Abella

The plaintiff sued her attending physicians and a prosthesis manufacturer for medical malpractice, claiming damages for pain, suffering, and reactive depression.

During examination on discovery, the defendants sought disclosure of the plaintiff's psychiatric records.

The plaintiff refused, citing professional secrecy.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that by claiming damages for psychological harm, the plaintiff implicitly waived the confidentiality of her medical records.

The defendants demonstrated the apparent relevance of the records for their defence, and the trial judge correctly dismissed the plaintiff's objection to disclosure.

The former chauffeur to the Speaker of the House of Commons filed discrimination and harassment complaints with the Canadian Human Rights Commission after his position was declared surplus.

The Speaker and the House of Commons challenged the Commission's jurisdiction, claiming parliamentary privilege over the management of employees.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the appellants failed to establish a broad parliamentary privilege immunizing all employee relations from external review.

However, the Court ruled that the employee was required to pursue his complaints through the grievance procedure established under the Parliamentary Employment and Staff Relations Act, which ousted the jurisdiction of the Canadian Human Rights Commission for this dispute.

The respondent pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and other offences.

At sentencing, she had spent 16 months in pre-sentence custody.

The sentencing judge considered this equivalent to almost three years and imposed a 14-month conditional sentence, which the Court of Appeal upheld.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that under s. 742.1 of the Criminal Code, a conditional sentence is unavailable to an offender who otherwise deserves a penitentiary term.

Time spent in pre-sentence custody cannot be used to reduce the sentence range to make a conditional sentence available.

The appellant fatally shot a trespasser who refused to leave his home.

At trial for second degree murder, the appellant claimed the shooting was accidental and that he intended to use his shotgun solely to intimidate the trespasser in defence of his property.

The trial judge instructed the jury that the underlying offence of careless use of a firearm had been made out and refused to instruct the jury on the defence of property.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the trial judge erred by encroaching on the exclusive domain of the jury to decide whether an offence has been proven on the facts, and by failing to leave the defence of property to the jury.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery and possession of stolen goods, arguing that the trial judge erred in relying on the doctrine of recent possession and in applying the test for determining guilt based solely on circumstantial evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal that both grounds were without merit.

The appellant developed a cancer-fighting drug containing paclitaxel, a medicine in the public domain.

The respondent held patents for specific formulations and uses of paclitaxel.

The appellant applied for a Notice of Compliance (NOC) as a new drug, not relying on the respondent's data.

The Minister issued the NOC.

The respondent sought to quash the NOC, arguing that under s. 5(1.1) of the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, the mere presence of paclitaxel triggered a statutory freeze.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 5(1.1) does not apply to innovative drugs but is confined to generic copies.

The Minister was entitled to issue the NOC without subjecting the appellant to the statutory freeze.

The appellant purchased a truck that was destroyed by a fire caused by a manufacturing defect.

The manufacturer and dealer refused to compensate her.

At trial, she was awarded general and exemplary damages under the Saskatchewan Consumer Protection Act.

The Court of Appeal set aside the exemplary damages and awarded costs against the appellant.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, restoring the exemplary damages because the manufacturer's failure to warn consumers of the known defect constituted a 'wilful' violation under s. 65 of the Act.

The Court also set aside the costs award, holding that s. 66 protects consumers from costs awards on appeal unless the action is frivolous or vexatious.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in a contract killing.

The Crown's case relied heavily on intercepted telephone conversations.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the wiretap evidence should have been excluded because he was a 'known' person not named in the initial authorizations, and that the trial judge erred in denying his application for severance to compel a co-accused to testify.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant was not a 'known' person when the initial authorizations were obtained and that the denial of severance did not result in a miscarriage of justice as the co-accused's proposed evidence was of marginal probative value.

The appellant was charged with manslaughter after the deceased died from injuries sustained in a fist fight outside a bar.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant on the basis of self-defence under s. 34(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that self-defence under s. 34(1) is not available to a combatant in a consensual fist fight because neither party can claim to be the innocent victim of an unprovoked assault.

The trial judge erred by failing to determine whether the appellant had consented to the fight and by misinterpreting the limits of consent to assault established in Jobidon.

The appellant, a Quebec chicken producer, grossly exceeded his allotted production quota and exported the bulk of his surplus to Ontario.

