Adele Monaco

The accused, F.D., applied for a bail review based on a material change in circumstances, including a new release plan, significant trial delay due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and the general impact of the pandemic on the inmate population.

The court found the proposed release plan, involving strict house arrest, electronic monitoring, and supervision by the applicant's fiancée's parents, to be robust.

Considering the strength of the supervision plan and the public health risks posed by COVID-19 in detention centers, the court granted bail, concluding that release would not undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

BMD, detained since October 2018 on firearm and drug-related offences, sought a detention review under s. 525 of the Criminal Code.

He proposed a strengthened release plan including house arrest, two sureties, and GPS electronic monitoring, and argued the COVID-19 pandemic favored his release.

The court found the pandemic irrelevant to the secondary ground but relevant to the tertiary ground.

The strengthened release plan, particularly electronic monitoring and responsible sureties, addressed public safety concerns under the secondary ground.

On the tertiary ground, despite serious charges, the robust release plan and the public health imperative to de-populate correctional facilities due to COVID-19 led the court to conclude that continued detention was not necessary to maintain public confidence.

BMD was ordered released on strict conditions.

The applicant, charged with second-degree murder, brought an application challenging the constitutionality of the recent Criminal Code amendments that abolished peremptory challenges during jury selection.

The applicant relied on a recent decision by a judge of coordinate jurisdiction that found the amendments unconstitutional.

The court held that it was not bound by the prior decision and found it to be plainly wrong.

The court concluded that the elimination of peremptory challenges does not violate the right to a fair trial, an impartial jury, or the principles of fundamental justice, as other safeguards such as challenge for cause and the enhanced stand-aside power remain in place.

The application was dismissed and the legislation was upheld as constitutional.

The three accused were charged with firearms offences after police located a loaded restricted firearm in a vehicle they occupied.

The police were investigating reports of gunshots and detained the vehicle.

The court dismissed the Crown's application to admit a police officer's preliminary inquiry evidence due to insufficient proof of his medical inability to testify.

The court found the investigative detention and pat-down searches lawful, but held that the subsequent search of the vehicle violated section 8 of the Charter because the searching officer did not testify to his subjective grounds.

However, the court declined to exclude the firearm under section 24(2).

Ultimately, the passenger who hid the firearm was convicted of possession offences, the driver was convicted of occupying a vehicle with a firearm, and the other passenger was acquitted of all charges.

The accused was charged with robbery and unauthorized use of a stolen credit card arising from a home invasion.

Following a voir dire on the admissibility of a video-recorded statement, the court found the statement was involuntary and excluded it from evidence.

The court also found a breach of the accused's section 10(b) Charter rights due to police denigration of defence counsel's advice.

The court applied the Grant test and determined that exclusion of the statement was necessary to preserve the integrity of the criminal justice system.

A young person charged with sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching brought a motion for a stay of proceedings under section 24(2) of the Charter based on an alleged infringement of the right to a speedy trial under section 11(b).

The applicant argued that the total delay of 18 months and 7 days exceeded the presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found that while the net delay fell slightly below the 18-month ceiling when defence delay was deducted, the case warranted a stay because: (1) a reduced presumptive ceiling of 12 months should apply to youth cases; (2) even applying the 18-month ceiling, the delay was unreasonable as a clear case falling below the ceiling; and (3) the defence demonstrated sustained efforts to expedite proceedings while the Crown and trial coordination system failed to provide timely disclosure and trial dates.

The court emphasized that young persons should be tried within a markedly shorter timeframe than adults.

The applicant, charged with first degree murder following a fatal stabbing, applied for bail.

The Crown conceded the primary ground but opposed release on the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found the proposed release plan, involving three sureties, house arrest, and electronic monitoring, addressed secondary ground concerns.

On the tertiary ground, the court noted the Crown's case for first degree murder was non-existent and the case for second degree murder was mediocre, while the case for manslaughter was strong.

