirement to pay back $336,000.00 (with compound interest) and the necessity to obtain a loan to finance the wedding. And I do not accept Dr. Ghumman’s sworn testimony that he informed Ms. Khaira, at any time prior to separation, of the eight loan agreements, and of the amount of his debt, said to have grown by then with compound interest to the amount of $1,884,160.00. This is something that Ms. Khaira would have remembered.

[187] Further, neither Ms. Khaira nor Dr. Ghumman lived their married life as a couple that had an imminent obligation (according to the repayment terms contained in the various loan agreements) to pay back hundreds of thousands of dollars to family members. They vacationed and they maintained households in both Calgary and Toronto. Most importantly, Ms. Khaira and Dr. Ghumman diligently budgeted to pay other expenses and debts. Their lived experience of prudently managing and attending to their monthly household expenses stood in stark contrast to Dr. Ghumman’s evidence that Ms. Khaira was aware of the huge debt to his parents that was compounding monthly with interest of 8-10%.

[188] I found that Ms. Khaira was a more reliable and credible witness than Dr. Ghumman. I prefer Ms. Khaira’s evidence over the evidence of Dr. Ghumman on all areas where they diverge.

[189] I will now explain my credibility determinations in regard to Mr. Harbhajan Ghumman, as his evidence was broadly tendered to corroborate the evidence of his son. I found elements of the testimony of Mr. Ghumman to be unconvincing and unreliable. He offered no reasonable explanation for the rush to implement a loan agreement during his son’s convocation week, when some of the advances were by then three years old, and then again two days prior to the wedding. I find that the catalyst for Mr. and Mrs. Ghumman entering into the May 2006 Loan Agreement was their son’s engagement to Ms. Khaira. This conclusion was reinforced by Mr. Ghumman’s implementation of the May 2007 Loan Agreement two days before the parties’ marriage. The inference that I draw is that Mr. Ghumman was, throughout, motivated to shield his son’s finances from his daughter-in-law.

[190] Mr. Ghumman’s explanation of providing his son with two advances totaling $120,000.00 to assist in his son’s education in stock trading, was unconvincing when unaccompanied by any evidence of any actual return on investment. Why then provide an “emergency loan” of $100,000.00, and why advance $64,000.00 for a BMW automobile when not a dollar of the $120,000.00 investment loan had by that time been repaid? Mr. Ghumman claimed that he loaned his son the money for a new BMW automobile when he had gifted his daughter a Mercedes Benz. These are some examples of Mr. Ghumman’s evidence that I found to be implausible.

[191] Throughout the years of implementing the eight loan agreements, Mr. Ghumman excluded Ms. Khaira from involvement in the execution of multiple loan agreements for repayment of hundreds of thousands of dollars only now to say that he intends to collect upon them to her financial detriment. Mr. Ghumman involved himself in this matrimonial litigation, including by coaching on the position that his son should take in relation to the date of separation. He prepared and presented extensive, detailed spreadsheets to suggest that Ms. Khaira spent more money than she contributed by salary. I disregarded Mr. Ghumman’s evidence when it strayed beyond fact witness testimony to opinion evidence or advocacy.

[192] I found that Mr. Ghumman’s collaboration in his son’s defence positions, including his role as re-activated collector of long-dormant “debts”, called for assessment of whether his evidence was credible or reliable. Having considered Mr. Ghumman’s evidence in contrast with the evidence of Ms. Khaira and the other evidence in this trial, and having considered the plausibility of Mr. Ghumman’s evidence in the context of the evidence that I have accepted, I reject Mr. Ghumman’s evidence on all points where it conflicts with the evidence of Ms. Khaira.

(h) Analysis – Loans or Gifts?

[193] I am satisfied that Dr. Ghumman has proven that the amounts of money set out in the August 2010 Loan Agreement ($745,300.00), the December 2012 Car Loan Agreement ($79,700.00) and the October 2014 “Emergency” Loan Agreement ($100,000.00), were provided to Dr. Ghumman by his parents. Ms. Khaira had no evidence to challenge the uncontradicted evidence of Dr. Ghumman and his parents that this money was advanced. These amounts total $925,000.

[194] I recognize that some of the amounts included in the total funds advanced were not detailed in evidence, such as the estimated amounts said to have been provided to Dr. Ghumman in 2002 to 2006 to reduce credit card debt ($15,000.00) and for uncharacterized expenses (10,000.00) and the payment of car insurance. However, these amounts constitute a small component (about 3%) of the overall amounts provided to Dr. Ghumman by his parents and were not disputed by Ms. Khaira.

[195] I have analysed whether the monetary advances set out in the loan agreements are loans or gifts, applying the factors identified in Barber OSCJ, at para. 42, as affirmed by Barber OCA, at para. 4, and have reached the conclusion that Dr. Ghumman established that they are loans. I will explain why.

[196] First, the unchallenged evidence of Dr. Ghumman and Mr. Ghumman was that at the time that the parents first began to provide money to their son for his education and attendant living expenses, their intention was to advance the money as loans. Ms. Khaira has no evidence on this point. Mr. Ghumman testified to an email that he received from his son that demonstrated that the parties’ intention on June 11, 2007 was to enter into a loan arrangement. Dr. Ghumman wrote: “I will also have to start borrowing money for living expenses as well. I will work out projected monthly living costs and let you know and we can work out a loan, which I can start repaying once I actually get a job” (emphasis added).

[197] The legal test for characterization of the monies advanced focusses on the intent of the transferor at the time of the transfer: Chao, at para. 56, applying Pecore v. Pecore, at paras. 44 and 59. Here, the evidence that I have accepted supports my finding that the intention of Mr. Ghumman at the time of the transfer of funds was to enter into a loan arrangement with his son.

[198] Second, there is uncontradicted, unchallenged evidence, which I accept, that each of the eight loan agreements, as well as the 2018 Consolidated Loan Agreement were prepared and executed at or about the date of their signing. The evidence by Dr. Ghumman, his parents, sister, and family friend of the signing of these agreements was not contradicted by Ms. Khaira and was not seriously challenged in cross-examination. I find that the loan agreements were valid and enforceable contracts at the time that they were executed, although later merged into the 2018 Consolidated Loan Agreement.

[199] The amounts advanced by Dr. Ghumman’s parents in the years 2002 to 2005 were not documented into a loan agreement contemporaneously. I have already explained my finding that Dr. Ghumman and his parents were not motivated to do so until the time of the engagement. However, in all other instances of monetary advances, the amounts were incorporated into a loan agreement within a matter of months. This was consistent with the evidence of Dr. Ghumman and his parents, which I accept as it is uncontradicted, that this was a practical means by which the parties attended to the implementation of the loan agreements, considering the high frequency of monetary advances and the geographic distance between the parties during the period in which Dr. Ghumman was in Washington, D.C., or New Jersey.

[200] Third, while the loan agreements did not specify a repayment schedule, or a manner of repayment, they all set out an interest rate and a date by which either re-payment would be initiated, or re-payment would be completed.

