Allan D. J. Dick

The moving parties sought to set aside two international arbitral awards under Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, alleging inability to present their case, excess of jurisdiction, and inadequate reasons.

The court found a procedural fairness breach where the arbitrator made a proper-party finding without submissions, but held the issue was not material in context because separate findings eliminated personal liability on other grounds.

The court rejected the jurisdiction and insufficiency-of-reasons challenges, emphasizing the narrow scope of intervention and deference to international arbitral awards.

Exercising discretion under Article 34, the court declined to order a new arbitration.

The application was dismissed.

The court dismissed motions by the defendants to strike out the plaintiff’s statement of claim on the basis of absolute privilege.

The case concerns whether statements made in an affidavit in another proceeding, about a non-party, are protected by absolute privilege.

The court held that absolute privilege is subject to exceptions and applies only to statements made “with reference to the inquiry.” Without the full context of the affidavit and related documents, the court could not determine that the claim was bound to fail.

The court also addressed the application of absolute privilege to counsel and found no basis to treat counsel differently in this context.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed an appeal concerning an international commercial arbitration award.

The application judge had set aside the award due to a reasonable apprehension of bias by the arbitrator, who had accepted a second, unrelated arbitration engagement from the appellants' counsel without disclosure to the respondents.

The Court of Appeal held that the application judge erred by applying a subjective test for disclosure and bias, rather than the objective test mandated by the UNCITRAL Model Law.

The Court found no breach of the arbitrator's legal duty to disclose and no reasonable apprehension of bias, as the second arbitration involved no common parties or overlapping issues, and the arbitrator was not aware of the parties' subjective disclosure expectations.

The matter was remitted to the Superior Court to address other grounds for attacking the award.

The Applicants sought to set aside an arbitrator's decision denying their challenge for bias and to remove the arbitrator, alleging reasonable apprehension of bias due to the arbitrator's undisclosed involvement in another arbitration with the Respondents' counsel, and actual bias from a costs decision.

The court dismissed the application, finding the bias challenge was not brought in a timely manner and that neither reasonable apprehension of bias nor actual bias was established.

The court found no meaningful overlap between the arbitrations and that the arbitrator's finding of 'false statements' did not indicate actual bias.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking the appointment of an interim receiver over the shares of one of the defendants in several companies involved in land development projects.

The parties, who are shareholders in these companies, had a significant falling out, leading to defaults on secured loans.

The plaintiffs argued that a receiver was necessary to refinance debt and maximize value.

The court determined that the appropriate test for the interlocutory receiver appointment was the RJR MacDonald test, with an elevated 'strong prima facie case' standard due to the Mareva-like nature of the relief.

The court found that the plaintiffs failed to meet the merits requirement, as they asserted no legal or beneficial interest in the defendant's shares and the memorandum of understanding did not obligate the defendant to contribute further funds.

Furthermore, the court found no irreparable harm and that the balance of convenience did not favor the appointment, concluding that a receivership was not an appropriate remedy for a shareholder dispute where the moving party sought to eliminate the other party's control over their own shares.

The applicants sought to set aside two international arbitral awards, alleging reasonable apprehension of bias, exceeding jurisdiction, and inadequate reasons by the arbitrator.

The core issue was the arbitrator's failure to disclose a concurrent retainer from the respondents' counsel while the arbitration was ongoing.

The court found a reasonable apprehension of bias, emphasizing the importance of arbitrator impartiality and the specific context of the parties' pre-appointment concerns regarding relationships with counsel.

The awards were set aside, and a new arbitration was ordered.

The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal concerning the rescission of a franchise agreement.

The trial judge had found that the franchisees were entitled to rescind the agreement under the Arthur Wishart Act due to the franchisor's failure to provide a signed and dated disclosure certificate, and held the franchisor's sole director personally liable as a "franchisor’s associate." The appeal court affirmed that the absence of a proper certificate is a fatal flaw in disclosure, not requiring proof of an inability to make an informed investment, and upheld the finding of personal liability based on the director's representations.

