Superior Court of Justice – Ontario (Family Court)
Court File and Parties
Court File No.: FD151/16
Date: January 29, 2019
Re: John Anthony Shelley, applicant
And: Josephine Anne Shelley, respondent
Before: MITROW J.
Counsel: Monique Rae Bennett for the applicant Jordan D. McKie for the respondent
Heard: written submissions filed
Trial Costs Endorsement
[1] Pursuant to the trial judgment dated August 7, 2018,[^1] the parties were permitted to make written costs submissions, the last of which was received September 24, 2018, being the applicant’s reply.
[2] A brief endorsement released October 29, 2018[^2] invited the parties to make further written submissions on costs for two reasons: first, both parties had referred to the factors in r. 24(11), notwithstanding that this rule had been repealed and replaced by r. 24(12); secondly, the Court of Appeal for Ontario had released recently the decision in Beaver v. Hill, 2018 ONCA 840 (Ont. C.A.), discussing and reviewing the principles in relation to determining costs under the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99. The supplementary costs submissions were limited to the amendment in the Rules in relation to costs and the decision in Beaver v. Hill. Each party filed supplementary submissions by in or about mid-November 2018.
[3] The sole issue at trial was the respondent’s claim for spousal support pursuant to the Divorce Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.). The respondent was receiving spousal support pursuant to an existing separation agreement (“agreement”), time-limited at the latest to December 31, 2029, in the amount of $2,500 per month, indexed; at the time of trial, the indexed spousal support was $2,680 per month: see para. 200, reasons for judgment.
[4] The respondent asserted her claim for spousal support in her answer filed in response to the applicant’s claim seeking only a divorce. The respondent, in essence, framed her claim as a corollary relief proceeding pursuant to the Divorce Act. The respondent sought spousal support in the amount of $4,866 per month, for an indefinite period, said amount being the high end of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (“SSAG”) according to the respondent’s calculations.
[5] During trial, the applicant brought a motion for a non-suit; he elected to call evidence, as a result of which the decision on the motion for a non-suit was reserved. The trial judgment dismissed both the respondent’s claim for spousal support and the applicant’s motion for a non-suit. The principles discussed in Miglin v. Miglin, 2003 SCC 24, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 303 (S.C.C.) were central to the respondent’s claim.
[6] Following trial, the respondent was left in the same position as at the beginning of trial – her right to receive spousal support remained contractual as set out in the agreement.
[7] The applicant claims costs on a “full indemnity” basis totaling $212,037.61. Of this amount, Ms. Bennett’s fees at $500 per hour total $154,900, the paralegal’s fees at $150 per hour total $17,700, the disbursements total slightly over $15,000 and the rest is HST. It is the applicant’s position that he had submitted an offer, early on, that is consistent with the trial result and that the respondent has behaved unreasonably. In his supplementary submissions, the applicant raises the prospect that the respondent’s conduct may be characterized as bad faith. I reject any submission that the respondent’s conduct rises to the level of bad faith.
[8] The respondent concedes that the applicant, as the successful party, is presumptively entitled to costs. The issue is quantum.
[9] The respondent characterizes the costs sought as “extremely excessive.” She submits also that the applicant has failed to take into account that he lost the motion for the non-suit and that his summary judgment motion did not proceed.
[10] It is the respondent’s submission that a costs award of $50,000 is “appropriate.”
Discussion
[11] There is much discussion in the applicant’s submissions as to partial indemnity and substantial indemnity, which are the scales of costs set out in the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194.
[12] Discussion as to scales of costs such as partial and substantial indemnity, including whether one is a certain percentage of the other, is not an analysis mandated by the Family Law Rules.
[13] The inapplicability of the scales of costs set out in the Rules of Civil Procedure, when dealing with costs under the Family Law Rules, is far from a novel concept.
[14] Approximately 19 years ago, Aston J. explained this principle in Sims-Howarth v. Bilcliffe, 2000 CarswellOnt 299 (S.C.J.), stating at para. 4:
4 The court must quantify costs under rule 24 according to the factors set out in subrule 24(11). In my view, the concept of the two traditional scales of costs is no longer the appropriate way to quantify costs under the Family Law Rules. Unlike the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, O. Reg. 194, fixed costs are the norm, not the exception. See subrule 24(10) of the Family Law Rules:
Promptly after each step in the case, the judge or other person who dealt with that step shall decide in a summary manner who, if anyone, is entitled to costs, and set the amount of costs.
