Andrew J. Hotke

The applicant sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal, leave to appeal sentence, and a release order pending appeal.

The primary issue was the court's jurisdiction to grant a release order under s. 679 of the Criminal Code, as the applicant had already been released under an invalid Superior Court order.

The court initially refused the release order, holding that the applicant was not in "custody" for the purposes of s. 679 while released under the invalid order.

The court granted the release order only after the applicant surrendered into physical custody, clarifying that an invalid release order remains binding until negated by due process or surrender.

The appellant, Subeer Bakal, appealed his convictions for firearm offences and breaches, and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

He also sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the principles for assessing evidence, including circumstantial evidence (R. v. W.(D.) and R. v. Villaroman).

The court also denied the application to admit fresh evidence, finding it lacked cogency and was implausible.

Finally, the court granted leave to appeal the sentence but dismissed the sentence appeal, concluding that the trial judge properly considered sentencing principles, including the totality principle, time spent on bail, and the issue of anti-Black racism.

The appellant, a former high school teacher, appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual exploitation involving two former students (D.R. and L.G.).

The appeal focused on alleged misapprehensions of evidence by the trial judge concerning L.G.'s and a corroborating witness's testimony, and a misdirection on the reasonable doubt standard, particularly regarding the R. v. W.(D.) principles.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's errors in summarizing evidence were not material and that, despite a misstatement of the W.(D.) steps, the trial judge properly applied the reasonable doubt standard to all allegations.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Gurkirat Rai, appealed his conviction following guilty pleas to multiple driving-related offences, including dangerous operation and driving while disqualified, which resulted in a permanent licence suspension by the Ministry of Transportation under the Highway Traffic Act.

The appellant argued his pleas were uninformed because his counsel erroneously advised him that his licence could be reinstated after 10 years, and he was unaware of the automatic lifetime suspension under the HTA or the cumulative effect of consecutive two-year suspensions.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to admit fresh evidence but dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to establish subjective prejudice.

The court concluded that it was not credible that the appellant would have acted differently had he received accurate advice, given his primary motivation to be released from pre-trial custody quickly, his willingness to plead guilty despite knowing a lifetime Criminal Code prohibition was possible, the strong Crown case, and his subsequent conduct of re-offending.

This is an appeal from convictions for firearm offences.

The appellants argued Charter breaches (s. 8, 9, 10(b)) and unreasonable verdicts based on misapprehension of evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no Charter breaches, disagreeing with the trial judge's s. 8 finding.

However, it allowed both conviction appeals, finding that the trial judge's conclusion regarding an "exchange of gunfire" was based on a fundamental misapprehension of evidence, and that the use of cellphone photographs to infer possession was improper due to lack of similarity and risk of propensity reasoning.

Ahmed's convictions were quashed and acquittals entered, while Yusuf's convictions were quashed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for multiple firearm-related charges, arguing that his Charter rights under sections 8 and 9 were breached due to an unlawful arrest and subsequent search, and that the trial judge erred in admitting the seized evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the police had reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest and search incident to arrest, based on the totality of the circumstances including confidential informant information, observed drug transactions, and the dynamic nature of the situation.

The court also found no error in the sentence imposed.

The appellant, Davoud Tohidy, sought to lay an information against Premier Doug Ford alleging Criminal Code offences related to the provincial government's COVID-19 pandemic response.

After a justice of the peace refused to receive the information and the Superior Court summarily dismissed his application for mandamus and other relief, Mr. Tohidy appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The Registrar referred the appeal for summary dismissal under s. 685(1) of the Criminal Code and r. 17 of the Criminal Appeal Rules.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reviewing judge's reasons, finding the appeal meritless, frivolous, and vexatious, and dismissed it without a full hearing.

The appellant was convicted of defrauding a business partner and sentenced to 18 months incarceration and restitution.

He appealed his conviction, arguing a s. 11(b) Charter violation (right to be tried within a reasonable time) and an error in the R. v. W.(D.) analysis.

He also sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The Court of Appeal found a s. 11(b) violation, concluding that the trial judge incorrectly applied the presumptive ceiling for delay.

The court dismissed the Crown's request to impose a remedy other than a stay of proceedings, reaffirming that a stay is the appropriate and only available remedy for a s. 11(b) breach.

The conviction for fraud was stayed.

The appellant's other grounds of appeal, including the W.(D.) analysis and the sentence appeal, were dismissed.

The appellant, Dwayne Campbell, appealed his convictions for robbery, forcible confinement, and use of an imitation firearm, arguing that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was breached.

The total delay was 28 months and 26 days, below the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the application judge erred in assessing the appellant's "meaningful steps to expedite," the case did not "markedly" exceed the reasonable time requirements, largely due to the co-accused's actions and the Crown's reasonable decision not to sever the trials.

The appellant, Dia 'Eddin Hanan, appealed his conviction for manslaughter and firearms-related offences, and his sentence, following a jury trial.

The appeal raised two main grounds: an alleged breach of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time, and alleged errors in the trial judge's jury charge regarding the burden of proof and self-defence.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals.

They upheld the trial judge's assessment of delay, including the attribution of defence delay and the application of the transitional exceptional circumstance under R. v. Jordan.

They also found no reversible error in the jury instructions, concluding that the charge, read as a whole, adequately conveyed the burden of proof and the W.(D.) rule.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal, finding a s. 11(b) breach and serious errors in the jury instructions.

