Amy Alyea

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for repeated acts of sexual abuse against his step-daughter.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, erred in refusing production of therapist notes, and erred in treating after-the-fact conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed the evidence and that the verdict was reasonable.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court upholding the 18-month custodial sentence as fit.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to possess stolen motor vehicles and four counts of possession of stolen motor vehicles.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the inference available from recent possession of stolen property.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge improperly conflated the issues of possession and guilty knowledge, and mischaracterized the defence's position by suggesting the appellant had offered an explanation for possession when he had denied possession entirely.

The appeal was allowed, the substantive possession and conspiracy convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of sexually assaulting a young foster child in his care and sentenced to 15 months' imprisonment.

He appealed both the conviction, arguing the verdict was unreasonable due to credibility issues with the complainant, and the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the jury's assessment of credibility.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge did not err in principle by declining a conditional sentence and imposing incarceration.

The appellant appealed his convictions and the total sentence of ten years imposed for three offences.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to assess the complainant's credibility based on the totality of the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence.

On the sentence appeal, the Court found the ten-year sentence was beyond the appropriate range and exceeded the Crown's suggested sentence.

The sentence appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to six years concurrent for each offence, taking into account pre-trial custody.

The appellant, a young person, was convicted of seven counts of extortion and sentenced to 10 months of custody.

He appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing that the trial judge's handling of his co-accused's guilty plea created an apprehension of bias, and that she erred in admitting his statement, rejecting his alibi, applying the W.(D.) test, and assessing identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no fatal errors in the trial judge's rulings or credibility assessments.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 10-month custodial sentence was deemed fit for the serious offences committed.

The applicant sought release from custody pending his new trial for first degree murder, having spent almost 10 years in custody.

The Court of Appeal had previously quashed his conviction due to errors regarding jailhouse informant testimony and bad character evidence.

The court found the applicant met his onus under section 515(10) of the Criminal Code, noting the Crown's case was now considerably weaker, the applicant had strong community ties, a positive institutional record, and posed minimal risk to the public.

The application for release was granted subject to strict conditions, including a cash deposit and substantial sureties.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder.

At trial, the Crown relied heavily on the testimony of a jailhouse informant.

The trial judge gave a Vetrovec warning but erred by providing the jury with examples of potentially confirmatory evidence that were not capable of confirming the informant's testimony.

The trial judge also erred by allowing the Crown to introduce highly prejudicial investigative hearsay evidence regarding the appellant's antecedents, including alleged ties to terrorism and the drug trade, to rebut a defence claim of an inadequate police investigation.

The Court of Appeal found that both errors deprived the appellant of a fair trial.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, a former psychotherapist, appealed his convictions for historical sexual offences against five female patients.

At trial, the appellant argued that the sexual acts were either consensual, part of bona fide therapy, or occurred outside the therapeutic relationship.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge fundamentally erred in his jury instructions on consent by conflating medical 'informed consent' with criminal consent and failing to properly put the defence's theory to the jury.

The Court also held that the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay evidence from a prior disciplinary hearing under the principled exception, as the necessity and reliability criteria were not met.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in responding to a jury question about reasonable doubt and by holding an in-chambers conference regarding the jury's request to clear the courtroom for the verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's repetition of the original reasonable doubt charge was appropriate.

The court also held that the in-chambers conference was not inappropriate, caused no prejudice, and any irregularity was cured by section 686(1)(b)(iv) of the Criminal Code.

The young person appellant appealed his convictions for assault and assault causing bodily harm arising from two altercations with another youth on the same day.

The Court of Appeal quashed the simple assault conviction, finding the first incident was a consensual schoolyard scuffle and the resulting head injury was unintended.

The Court upheld the conviction for assault causing bodily harm for the second incident, as the appellant initiated the confrontation and the victim did not consent to fight.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, replacing the suspended sentence with a conditional discharge and one month of probation, noting the appellant's good character and lack of criminal record.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault against an intellectually disabled complainant.

At trial, the Crown did not argue that the complainant lacked the capacity to consent, but the trial judge instructed the jury on capacity under s. 273.1(2)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that while expert evidence is not strictly required to assess capacity, the trial judge erred by leaving the issue with the jury when it was not raised by the Crown, prejudicing the defence.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed her conviction and sentence for pointing a firearm at her two children during an incident that occurred 19 years prior.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on the testimony of the complainants, despite the appellant's denial and inconsistencies in the complainants' evidence.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge properly assessed credibility and applied the burden of proof.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, and a one-year conditional sentence was imposed.

The appellant challenged assault convictions on the basis that the verdicts were unreasonable.

The court held that in-court identification evidence from the two victims, standing alone, could not support reasonable convictions.

Although evidence that the attacker was addressed by the first name Perry was capable of providing some confirmation, the Crown led no evidence explaining how the recorded licence plate number led police to the appellant.

The court held it could not fill gaps in the Crown's case and concluded the verdict did not cross the reasonableness threshold.

The Crown appealed a directed verdict acquitting a young offender on a sexual assault charge arising from the same incident as a charge under s. 152 of the Criminal Code.

The appeal court held that s. 150.1(3), which limits prosecution of persons aged twelve or thirteen for offences under s. 151 or s. 152 absent a specified relationship, does not apply to sexual assault under s. 271(1).

The court further held that the evidence of inducing a seven-year-old complainant to perform fellatio constituted evidence of touching and interference with bodily integrity amounting to force for assault purposes, rendering consent irrelevant given the complainant's age.

The acquittal was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant challenged historic convictions for gross indecency, indecent assault, and common assault arising from repeated sexual abuse of his younger sisters over a lengthy period.

The court held the trial judge's characterization of the appellant as violent and vindictive was reasonably grounded in the evidence and was admissible as narrative context explaining delayed disclosure, not as propensity proof.

The court further held that the convictions rested on a proper credibility assessment, including rejection of the fabrication theory, and that improper Crown cross-examination caused only minimal prejudice.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the 44-month concurrent custodial sentence was upheld as fit given the prolonged abuse, force, threats, and enduring harm.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposing a conditional sentence for a serious but isolated incident.

The Court of Appeal held it was open to the trial judge, in the particular circumstances and in light of the complainant's expressed wishes, to emphasize restorative principles.

The decision to impose a conditional sentence was not unreasonable and attracted deference.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged his conviction on evidentiary and credibility-assessment grounds.

The court held that evidence relating to a stolen Nintendo and a note left by the appellant was admissible, provided it was not used as propensity evidence, and found no such misuse on the record.

However, the trial judge's reasons showed a failure to assess whether disbelief of the appellant's testimony nonetheless left the court with a reasonable doubt in a case turning on credibility.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.