A law firm, Teplitsky Colson, and its lawyer, Stephen Brunswick, brought a motion to be removed as lawyers of record for the plaintiff, Corey Libfeld, citing an irreparable breakdown in the solicitor-client relationship.

The firm argued that the plaintiff failed to provide instructions, made accusations of scheming and fiduciary duty violations, and threatened legal action.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, asserting no irreparable breakdown existed and that the firm continued to act on other matters.

The court found that the firm had demonstrated good and justifiable cause for removal, noting the severe deterioration of trust and communication, and granted the motion, dismissing the plaintiff's opposition.

The plaintiff franchisee and its officers sought statutory compensation and damages under the Arthur Wishart Act (Franchise Disclosure), 2000, alleging a fatally flawed disclosure certificate.

The defendant franchisor and its principal counterclaimed for wrongful rescission and damages.

The court found the franchisor's disclosure certificate was fatally flawed, entitling the franchisee to rescind the agreement.

The principal was found to be a franchisor's associate, personally liable for statutory compensation.

The counterclaim was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion to set aside two partial default judgments obtained by the plaintiff, NRG Lites Inc., arguing the Registrar lacked jurisdiction.

The Master agreed, finding the claim was not for a liquidated demand as it required a legal determination of individual liability for a contract with an alleged non-existent corporation and lacked sufficient particulars.

The Master also criticized the plaintiff's counsel for sharp practice in obtaining default judgments without notice to opposing counsel.

The motion was granted, setting aside the judgments, notings in default, and writs of seizure and sale.

The court approved the class action distribution plan, which allocated proceeds proportionally based on prior wind-down payments, and the class counsel's retainer agreement, fees, and disbursements.

The court also approved honourariums for the representative plaintiff and another instrumental class member.

A dispute regarding priority between General Motors' security interest and Class Counsel's first charge was noted for a subsequent decision.

This is a motion to vary the Court of Appeal's decision in a solicitor's negligence case.

The moving party sought to clarify the trial judge's discretion regarding the final quantification of damages and the process for calculating the damages award, subject to a ceiling of $36.9 million.

The respondent opposed the motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party could not bring itself within the applicable rules permitting reconsideration of appellate decisions, and that it was not in the interests of justice to invoke the court's narrow jurisdiction to reconsider.

This appeal concerns a class action by General Motors of Canada Limited (GMCL) dealers against the law firm Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP for breach of fiduciary and contractual duties.

During the 2009 financial crisis, Cassels represented three potentially conflicting clients: the Saturn Dealers, Industry Canada (regarding GMCL bailout financing), and GMCL dealers generally regarding a potential restructuring or insolvency.

The trial judge found that Cassels breached its duties by failing to disclose the conflict of interest with Industry Canada to the dealers and by failing to provide proper advice regarding Wind-Down Agreements (WDAs) offered by GMCL.

The dealers lost the opportunity to negotiate collectively for better compensation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the liability findings but reduced the damages award from $45 million to approximately $41 million (subject to further calculation regarding class composition).

This appeal arises from the 2009 General Motors of Canada bailout and the termination of franchise dealerships.

The franchisor offered Wind-Down Agreements to 240 dealers, providing payment in exchange for comprehensive releases of all claims, including those under the Arthur Wishart Act.

The dealers were required to obtain independent legal advice before signing.

A class action was subsequently brought by terminated franchisees claiming breaches of statutory rights.

The trial judge found the releases valid under the Tutor Time exception to section 11 of the Wishart Act, as they constituted settlements of known and existing claims entered into with legal advice.

The trial judge also held that covenants not to sue and indemnity provisions were void for public policy reasons but were severable from the release.

The Court of Appeal upheld both the validity of the releases and the severance of the covenant not to sue.

The court issued a supplementary endorsement reconsidering its prior decision to grant leave to appeal.