This is significantly different from its companion, subrule 57.01(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. There is no provision in the Family Law Rules for an assessment of costs by some other court official, and no tariff of costs. Having determined that one party is liable to pay costs, the court must fix the amount at some figure between a nominal sum and full recovery. The Family Law Rules demand flexibility in examining the list of factors in subrule 24(11) without any assumptions about categories of costs.
[15] Three years later, the Court of Appeal for Ontario in M.(C.A.) v. M.(D.), 2003 18880 (ON CA), 2003 CarswellOnt 3606 (Ont. C.A.) adopted Aston J.’s analysis. Rosenberg J.A., at para. 42, stated in part:
… I agree with Aston J. in Sims-Howarth at para. 4, that the "Family Law Rules demand flexibility in examining the list of factors in subrule 24(11) without any assumptions about categories of costs". …
[16] In Beaver v. Hill, supra, the Court of Appeal for Ontario emphasized, again, that the scales of costs found in the Rules of Civil Procedure are not mentioned in the Family Law Rules:
7 In terms of her costs award, the motion judge correctly concluded that a risk premium could not be awarded. She also correctly concluded that this was not a case for a full recovery award of costs.
8 Yet, that is not how the costs in this case were determined. Rather, the resulting award approached a full recovery amount. In defence of that result, the respondent relies on what is contended to be the principle from Biant v. Sagoo, 2001 28137 (ON SC), [2001] O.J. No. 3693, 20 R.F.L. (5th) 284 (Ont. S.C.J.) that costs in family proceedings should "generally approach full recovery". I would make a couple of points in response to that contention.
9 First, while the judge in Biant does make that statement, it is based on two decisions of other Superior Court judges, a close reading of which do not support the thrust of that statement. What those other cases do establish is that under the Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99, judges are not constrained to the normal scales of costs found in the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, since no scales of costs are mentioned in the Family Law Rules. Also, the Family Law Rules expressly provide that, depending on the conduct of the parties and the presence or absence of offers to settle, a judge may increase or decrease what would otherwise be the appropriate quantum of costs awarded.
10 Second, the respondent's assertion that this court's decision in Berta v. Berta, 2015 ONCA 918, 128 O.R. (3d) 730 (Ont. C.A.) supports the "full recovery" approach to costs in family matters also reflects a failure to read the decision closely. What this court endorsed in that case was the principle that "a successful party in a family law case is presumptively entitled to costs" (at para. 94) subject, though, to the factors set out in Rule 24. This caveat is an important one since, as this court pointed out in Frick v. Frick, 2016 ONCA 799, 132 O.R. (3d) 321 (Ont. C.A.), the Family Law Rules "embody a philosophy peculiar to a lawsuit that involves a family" (at para. 11).
11 There is no provision in the Family Law Rules that provides for a general approach of "close to full recovery" costs. Rather, r. 24(12) sets out the appropriate considerations in fixing the quantum of costs. …
[emphasis added re: para. 9]
[17] The factors that a court is required to consider are contained in r. 24(12):
24(12) In setting the amount of costs, the court shall consider,
(a) the reasonableness and proportionality of each of the following factors as it relates to the importance and complexity of the issues:
(i) each party’s behaviour,
(ii) the time spent by each party,
(iii) any written offers to settle, including offers that do not meet the requirements of rule 18,
(iv) any legal fees, including the number of lawyers and their rates,
(v) any expert witness fees, including the number of experts and their rates,
(vi) any other expenses properly paid or payable; and
(b) any other relevant matter.
[18] The effect of the applicant’s submissions is that this is an appropriate case to award him costs that include all of his lawyer’s and paralegal’s docketed time. For reasons explained below, I reject that submission entirely.
[19] In fixing the costs of an unsuccessful party, reasonableness has been held to be a guiding principle. The court is not to engage in a mathematical or mechanical exercise of the type that underpins the applicant’s submissions in the case at bar.