The appellant, under a detention order from the Ontario Review Board (ORB) following a Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) finding, appealed the ORB's decision to continue his detention.

The appellant argued the ORB erred in finding he posed a significant risk to public safety and sought an absolute or conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the ORB's conclusion that the appellant posed a significant risk, based on psychiatric evidence of likely decompensation and violence if discharged, was reasonable.

The court also found the ORB reasonably considered and rejected a conditional discharge, given the risk of rapid deterioration.

The Crown appealed, with leave, a summary conviction appeal judge's decision that set aside a sexual assault conviction and ordered a new trial.

The complainant testified to waking up unconscious during sexual activity with the respondent.

The trial judge found the complainant unable to and did not consent, concluding she was unconscious.

The summary conviction appeal judge (SCAJ) criticized the trial judge's reasons for insufficiency, particularly regarding the timing of unconsciousness, prior consent, and the handling of expert toxicological evidence and post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal found the SCAJ unduly critical, reiterating that trial judges are not required to detail every piece of evidence and that expert evidence, while not definitive, supported the complainant's account.

The Court of Appeal rejected the SCAJ's suggestion of drawing an adverse inference against the Crown for perceived deficiencies in expert evidence presentation, deeming it unprecedented.

It also found the trial judge's use of post-offence conduct, though equivocal, was not fatal in a judge-alone trial.

Applying the principle that an unconscious person cannot consent, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial judge was entitled to find an absence of consent.

The appellant challenged his conviction and sentence, arguing the application judge erred by not allowing cross-examination of an affiant regarding omitted information about the appellant's residence and the reliability of a confidential informant (CI#1).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's discretionary decision.

The court held that the omitted information about the appellant's residence was not sufficiently cogent to warrant cross-examination, and the affiant's omission of CI#1's general comment about lying was not an attempt to mislead, nor did it detract from the specific, corroborated information provided by CI#1 for the search warrant.

The appellant, S.F., appealed his conviction for sexual interference, arguing the trial judge erred in making impermissible use of prior consistent statements, misapprehending evidence concerning disclosure to a high school counsellor, and applying an uneven standard of scrutiny to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly articulated and applied the principles governing prior consistent statements, did not misapprehend the evidence, and properly assessed witness credibility without uneven scrutiny.

The appellant, Linda Lawlor, appealed her conviction for fraud over $5,000 and the fine in lieu of forfeiture portion of her sentence.

The conviction arose from the fraudulent transfer of a property using a personal security license, leading to substantial mortgages.

The appellant argued for a mistrial, claiming a misunderstanding of the charge's scope, as the trial proceeded on the basis of eight properties when her committal was limited to one.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the conviction rested on overwhelming evidence related to the specific property, and that evidence regarding other properties was admissible to show the relationship between the appellant and co-accused.

The court also rejected arguments about the defence's informed choices and reopening evidence.

Regarding the sentence appeal, the court affirmed that the fine in lieu of forfeiture is based on the value of property controlled, not just traced benefit, and that the co-accused's lack of control over funds meant the appellant could not rely on them for payment.

The appellant, Shawn Labrosse-Quinn, appealed a six-month sentence for robbery and possession of stolen property, arguing the sentencing judge misconstrued his role and erred in not imposing a conditional or intermittent sentence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found the sentencing judge correctly assessed the appellant's moral culpability as a getaway driver who was wilfully blind to the robbery and did not err in declining a conditional or intermittent sentence, emphasizing the need for deterrence and denunciation.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Kevin Luangchaleun, appealed an Ontario Review Board disposition that ordered his detention in the Ontario Shores Centre for Mental Health Sciences with conditions allowing community living in approved accommodation.

The appellant sought an absolute discharge or a conditional discharge with a residence requirement, arguing the Board's order was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was reasonable, based on the treating psychiatrist's opinion that the appellant remained a significant threat to public safety if not closely supervised and monitored.

This appeal concerned the sufficiency of a trial judge's reasons for finding a police officer credible in a Charter application.

The appellant was stopped for a suspended license, and a subsequent search revealed a handgun.

Disclosure later revealed the stop was partly based on confidential informant information, which the officer initially omitted.

The trial judge found the officer credible, dismissing the appellant's s. 9 Charter breach claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's reasons, while brief, were sufficient given the context where there was no conflicting evidence and the defence had abandoned issues related to late disclosure.

The appellant, Bevon Marshall, appealed a cumulative sentence of 21.5 years for various criminal offences, including robbery, firearms offences, drug trafficking, and aggravated assault, imposed by three different judges.

He also appealed the duration of a ten-year long-term supervision order (LTSO).

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, affirming that the sentencing judges properly applied the totality principle and that the sentences were fit.

The court upheld the 10-year LTSO, concluding that the expert evidence and the appellant's extensive criminal history established a substantial risk of violent re-offence, justifying the order's maximum duration.

The appellant, Brian Lariviere, appealed a 12-month imprisonment sentence for aggravated assault, use of an imitation firearm, breach of recognizance, and fentanyl possession, after receiving credit for pre-sentence custody and stringent bail conditions.

The appeal sought a reduction in sentence due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on detention conditions.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding the original sentence fit and that general pandemic conditions, without unique personal vulnerability, did not justify a sentence reduction.