[201] Fourth, while there was no security for any of the loans, this was consistent with the parties’ conduct even where a loan is acknowledged, as shown by the Matrimonial Home Loan. As explained earlier, the Matrimonial Home Loan was acknowledged by Ms. Khaira as valid and yet it was not secured at any time prior to the parties’ separation. Accordingly, I find, on the evidence in this case, that the absence of security for the monetary amounts advanced in the eight loan agreements did not detract from their characterization as loans.

[202] Fifth, there were unequal advances to the Ghumman children. The evidence of Mr. Ghumman and his daughter, Ms. Ramesh, showed that Mr. Ghumman and his spouse advanced $95,000 to Ms. Ramesh to assist with her post-graduate education, and that she paid this amount back to her parents within a year of graduation. The money advanced to Dr. Ghumman was over nine times greater.

[203] Six, Mr. Ghumman has provided some evidence that the loans will be repaid, by his testimony that his Last Will and Testament dated December 28, 2014, contains a direction to his estate trustees that “proceeds from loans to kids” form part of his estate. Dr. Ghumman would receive between 0% to 72% of his father’s estate, depending on whether his mother and/or sister should predecease him. The parents’ expectation of repayment is further supported by the lengths that they have gone to document their loans. However, I will have more to say about the expectation or likelihood of repayment as applicable to my consideration of discount of the loan amounts for purposes of NFP equalization.

[204] Ms. Khaira relied on factors that would suggest that these monetary advances are more in the nature of gifts than loans. I accept the Ms. Khaira’s submission that Mr. and Mrs. Ghumman have not made any demand for repayment. No action has been started to recover the amounts claimed to be owed, and no demand letter was tendered into evidence. I find that Mr. and Mrs. Ghumman did not, at any time before separation, demand repayment of any of the amounts advanced to Dr. Ghumman apart from the 2012 Mortgage Loan.

[205] Further, I find that Dr. Ghumman did not repay any of the loans before the date of separation. Dr. Ghumman and Mr. Ghumman testified that Dr. Ghumman made a “notional repayment” at the time of entering into the 2012 Mortgage Loan Agreement in that Mr. and Mrs. Ghumman advanced on closing (September 2012) the amount of $639,700.00 rather than the stated Mortgage Loan amount of $700,000.00, with $60,300.00 said to constitute repayment under the loan agreements. However, Dr. Ghumman did not repay his parents the amount of $60,300.00 from his own resources. Rather, he and his parents notionally discounted the amount due under the August 2010 Loan Agreement by $60,300.00 from $745,300.00 to $685,000.00, commensurate with the discount in the amount advanced on closing of the Matrimonial Home by $60,300. In my view, this is not a repayment. This is an accounting transfer intended to give the appearance of a repayment (the “Notional Repayment”).

[206] Considering all the evidence, I determined that Dr. Ghumman discharged his burden of establishing, on a balance of probabilities (more likely than not), that the amounts provided to him by his parents in the principal amount of $925,000 are loans. Although I found that the Notional Repayment was simply an accounting transfer, I will deduct the amount of the Notional Repayment ($60,300) from the amount of the loans ($925,000) to reduce the principal amount of the loans to $864,700 for the sole purpose of avoiding double-counting with the amount outstanding under the Mortgage Loan.

[207] I find that Dr. Ghumman has established that at the date of separation he had loans outstanding to his parents in the principal amount of $864,700, that with compound interest totaled $1,884,160.[2] I will refer to these as the “Parental Loans”.

(i) Are the Parental Loans Deductible, in Whole or in Part, for the Purpose of NFP Equalization?

[208] My determination that the amounts provided to Dr. Ghumman were loans and not gifts does not end my analysis of their treatment for the purpose of net family property equalization. Rather, where there is reduced likelihood that the loans will be repaid, in the context of the evidence that is accepted, the court may apply a discount to the value of the debt.

[209] A thorough assessment of the likelihood that a loan will be repaid flows from the very objective of NFP equalization, “which is to divide equally between the spouses the net wealth accumulated from the date of marriage to the date of separation”: Zavarella v. Zavarella, 2013 ONCA 720, 117 O.R. (3d) 641 at para. 33. The Court of Appeal explained at para. 36, in the context of a debt brought to the marriage, that if the evidence does not support that the debt is a real liability, “the court cannot simply insert the face value of the debt into the NFP calculation” but rather “must make a meaningful determination of the value to attribute to the … debt.” Also, Cade OCA, at para. 8: “Courts are frequently called upon to assess the actual worth of a claim, asset or liability.”

[210] The debt claimed by Dr. Ghumman through the Parental Loans will have the effect of providing him with a sizable credit in the equalization calculation and will reduce the amount that he is required to pay to the Applicant or could, indeed, render the Applicant liable to pay him an equalization payment. Accordingly, as was explained by Justice Heeney in Poole, at para. 36, as relied on by Justice McSweeney in Elbahr, at para. 152 and as quoted by Justice Wood in Rotstein OSCJ, at para. 59, “[f]airness dictates that he should not receive a credit for a debt, with the financial benefits that flow from that credit, if he will never be called upon to pay the debt.”

[211] Here, Dr. Ghumman effectively asks that Ms. Khaira absorb the financial consequences of one-half of his debt obligations when he has not been inconvenienced by the Parental Loans for the past two decades. Courts have observed that where, like here, the debtor spouse argues forcefully, and against his own economic interests, that he is subject to a multitude of loans, to the point of enlisting his counsel to work closely with the creditor parent to lead evidence of the magnitude and scope of his debt obligations, it is necessary to analyse whether there is a realistic likelihood that the debtor spouse will be called upon to repay the debts: Poole, at para. 40; Rotstein OSCJ, at para. 60; Elbahr, at para. 149. The degree of collaboration between Dr. Ghumman and his parents was so extensive that I saw no challenge by Dr. Ghumman of factors that had an impact on the size of the debt, including: the interest rate charged (10% from 2006 to 2012, 8% from 2012 onward); the computation of the compound interest; the service charge imposed by the parents for exchanging the U.S. currency to Canadian; whether the averaging of the currency exchange rate by Mr. Ghumman was appropriate, given fluctuating exchange rates.

[212] I find that there is a low likelihood of Dr. Ghumman ever being compelled to repay the Parental Loans. I will explain why.

[213] First, Mr. and Mrs. Ghumman did not demand repayment of the Parental Loans at any time prior to the date of separation. The earliest amounts were advanced 20 years ago. There was no demand for repayment during the parties’ marriage even though certain of the loans were 14 years old by the date of separation. Not a single “start to pay by” date in any of the loan agreements was honoured or enforced. I find that there was no real demand for repayment even post-separation. While it is understandable that the loans would not be pursued while the purpose for which they were advanced, such as when Dr. Ghumman’s post-graduate education was ongoing, the parents did not demand repayment of the loans during the time that Dr. Ghumman has been a practicing orthodontist. Indeed, the parents extended further financing during his professional career, even though he is earning income. I do not accept Mr. Ghumman’s testimony that he has deferred demanding repayment to be “considerate”. While Mr. Ghumman’s sworn testimony was that he and his wife intended to collect the Parental Loans, this contradicted his conduct, for two decades, wherein he continuously advanced money and did not collect any of the amounts said to be due.