[20] In Davies v. Clarington (Municipality), 2009 ONCA 722 (Ont. C.A.), the Court of Appeal for Ontario discussed the principle of reasonableness, including its relationship to access to justice, at para. 52:
52 As can be seen, the overriding principle is reasonableness. If the judge fails to consider the reasonableness of the costs award, then the result can be contrary to the fundamental objective of access to justice. Rather than engage in a purely mathematical exercise, the judge awarding costs should reflect on what the court views as a reasonable amount that should be paid by the unsuccessful party rather than any exact measure of the actual costs of the successful litigant. In Boucher, this court emphasized the importance of fixing costs in an amount that is fair and reasonable for the unsuccessful party to pay in the particular proceeding at para. 37, where Armstrong J.A. said "[t]he failure to refer, in assessing costs, to the overriding principle of reasonableness, can produce a result that is contrary to the fundamental objective of access to justice."
[21] While the concept of reasonableness should include a consideration of proportionality, r. 24(12) expressly requires the court to consider the reasonableness and proportionality of each of the enumerated factors. In Beaver v. Hill, supra, the court stated at para. 12:
12 As the wording of the rule makes clear, proportionality and reasonableness are the touchstone considerations to be applied in fixing the amount of costs.
[22] In considering the factors, I start with each party’s behaviour. I do agree with the applicant’s submission that there were aspects of the respondent’s conduct that unnecessarily prolonged this proceeding: the respondent gave some testimony at trial that contradicted the agreed statement of fact; she made and pursued allegations in her claim in relation to her knowledge of the applicant’s income and whether she had obtained legal advice that were not accurate; she failed to concede until the month prior to trial that she had obtained income disclosure from the applicant prior to signing the separation agreement; she did not disclose that she had received SSAG calculations during her 2012 consultation with a lawyer; and those calculations only surfaced after discoveries because the applicant had located a copy that had been given to him by the respondent apparently in 2012.
[23] I would characterize the foregoing as unreasonable conduct, which I take into account in awarding costs. However, that does not equate to characterizing the entire theory of the respondent’s case as unreasonable.
[24] The respondent was of the view that the existing agreement did not provide sufficiently for her support. She had a right to access to justice – a right to pursue a claim for more spousal support. The fact that her claim was dismissed does not per se characterize the bringing of the claim as unreasonable conduct.
[25] Clauses (ii) and (iv) in r. 12(a) pertaining to the time spent and legal fees can be dealt with together and are important considerations in this case.
[26] Ms. Bennett is senior counsel with 26 years’ experience. Her hourly rate, as indicated earlier, is $500. Ms. Bennett docketed 309.8 hours and her paralegal docketed 118 hours.
[27] The respondent also has filed her bill of costs and time dockets for her current lawyer. The respondent shows her “full indemnity” costs as $78,141.42. This consists of $65,010.50 for fees, $4,143.38 for disbursements and with the balance being HST. In relation to the fees, $50,569 was for lawyers’ fees with the balance being allocated to clerks and articling students.
[28] The respondent’s bill of costs shows that total time spent by lawyers acting for her is 236.9 hours. Except for 10.7 hours, all the lawyers’ time was put in by Mr. McKee at an hourly rate of $200 for the first 189.9 hours and then increasing to $225 per hour for the balance. Mr. McKee was called to the bar in 2015.
[29] The respondent relies on her bill of costs, in contrast to the applicant’s costs, as part of her argument that the costs sought are excessive.
[30] It is apparent that Ms. Bennett’s hourly rate exceeds substantially that of Mr. McKee given her seniority. I would note that the two other lawyers mentioned in the respondent’s bill of costs, who had very minor roles in the file, had hourly rates of $525 and $410 and years of call, respectively, in 1972 (46 years) and 2000 (18 years).
[31] The applicant points out that it is not possible to compare the two bills because the respondent had a previous lawyer, whose bill was not produced. The respondent retained Mr. McKee’s firm in February 2017, whereas the file had started some 13 months earlier.
[32] According to Ms. Bennett’s dockets, the file commenced in January 2016 when the divorce application was issued. However, until February 2017, Ms. Bennett’s docketed time and her paralegal’s docketed time both were quite minor, with there being long periods of time during that 13 months when no work was docketed.
[33] Although the applicant is correct to complain about non-production of the previous lawyer’s bill, it would appear quite unlikely, given Ms. Bennett’s dockets, that anything of substance occurred during the first 13 months other than the exchange of pleadings.