The provincial marketing board reduced his quota to zero and imposed a monetary penalty.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the provincial component of the federal-provincial chicken marketing scheme, arguing it could not apply to production destined exclusively for the interprovincial market.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the provincial legislation is constitutional as its pith and substance relates to the local control of agricultural production, and any effect on extraprovincial trade is incidental.

The Court also upheld the federal body's delegation of regulatory powers and referential incorporation of provincial legislation.

The respondents' fish were lawfully seized and sold by the Crown under the Fisheries Act.

After the respondents' convictions were overturned and proceedings stayed, the Crown returned the net proceeds of the sale but refused to pay interest.

The respondents claimed interest based on unjust enrichment, fiduciary duty, and trust.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Fisheries Act constitutes a complete code for the return of seized property and does not require the payment of interest.

The claims for unjust enrichment, fiduciary duty, and trust were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted at trial of six counts of sex-related offences involving two young children.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial on counts involving one complainant but upheld the others.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, arguing the trial judge erred by considering evidence from other counts when assessing his credibility.

The Supreme Court held that while verdicts must be based on admissible evidence for each count, a trial judge may consider the totality of a witness's evidence when assessing credibility.

However, because the credibility findings were deeply intertwined and a new trial had already been ordered for some counts, the Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on the remaining counts as well.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada as of right, relying on a dissent in the court below.

The appeal was brought pursuant to section 693(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada reviewed the matter to determine if the dissent raised a valid question of law.

The Court concluded that the dissent in the court below did not raise an issue of law as required by the statute.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed.

The appellant, an adult in need of protection, was subject to a plan of care proposed by the Minister of Health.

The Family Court judge approved the plan but added a condition prohibiting placement outside the Halifax region.

The Court of Appeal held the Family Court exceeded its jurisdiction, ruling it could only accept or reject the Minister's plan.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Family Court's statutory duty to ensure the adult's best interests includes the jurisdiction to attach reasonable terms and conditions to the Minister's proposed plan of care.

The appellant, a federal public servant, was declared surplus and sought early retirement incentive benefits provided by regulation.

His application was rejected, and he was subsequently laid off.

While his lay-off was arbitrable under the Public Service Staff Relations Act (PSSRA), his claim for benefits was grievable but not arbitrable.

Instead of grieving the denial of benefits, the appellant initiated a negligence action in the Federal Court.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the PSSRA does not explicitly oust the courts' residual jurisdiction, the courts should generally decline to intervene in workplace disputes where Parliament has established a comprehensive statutory scheme, even if that scheme does not provide for independent third-party adjudication.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent tobacco company sought a declaration that s. 6 of the Saskatchewan Tobacco Control Act, which bans the display of tobacco products in premises where persons under 18 are permitted, was inoperative due to the federal paramountcy doctrine.

The respondent argued it conflicted with s. 30 of the federal Tobacco Act, which allows retailers to display tobacco products.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provincial legislation was not inoperative.

The Court found no operational conflict, as retailers could comply with both by either not admitting minors or not displaying the products, and the provincial law did not frustrate the federal legislative purpose of addressing a national public health problem.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality and administrative validity of a Quebec regulatory provision respecting the colour of margarine.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the provision falls within provincial jurisdiction over local trade, does not infringe freedom of expression under the Charter, and was clearly authorized by its enabling legislation.

The appellant received a lump sum settlement of $105,000 from her disability insurer after her benefits were terminated and she sued.

The Minister of National Revenue reassessed her to include the full amount as income.

The Tax Court set aside the reassessment, but the Federal Court of Appeal held that the portion attributable to arrears was taxable.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that under the surrogatum principle, the portion of the settlement intended to replace past disability benefits was payable on a periodic basis pursuant to a disability insurance plan and was therefore taxable under s. 6(1)(f) of the Income Tax Act.

The respondents were charged with wilfully promoting hatred against the Roma people after participating in a demonstration outside a motel housing Roma refugee claimants.

The trial judge acquitted the respondents, finding the Crown failed to prove that the term 'gypsies' used in the demonstration was interchangeable with 'Roma'.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered new trials, holding that the trial judge erred in law by focusing solely on the interchangeability of the terms rather than considering the totality of the evidence, and that he should have taken judicial notice of dictionary definitions linking the two terms.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing that the trial judge erred by not leaving the defence of provocation with the jury.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal that there was no air of reality supporting the objective components of the test for the defence of provocation.

Justice Fish dissented, finding that a reasonable jury could have been left with a reasonable doubt on the issue.