[214] Second, Dr. Ghumman did not repay any of the loans even post-separation until the eve of an earlier trial date. As explained earlier, I did not accept that the Notional Repayment was a loan repayment as opposed to an accounting transfer. After separation on June 1, 2016, Dr. Ghumman did not make any payments on the loans until a payment of $2,500 on October 28, 2021, the eve of an earlier trial date in this action, followed by six further payments. Put in context, Mr. Ghumman testified that Dr. Ghumman’s loans had grown, with compound interest, to $2,422,840 on January 1, 2019, as seen in the 2018 Consolidated Loan Agreement, and to $2,779,584 by May 2022, after credit for the $17,500 paid in monthly payments. This means that in the first 14 years of borrowing money from his parents, Dr. Ghumman repaid nothing, and in 20 years of borrowing money from his parents Dr. Ghumman repaid less than 1% (about 0.63%) of his debt.

[215] Third, not only did Dr. Ghumman not repay any of the loans during the marriage, he did not even tell Ms. Khaira that he felt contractually obligated to do so. The parties both testified, and I found that they did not budget, during the marriage, to repay loan amounts to Mr. and Mrs. Ghumman, and did not do so, unlike their monthly budgeting and payment of the Mortgage Loan. From this, I conclude that but for the parties’ separation, they would not have budgeted for payment of the Parental Loans, and they would not have been called upon to pay the Parental Loans.

[216] Fourth, the timing of payment by Dr. Ghumman, so close to the initiation of trial, allows for the finding, which I make, that it was more to bolster a position in litigation than a requirement imposed by the creditors. After 19 years of borrowing, Dr. Ghumman made his first payment: $2,500.00. I do not accept that a monthly payment of $2,500.00 is a meaningful effort to repay $2,779,584 in indebtedness. At this rate of repayment, the monthly compound interest would out-pace the monthly payments by a significant margin. Where, as here, the evidence suggests that a repayment was motivated by the separation of the parties, the advance can be found to be a loan but discounted to reflect the reality that it will not likely be repaid: Rotstein OCA, at para. 7.

[217] Fifth, there is little likelihood of Mr. and Mrs. Ghumman ever demanding repayment. Mr. Ghumman conceded that to repay the loans by December 31, 2023, as is required by the 2018 Consolidated Loan Agreement, Dr. Ghumman would have to sell the Matrimonial Home, and sell all his orthodontic practices. I do not accept that Mr. and Mrs. Ghumman have any intention of rendering their son homeless and without a means to carry on his profession. I saw no evidence in support of Mr. Ghumman’s testimony that he is “very certain” that his son will repay all his debt by the end of 2023. I do not find this evidence to be credible.

[218] Sixth, Mr. and Mrs. Ghumman have always taken the position that Dr. Ghumman can repay the loans when he can afford to do so and have consistently extended the time for repayment to accommodate their son. I find that there is a good likelihood that the due date of the 2018 Consolidated Loan Agreement will similarly be extended.

[219] Seventh, I do not accept that since Ms. Ramesh repaid, within one year, her parental educational loan of $95,000 that it necessarily or reasonably follows that Dr. Ghumman will be called upon to repay the Parental Loans. The siblings’ experience in loans from their parents is different. Dr. Ghumman’s obligation to repay has been continuously extended for two decades, and he has been provided with new loans while earning income as a professional and while existing loans were not serviced. Ms. Ramesh’s parental educational loan does not share these characteristics.

[220] And last, I was not persuaded by Mr. Ghumman’s testimony that his Last Will and Testament demonstrates that the loans will be enforced against his son. The Parental Loans are not expressly specified in the Will, but rather are only referred to generically, even though they were all advanced by the time of execution of the Will on December 28, 2014. Further, Mr. Ghumman is at liberty to change his Will at any time.

[221] I thereby conclude that the loans must be discounted for equalization purposes to reflect the reality that Dr. Ghumman may never be called upon to pay them. In considering the percentage of discount, I have considered the approaches taken by other Courts. In Rotstein OSCJ, the debt of $192,000 was discounted to 5% of face value. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Rotstein OCA. In Poole, the trial judge discounted the loans to 10% of their face value, and in Elbahr, the Court discounted the loans to 5% of their value. In LeVan v. LeVan, 2006 CanLII 31020 (ON SC), 82 O.R. (3d) 1, (S.C.J.), additional reasons at (2006), 2006 CanLII 63733 (ON SC), 32 R.F.L. (6th) 359 at paras. 235-237 (Ont. S.C.J.), aff’d on appeal 2008 ONCA 388, additional reasons at 2008 ONCA 505, the trial judge found that a $1,000,000 loan should be discounted to zero in determining the husband’s net family property because it was highly unlikely that the husband would be required to repay the loan, the parent was wealthy and did not need the money, the husband’s siblings had already received gifts in similar amounts and there had never been any demands for repayment.

[222] The characteristics of the loans in this case are similar to those analysed in Rotstein, Elbahr and Poole. On the basis of the reasons explained, above, and in particular on my finding that it is unlikely that Dr. Ghumman will be called upon to repay the loans that he seeks to deduct in equalization, I find that the value of Dr. Ghumman’s loans shall be discounted to 10% of their face value for use in the NFP equalization.

[223] Specifically, I find that the values of the loans shall be discounted from $864,700 to $86,470, and the principal amount of the loans with compound interest to the date of separation shall be discounted from $1,884,160 to $188,416 for use in the NFP equalization. There shall be a corresponding reduction to 10% of the value to each of the loans that comprise the total principal amount.

D. What is the Computation of Net Family Property Equalization?

[224] Having determined the issues pertaining to Ms. Khaira’s claim for an interest in the Matrimonial Home, her claim for a share of its increase in value post-separation, the valuation of the orthodontal practices and the Parental Loans and taking into consideration all the elements of the NFP that the parties have agreed upon, I have calculated the NFP equalization in the manner set out in Schedule “A” to these Reasons for Judgment. Based on these calculations, I have determined that Dr. Ghumman shall pay to Ms. Khaira a NFP equalization payment of $606,728.60.

[225] If the parties should consider that there is an arithmetic or computational error in the calculation of the NFP, as set out in Schedule “A”, they may confer and agree on an arithmetic or computational correction or they may request, within 30 days of the date of these Reasons for Judgment, the scheduling of a Case Conference to speak to any required correction.

E. Did Ms. Khaira Establish an Entitlement to an Unequal Division of Net Family Property?

[226] Section 5(6) of the FLA allows a court to “award a spouse an amount that is more or less than half the difference between the net family properties if the court is of the opinion that equalizing the net family properties would be unconscionable”. In Rawluk, at p. 93, the Supreme Court commented that the s. 5(6) analysis is “a last avenue of judicial discretion which might be used in order to bring a measure of flexibility to the equalization process.” The test to be applied in considering an unequal division of net family property is not “mere unfairness” but whether the equalization is “a shock to the conscience”: Gionet, at para. 36, citing Ward v. Ward, 2012 ONCA 462, 111 O.R. (3d) 81, at para. 36.