[34] This case was a one-issue trial, albeit with some measure of complexity given the Miglin analysis. The trial was spread over six days, including argument, although some of the days were not full days. The applicant submits that Ms. Bennett’s time of 309.8 hours is reasonable because, despite the “glaring omission” of not including 13 months of time from the respondent’s first lawyer, the respondent’s lawyers still managed to docket 290.1 hours, which is close to the time that Ms. Bennett docketed. However, as noted earlier, the total lawyers’ time for the respondent is 236.9 hours.
[35] In any event, even if the time spent by the respondent’s lawyers was close to that of the applicant’s lawyer, this would not corroborate that the time spent on behalf of the applicant was reasonable; rather, I conclude in the case at bar that the time spent by lawyers and others on behalf of both parties was excessive.
[36] The applicant appears to have approached this case from the perspective that no stone should be left unturned. Despite an extensive agreed statement of fact that was designed to reduce the trial time, the applicant brought a motion for summary judgment on the eve of trial. The endorsement of Templeton J. required the applicant to choose between proceeding to trial or proceeding with the motion for summary judgment. The applicant chose the former. In her endorsement, Templeton J. noted that counsel had agreed that with the filing of the agreed statement of fact that the trial would be reduced to “1½ to 2 days.” The trial turned out to be substantially longer and, for that, both parties are responsible.
[37] In my view, the motion for a non-suit was “overkill.” Also, I agree with the respondent that the motion for summary judgment, not having proceeded, can be viewed as wasteful and certainly not something that the respondent should pay for.
[38] As a litigant, the applicant was entitled to instruct his counsel to litigate this case “leaving no stone unturned.” It was his right to spend over $200,000 in legal fees to achieve the success that he did. However, a successful litigant such as the applicant needs to be wary that just because he elected to pay his lawyer over $200,000 to defend a request for increased spousal support, that does not mean necessarily that he will be entitled to recoup all or most of those costs from the unsuccessful party.
[39] From the perspective of reasonableness and proportionality, I find that the trial was unnecessarily lengthy. In Sepiashvili v. Sepiashvili, 2001 25708 (ON SC), 2001 CarswellOnt 3459 (S.C.J.), relied on by the respondent, I adopt the following comments of Wildman J., at para. 20:
20 I am assuming that the decision to spend so much money preparing for this motion was Mr. Sapir's rather than his counsel's. Regardless of the outcome of the case, a client is not entitled to direct vast resources to litigation and expect full reimbursement. When the rules use the term "full recovery costs", there is an implied qualification that the costs incurred must be reasonable. There must be some assessment of the most effective use of resources to present the case, and some attempt to approach the matter in a cost-effective manner. This is particularly so in a case such as this, in which the resources of the parties are not balanced. I am left to wonder if these parties would be closer to resolution if more of Mr. Sapir's funds were offered to his wife rather than directed to funding this litigation. I urge the parties to rethink their approach to this case, as their adversarial conduct to date has been very expensive and not terribly productive.
[40] In relation to clause (iii), the applicant served three offers and the respondent served two offers. The applicant’s offers were much more consistent with the trial result.
[41] The applicant has presented his costs summary in relation to his offer dated May 20, 2016, served in the early stages of this litigation. The applicant has organized his costs submissions summary as “pre-offer” and “post-offer.” Most of the time spent was subsequent to the offer.
[42] The applicant’s May 2016 offer proposed that all claims except the claim for divorce be dismissed. However, that offer also dealt with costs. There were to be no costs if accepted by May 31, 2016; otherwise, paragraph 4 of the offer dealt with costs as follows:
In the event that this Formal Offer to Settle is not accepted in accordance with paragraph 3 above, then after May 31, 2016 at 4:01 p.m., if the Applicant, John Anthony Shelley obtains a result at the conclusion of a hearing of this matter or at trial or on consent, that is as favourable as or more favourable than this offer, then he seeks his costs after the deadline set out in this offer on a full indemnity basis, plus assessable disbursements and HST, from the date of this offer to the date of acceptance or any order of the court and on a partial indemnity basis for any period of time prior to the date of the offer from the commencement of the proceeding and to the date of the offer, as ordered by a Justice hearing the issue of the costs in this matter.
[43] Although neither party made specific reference to r. 18(14) in his or her submissions, I do consider this rule as the applicant appears to be relying on it:
(14) A party who makes an offer is, unless the court orders otherwise, entitled to costs to the date the offer was served and full recovery of costs from that date, if the following conditions are met:
If the offer relates to a motion, it is made at least one day before the motion date.