The initial decision granted leave to appeal an injunction order concerning a restrictive covenant in a commercial lease.

The reconsideration was prompted by an oversight where responding and reply materials were not initially put before the judge.

After reviewing the full record, the court affirmed its decision to grant leave to appeal, finding reasons to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's interpretation of the restrictive covenant and its exception, and the application of the RJR Macdonald test regarding irreparable harm and delay.

The court also noted the importance of the issues due to the common use of restrictive covenants in commercial leases.

Costs were reserved to the Divisional Court or to be fixed by the judge upon written submissions.

In a certified class action arising from the termination of automobile dealerships following the 2009 automotive industry restructuring, the plaintiff brought a Rule 30 motion seeking production of documents withheld on the basis of solicitor‑client privilege by a non‑party dealers’ association.

The court reviewed 211 disputed documents in camera to determine whether they constituted privileged legal advice or merely legal information.

Applying the distinction between general legal information and particularized legal advice concerning rights, duties, or liability, the court found that many communications concerned general information about potential bankruptcy proceedings under the CCAA rather than legal advice.

Of the documents reviewed, 60 were held to be privileged while the remainder were ordered produced.

The decision clarifies the analytical distinction between legal advice and legal information for purposes of solicitor‑client privilege in document production disputes.

Former franchisees rescinded their franchise agreements under the Arthur Wishart Act after failing to receive a disclosure document.

Following a reference determining the franchisor’s payment obligations under s. 6(6) of the Act, the franchisor defendants moved to oppose confirmation of the Master’s report, challenging awards for inventory, supplies and equipment, the refusal to offset profits earned during operation, and the costs award.

The court applied the deferential standard governing review of a master’s report and held that no error in principle or misapprehension of evidence had been demonstrated.

The court confirmed that payments under s. 6(6)(a)-(c) are independent statutory entitlements and cannot be offset by profits under s. 6(6)(d).

The Master’s findings and costs award were upheld.

Following the dismissal of two Rule 30 motions brought by the defendants seeking production of allegedly privileged documents in a certified class proceeding, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

Although the court agreed that solicitor-client privilege had been expressly waived during cross-examinations, the motions were dismissed because the legal advice received by an individual class member was irrelevant to the certified common issues.

On the costs issue, the court rejected the defendants’ submission that success was divided and held that the responding party was substantially successful.

Applying the factors in Rule 57.01(1) and the guidance from the Court of Appeal in Boucher, the court fixed a fair and reasonable costs award below the amount claimed.

Costs of $20,000 all-inclusive were awarded to the responding party, divided equally between the two defendants.

In a certified class action involving former automobile dealers whose franchises were terminated during the 2009 automotive industry restructuring, the defendants sought production of documents relating to legal advice the representative plaintiff received from its own lawyer when signing wind‑down agreements.

The moving parties argued that solicitor‑client privilege had been waived and that the advice was relevant to issues such as causation and damages.

The court held that although privilege regarding advice about the wind‑down agreement had been expressly waived during earlier cross‑examination, relevance for discovery in a class proceeding prior to the common issues trial is confined to the certified common issues.

Because the certified issues focused on the defendants’ conduct under provincial franchise legislation and alleged professional duties, and did not require examination of the individual legal advice received by class members, the requested documents were not relevant at this stage.

The motions to compel production were therefore dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion under s. 47(1) of the Construction Lien Act to discharge the plaintiff’s construction lien and certificate of action and to dismiss the action.

The court held that the lien against the property owner was invalid because the plaintiff failed to provide the written notice required under s. 19(1) of the Act.

The court further found, on the evidentiary record, that the amount already paid exceeded the value of the work actually performed under the contracts.

Applying the summary judgment principles in the Rules of Civil Procedure and the guidance in Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch, the court concluded a trial was unnecessary.

The lien and certificate of action were discharged and the action dismissed as against the relevant defendants.