[227] I see no reason to alter the equal division of NFP as determined, above.

V. THE CLAIM FOR SPOUSAL SUPPORT

[228] Ms. Khaira claimed entitlement to spousal support to compensate her for economic loss or disadvantage that resulted from the role that she adopted in the marriage. Ms. Khaira submitted that she supported Dr. Ghumman’s professional aspirations to the point of subordinating her career to his. This resulted, in her submission, in Dr. Ghumman having three thriving orthodontic clinics post-separation while she had no savings and a job that has limited potential for advancement.

[229] In terms of amount, Ms. Khaira claimed a $250,000 lump sum payment for spousal support without citing any authority to support a lump sum award. Ms. Khaira rested on the submission that Dr. Ghumman can not be relied on to pay monthly spousal support and that the parties’ toxic dealings are best addressed by a clean-break, lump sum award.

[230] Dr. Ghumman contended that Ms. Khaira was not entitled to any award of spousal support. He submitted that this was a nine-year marriage with no children, where the parties lived apart for more than two years: 2007 to 2009, when Dr. Ghumman lived in New Jersey and Ms. Khaira lived in Calgary; and 2012 to 2013, when Dr. Ghumman lived in Toronto and Ms. Khaira lived in Calgary. Dr. Ghumman stated that Ms. Khaira did not support Dr. Ghumman in his career, and that any disadvantage in her career is self-inflicted because Ms. Khaira did not build on her five degrees or certificates from post-secondary institutions to establish her own career. Rather, he maintained that Ms. Khaira chose to abandon her undergraduate and graduate degrees in education, then resign her job in the telecommunications sector and inexplicably become under-employed.

[231] In the alternative, if entitlement is established, Dr. Ghumman submitted that the quantification of his support obligation should be based on: (i) Mr. Krofchick’s unchallenged expert opinion evidence that Dr. Ghumman’s three-year average income for support purposes is $216,754; and (ii) imputation of income to Ms. Khaira of $76,476, being her highest income year. This produced a range of spousal support from a low of $1,578 per month, to a mid-point of $1,841 per month to a high of $2,104 per month for a duration of four and a half to nine years (a range of one-half year to one year for each year of marriage).

[232] The starting point for determination of a support dispute is consideration of the objectives which the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.3, stipulates the support order should serve. In accordance with s. 15.2(4) of the Divorce Act, I have taken into consideration “the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse, including”:

(a) The length of time the spouses cohabited;

(b) The functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation; and

(c) Any order, agreement or arrangement relating to support of either spouse.

[233] Here, the parties did not have any agreement that related to the issue of spousal support, so the factor set out in s. 15.2(4)(c) of the Divorce Act is not applicable.

[234] The objectives of a spousal support order are set out in s. 15.2(6) of the Divorce Act. A spousal support order should achieve the following objectives:

(a) Recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown;

(b) Apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and above any obligation for the support of any child of the marriage;

(c) Relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage; and

(d) In so far as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time.

[235] The Supreme Court has instructed that “no single objective is paramount; all must be borne in mind”: Bracklow v. Bracklow, 1999 CanLII 715 (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 420, at p. 440. Justice McLachlin continued: “There is no hard and fast rule. The judge must look at all the factors in the light of the stipulated objectives of support, and exercise his or her discretion in a manner that equitably alleviates the adverse consequences of the marriage breakdown”: Bracklow, at p. 440. Also, Fisher v. Fisher, 2008 ONCA 11, 88 O.R. 3(d) 241, at para. 34: “[N]o one objective predominates; rather, it is important to balance all four objectives in the context of the circumstances of the particular case”, citing Moge, 1992 CanLII 25 (SCC), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813, at para. 52; Bracklow, at para. 35 and Miglin v. Miglin, 2003 SCC 24, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 303, [2003] S.C.J. No. 21, at para. 39.

[236] With these considerations and objectives, I will turn to the question of whether Ms. Khaira has established an entitlement to spousal support.

A. Did Ms. Khaira Establish an Entitlement to Spousal Support?

[237] In Moge, at p. 864, the Supreme Court stated that “marriage per se does not automatically entitle a spouse to support”. Rather, it is the relationship that was established and the expectations that may reasonably flow from it that give rise to the obligation for support: Bracklow, at p. 445.

[238] In Bracklow, at p. 441, Justice McLachlin identified three conceptual bases for spousal support obligations: (i) contractual; (ii) compensatory; and (iii) non-compensatory. The contractual basis for a spousal support obligation is not material in this case, as the parties did not have any contract that addressed spousal support. I will thereby consider whether Ms. Khaira has established an entitlement to spousal support on either a compensatory or non-compensatory basis.

(a) Compensatory Basis for Spousal Support

[239] The Supreme Court has held that a compensatory award of spousal support may be awarded “where a spouses’ education, career development, or earning potential have been impeded as a result of the marriage”: Elbahr, at para. 198, citing Moge and Bracklow; Thompson v. Thompson, 2013 ONSC 5500, at para. 55. In Bracklow, at para. 1, Justice McLachlin succinctly stated this principle as follows: “It is now well-settled law that spouses must compensate each other for foregone careers and missed opportunities during the marriage upon the breakdown of their union.”

[240] I agree with, and apply, Justice Chappel’s summary of these principles in Thompson, at para. 58, citing Cassidy v. McNeil, 2010 ONCA 218, 99 O.R. (3d) 81, and Allaire v. Allaire, 2003 CanLII 26263 (ON CA), [2003] 35 R.F.L. (5th) 256: “A compensatory claim for spousal support may be established even where the recipient spouse is employed and reasonably self-supporting at the time of the parties’ separation. This situation can arise where, despite that spouse’s ability to meet their own needs, their financial advancement has been impaired as a result of subordinating their career to that of the other spouse, or from adopting a less lucrative career path in order to accommodate the needs of the family.”

[241] I turn first to the applicable factors set out in s. 15.2(4) of the Divorce Act: the length of time that the spouses cohabited; and the functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation.

[242] The evidence showed, and I accept, that the parties were married for nine years and were engaged for 17 months before marriage. Dr. Ghumman emphasized that the parties had intermittent periods during the marriage where they lived apart. I find that this was a shared and accepted reality of these parties’ marriage and life together. The parties started their relationship in 2002 and, for four years, had a long-distance relationship while Dr. Ghumman attended Howard University. When this continued during the parties’ first years of marriage, with Dr. Ghumman in Connecticut and then New Jersey and Ms. Khaira visiting on occasion, it was part of their routine. I do not accept Dr. Ghumman’s submission that the time that the parties were apart constitutes a significant negative factor in Ms. Khaira’s claim for spousal support.