Given the applicant's youth, lack of criminal record, and the weakness of the murder charge, the court granted bail with a $300,000 pledge.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter alleging an infringement of the right to a speedy trial under s. 11(b).

The accused was charged with importing heroin, conspiracy to import heroin, and conspiracy to possess heroin for the purpose of trafficking.

The information was sworn on September 9, 2016, and trial was scheduled for June 25-28, 2018, resulting in a total delay of 658 days (21 months and 20 days), exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found that after deducting defence delay of 105 days, the net delay was 555 days (18 months and 13 days), exceeding the ceiling by 13 days.

The Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances to justify the delay.

The court granted the stay of proceedings.

The defendant was charged with possession of marijuana and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking contrary to s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The charges arose from a traffic stop initiated for an expired validation sticker, during which police claimed to smell marijuana and subsequently searched the vehicle, discovering packaged drugs.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of evidence based on alleged breaches of Charter rights (ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b)).

The court found that the police officers' testimony was unreliable due to significant discrepancies regarding timing and sequence of events, contradictions between the two officers' accounts, and inconsistencies with independent dispatch records.

The court determined that there were no objectively reasonable grounds for the arrest and search, and that the defendant's right to counsel was breached.

The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and the defendant was acquitted.

Following a traffic stop for an unilluminated rear light, the accused brought a Charter application challenging their arrests, searches, and the seizure of firearms.

The court held that the driver was unlawfully arrested for breach of probation because the probation order plainly permitted him to be out during curfew while with the mother of his child, and the officers had reviewed that order.

The court further found the asserted marijuana-based grounds for arresting the passenger were not established, rendering that arrest a pretext and unlawful.

Applying the Grant framework, the court characterized the police conduct as very serious, found significant impact on the accuseds’ liberty and privacy interests, and excluded the two firearms as against the driver and the firearm found on the passenger.

The accused was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm and carrying a concealed weapon after police found a loaded handgun tucked into his waistband during a high-risk vehicle stop.

The accused raised a 'hot potato' defence, claiming the driver of the vehicle suddenly tossed the gun onto his lap as police approached, and he reacted by hiding it in his pants out of fear of being shot.

The court rejected the accused's evidence as implausible and inconsistent with the observations of multiple police officers who maintained constant surveillance of the vehicle.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts, concluding he had actual knowing possession and control of the concealed firearm.

The defendant brought a Charter section 8 application to exclude evidence seized during a search of his residence.

The search was conducted pursuant to a Criminal Code search warrant based on information from two confidential informants.

The defendant challenged the adequacy of the judicial summary prepared under the Garofoli step six procedure, arguing it was insufficient to permit meaningful challenge to the warrant's validity.

The defendant also challenged whether reasonable and probable grounds existed for the warrant's issuance.

The court found the judicial summary adequate to allow the defendant to mount both facial and sub-facial challenges, and concluded that reasonable and probable grounds existed based on the totality of circumstances, including information from two corroborating confidential sources with track records of reliability, some first-hand observations, and police corroboration through database checks and surveillance.

The application was dismissed and the evidence ruled admissible.

The accused was arrested for attempted murder and firearm offences following a shooting in downtown Toronto.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the accused's post-arrest statements, including an 80-minute video interview, arguing breaches of s. 10(b) of the Charter and lack of voluntariness.

The court found a serious breach of s. 10(b) due to an unjustified three-hour delay in facilitating access to duty counsel while gunshot residue tests were conducted.

The court also found the statements were involuntary due to police threats to lay additional charges, inducements, and the 18-year-old accused's learning disabilities and physical distress.

All post-arrest statements were excluded.

The applicant sought a bail review after a justice of the peace denied release on the secondary and tertiary grounds under s. 515(10) of the Criminal Code.

A new release plan with two sureties, strict house arrest, and $60,000 in pledged sureties was advanced as a material change in circumstances.

