Amy Alyea

Le demandeur, inculpé de fraude et d'entrave à la justice aux États-Unis pour avoir enlevé des cartons de documents, demande l'autorisation d'interjeter appel d'une ordonnance d'obtention rendue en vertu de la Loi sur l'entraide juridique en matière criminelle.

La Cour d'appel applique le critère de l'arrêt Ross et conclut que l'ordonnance d'obtention n'est qu'une étape préliminaire visant à préserver les documents avant l'audition de la requête en transmission.

La demande d'autorisation d'appel et la requête en suspension sont rejetées.

The appellant appealed her sentence of three months' jail and three years' probation for assault, break and enter, and other offences.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the appellant's mental health progress and the likelihood of drug use while on a conditional sentence.

Noting the uncontradicted evidence from her psychiatrist that a custodial sentence would be particularly difficult, and her continued progress while on bail, the Court allowed the appeal and reduced the custodial sentence to time served.

The Crown appealed a sentence consisting of a $500 fine.

The Court of Appeal noted that given the gravity of the offences and the offender's substantial record, the fine was inadequate to address denunciation, general deterrence, and protection of the public.

However, because the offender had turned his life around and assumed substantial family responsibilities, the court concluded that incarcerating him would not be in the interest of justice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of criminal harassment for sending two unwanted letters to the complainant over an 18-month period.

He appealed, arguing that two communications do not meet the threshold of 'repeatedly' communicating under s. 264(2)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that 'repeatedly' means more than once, and that two communications can suffice depending on the context and history between the parties.

The court also denied leave to appeal the sentence of 18 months' imprisonment, finding it manifestly fit given the appellant's extensive criminal record.

The appellant was convicted of sexually interfering with his niece and a family friend, both young children.

At trial, the judge admitted four out-of-court statements by the niece which contained details missing from her viva voce testimony.

On appeal, the appellant argued the statements should not have been admitted.

The Court of Appeal held that while the trial judge did not err in finding the necessity and reliability criteria were met for the statements, he erred in admitting all four statements instead of just one.

The cumulative impact of the four statements was prejudicial, and the curative proviso could not be applied.

The conviction appeal regarding the niece was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The sentence appeal regarding the family friend was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual offences against his stepdaughter, arguing the trial judge erred in defining reasonable doubt, misused prior inconsistent statements, and improperly assessed witness credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge adequately instructed himself on the burden of proof, properly handled the prior inconsistent statements, and reasonably assessed the evidence and credibility of the witnesses.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 18 months in custody and 15 months' probation for robbery.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred by overemphasizing general deterrence for a youthful first offender, ignoring the principle of restraint for a first custodial sentence, and failing to consider the appellant's Aboriginal status.

Based on fresh evidence of educational and occupational opportunities, the sentence was reduced to time served plus 15 months' probation.

The appellant appealed his conviction on four counts of parental abduction and his sentence of 28 months' imprisonment (plus 20 months' pre-sentence custody).

He argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his O'Connor application for third-party records, improperly intervened during trial, admitted an untranslated videotape as demeanour evidence, and improperly instructed the jury on discreditable conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors and concluding the appellant's right to a fair trial was not compromised.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence fell within the appropriate range.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision that acquitted the accused of driving over 80.

The accused had been stopped by police for failing to signal a turn and was followed into his underground parking garage, where he was arrested and provided breath samples.

The appeal judge had found Charter breaches regarding arbitrary detention, unlawful search, and right to counsel.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the conviction, finding that the police were acting in the lawful execution of their duties, were entitled to follow the accused into the garage in continuous pursuit, and that the accused's right to counsel was not violated.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and his summary conviction appeal was dismissed.

He appealed to the Court of Appeal, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and failed to properly apply the W. (D.) test for assessing credibility and reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge's reasons suggested a credibility contest, misstated the standard of proof, and misapprehended key evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a severe sentence for an unprovoked and vicious assault that resulted in serious injuries.

The Court of Appeal found no legal error in the sentencing judge's reasons, noting that mitigating factors such as a guilty plea, a positive pre-sentence report, and the appellant's first-offender status were properly considered.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to uttering a death threat and received a sentence of one day in prison, two years' probation, and credit for pre-trial custody.

He appealed his conviction, seeking to withdraw his guilty plea on the grounds that his counsel coerced and misled him.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the appellant's claims incredible and concluding the plea was voluntary, unequivocal, and informed.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the custodial portion was moot and the sentencing judge made no error in accepting the joint submission.

The appellant pleaded guilty to multiple charges, including possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and possession of prohibited firearms, and was sentenced to two years less a day.

He appealed his sentence, arguing that the sentencing judge made significant errors, including misapprehending the maximum penalty for the drug offence and relying on inaccurate facts.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the sentencing proceedings contained significant errors, warranting a non-deferential review.

However, the Court concluded that the sentence imposed was ultimately fit given the seriousness of the offences, particularly the possession of loaded handguns, balanced against the appellant's youth and rehabilitative potential.

The sentence appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, who was on full parole after being convicted of child pornography offences, sought bail pending appeal to modify a parole condition restricting his access to computers.

The Crown opposed the application, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction under s. 679 of the Criminal Code because a person on full parole is not in 'custody'.

The Court of Appeal held that full parole is a form of custody sufficient to engage the court's jurisdiction under s. 679.

The court granted bail pending appeal and modified the conditions to allow the applicant to use computers and the internet for employment purposes.

The appellant brought a motion to unseal a victim impact statement solely for inclusion in the Appeal Book.

The Crown consented to the request.

The Court of Appeal granted the order, directing that the victim impact statement be included in a sealed envelope within the Appeal Book to preserve the intent of the original sealing order.

The appellant appealed his assault conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings—that the appellant undertook to protect the complainant and that her dependence on him for necessities made her particularly vulnerable to his influence—were supported by the evidence and warranted a conviction.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and unlawful confinement.

He appealed the conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the complainant's prior inconsistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge did not adhere to model jury instructions and made a factual error regarding a cell phone, the instructions as a whole made it clear how the jury could use the prior inconsistent statements to assess credibility, and the error was not prejudicial.

The appellant appealed a 3-year sentence for extortion and threatening, arguing the sentencing judge failed to give adequate weight to the totality principle.

The appellant committed the offences while in custody for previous offences against the same complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the 3-year sentence reflected the totality principle, as the offences would have merited a longer sentence given the appellant's extensive criminal record had he not already been serving a substantial sentence.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of seven bank robberies based on a videotaped confession, eyewitness identification, and circumstantial evidence.

On appeal, he argued that his videotaped statement was inadmissible because police did not reiterate his right to counsel when questioning shifted to other robberies, that the jury was inadequately instructed on photo lineups, that the trial judge's interventions caused a miscarriage of justice, and that the jury was not told to consider evidence for each count separately.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant understood his jeopardy and right to counsel, and dismissed the first three grounds.

While the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury to consider the identification evidence separately for each count, the Court applied the curative proviso because the videotaped confession provided overwhelming evidence of guilt.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a 9-month sentence imposed on the respondent for sexually molesting his stepdaughter over a three-year period.

The victim was between nine and twelve years old.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence demonstrably unfit given the intrusive nature of the conduct and the blatant breach of trust.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was varied to two years less a day in custody, followed by the probation order imposed at trial.