[243] In assessment of functions performed by the parties during cohabitation, I find that in the early years of their marriage, Ms. Khaira supported Dr. Ghumman in a number of ways. She held several jobs during the time that Dr. Ghumman was completing his orthodontic residency from 2007 to 2010, and provided emotional support as well as assistance in moving residences and household tasks. Ms. Khaira relocated to New Jersey in 2009 to support Dr. Ghumman. When the parties returned to Calgary in August 2010, Dr. Ghumman did not earn any income for the first four months while working with Dr. Tarun Mehra and earned only $39,294 in income for the year 2010. The parties had the benefit of the income earned by Ms. Khaira through her part-time employment.

[244] An assessment of the s. 15.2(6) objectives supports the appropriateness of an award of spousal support. Ms. Khaira has sustained economic disadvantage through the marriage breakdown. Dr. Ghumman exited the marriage with the Matrimonial Home and his orthodontic practice while Ms. Khaira left the marriage with no assets, no balance in her bank account and no financial stability.

[245] I accept that Ms. Khaira subordinated her career aspirations to those of Dr. Ghumman. This was established by the parties’ conduct. Ms. Khaira left Calgary and moved to New Jersey to support her husband during his residency even though she did not qualify for a work visa while in the United States. Her career in education was put on hold. I accept Ms. Khaira’s evidence that when the parties returned to Calgary, and Ms. Khaira began employment with a telecommunication company, she did so because it was too late to obtain a teaching position for the academic year and the parties needed steady employment income to support them while Dr. Ghumman launched his career. This finding is validated by the undisputed fact that the entirety of Ms. Khaira’s income was, throughout the marriage, deposited in a joint account used by the parties to pay household expenses.

[246] The best evidence that Ms. Khaira’s career pursuits were secondary to those of Dr. Ghumman is Ms. Khaira’s enrolment, in September 2011, in a Human Resources Management certificate program at the University of Calgary. As she had three undergraduate degrees and a post-graduate degree in education at that time, I find that Ms. Khaira’s only purpose in studying human resources was to act as office manager in her husband’s emerging orthodontic practice. I find that this change in career path was undertaken by Ms. Khaira with Dr. Ghumman’s concurrence for the purpose of supporting Dr. Ghumman’s career objectives.

[247] I reject Dr. Ghumman’s testimony that Ms. Khaira was free to pursue a career in education and that her decision not to do so – the “waste” of her education - is a failure on her part. I do not see this as the reality of this marriage. I accept Ms. Khaira’s evidence that Dr. Ghumman was always going to be the “primary breadwinner”, that everything focused on his career pursuits and professional aspirations and that his expectation was always that her role was to focus on his career needs first, and hers only secondarily. Again, this is seen by conduct. I accept that Ms. Khaira did not want to move to Ontario. Indeed, she delayed her permanent move for a year, but reluctantly moved across the country and accepted a demotion in employment position and salary, to support Dr. Ghumman’s determination to establish orthodontic clinics in the GTA. Conversely, I did not see a single instance where Dr. Ghumman placed Ms. Khaira’s preferences and career objectives above his.

[248] The result was that Ms. Khaira’s career path was disrupted and she was, in my determination, rendered less capable of achieving financial self-sufficiency and stability by reason of the transitions and interruptions caused by relocating from Calgary to New Jersey, back to Calgary and then to Toronto in support of Dr. Ghumman’s education and career. Ms. Khaira uprooted and moved for the sole purpose of supporting her husband, to the detriment of her career. This meets the threshold of entitlement to spousal support on compensatory grounds: Cassidy, at paras. 67-69.

[249] On these reasons, I find that Ms. Khaira has established entitlement to an award of spousal support on compensatory grounds, in accordance with s. 15.2(6)(a) of the Divorce Act.

(b) Non-Compensatory Basis for Spousal Support

[250] Having found that Ms. Khaira has established a compensatory basis for spousal support, it is not necessary to determine whether she has also established an entitlement to spousal support on non-compensatory grounds for the purposes of finding entitlement. However, as it is material to my determination of the amount and duration of spousal support, I will explain my determination that Ms. Khaira is also entitled to spousal support on non-compensatory grounds.

[251] Justice McLachlin instructed in Bracklow, at p. 442, that the Divorce Act contemplates an obligation of support beyond any contractual or compensatory basis upon consideration of the “spouse’s actual ability to fend for himself or herself and the effort that has been made to do so, including efforts after the marriage breakdown.” This is part of the assessment of the “condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse”, as required by s. 15.2(4) of the Divorce Act.

[252] An assessment of the conditions, needs, and means of each spouse, shows that Ms. Khaira has struggled since separation to meet her financial needs. Ms. Khaira’s financial statement, sworn March 3, 2021, showed that her monthly expenses exceed her income, with the result that she has a monthly deficit in excess of $2,000. A comparison of the parties’ line 150 income levels shows that Dr. Ghumman’s income has historically been over double Ms. Khaira’s income, and at time three times her income level. In both her former position and her current position, Ms. Khaira’s potential for annual income increase is more modest than the increases in income that Dr. Ghumman can expect, based on his income history. And importantly, Ms. Khaira testified that she is currently on disability from her position of employment due to a workplace injury that she sustained.

[253] Ms. Khaira has sustained an economic disadvantage resulting from the marriage breakdown which, in my view, was caused or contributed to by her role in the marriage. I thereby conclude that Ms. Khaira is entitled to spousal support on a needs basis, as the economic hardship faced by Ms. Khaira calls for an award of spousal support while she continues toward self-sufficiency, in accordance with s. 15.2(6)(c) of the Divorce Act.

B. What Amount of Spousal Support was Established?

[254] The same factors set out by the Divorce Act that to go the determination of entitlement to spousal support have an impact on the assessment of the amount and duration of spousal support: Bracklow, at pp. 448-449. All factors must be considered, and the amount and duration of the spousal support “will vary with the circumstances and the practical and policy considerations” affecting each case: Bracklow, at p. 450.

[255] I have considered the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines: The Revised User’s Guide, April 2016: Professor Carol Rogerson and Professor Rollie Thompson (“SSAGs”) as they provide concrete guidance in the determination of the amount and duration of spousal support once entitlement has been determined. The SSAGs are informal, advisory guidelines that were intended to bring certainty and predictability to spousal support awards under the Divorce Act. The parties’ submissions on the amount and duration of spousal support were both made on the basis of DivorceMate calculations derived from the SSAGs, calculated using the without child support formula. Neither party submitted that the range of support set out by the SSAGs conflicts with applicable authorities.

(a) Determination of Income

[256] The determination of the amount of the parties’ income is a central task in the calculation of spousal support. Dr. Ghumman tendered Mr. Krofchick’s expert opinion evidence on determination of Dr. Ghumman’s income for support purposes. Mr. Krofchick opined that Dr. Ghumman’s income for support purposes was $396,620 for 2017, $153,940 for 2018 and $99,730 for 2019. Mr. Krofchick attributed Dr. Ghumman’s lower income in 2019 to Dr. Ghumman’s operating companies having limited cash reserves in 2019 and no ability to pay Dr. Ghumman more than $99,730. Neither party tendered any expert opinion evidence on Dr. Ghumman’s income for support purposes post-2019. The only evidence of Dr. Ghumman’s income pre-2017 was the line 150 income reporting on Dr. Ghumman’s income tax returns, which were agreed upon by the parties. These amounts were well-below the average of Dr. Ghumman’s income for support purposes for the years 2017-2019.

