Victor Mitrow

The moving party mother brought a motion to change seeking over $540,000 in retroactive child support and section 7 expenses for the parties' two adult children, primarily for the son's dental school expenses in the United States.

The responding party father argued that his support obligations had terminated under their separation agreement and that both children had unilaterally terminated their relationships with him.

The court found that both children remained dependants while pursuing their post-secondary degrees and that retroactive support was appropriate effective January 1, 2009.

However, the court declined to order the father to contribute to the son's dental school expenses or the daughter's section 7 expenses, finding that both children had unjustifiably and unilaterally terminated their relationships with their father.

The father was ordered to pay $129,000 in table amount child support arrears.

The parties brought cross-motions for interim parenting, child support, and spousal support.

The parties agreed on an equal parenting schedule based on a Voice of the Child report.

The primary issue was whether to impute income to the applicant, who had been a stay-at-home parent for many years but had not sought employment since separation.

Applying the principles from Drygala v. Pauli, the court found the applicant was intentionally unemployed and imputed an annual income of $55,000 based on a vocational assessment report.

The moving party (mother) brought an ex parte motion seeking sole custody and supervised access, alleging the responding party (father) attempted to abduct their child to the United States.

The court found no exigent circumstances justified the ex parte motion and that the moving party egregiously failed in her duty to make full and fair disclosure of material facts.

The responding party's attempts to cross the border without proper documentation showed bad judgment but did not constitute abduction.

The moving party's motion was dismissed on its merits, and the court imposed procedural constraints to manage the high-conflict litigation, including requiring leave for future motions.

The applicant was successful in a mobility trial permitting her to relocate with the parties' two children from London to Woodstock.

She sought costs of $8,857.71.

The respondent did not file costs submissions.

The court considered the factors under rule 24(12) of the Family Law Rules and the applicant's offers to settle.

The court noted that the respondent's refusal to agree to the move was not unreasonable simply because he was unsuccessful.

The court awarded the applicant costs of $3,500 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The applicant brought a motion to strike the respondent's answer due to his failure to comply with an interim spousal support order and an interim costs order.

The respondent argued he was financially unable to comply, citing his retirement and depleted investments.

The court found the respondent's non-compliance to be willful, deliberate, and flagrant, noting his ability to pay for a luxury vehicle lease buyout while claiming poverty.

The court ordered the respondent's answer struck, except for the claim for divorce, but granted a time-limited stay to allow him a final opportunity to pay the full arrears.

The applicant child, J.N.-L., brought an openness application seeking an order for continued contact with her four siblings, who were respondents along with the Children's Aid Society.

The primary issue addressed was the procedural requirement of notice to a biological parent (Ms. N.) who had not signed a consent to the openness order, particularly concerning a child in her primary care.

The court determined that while statutory notice provisions for openness applications do not explicitly extend to such parents, the court retains discretion under the Family Law Rules to add parties or require service.

Given Ms. N.'s engagement in the process and subsequent consent to one of the openness orders, the court found it unnecessary to add her as a party or serve her with the application.

The court granted two separate openness orders, one for J.N.-L. with three siblings and another for J.N.-L. with J.N., finding them to be in the best interests of the applicant.

The applicant sought costs following a successful interim spousal support motion.

The court considered the applicant's offers to settle, which included costs provisions and spousal support for periods not covered by the order.

The court found that these offers did not meet the strict conditions of Rule 18(14) for full indemnity due to the inclusion of costs and extraneous support periods.

However, the offers were considered under Rule 18(16).

Applying principles of reasonableness and proportionality under Rule 24(12), the court awarded the applicant $11,500 in costs, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST, rejecting the respondent's argument that the applicant's conduct was unreasonable.

The applicant sought to relocate with the two young children from London to Woodstock, Ontario.

The respondent, the children's father, opposed the move.

The court, applying the factors from *Gordon v. Goertz* and *Bjornson v. Creighton* under the *Children's Law Reform Act*, found that the relocation was in the children's best interests.

The applicant was the primary caregiver, and the move would improve her employability and financial security, as well as provide her with emotional and psychological support from her family in Woodstock.

The court granted the relocation, with adjustments to transportation costs and access times to accommodate the respondent.

The applicant sought an order to make a previously awarded trial costs order, fixed at $80,510 against the respondent, enforceable by the Director under the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act, 1996 (FRSAEA).

The costs were awarded after the respondent's spousal support claim at trial was dismissed.

The court, relying on appellate decisions in Clark v. Clark and Reisman v. Reisman, found no principled reason to deny enforcement by the Director, emphasizing a broad interpretation of "support order" under s. 1(1)(g) of the FRSAEA to include costs related to a dismissed support claim.

The court granted the applicant's request, deeming the costs order a "support order" enforceable by the Director.

The applicant brought a motion for interim spousal support.

The primary issue was the respondent's early retirement and whether income should be imputed to him.

The court found the respondent intentionally unemployed, as his retirement was voluntary and not due to health or incapacity, and he had not sought new employment.

Income was imputed to the respondent based on an average of his pre-retirement earnings, including commissions and capital gains.

