Amit A. Ghosh

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with an excess blood alcohol concentration contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

Following a RIDE investigation, the defendant failed an approved screening test and was arrested.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of breath test readings, alleging violations of his section 10(b) Charter right to counsel.

The defendant argued that police violated his right to counsel of choice by presenting a binary option between identified counsel and duty counsel, failing to provide tools to search for counsel, and inappropriately steering him to duty counsel.

The court found no Charter violation and admitted the breath test evidence.

The defendant was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while having an excess blood alcohol concentration contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant challenged the approved screening device demand on the basis that it was not made "forthwith" as required by law, arguing violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that while there was a five-minute delay between the formation of reasonable suspicion and the provision of the demand, the delay was reasonably necessary given the defendant's exceptional chattiness and the operational context of a roadside stop.

The court found the demand was made forthwith and no Charter violation occurred.

The defendant was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while having an excess blood alcohol concentration contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence challenged the validity of the approved screening demand, arguing it was not made "forthwith" as required by law, and sought exclusion of the breath readings on Charter grounds.

The court found that while there was a five-minute delay between the formation of reasonable suspicion and the provision of the demand, the delay was reasonably necessary given the defendant's exceptional chattiness and the practical circumstances of the roadside stop.

The court concluded the demand was made forthwith and there was no Charter violation.

The defendant was found guilty.

The offender pleaded guilty to impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm.

He drove his vehicle into oncoming traffic, causing a head-on collision with a 79-year-old victim who suffered catastrophic injuries including a shattered hip and femur, broken ribs, fractured shoulder and neck, and a brain injury.

The offender's blood alcohol concentration was approximately twice the legal limit.

The offender was a first-time offender with strong character references and demonstrated genuine remorse.

The Crown sought 18 months custody, while the defence sought a 90-day intermittent sentence.

The court imposed 14 months custody, finding that general deterrence and denunciation were paramount sentencing objectives despite significant mitigating factors.

The defendant applied under section 276 of the Criminal Code to admit evidence of the complainant's prior sexual history at trial for a sexual assault charge.

The defendant sought to introduce evidence of prior consensual physical contact between the parties to rebut the complainant's anticipated testimony that they had no previous "relationship" or sexual contact, and to provide context regarding the nature of their relationship.

The court granted the application, finding the evidence admissible for purposes of narrative context, consent, and credibility assessment, as it did not engage the "twin myths" prohibited by section 276(1) and was necessary for the defendant's full answer and defence.

The accused was tried for robbery with a firearm at a residential property in Vaughan.

The Crown's case relied on video surveillance footage, GPS tracking of the suspect vehicle, cell tower evidence, cell phone contact records, and DNA evidence.

The key issue was identification of the accused as one of the three perpetrators captured on church surveillance footage.

The court found the accused guilty on all counts based on a holistic assessment of the evidence, including video identification under the Nikolovski test, GPS evidence placing the suspect vehicle at the accused's residence and the robbery scene at relevant times, and DNA evidence linking the accused to a glove found in the suspect vehicle.

The Crown applied to admit recognition evidence from a police officer identifying the defendant in surveillance video footage from a church parking lot.

The officer claimed to recognize the defendant as one of the suspects fleeing from a gunpoint robbery in Vaughan.

The application turned on whether the officer had sufficient prior acquaintance with the defendant to satisfy the Leaney/Brown test for admissibility of lay recognition evidence.

Despite reliability concerns regarding the officer's recollection of certain physical characteristics and limited prior contact, the court found the officer had sufficient prior acquaintance through a face-to-face interaction and was in a better position than the trier of fact to identify the perpetrator.

The recognition evidence was admitted.

The offender pleaded guilty to publication of intimate images without consent contrary to s. 162.1(1) of the Criminal Code.

The offender and victim were in an intimate relationship.

The victim initially consented to some video recordings for private viewing only.

The offender subsequently placed hidden cameras, continued posting videos online despite the victim's objections, and posted intimate images on multiple websites with the victim's full name and contact information.

The victim received over 300 calls or messages in response to an escort advertisement posted by the offender.

Eleven videos were discovered online, many viewed over 10,000 times.

The court accepted a joint submission for 18 months imprisonment and 3 years probation.

The appellant appealed his conviction for disobeying a stop sign contrary to section 136 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The appeal raised four grounds: improper denial of an adjournment application, failure to afford meaningful opportunity to review disclosure, conviction by section 54 rather than section 9.1 of the Provincial Offences Act, and insufficient evidence of identification.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the adjournment was properly denied, the brief hold-down for disclosure review was reasonable, section 54 was the appropriate procedure, and identification evidence was sufficient.

The defendant pleaded guilty to robbery contrary to s. 344 of the Criminal Code.

He accosted an 81-year-old woman at an automated banking machine on Yonge Street in Richmond Hill, used force to rob her of approximately $500, and damaged her eyeglasses valued at approximately $500.

The court imposed a sentence of 6 months imprisonment, less credit for 108 days of presentence custody (credited at 1.5 days per day for a total of 162 days), leaving 18 days to be served.

The defendant was also placed on probation for 36 months with conditions including substance abuse counselling, a no-contact order with the victim, a 100-metre distance restriction, restitution of $1,000, and a 10-year weapons prohibition.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while having a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude breath test results, alleging violations of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter based on insufficient grounds for arrest and the arbitrariness of the arrest.

The court found that the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest for impaired operation and should have instead demanded an approved screening device.

The court excluded the breath samples under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The court also found reasonable doubt regarding the impairment charge based on the limited objective evidence.

The accused was acquitted of both charges.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while having a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit, contrary to sections 253(1)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was found unconscious in the driver's seat of a parked vehicle.

The Crown conceded that the accused was seated in the driver's position and that his ability to drive was impaired with blood alcohol over the legal limit.

The sole issue was whether the accused had care or control of the vehicle.

The court found that the accused rebutted the statutory presumption under section 258(1)(a) by establishing on a balance of probabilities that he did not occupy the driver's seat for the purpose of setting the vehicle in motion.

The court further found that the Crown failed to prove de facto care or control, as the requisite realistic risk of danger was not present.

The accused was acquitted of both counts.