[257] Ms. Khaira did not tender any expert opinion evidence on the issue of Dr. Ghumman’s income for support purposes. She argued that Dr. Ghumman’s income should be set at his 2017 income level as determined by Mr. Krofchick: $396,620. Ms. Khaira stated that the basis for this was that there were “questionable transactions” between Dr. Ghumman and his father, and his uncle, Mr. Basra, that had the effect of under-stating Dr. Ghumman’s income for support purposes. However, Ms. Khaira did not establish either the “questionable transactions” or the monetary impact that any such questionable transaction had on Dr. Ghumman’s income for support purposes.

[258] As Mr. Krofchick’s expert opinion evidence was unaffected by cross-examination, and unchallenged by any evidence tendered by the Applicant, I accept Mr. Krofchick’s expert opinion evidence on the quantification of Dr. Ghumman’s income for support purposes for the years from 2017 to 2019.

[259] Dr. Ghumman submitted that his income for the purpose of calculation of spousal support should be the average of his income levels from 2017 to 2019: specifically, $216,754.33 ($396,620+$153,940+$99,730=$650,289.99/3=$216,754.33). I accept this submission because it fairly discounts the impact of the Dr. Ghumman’s drop in income in 2019, and is consistent with the general increase in Dr. Ghumman’s income from the pre-2017 line 150 income levels.

[260] I turn to Ms. Khaira’s income for the purpose of spousal support. Ms. Khaira submitted that her income for support purposes should be set at $68,043, which was her income level for 2017. Dr. Ghumman submitted that Ms. Khaira’s income for support purposes should be set at $76,476, which was her line 150 annual income for 2020. I do not accept either submission, for reasons that I will now explain.

[261] Ms. Khaira was employed by a telecommunications company for about 10 years: from 2011 to 2021. Ms. Khaira’s income increased through promotion from 2011 to 2013 until she transferred to Toronto, where her assignment was to a lower paying role with a 5-6% drop in income. I observe, again, that she absorbed this backward step in income to accommodate Dr. Ghumman’s objective of developing his practice in the GTA. Ms. Khaira obtained a promotion the year following.

[262] Ms. Khaira resigned her position at the telecommunications company in May 2021. She testified that she decided to do so because of the stress, depression and anxiety caused by the ongoing matrimonial litigation. In July 2021, Ms. Khaira accepted a position as a flight attendant, with a starting salary of $22,000. This is a significant reduction from Ms. Khaira’s historic income levels. Ms. Khaira’s income tax returns for 2012 to 2014, which were tendered into evidence, showed T4 earnings from employment as follows: $52,460 in 2012 (total line 150 income of $83,966 with income splitting); $54,779 in 2013 (total line 150 income of $86,672 with income splitting); $49,322 in 2014 (total line 150 income of $50,287). Ms. Khaira’s average annual employment income over the three-year period from 2012-2014 was $52,187.

[263] The parties agreed that Ms. Khaira’s line 150 reported income levels in the years from 2015 to 2020 ranged from $81,409 in 2015 to $76,476 in 2020. Ms. Khaira’s average annual income over this period was $73,812.83. However, in 2021, Ms. Khaira’s line 150 income fell to $55,822. This was the result of Ms. Khaira’s decision to accept a lower paying job.

[264] Dr. Ghumman submitted that I should impute to Ms. Khaira, for the purposes of the support calculation, an income of $76,476 (namely, her 2020 line 150 income), on the basis that Dr. Ghumman should not bear the consequence of her decision to accept a lower paying position. I am not prepared to do so, because Ms. Khaira’s historic income levels are below her 2020 income. I am also not prepared to attribute to Ms. Khaira an income of $22,000 for the purposes of the support calculation, being her current salary. Ms. Khaira did not tender any medical evidence to establish that she is unable to work at the levels of her employment over the last decade or that her decision to leave her previous position was due to medical conditions or physical limitations, as opposed to a lifestyle decision. Also, I am not persuaded that the 2021 income level is representative of Ms. Khaira’s income potential going forward considering her evidence that there is the possibility of advancement in her new position and considering that Ms. Khaira had a track record of consistently being promoted in her previous position.

[265] Just as I accepted Dr. Ghumman’s submission that a three-year average of his income for support purposes was fair for calculation of support, I will also use a three-year average of Ms. Khaira’s income for support purposes. Ms. Khaira’s three-year average income in the years 2019-2021 was $68,241.66 ($72,427+$76,476+$55,822=$204,725/3=$68,241.66). I will then set Ms. Khaira’s income for support purposes at $68,241.66 which, I observe, is close to the amount she proposed through use of her 2017 income ($68,043) in computation of her proposed lump sum award.

(b) Determination of the Amount and Duration of Support

[266] The Court of Appeal explained that although the SSAGs are neither legislated nor binding, “they are a useful tool with which to measure the quantum and duration of spousal support”: Gray v. Gray, 2014 ONCA 659, at para. 42. In Fisher, at para. 96, the Court of Appeal stated that the SSAGs apply to initial orders for support, as here, and explained that “in all cases, the reasonableness of an award produced by the Guidelines must be balanced in light of the circumstances of the individual case, including the particular financial history of the parties during the marriage and their likely future circumstances.”

[267] Both parties tendered DivorceMate calculations on spousal support without reliance on any issues or exceptional circumstances that would necessitate deviation from the SSAGs. However, the DivorceMate calculations tendered by the parties are not helpful because they used income levels for the parties that are different than those that I have found. Dr. Ghumman set his income at $216,754, which I have accepted, but an income for Ms. Khaira of $76,476, which I reject. Ms. Khaira set her income at $68,043, which is close to the amount that I have determined ($68,241.66), but an income for Dr. Ghumman that is higher than the amount that I have found.

[268] Applying the SSAGs, with my determination of income for Dr. Ghumman at $216,754 and income for Ms. Khaira at $68,241.66, results in a range of spousal support at the low end of $1,671, the mid-level of $1,949 and the high level of $2,228. The “Without Child Support Formula” that I have applied incorporates both compensatory and non-compensatory support objectives by taking into consideration both the parties income levels and the length of their cohabitation: Fisher, at para. 104. In terms of duration, at nine years of cohabitation, the parties’ marriage falls within the category of “medium term cohabitation”: Fisher, at para. 106. The SSAGs suggest a duration for spousal support from four and one-half years to nine years representing a range of one-half year to one year for each year of marriage.