If the offer relates to a trial or the hearing of a step other than a motion, it is made at least seven days before the trial or hearing date.
The offer does not expire and is not withdrawn before the hearing starts.
The offer is not accepted.
The party who made the offer obtains an order that is as favourable as or more favourable than the offer.
[44] It is trite that the proposal for costs in the May 2016 offer is part of the offer itself. That means that the costs proposal has to be considered in determining whether the offer as a whole complies with paragraph 5 of r. 18(14). However, costs are yet to be determined; hence, considering the costs provision in an offer, as part of the analysis in determining costs, can lead to a circular conundrum. The applicant, for example, claims to be entitled to “partial indemnity” costs to the date of the offer. What does that mean? As discussed earlier, there is no provision in the Rules for partial indemnity. The burden is on the applicant to prove compliance with paragraph 5 of r. 18(14): see r. 18(15). Given that the costs provisions are intertwined with the substantive provisions, I am unable to find that the applicant has discharged that burden of proof.
[45] That said, however, the applicant’s May 2016 offer correctly predicts the result at trial. That offer is an important consideration and I take it into account pursuant to r. 18(16).
[46] It is noted that even when “full recovery” costs are ordered, that the quantification of such costs is still subject to reasonableness and proportionality. I adopt the statement of Pazaratz J. in Jackson v. Mayerle, 2016 ONSC 1556 (S.C.J.), relied on by the respondent, at para. 91:
91 Even where the "full recovery" provisions of the Rules are triggered — either by an offer which meets Rule 18(14) requirements, or by a finding of bad faith — quantification of costs still requires an overall sense of reasonableness and fairness. Goryn v. Neisner, 2015 ONCJ 318 (Ont. C.J.). The Rules do not require the court to allow the successful party to demand a blank cheque for their costs. Slongo v. Slongo, 2015 ONSC 3327 (Ont. S.C.J.). The court retains a residual discretion to make costs awards which are proportional, fair and reasonable in all the circumstances. M. (C.A.) v. M. (D.) (supra); Scipione v. Del Sordo (supra) [2015 ONSC 5982].
[47] None of the applicant’s three offers provided for any increase in spousal support. For her part, the respondent served her first offer to settle in early September 2017, which was approximately two months before trial, seeking $4,258 per month spousal support indexed until December 31, 2029. The respondent decreased this to $3,645 per month pursuant to an offer served at or about the time of trial.
[48] The issue of proportionality zooms into sharp focus when one considers that between them both parties have spent over $290,000 in legal fees. At $2,500 per month (ignoring indexing), the spousal support payable over the next ten years will total $300,000, with less than a year remaining prior to the December 2029 deadline contained in the agreement. One wonders, similar to Wildman J. in Sepiashvili, supra, whether the applicant could have diverted some of the vast resources he spent on legal fees towards some increase in spousal support and, further, whether the respondent could have made offers earlier in the proceeding seeking more modest increases in spousal support.
[49] I find that both parties failed to adhere to the principle of proportionality in dealing with this case. In family law “money cases,” such as the case at bar, it is important for parties to anticipate, and know, approximately how much they may end up spending in legal fees, and to make serious efforts, especially early during the litigation, to resolve issues in a cost-efficient manner even if that requires some compromise as to each party’s position; otherwise, the “money cases” may turn into a “run-away train” with ever-increasing legal costs that could spiral to the point where any sense of proportionality fades into an illusory concept.
[50] In relation to clause (vi), the respondent questions the amount of disbursements, in particular the photocopies, including colour copies. The photocopy costs exceeded $9,500. Even acknowledging the applicant’s submission that most of the trial exhibits were prepared by the applicant, there is some merit to the respondent’s submission regarding disbursements.
[51] There is no disagreement between the parties that under r. 12(b) (“any other relevant matter”) that a court can consider an unsuccessful party’s financial circumstances in determining the amount of costs: see, for example, M.(C.A.) v. M.(D.), supra, at para. 42, and Beaver v. Hill, supra, at para. 18. Included in the respondent’s submissions was a brief affidavit from the respondent, not objected to by the applicant, where the respondent deposed that subsequent to trial there were a number of layoffs where she worked and that she was terminated effective September 10, 2018, receiving two months’ severance pay. The respondent deposed that she had not yet found employment; however, her affidavit is sworn only eight days after her termination.
