Yaroslav Obouhov

The applicant mother brought an urgent, ex parte motion to vary a temporary order regarding the respondent father's in-person access to their children.

The motion was prompted by recent criminal charges against the father for breach of a restraining order and criminal harassment, and concerns from the York Region Children’s Aid Society regarding the father's lack of cooperation.

The court found the motion met the urgency test, temporarily suspending the father's in-person access while granting him nightly telephone or videocall access.

A schedule was set for the father to respond and for a return hearing of the motion.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operation of a motor vehicle with blood alcohol over the legal limit.

The defence brought a Charter application arguing that the police violated section 8 rights by making a breath demand without reasonable and probable grounds as required by section 254(3) of the Criminal Code.

The court found no Charter violation, as the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to believe the accused was driving while impaired within the three-hour window.

However, on the trial proper, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to drive was impaired at the time of driving, despite proving the over 80 charge through breath sample evidence.

The Applicant, Ekaterina Karmanova, and the Respondent, Zurab Gugushvili, were in a common-law relationship.

The Applicant sought spousal support, a constructive trust or resulting trust over a condominium solely titled in the Respondent's name, and general damages for alleged cruel conduct.

The court found that the parties cohabited for a sufficient period to trigger spousal support obligations and that a joint family venture existed regarding the condominium.

However, a proprietary interest in the condominium was denied, and a monetary remedy on a fee-for-service basis was awarded for the Applicant's contributions to condominium expenses.

General damages for alleged cruel conduct were dismissed due to insufficient evidence and mutual inappropriate behavior.

The Applicant was awarded modest transitional spousal support.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and having a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The court conducted a blended voir dire to determine whether the accused's Charter rights were violated and whether evidence should be excluded.

The court found a breach of the accused's section 10(b) right to counsel of choice when police failed to wait a reasonable period for the accused's preferred counsel to return a call before offering duty counsel.

However, the court found the accused was in care and control of the vehicle and was impaired by alcohol.

The breath sample evidence was excluded due to the Charter violation, resulting in dismissal of the "over 80" charge but conviction on the impaired driving charge.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

The defence brought a Charter application to exclude breath readings, alleging a breach of section 10(b) rights to counsel.

The officer delayed providing rights to counsel for approximately 3-4 minutes after arrest to secure the vehicle, conduct an inventory search, and address a passenger.

The court found a breach of section 10(b) but admitted the breath samples under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the breach was cured by the subsequent provision of rights to counsel and access to duty counsel prior to the breath samples being obtained.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, and with having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol.

The accused was found sleeping in the driver's seat of his parked vehicle on a residential side street adjacent to his apartment building.

The trial judge found that the Crown failed to prove an essential element of the offence—that the accused had care or control of the vehicle.

Applying the framework established in R. v. Boudreault, the court determined that the accused had rebutted the statutory presumption of care or control under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code by establishing he had no intention to drive.

Furthermore, the Crown failed to establish a realistic risk of danger to persons or property, as the vehicle was safely parked on a quiet residential street with no foreseeable danger.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

The accused was charged with impaired driving, driving with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg per 100 ml of blood, and Highway Traffic Act offences related to being a novice driver with a blood alcohol level exceeding zero.

The defence raised Charter violations regarding the arrest and the right to counsel, alleging language barriers.

The court found that the police had objective grounds to arrest the accused based on the serious single-vehicle collision, witness observations of reckless driving, and indicia of impairment.

The court also found no breach of the right to counsel, determining that special circumstances related to language comprehension did not exist.

On the merits, the court found overwhelming evidence of impairment and identified the accused as the driver beyond a reasonable doubt.

The offender pleaded guilty to possession of fentanyl, cocaine, and methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of a prohibited weapon while prohibited.

The court weighed the offender's lengthy criminal record and the large quantities of highly dangerous narcotics against his guilty pleas, family responsibilities, and willingness to seek treatment.

The court sentenced the offender to 5 years in custody, less pre-sentence credit, along with a lifetime weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

The accused brought a pretrial Charter application alleging violations of his rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10(a) following a traffic stop that led to the discovery of a prohibited weapon and a large quantity of narcotics.

The court rejected the accused's version of events, preferring the testimony of the police officers.

The court found no Charter violations, concluding that the brief delay in informing the accused of the reason for the stop was justified, the detention and frisk-search were necessary for officer safety, and the vehicle search was a lawful search incidental to arrest.

The application to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess alcohol following a roadside stop for driving without lights.

The defendant, a native Russian speaker with conversational English ability, challenged the admissibility of breath test results, arguing he was denied his Charter rights to counsel due to language barriers.

The arresting officer initially recognized language issues and called for a Russian-speaking officer, but subsequently decided not to use interpretation services.

The court found a serious breach of the defendant's section 10(b) Charter rights, as he was not meaningfully informed of his right to counsel and his subsequent request for legal advice was ignored.

Applying the R. v. Grant test, the court excluded the breath test evidence and acquitted the defendant.

An appeal from a conviction under the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2007 for acting as a motor vehicle dealer without being registered.

The trial was conducted ex parte in the absence of the defendant.

The appellate court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction, finding that the trial judge failed to conduct the required inquiry into whether an ex parte trial was appropriate, particularly given the prosecution's intention to seek a custodial sentence.

The court found that the procedural history demonstrated inadequate notice to the defendant and no proper consideration of the defendant's right to be present at trial, amounting to a miscarriage of justice.

The applicant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over .08 contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant brought a motion alleging breaches of her Charter rights under sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found that the applicant's right to counsel of choice under section 10(b) was breached when the police officer failed to inform the applicant of a third option to contact any lawyer and instead "foisted" duty counsel upon her without providing resources such as a lawyer's directory or internet access.

The court found that the officer's failure to comply with the informational component of the right to counsel of choice deprived the applicant of making a fully informed choice.

Under section 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the breath test results, finding that exclusion best served the long-term repute of the administration of justice, and dismissed the charge.

The applicant brought Charter applications under sections 8 and 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the context of a trial on Highway Traffic Act charges.

The applicant challenged the validity of a search warrant for cellular telephone records on the basis that the Information to Obtain was misleading and that the Justice of the Peace erred in issuing the warrant.

The applicant also sought a stay of proceedings based on unreasonable delay.

The court found that while the Information to Obtain contained minor inaccuracies, it was not materially misleading and the Justice of the Peace did not err in issuing the warrant.

However, the court excluded evidence relating to the actual text or content of SMS messages as an unreasonable breach of section 8 rights.

The court dismissed the section 11(b) application, finding that the delay of approximately 7.5 months from trial readiness to trial date fell within constitutionally tolerable limits for provincial offences matters.