[269] In determining the amount and duration of spousal support, I have taken into consideration the SSAG ranges, the compensatory and non-compensatory nature of Ms. Khaira’s entitlement, and the applicable case authority. The parties have been separated for over six years and this litigation is in its third year. Ms. Khaira did not seek an interim award of spousal support. The evidence shows, and I find, that Dr. Ghumman made voluntary contributions to Ms. Khaira’s support by funding payments for Ms. Khaira’s credit card expenses post-separation and by paying all the household expenses during the time that Ms. Khaira resided in the Matrimonial Home post-separation. However, Ms. Khaira’s financial statements show that she has sustained a chronic deficit of expenses exceeding income of approximately $2,000 each month, even before her change in employment to less remunerative work.

[270] I find that an award in the upper range of spousal support is appropriate. While Ms. Khaira has strong educational qualifications, they were not capable of being developed during the marriage due to her support of Dr. Ghumman and his career. She has job skills and experience in the workplace, but they will take more time to develop. Her current disability will impact her ability to advance her economic situation. Ms. Khaira’s strong compensatory claim is not adequately addressed by the low and mid ranges of spousal support.

[271] Ms. Khaira established a need for transitional support on a non-compensatory basis to allow her to adjust to her post-separation standard of living. The upper range of spousal support is required to address Ms. Khaira’s monthly household budget deficit. Further, an award at the upper end of the range recognizes that Dr. Ghumman has continued to reside in the Matrimonial Home, has retained use of most, if not all the furnishings and has had access to income from his practice during a period in which Ms. Khaira has relocated to Calgary and then to Vancouver in transition from the marriage.

[272] I have also taken into consideration the NFP equalization, because property division can affect the determination of spousal support within the ranges set out in the SSAGs. Ms. Khaira will share in the value of the matrimonial home only until the date of separation and left the marriage with no property. I find that the upper level of spousal support is unaffected by the NFP equalization in this case.

[273] A monthly award of $2,228 does not equalize incomes between these parties, but rather Ms. Khaira will receive about 36.4% of net disposable income (“NDI”). This is, in my view, consistent with the principles set out in the Divorce Act as applied to a marriage of medium duration with a spouse who was 34 years old at the date of separation with no children. It is also reasonable to allow Dr. Ghumman a greater percentage of the NDI considering the expenses that he will incur in continuing to generate his professional income.

[274] In terms of duration of spousal support, the Applicant did not establish that a lump sum spousal support award is appropriate in this case. The Applicant did not establish the basis for such an award, the method for calculating any such award together with a range of possible outcomes, or any basis for the exercise of discretion to provide a lump sum award. The Applicant did not prove the factors set out by the Court of Appeal in Davis v. Crawford (2011), 2011 ONCA 294, 95 R.F.L. (6th) 257, at paras. 51-76.

[275] I am of the view that this is an instance where a high-range amount of spousal support ought to be linked to a shorter duration. Ms. Khaira is young and has a proven record of achievement both in educational pursuits and in the job market. There is the potential that her financial situation will improve, even though she continues in a period of post-separation transition that has been compounded by her current disability and by her multi-year involvement in litigation. Ms. Khaira requires transitional support. Also, a shorter duration recognizes that Dr. Ghumman provided support in funding some of Ms. Khaira’s credit card expenses and costs of the Matrimonial Home while she lived there post-separation. I thereby find that the appropriate duration of the spousal support is four and one-half years, comprising six months for each year of marriage.

[276] Turning to the start date of the spousal support, I accept Dr. Ghumman’s alternative submission, uncontested by Ms. Khaira, that any spousal support should start at the date of judgment.

[277] Based on all the reasons explained herein, the SSAGs and applicable case authority, I conclude that payment by Dr. Ghumman to Ms. Khaira of monthly spousal support of $2,228 over a time-limited duration of four and one-half years commencing January 1, 2023 is in accordance with the objectives and purposes set out in the Divorce Act.

VI. THE RECOVERY OF PERSONAL BELONGINGS

[278] The parties did not dispute that Ms. Khaira has personal belongings in the Matrimonial Home. Ms. Khaira testified that she stored these belongings in a bedroom and small closet, and that items listed on her list of Household Goods & Furniture were purchased by her.

[279] Dr. Ghumman shall provide Ms. Khaira with two days to remove her personal belongings and furniture from the Matrimonial Home, which Ms. Khaira may schedule on 14 days’ notice to Dr. Ghumman. If the lawyers for the parties cannot agree on terms for this process, they may request a Case Conference.

VII. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

[280] In conclusion, I have determined the issues raised by this trial as follows:

1. The Matrimonial Home Issues:

A. Ms. Khaira did not establish a beneficial interest in the Matrimonial Home. Ms. Khaira is entitled to share in the value of the Matrimonial Home at the date of separation, but not in the post-separation increase in value.

B. Ms. Khaira is not entitled to occupation rent.

2. The Property Valuation Issues Affecting NFP Equalization:

A. Dr. Ghumman’s business interests in his orthodontal practice on the date of separation shall be valued for the purpose of NFP equalization as follows: (i) $305,000, regarding the interest in Ghumman Dentistry Professional Corporation, with disposition costs of $44,000; (ii) shareholder loans in the amounts of $237.00 and $7,558.18; (iii) $580,000, regarding the interest in Ghumman Dhingra Dentistry Professional Corporation, with disposition costs of $53,750; (iv) $95,000, regarding the interest in Dhingra Ghumman Dentistry Professional Corporation, with disposition costs of $28,250.

B. Dr. Ghumman shall not be allocated $50,000 in “General Household Items”.

3. The Propriety of Deductions:

A. The funds provided to Dr. Ghumman by his parents prior to separation totaling $864,700, and which increased by compound interest to the amount of $1,884,160, are loans.

B. The loans provided to Dr. Ghumman by his parents prior to separation are deductible, for the purposes of NFP equalization, to 10% of their value.

4. Net Family Property Calculation

A. Dr. Ghumman shall pay Ms. Khaira the amount of $606,728.60 as NFP equalization, subject to any arithmetical or computational error that either party is advised to raise, within 30 days of the date of these Reasons for Judgment, in the calculation of the NFP as set out in Schedule “A” to these reasons.

B. Ms. Khaira did not establish any basis for an unequal division of the NFP.

5. Spousal Support

A. Ms. Khaira is entitled to an award of spousal support on both compensatory and non-compensatory grounds.

B. Dr. Ghumman shall pay Ms. Khaira monthly spousal support of $2,228, commencing January 1, 2023 and continuing for four and one-half years.

6. Recovery of Personal Belongings

A. Dr. Ghumman shall provide Ms. Khaira with two days to remove her personal belongings and furniture from the Matrimonial Home, which Ms. Khaira may schedule on 14 days’ notice to Dr. Ghumman.

VIII. DISPOSITION

[281] A judgment shall issue in the following terms:

(a) Dr. Ghumman shall pay Ms. Khaira net family property equalization in the amount of $606,728.60.

(b) Pursuant to the Divorce Act, Dr. Ghumman shall pay monthly spousal support of $2,228, commencing January 1, 2023 and continuing on the first day of each month that follows for four and one-half years.

(c) A Support Deduction Order shall issue.

(d) Dr. Ghumman shall provide Ms. Khaira with two days to remove her personal belongings and furniture from the Matrimonial Home, which Ms. Khaira may schedule on 14 days’ notice to Dr. Ghumman.

