Abella

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder at trial.

The Court of Appeal set aside the conviction due to a fatally flawed jury charge and substituted a conviction for second degree murder.

The Supreme Court of Canada agreed that the jury charge was flawed, specifically regarding the strict causation requirement under s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code.

However, the Court held that the Court of Appeal erred in substituting a verdict, as another verdict might be reasonable.

A new trial on the original indictment for first degree murder was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder.

During an undercover operation, he confessed to police officers posing as members of a criminal organization who claimed they could use corrupt police contacts to influence the murder investigation.

The trial judge admitted the statements without a voluntariness voir dire, finding the undercover officers were not 'persons in authority'.

The trial judge also excluded defence evidence suggesting a third party committed the murder due to an insufficient connection to the crime.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the undercover officers were not persons in authority because the appellant believed they were acting against the state's interests, and that the third-party evidence was properly excluded as lacking probative value.

The appellant was convicted of committing an indecent act in a public place after neighbours observed him masturbating in his illuminated living room through an uncovered window.

The trial judge found he had converted his living room into a public place.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and entered an acquittal, holding that a private living room is not a 'public place' within the meaning of the Criminal Code.

The Court concluded that 'access' to a public place requires physical access, not merely visual access from the outside.

The appellants appealed a decision regarding the liability of an amalgamated corporation for the remediation of a contaminated site caused by the pre-amalgamation activities of one of its predecessor corporations.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, adopting the dissenting reasons of Rowles J.A. in the British Columbia Court of Appeal, holding that the wording of the amalgamation agreement did not limit the liability of the amalgamated corporation.

The appellant was served a notice of ascertained forfeiture under the Customs Act for allegedly attempting to export stolen automobiles using false statements.

He appealed the Minister's decision upholding the forfeiture to the Federal Court.

The Minister sought to examine the appellant for discovery, which the appellant resisted, claiming protection against self-incrimination under section 11(c) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the appellant was not a 'person charged with an offence' because ascertained forfeiture is an administrative, civil collection mechanism, not a penal proceeding, and does not impose true penal consequences.

Therefore, section 11(c) of the Charter did not apply, and the appellant could be compelled to submit to examination for discovery.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and uttering threats after beating the victim with a baseball bat.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, specifically regarding whether the victim's life was endangered.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, affirming the stringent standard from R. v. Morrissey.

The Court held that to set aside a conviction, a misapprehension of evidence must go to the substance rather than detail, and must play an essential part in the reasoning process resulting in the conviction.

In a federal reference concerning proposed civil marriage legislation, the Court held that Parliament had jurisdiction to define civil marriage as the lawful union of two persons, but not to legislate protections for religious officials in relation to solemnization, which falls within provincial authority.

The Court further held that extending civil marriage to same-sex couples was consistent with the Charter and that freedom of religion broadly protects religious officials from state compulsion to perform marriages contrary to their beliefs.

Exercising its residual discretion under the Supreme Court Act reference jurisdiction, the Court declined to answer whether the pre-existing opposite-sex requirement for civil marriage was Charter-compliant, given the government's legislative position, the reliance interests created by lower-court rulings, and the risk of legal confusion.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving causing bodily harm, driving while disqualified, and failing to stop at the scene of an accident.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and entered acquittals, holding that the frailties of the eyewitness identification evidence rendered the convictions unsafe.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The Supreme Court of Canada found that the trial judge misapprehended the DNA evidence by assuming the complainant's DNA was found on the inside of the appellant's trousers, a finding unsupported by the record.

As this misapprehension was central to the trial judge's finding of guilt, the appeal was allowed, the conviction vacated, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal, which had set aside his acquittal on a charge of possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal that there was sufficient material before the Justice of the Peace to support the issuance of the search warrant.

The appellant challenged convictions entered following a nighttime search of his apartment under a warrant obtained on the basis of a confidential informant's tip about stolen property.

The court held that the information to obtain the warrant misleadingly described the informant as reliable, included another person's more serious criminal record, failed to address the informant's own criminal record properly, and did not justify nighttime execution.

Applying the totality of the circumstances analysis for informer-based warrants and the s. 24(2) exclusion framework, the court found the warrant invalid and the search unconstitutional under s. 8 of the Charter.

Given the flagrantly careless police conduct and the seriousness of an unjustified nighttime home intrusion, the seized drugs, weapons, and ring were excluded.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The appellant mortgagee appealed an order dismissing its claim against two original mortgagors on the basis of novation.

The court held that, despite a fraudulent scheme by a third party and subsequent assumption and renewal of the mortgage, the agreed facts stipulated that the fraud did not affect the appellant's legal position.