[52] In relation to the respondent’s financial situation, I do consider, from the evidence at trial, that her income and her capacity to earn an income is substantially less than that of the applicant. I also take into account from the evidence at trial that the respondent had achieved an admirable level of proficiency in her work and that she had a good history of gainful employment. There is no other information regarding the respondent’s recent termination.
[53] In the circumstances, while I do consider the respondent’s financial circumstances, including her income earning history, the costs order being made as set out below would have been the same whether or not the respondent had lost her current employment.
[54] Considering the “touchstones” of reasonableness and proportionality, I allow the applicant $70,000 for fees, $7,000 for disbursements and $10,010 for HST, for a total of $87,010. Against this amount, I allow the respondent $5,000 for being successful in having the motion for a non-suit dismissed and, further, $1,500 which I awarded to the respondent when the applicant’s post-trial motion for security for costs was dismissed. Both those costs amounts are all inclusive.
[55] The foregoing reflects an award of costs that is near the range of “full recovery costs,” where “full recovery costs” are determined applying the principles of proportionality and reasonableness, together with the other provisions of r. 24, including the factors in r. 24(12). The respondent’s failure to make offers earlier than she did, her unreasonable behaviour discussed earlier and the applicant’s May 2016 offer are some of the factors that justify the range of the costs award.
[56] The net result is $80,510. However, given the fact situation, namely that the respondent is continuing to receive spousal support from the applicant, I find that this is a proper case to order the full amount of costs to be paid monthly consistent with the maximum time contemplated by the agreement. This type of approach was approved by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Reisman v. Reisman, 2014 ONCA 109 (Ont. C.A.).
[57] In Reisman, like the case at bar, costs were awarded against the wife in circumstances where she was in receipt of spousal support. The trial judge awarded the husband $250,000 in costs, payable by the wife over ten years in equal monthly installments of $2,083.33 unless the husband’s spousal support obligation ended sooner, in which case the entire award would be due and payable (see para. 75). The trial judge had ordered the spousal support payments to be limited to ten years. The quantum of spousal support was $4,500 per month.
[58] The Court of Appeal for Ontario set aside the ten-year upper limit on spousal support; although the amount of costs was not disturbed on appeal, the court did order that the costs be paid at the rate of only $1,000 per month, but that if the wife’s entitlement to support ends, then she was required to pay the outstanding costs amount (paras. 78-80).
[59] In the present case, if the costs order starts to be paid March 1, 2019, then the maximum duration to December 2029 is 130 months. The result is an average monthly payment of $619.31 per month, which I round to $620. If entitlement to spousal support ends prior to December 2029, then the full amount of costs owing shall be paid.
[60] The applicant made a request, but only in his reply submissions, that the court should make an order pursuant to the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act, 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 31, to deem the costs payable by the respondent as a support order to permit enforcement by the Director of the Family Responsibility Office (“Director”). No authorities were provided by the applicant on that point notwithstanding the somewhat unusual situation in the present case where there is no underlying support order made by the court.
[61] Enforcement of a costs order could subject the respondent, potentially, to an enforcement proceeding by the Director. It appears that a costs order made in favour of a successful party may be made enforceable by the Director where a claim by the unsuccessful party for support has been dismissed (see, for example, Clark v. Clark, 2014 ONCA 175 (Ont. C.A.), particularly at paras. 75-79 and para. 105, where the court permitted costs ordered in favour of the successful party to be enforced by the Director in circumstances where the unsuccessful party’s child support claim had been dismissed).
[62] However, in the case at bar, I decline to make that order because it was advanced, improperly, in reply submissions leaving no opportunity for the respondent to address the issue.
Order
[63] I make the following final order:
The respondent shall pay to the applicant his costs of this proceeding fixed in the amount of $80, 510 inclusive of disbursements and HST, payable on the terms set out in paragraph 2.
The costs shall be paid as follows:
a) $620 per month on the first day of each month commencing March 1, 2019 until paid in full;
b) in the event that the respondent’s entitlement to spousal support ends prior to the payment of costs in full, then within 30 days thereafter, any outstanding costs still owing by the respondent to the applicant shall be paid in full.
“Justice Victor Mitrow”
Justice Victor Mitrow
Date: January 29, 2019
[^1]: Shelley v. Shelley, 2018 ONSC 4516 [^2]: Shelley v. Shelley, 2018 ONSC 6425