(e) The judgment bears interest at the applicable rate under the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43.

[282] The parties may deliver a form of judgment, with their approval as to form and content. If they do not agree on the form of judgment, the parties may request a Case Conference.

IX. COSTS

[283] The parties are encouraged to agree on the issue of costs. If the parties cannot agree on the issue of costs, any party seeking costs may, by January 20, 2023, deliver by email to my judicial assistant after service and filing on CaseLines, written costs submission of no more than 8 pages, plus a Bill of Costs. Any party against whom costs is sought may, by February 10, 2023, deliver by email to my judicial assistant after service and filing on CaseLines, responding cost submissions of the same length. If no party delivers any written cost submissions by February 10, 2023, I will deem the issue of costs to have been settled.

Justice A.A. Sanfilippo

Released: December 20, 2022

SCHEDULE “A”

Calculation of Net Family Property Equalization

1. VALUE OF ASSETS OWNED ON VALUATION DATE

(a) Land

Ms. Khaira

Dr. Ghumman

Matrimonial Home

44 Claritrell Road, Toronto

$0.00

$1,170,000.00

TOTAL (A): Value of Land:

$0.00

$1,170,000.00

(b) General Household Items and Vehicle

Cars

2006 Honda Accord and 2013 BMW 335xi

$34,612.50[3]

Other special items

Jewelry gifted by either party

$25,071.00[4]

$2,800.00[5]

TOTAL (B): Value of Household Items & Vehicles:

$25,071.00

$37,412.50

(c) Bank Accounts and Savings, Securities and Pensions

TOTAL (C): Value of Accounts and Savings:

$94,589.16[6]

$123,677.73[7]

(d) Life and Disability Insurance

TOTAL (D): Cash Surrender Value of Insurance:

$0.00[8]

$0.00[9]

(e) Business Interests

Orthodontic Practice

Value of Ghumman Holding Company

$305,000.00

Shareholder loans from Ghumman Holding Company

$237.00 $7,558.18

Value of Maple Corporation

$580,000.00

Value of the Brampton Corporation

$95,000.00

Disposition Costs

Disposition - Ghumman Holding Company

($44,000.00)[10]

Dispositions Costs of Maple Corporation

($53,750.00)

Disposition Costs of Brampton Corporation

($28,250.00)

TOTAL (E): Value of Business Interests:

$0.00

$861,795.18

(f) Money Owed to You

2015 Tax Refund owed to husband

2015 Notice of Assessment

$17,028.27[11]

TOTAL (F): Money Owed to You:

$0.00

$17,028.27

(g) Other Property

TOTAL (G): Value of Other Property:

$0.00

$0.00

TOTAL (1) VALUE OF PROPERTY OWNED ON VALUATION DATE: (Items A to G, inclusive)

$119,660.16

$2,209,913.50

2. VALUE OF DEBTS AND OTHER LIABILITIES ON VALUATION DATE

Matrimonial Home Loan

$717,402.63[12]

Cost of Disposition of Matrimonial Home

5% for real estate commission and $2,000 for legal fees

$60,500.00

VISA Bills

$3,056.66[13]

Loans from totaling $685,000

May 17, 2006; December 14, 2007; March 20, 2009; November 20, 2009, discounted to 10%

$68,500.00

Loans totaling $79,700 for car loans and rental car

December 22, 2012 loan agreement discounted to 10%

$7,970.00

Loan totaling $100,000

October 22, 2014 loan agreement discounted to 10%

$10,000.00

Ms. Khaira’s student loans

$29,791.74

Ms. Khaira’s credit card debt

$2,746.13

Disposition cost of pension

$8,318.52

Disposition cost of RRSP

$3,832.22

TOTAL (2): Value of Debts and other Liabilities:

$44,688.61

$867,429.29

3. NET VALUE OF PROPERTY, DEBTS AND LIABILITIES ON THE DATE OF MARRIAGE

General household items and vehicles

$25,390.00

RBC Dominion Securities[14]

$80,471.51

Wife’s jewelry

$25,071.00

TOTAL Value of Date of Marriage Property:

$25,071.00

$105,861.51

Date of Marriage Loan to parents of $336,000

Discounted to 10%

$33,600.00

Disposition costs of savings account

$6,865.00

TOTAL Value of Date of Marriage Debt:

$6,865.00

$33,600.00

TOTAL (3): NET VALUE of Property Owned at Date of Marriage:

$18,206.00

$72,261.51

TOTAL (4) Value of Property Excluded Under s. 4(2) of the Family Law Act

$0.00

$0.00

TOTAL (2): Value of Debts and other Liabilities:

$44,688.61

$867,429.29

TOTAL (3) Net Value of Date of Marriage Property:

$18,206.00

$72,261.51

TOTAL (4) Value of Property Excluded – FLA:

$0.00

$0.00

TOTAL (5): TOTAL (2) + (3) + (4):

$62,894,61

$939,690.80

TOTAL (1) VALUE OF PROPERTY OWNED ON VALUATION DATE:

$119,660.16

$2,209,913.50

TOTAL (5): (immediately above)

$62,894,61

$939,690.80

TOTAL (6): NET FAMILY PROPERTY

$56,765.55

$1,270,222.70

EQUALIZATION PAYMENT:

Dr. Ghumman pays to Ms. Khaira: $606,728.60

COURT FILE NO.: FS-19-009799

DATE: 20221220

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

BALKIRAN KAUR KHAIRA

Applicant

– and –

AJEET SINGH GHUMMAN

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

AA. Sanfilippo J.

Released: December 20, 2022

[1] The designation “USD” is used where funds were provided in currency of the United States. In all other instances where money is described in dollar values, it is in Canadian currency.

[2] The principal amount outstanding of $864,700 was derived as follows: (a) the August 2010 Loan Agreement in the amount of $745,300 reduced by the Notional Repayment of $60,300 for a net total outstanding of $685,000. With compound interest to the date of separation, this amount totaled $1,666,100; (b) the December 2012 Car Loan Agreement in the principal amount of $79,700. With compound interest to the date of separation, this amount totaled $105,360; (c) the October 2014 Loan Agreement in the principal amount of $100,000. With compound interest, to the date of separation, this amount totaled $112,700. The total of the principal amount outstanding on the date of separation was $685,000 + $79,700+100,000=$864,700. The total amount outstanding on the date of separation, with compound interest, was $1,666,100+$105,360+$112,700=$1,884,160.

[3] Agreed by the parties: $4,175 for 2006 Honda Accord; $30,437.50 for 2013 BMW.

[4] Agreed by the parties: Jewellery gifted to the Applicant, including engagement ring.

[5] Agreed by the parties: Wedding ring and watches.

[6] Agreed by the parties.

[7] Agreed by the parties.

[8] Agreed by the parties.

[9] Agreed by the parties.

[10] Agreed by the parties.

[11] Agreed by the parties.

[12] Agreed by the parties.

[13] Agreed by the parties.

[14] Agreed by the parties.