Amy Alyea

The appellant broke into the 76-year-old complainant's apartment, sexually assaulted her, and stabbed her multiple times.

He was convicted of aggravated sexual assault, attempted murder, and other offences, and sentenced to life imprisonment.

The Crown had withdrawn its dangerous offender application after the appellant refused a psychiatric assessment.

On appeal, the appellant argued the life sentence was unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the sentencing judge made no error in principle and that the egregious circumstances of the offences and the need to protect the public justified the maximum sentence.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder on the basis that she aided or abetted the principal offender in fatally stabbing the deceased.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge made three errors in the jury charge: omitting the requirement of the principal's subjective foresight of death, failing to focus the jury on when the principal's intention was formed, and improperly instructing the jury on post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal agreed that these errors amounted to errors of law that could have had a significant impact on the verdict.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention in a medium secure unit.

The appellant argued that the disposition was unreasonable, that the Board failed to consider the statutory factors, that the reasons were inadequate, and that a treatment impasse had been reached.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's decision was reasonable given the significant escalation in the appellant's aggressive and threatening behaviour and the expert evidence supporting the need for a higher security level.

The appellant appealed his convictions for refusal to take a breathalyzer test and impaired driving.

He argued that his section 10(b) Charter rights were breached when he was denied a second phone call to his lawyer, and that the trial judge erred in finding impairment and drawing an inference under section 258(3) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant was not asking to speak to counsel for further advice, and holding there was ample evidence of impairment.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from a summary conviction appeal court decision upholding his conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample.

He argued he was denied a fair trial as a self-represented accused, alleged improper police motive, and sought a constitutional exemption from the mandatory minimum sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding the trial judge provided sufficient assistance, there was no evidence of improper motive, and no discretion existed to grant a constitutional exemption.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault and gun storage offences.

The Court of Appeal found that evidence of the appellant's refusal to answer police questions about a gun cabinet key was improperly admitted and repeated in the jury charge.

Additionally, the Crown failed to disclose a property report relevant to the gun storage charges.

Given the potential adverse inference on the appellant's credibility, the court quashed all convictions and ordered a new trial.

The appellant, a high school teacher, was charged with possession of child pornography after a school computer technician found explicit images of a student on his work laptop.

The principal seized the laptop and copied the images, and the school board later copied temporary Internet files before handing everything to the police, who searched the laptop without a warrant.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his personal files on the work computer, though modified by the technician's right to maintain the network.

While the school officials did not breach the Charter, the warrantless police search of the laptop and temporary Internet files violated section 8.

Applying the Grant framework, the Court excluded the laptop and temporary Internet files under section 24(2), but admitted the disc containing the images of the student.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence for the aggravated assault of a woman he had been dating.

He argued that the sentencing judge erred in excluding the possibility that his risk to the public could be managed in the community under a long-term offender designation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge's conclusion that the appellant's risk could not be controlled in the community was amply supported by the record.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to inquire into his Aboriginal background and consider s. 718(2)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence in the form of a Gladue report detailing the appellant's systemic and personal challenges.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to time served, with additional probation conditions requiring the appellant to reside with his father, attend counselling, and participate in a Healing Lodge program.

The appellant appealed his sentence, having already served his term of imprisonment but expressing concerns about his ability to comply with the probation terms.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence fit given the seriousness of the offence and the appellant's record.

The court held that any future problems with probation terms should be addressed through an application under s. 732.2 of the Criminal Code.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual interference involving two of his step-granddaughters, as well as his sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the young complainants' credibility and failed to adequately consider the possibility of collusion or tainting.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were detailed and properly addressed the evidence's frailties.

Leave to appeal the sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed, as the court rejected the argument that the sentencing judge improperly punished the appellant for a lack of remorse.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision that allowed an appeal from a conviction for obstructing justice and ordered a new trial.

The summary conviction appeal judge found that a comment made by the trial judge early in the examination-in-chief, suggesting a key witness was committing perjury, raised a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, agreeing that the trial judge's comment, combined with the summary dismissal of a mistrial motion without hearing submissions, supported a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellant appealed her conviction, arguing the trial judge failed to apply the Vetrovec principles to a witness's evidence and erred in presuming she had knowledge of materials from various civil suits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge was alive to the witness's evidence and was not required to expressly refer to Vetrovec.

Furthermore, any error regarding the civil suits caused no prejudice as they were a minor aspect of the case and the appellant had the opportunity to provide an explanation.

The appellants appealed their convictions.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in foreclosing the appellants from challenging the factual underpinnings of the counselling to commit murder charges for which the appellant Vanderheyden stood convicted.

The Court of Appeal agreed, noting that the counselling convictions provided a significant boost to the credibility of two unsavoury witnesses.

The court found that the curative proviso could not be applied, as it could not be satisfied that Vanderheyden would not have testified had the trial judge ruled differently.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellants were convicted of armed robbery and possession of a loaded restricted firearm following an incident at a clothing store where a third accomplice, who was armed, died in a confrontation with the storeowner.

On appeal, they challenged the jury instructions regarding the storeowner's evidence, the elements of armed robbery, and party liability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals against the armed robbery convictions and sentences, finding the jury instructions adequate.

However, the court allowed the appeals regarding the firearm possession convictions, setting them aside and ordering a new trial because the trial judge failed to instruct the jury on the specific elements of that offence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for dangerous driving, arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial lawyer advised him to testify, resulting in a virtual confession.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that trial counsel's advice was a reasonable exercise of judgment given the formidable Crown case, and was a strategic attempt to show the conduct fell short of the 'marked departure' standard.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the court found no basis to interfere.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Crown conceded that the appeal must be allowed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter by a judge and jury after shooting the victim during horseplay with a handgun.

He appealed his conviction, arguing errors in the jury charge regarding the standard of proof, the lack of a Vetrovec warning for a witness, and instructions on the defence of accident and criminal negligence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the jury instructions and noting that a Vetrovec warning was not mandatory.

The appellant appealed his conviction for child pornography.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by relying on improper propensity reasoning related to the appellant's sexual orientation to infer knowledge.

The trial judge also erred in drawing inferences of consciousness of guilt from advice given to a witness and the location of a computer, without sufficient evidentiary basis linking them to the child pornography charge.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his sentence for a serious domestic assault.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misunderstood the Crown's position on sentence and imposed a sentence beyond the proposal without providing reasons.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was varied to 15 months, factoring in a 22-month base sentence and 7 months of credit for pretrial custody.