Applying the novation framework, the majority concluded that the no prejudice clause preserved the mortgagee's rights and that the evidence did not establish a novation releasing the original mortgagors.

The appeal was allowed and judgment was substituted for the outstanding mortgage balance, with costs to the appellant here and below.

This was an appeal, with leave, from a costs order arising out of summary judgment and related motions in ongoing litigation involving a counterclaim.

The court declined to interfere with the motions judge’s award of solicitor-and-client costs and with the allocation of costs, finding those determinations were within the judge’s discretion and supported by the record.

However, the court varied the order respecting the costs of the action by holding that two respondents whose litigation with the appellant remained ongoing should not receive those costs immediately, while another respondent was entitled to its costs of the action subject to careful assessment to avoid double-counting.

The court also held that costs payable to the appellant should be payable now on a party-and-party basis rather than in the cause.

In an insolvency appeal arising from a consumer proposal, the appellant bank challenged an order holding that an approved proposal compromised the unsecured portion of its secured claim and that a side agreement with the debtors was unenforceable.

The court held that, because the bank did not seek revision of the proposed assessment of its security, the approved proposal was binding on all unsecured claims under s.62(2)(a) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court further held that equality among creditors is a basic insolvency principle and that a secret side agreement violating that equality amounts to a fraud on other creditors and is unenforceable.

The appeal was dismissed, Mr. Farmer was to be removed as an inspector, and the order was amended by consent to remove any reference to misconduct by the trustee.

The union appealed from a Divisional Court judgment quashing a labour board decision that judges' secretaries were not excluded from bargaining-unit membership by the conflict-of-interest provision in the governing statute.

The Court of Appeal held that the core issue was a labour relations question within the Board's specialized jurisdiction, not a freestanding constitutional question, although judicial independence formed part of the context.

Applying a patent unreasonableness standard to the Board's ultimate decision, the court found the Board's conclusion was not patently unreasonable.

The appeal was allowed, the Divisional Court order was set aside, and the judicial review application was dismissed, with no costs.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings entered by the trial judge on his own motion in a prosecution for criminal negligence causing death arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge denied the Crown procedural fairness by not giving notice or an opportunity to address the proposed remedy.

It further held that non-disclosure could not justify a stay absent evidence of irreparable prejudice to the accused or abuse of process, and that pre-trial delay was irrelevant in the absence of a proper s. 11(b) Charter application.

The stay was set aside and a trial was ordered.

The appeal concerned whether dismissal from employment after the employee's spouse and child accused the employer of past sexual abuse constituted discrimination based on marital status and family status.

The court held that under the Human Rights Code, marital and family status include not only the fact of being married or in a parent-child relationship, but also the identity of the spouse and family members.

The court rejected the view that discrimination analysis turns on whether the complainant belongs to a historically disadvantaged group, emphasizing that the Code protects individuals arbitrarily disadvantaged on enumerated grounds.

Because the employee was dismissed based on assumptions arising from his relationship to his spouse and child rather than his own conduct or merit, the dismissal was discriminatory.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the Board of Inquiry on remedy.

The appellant appealed convictions arising from an incident involving two taxi drivers, arguing identity and challenging the legal basis for certain convictions.

The court rejected the identity argument and upheld the robbery conviction, finding the injury to the first driver was sufficient to constitute bodily harm and that robbery under s. 343(c) did not require an actual theft.

Applying the Kienapple rule, the court stayed the assault causing bodily harm conviction as an included offence of robbery arising from the same delict.

The court also quashed the conviction for personating a police officer because that summary conviction offence had been improperly joined and tried in superior court following a preliminary inquiry.

The remaining conviction appeals were dismissed.

The appellant bank appealed a forfeiture order over a U.S. dollar account used in connection with a fraudulent telemarketing gemstone scheme.

The court held that the fraudster's interest in victim funds was voidable, not void ab initio, so the bank's security interest could attach and constituted a valid interest under s. 462.41 of the Criminal Code.

The sentencing judge erred by treating the proceeds of crime as incapable of being given as security and by failing to consider the discretionary relief available to an innocent secured creditor.

On appeal, the court exercised that discretion only in part, ordering forfeiture of the identifiable proceeds of six victims and return of the remaining balance to the bank.

The appellants challenged a civil jury verdict, arguing that the apportionment of damages was perverse and that the award of pre-judgment interest should be varied.

The court held that appellate interference with a jury's apportionment is subject to an exceptionally high threshold and found that threshold was not met on the evidence.

The court also rejected the argument that a post-judgment interest rate should effectively replace pre-judgment interest from the date the trial ought to have occurred.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.