The court ordered the respondent to pay interim spousal support of $8,000 per month and maintained the applicant as an irrevocable beneficiary of a life insurance policy.

The court addresses a preliminary issue in an openness application concerning whether a parent, K.N., who has not consented to the openness order and is the custodial parent of one child (J.N.) and non-custodial parent of others (C.S.-N., A.S.), is entitled to receive notice of the application.

The proposed order affects J.N. by providing for access arrangements and prohibiting K.N. from attending visits.

The court raises questions of due process, confidentiality, and the exhaustive nature of notice provisions under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, adjourning the matter for further submissions and inviting the Attorney General to participate.

This trial decision addresses complex family law issues including custody, access, child support, spousal support, and equalization payment.

The court awarded sole custody of the child to the applicant mother, Xu Wang, but significantly expanded the respondent father, Wan-Peng Sun's, parenting time beyond her proposal.

The judge criticized the mother's conduct in limiting access and found her stalking allegations against the father unsubstantiated.

The decision details the calculation of retroactive and ongoing child and spousal support, including a lump sum payment, and orders for an equalization payment.

The divorce claim was severed to proceed separately.

Following a trial where the respondent's claim for increased spousal support was dismissed, the successful applicant sought full indemnity costs of over $212,000.

The court rejected the application of civil rules scales of costs, applying the Family Law Rules principles of reasonableness and proportionality.

Finding that both parties spent excessive amounts on legal fees and failed to adhere to the principle of proportionality, the court fixed the applicant's costs at $80,510, ordering them payable in monthly installments of $620 to coincide with the respondent's ongoing receipt of spousal support.

The Children's Aid Society of London and Middlesex brought a summary judgment motion seeking extended Society care for the child, C. The mother, A.S., and father, R.D., opposed, seeking custody or supervision orders.

The court considered extensive evidence, including a parenting capacity assessment, detailing the parents' substance abuse, unstable lifestyles, criminal records, and lack of insight.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, concluding that neither parent nor the paternal grandmother could provide a safe and stable environment.

The motion was granted, placing the child in extended Society care, with no access ordered for the parents or paternal grandmother, as their relationships were not deemed beneficial or meaningful to the child.

The applicant sought an interim restraining order and supervised access exchanges due to the respondent's abusive communications, intimidating behavior, and suspected involvement in property damage.

The respondent opposed the restraining order and moved to strike portions of the applicant's affidavit.

The court granted the interim restraining order, largely dismissed the motion to strike, and ordered supervised access exchanges at a family support center or designated public locations, finding the applicant had reasonable grounds to fear for her psychological and physical safety and the child's safety.

The court reviewed written costs submissions from both parties.

Noting recent amendments to the Family Law Rules regarding costs factors and a recent Court of Appeal decision on costs principles, the court invited the parties to file supplementary written submissions limited to these new developments.

The Children's Aid Society sought extended society care for two children against their father and mothers.

The mothers consented to extended society care.

The father opposed, seeking custody.

The court found both children in need of protection due to the father's pedohebephilia diagnosis, untreated impulsivity, chaotic lifestyle, substance use, and history of non-compliance with orders.

The court dismissed the father's plan of care, finding it unrealistic, and ordered extended society care for both children, with silent access for parents but continued inter-sibling access.

The applicants, two women in a platonic relationship, sought to jointly adopt a Crown ward.

The Child, Youth and Family Services Act (and its predecessor, the Child and Family Services Act) restricted joint adoption applications to individuals who are "spouses of one another" defined as married or in a conjugal relationship.

The applicants challenged this restriction as discriminatory under section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing it violated their equality rights based on marital status.

The Attorney General of Ontario intervened and conceded constitutional invalidity.

The court found the legislation created a distinction based on marital status, an analogous ground, and perpetuated prejudice and stereotyping by excluding non-spousal couples from joint adoption without merit-based assessment.

The court further found the infringement was not justified under section 1 of the Charter, as it lacked rational connection and minimal impairment, and its deleterious effects outweighed any benefits.

The court declared the words "who are spouses of one another" in the relevant sections of both Acts to be of no force and effect for public adoptions.

The applicant brought a motion for security for costs, seeking disclosure of the respondent's lawyer for her home sale, a certificate of pending litigation, and an order to hold net proceeds from the sale in trust until trial costs were determined.

The motion was dismissed.

The court found that the applicant's belief that the respondent was attempting to hinder costs recovery was speculative and that none of the enumerated grounds for security for costs under r. 24(13) of the Family Law Rules were satisfied.

The respondent's reasons for selling her home were found to be credible, and there was no evidence of a lack of assets in Ontario or that the case was a waste of time or nuisance.

The respondent (Davila) filed a variation application under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act, 2002, seeking to vary his child support obligation and accumulated arrears, and also requested a DNA test for paternity.

The court dismissed the request for a DNA test as not being a proper subject for a variation order.

The court also dismissed the variation application, finding that Davila failed to discharge his onus to establish a material change in circumstances to reduce his imputed income of $50,000, citing the principles from Trang v. Trang and Gray v. Rizzi regarding the onus on a payor seeking to vary an order based on imputed income.