W. Gerald Punnett

The plaintiff bank sued to recover $494,425 obtained by the defendant Vincenzo Storr through fraudulent credit card cash advances.

The plaintiff sought to trace the funds into the accounts of Vincenzo's family members and related entities, arguing they were subject to a constructive trust.

The court found that Vincenzo obtained the funds by fraud and that the family members who received the funds were liable under the doctrine of knowing receipt, as the circumstances ought to have put them on inquiry.

The court granted judgment against Vincenzo and the family members who received the funds, while dismissing the claims against the corporate entities.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, arguing the Board erred in law by accepting hearsay evidence over his direct evidence without explanation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's reasons clearly demonstrated the appellant's version was rejected due to major discrepancies and his minimization of his criminal record.

The hearsay evidence, indicating the appellant was injured during a drug transaction, was cogent and properly accepted by the Board.

Following a prior application decision, both sides sought costs.

The applicant succeeded on the issue of lack of notice regarding a proposed sale of corporate assets, while the respondents succeeded on the issue concerning entitlement to certain chattels.

The court reviewed the purposes of costs awards and noted the absence of settlement offers.

Considering the mixed success and the relative importance of the issues, the court declined to award costs to either party.

The applicant shareholder sought an injunction preventing the sale of corporate real property and a mandatory order for the return of personal chattels allegedly left on the property.

The court found that the proposed sale constituted a disposition of assets outside the ordinary course of business and required a properly noticed special meeting of shareholders under the Business Corporations Act.

The applicant had received insufficient notice and was deprived of dissent rights associated with such a transaction.

The court therefore set aside the proposed sale and maintained the injunction preventing it.

However, the request for return of personal chattels was dismissed due to unresolved credibility issues and insufficient evidence on the paper record.

The appellant appealed an order requiring him to reinstate his former spouse as a beneficiary under his extended medical benefit coverage.

Prior to the appeal hearing, the appellant complied with the order, rendering the appeal moot.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, noting it also lacked jurisdiction as the order was not final, and awarded $5,000 in costs to the respondent, reduced due to both counsel's failure to recognize the appeal's futility earlier.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal court decision regarding whether a police officer had reasonable and probable grounds to make a breath demand.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, noting that appeals under s. 839(1) of the Criminal Code are confined to questions of law alone.

The court found the proposed ground was essentially a question of fact, did not raise issues of significance to the general administration of criminal justice, and was devoid of merit.

The young person appealed his conviction and sentence for administering a stupefying drug to and sexually assaulting his cousin.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in rejecting his father's alibi evidence.

The Court of Appeal held the trial judge properly concluded the alibi was incomplete as it left a window of opportunity for the offence.

The Court also upheld the sentence of 90 days' custody followed by probation, finding it appropriate under the Youth Criminal Justice Act given the breach of trust and violent nature of the offence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and invitation to sexual touching involving a nine-year-old complainant.

He argued that the trial judge erred in permitting the complainant to testify under oath, that the verdict was unreasonable, and that the evidence did not support a conviction under section 152 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's inquiry into the complainant's understanding of an oath, as no objections were raised at trial.

The court also held that the verdict was reasonable and that section 152, interpreted purposively, encompasses a request by an accused to permit him to touch a complainant's private parts.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the University of Toronto's appeal panel, which upheld a penalty of a zero grade for a course due to plagiarism.

The applicant argued that the penalty effectively prevented him from re-enrolling.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no manifest unfairness or violation of natural justice.

The court noted that the appeal panel had considered fresh evidence regarding the applicant's academic record and reasonably concluded that the trial panel did not intend to impose a sanction that would necessarily permit re-enrollment if the student was otherwise ineligible.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a three-year probation order imposed as part of her sentence.

The Court of Appeal found the probation order and its terms to be entirely fit and dismissed the application for leave to appeal as being without merit.

Following the dismissal of three appeals brought by the appellant, the court received written submissions to fix the costs of the appeal.

The respondent sought costs of up to $33,050.30.

The appellant argued that the respondent should be denied costs entirely due to excessive preparation time and unnecessary motions.

The Court of Appeal found no reason to deny costs but determined that substantial indemnity was not warranted.

The court fixed the respondent's costs on a partial indemnity basis at $17,500 inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The appellant was convicted of armed robbery based solely on the uncorroborated evidence of a single eyewitness.

The eyewitness had a limited opportunity to observe the robber, gave a problematic description, and made a tenuous identification from a photo line-up.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and entered an acquittal, finding the identification evidence too weak to safely found a conviction.

MacPherson J.A. dissented, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's verdict.

The applicant children's aid society appealed a decision that set aside a trial judge's order in a child protection matter.

The appeal judge had found palpable and overriding error based on the trial judge's comments regarding an expert witness's demeanour.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the appeal judge failed to read the trial judge's reasons as a whole.

The trial judge had placed her concerns about the expert's demeanour in context and provided positive reasons for relying on his evidence, which was supported by other accepted witnesses.

The trial judge's orders were restored.

The appellant appealed judgments regarding custody, access, child support, and property division, as well as orders preserving a boat pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's decisions on custody, access, or the imputation of income for child support.

The court granted minor variations to allow specific set-offs against child support arrears but otherwise upheld the trial judge's orders, including the requirement to sell the boat to satisfy arrears and costs.