The reviewing judge accepted that the new plan constituted credible new evidence potentially addressing the secondary ground by mitigating the risk of re‑offending.

However, the court held that the new plan did not materially affect the tertiary ground analysis, which was driven by the gravity of the offences, the strength of the prosecution’s case, the presence of a loaded firearm alongside significant quantities of drugs, and the prospect of a lengthy custodial sentence.

Balancing these factors, the court concluded detention remained necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The applicant brought a motion seeking a stay of firearm-related charges on the basis of unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

Applying the Morin framework, the court examined the 1,035-day period from charge to scheduled trial, deducting waived time and excluding delay attributable to the applicant, co-accused, and inherent case requirements.

The court held that most of the impugned delay arose from institutional limits and co-accused scheduling issues, with only a limited period attributable to the Crown.

Given the minimal prejudice flowing from delay itself and the serious public interest in trying the charges, the application was dismissed.

On a Garofoli review motion, the applicants sought leave to cross-examine the affiant on three Part VI authorizations arising from a robbery and homicide investigation.

The court reviewed the governing principles from Garofoli and Pires and held that there is no automatic right to cross-examine a wiretap affiant, but leave should be granted where there is a reasonable likelihood the questioning will assist the court on a material issue bearing on the authorization's validity.

Given the proposed areas of inquiry concerning the state agent, other suspects, and investigative omissions, the court found an evidentiary foundation sufficient to meet the threshold.

Leave was granted, limited to the questions identified in the applicants' factum.

In a murder jury trial, the Crown brought mid-trial applications to adduce bad character evidence against two accused after cross-examination of a Vetrovec witness.

The court held that defence counsel had not put either accused's character in issue by vigorously challenging the Crown witness's credibility, criminal lifestyle, planning role, or motive, particularly where much of that material had already been elicited in chief.

Applying the governing bad character principles, the proposed DNA, youth record, intercepted communications, firearms evidence, and criminal record evidence were all inadmissible propensity evidence whose prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value.

The timing of the applications also created unfairness because defence cross-examinations had been conducted in reliance on earlier evidentiary rulings and agreed redactions.

The applicants sought to quash Part VI authorizations arising from a homicide and robbery investigation, alleging the affiant failed to make full, fair, and frank disclosure regarding a state agent, a related firearms investigation, and inquiries into another suspect.

Applying the Garofoli line of authority, the court held the informations to obtain had to be assessed holistically and not by piecemeal dissection, and that the alleged omissions and inaccuracies did not undermine the existence of sufficient grounds for the authorizations.

One category of bad character intercept material concerning unrelated firearms was held to be excisable, but the remaining record still supported issuance.

In the alternative, applying Grant, the court held any breach would not justify exclusion because the police acted in good faith, the privacy impact did not warrant exclusion on these facts, and society’s interest in adjudication on the merits was high.

In a jury trial, one accused sought editing of an intercepted communication containing inculpatory remarks by a co-accused.

The court accepted that the intercept was admissible only against the declarant but held the impugned passage was highly probative against that accused and that any prejudice to the moving accused could be adequately managed through clear and emphatic limiting instructions.

Applying the authorities on editing co-accused statements, the court found the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect and that editing risked distorting the meaning and flow of the evidence.

The application was dismissed.

In a murder prosecution arising from a fatal shooting during a robbery at an illegal poker tournament, the moving party sought exclusion of DNA evidence found on a revolver that was not the murder weapon.

The Crown argued the evidence linked the moving party to the person controlling a cache of firearms that included the murder weapon and corroborated a Vetrovec witness.

The court held the inferential gap was too large because the DNA showed only that the moving party touched or handled the revolver at an unknown time and under unknown circumstances, and the revolver was found in a separate locker.

The evidence carried a real risk of impermissible propensity reasoning and its prejudicial effect outweighed its limited probative value.

The application to exclude the DNA evidence was granted.