David Winninger

The applicants, the child's paternal grandmother and father, and the respondent mother brought a consent motion for a final parenting order.

The court declined to grant the order on the current record, noting deficiencies in the evidence, including the grandmother's failure to provide a proper police records check under the Children's Law Reform Act, missing affidavits, and conflicting evidence regarding Children's Aid Society involvement.

The court issued a temporary order requiring the parties to file additional materials before the consent order could be considered.

In a child protection application, the father (A.A.) moved for a Section 98 assessment concerning allegations of sexual abuse against him and potential coaching of the children.

The court found the assessment necessary to determine the issues, particularly regarding coaching, as police opinions were deemed insufficient.

The motion was granted, and the court ordered the Children's Aid Society to pay 75% of the assessment costs, with the father responsible for the remaining 25%, including a repayment plan if he could not pay his share upfront.

The applicant father sought shared decision-making responsibility and equal parenting time for the parties' four children, two of whom have autism.

The respondent mother sought sole decision-making responsibility and defined parenting time, citing the father's history of alcohol abuse, criminal conduct, and family violence.

The court found the father's behaviour constituted family violence and that he lacked insight into his anger and its impact on the family.

The mother was granted sole decision-making responsibility.

The father was granted specified parenting time subject to strict conditions, including prohibitions on alcohol consumption and requirements to child-proof his residence.

This costs endorsement followed substantive motions regarding a child's school attendance and residence.

The respondent, Mazin Jillood, was found primarily successful on the substantive motions.

The court considered Family Law Rule 24 regarding costs, including divided success and unreasonable behaviour of both parties.

While Mazin was successful on the main issue of school attendance and largely on residence, his "self-help" in removing the child from the applicant's care was deemed unreasonable.

The applicant, Deborah Friesen, also contributed to the dispute by unilaterally moving.

The court assessed the reasonableness and proportionality of costs, considering the importance and complexity of issues, time spent by counsel, and the parties' financial circumstances.

Ultimately, the court awarded Mazin $4,500.00 in all-inclusive costs, a reduction from the amount sought, and deferred payment until child and spousal support issues are resolved.

The Family and Children Services of St. Thomas and Elgin brought a summary judgment motion to terminate an existing supervision order for the child, T., arguing she was no longer in need of protection.

Both parents, B.M. and D.O., opposed the termination, each seeking primary decision-making authority for T. The court dismissed the Society's motion, finding that a genuine issue for trial existed regarding T.'s continued need for protection due to the parents' ongoing high conflict and its negative emotional impact on the child, as evidenced by T.'s distress and withdrawal during parental arguments.

The court emphasized that the Society's withdrawal would likely exacerbate parental conflict over major decisions, such as T.'s schooling and medication, which would not be in the child's best interests.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the father sought to return to a joint custody and shared residential arrangement that had been in place since November 2017 pursuant to a separation agreement.

The mother suspended this arrangement in May 2020, citing concerns about the father's alcohol addiction, relationship instability with his partner, and the impact on the children.

The court found urgency was established and determined that a graduated return to the shared custody arrangement was in the children's best interests, with conditions requiring the father to continue working with addiction services and counselling, and prohibiting excessive alcohol consumption while caregiving or in the presence of the children.

The applicants (paternal grandmother and father) brought an urgent motion for an interim parenting order for their two-year-old child.

The urgency arose because the mother had unilaterally taken the child to Prince Edward Island, which the court previously ordered her to return from.

The court considered the father's extensive criminal record, including assault convictions, and the mother's wrongful self-help actions, as well as questions regarding the mother's parenting abilities.

The court made an interim parenting order granting the paternal grandmother care and control for part of the week and the mother for the remainder, with the father having supervised daytime access.

The motions were adjourned to a case conference to address the mother's future housing arrangements.

The paternal grandmother and father brought an urgent motion for the return of a two-year-old child after the mother unilaterally relocated with the child from London, Ontario to Prince Edward Island.

The mother brought a cross-motion for interim custody and permission to reside in PEI.

The court applied the Plumley test for interim mobility and found no compelling circumstances to justify the move, noting the child's habitual residence was London and the move would undermine the child's relationship with the applicants.

The mother was ordered to return the child to London pending further interim orders.

The applicant mother sought sole custody, child support, and restricted access for the respondent father, while the father sought joint custody and shared time.

The court found that joint custody was not in the children's best interests due to the parents' inability to communicate and the history of conflict.

The mother was awarded sole custody.

The father, who had struggled with alcohol abuse following his sister's death, was granted a graduated access schedule subject to a strict sobriety condition.

The court also imputed an annual income of $13,000 to the unemployed father for child support purposes, finding him intentionally underemployed, but declined to order him to obtain life insurance due to lack of evidence regarding insurability and ability to pay.

The Children’s Aid Society brought a status review application seeking extended society care for two children, E.P. and M.P., who had been in temporary care for approximately 1100 days.

The mother, father, and maternal grandmother (respondents) opposed this, proposing the children be returned to their care subject to Society supervision.

The court found the children continued to be in need of protection due to the respondents' ongoing addiction and mental health issues.

After evaluating all plans of care, the court determined that extended society care was in the children's best interests, given their complex behavioural and educational needs, tumultuous placement history, and the respondents' fragile recovery and inability to provide sustained safe care.

Access for all respondents was ordered to continue at the Society's discretion, subject to the children's wishes.

The applicant brought a motion to change a final order to increase spousal support and terminate child support.

The respondent sought to terminate spousal support.

The court found that the applicant's receipt of provincial disability benefits did not constitute a material change, as she was still capable of part-time work and her disability was unrelated to the marriage.

However, the court found that the passage of time of over ten years and the amount of support paid constituted a material change.

The court concluded that the applicant's entitlement to both compensatory and non-compensatory support had ended, and terminated the respondent's spousal support obligation.

Child support was also terminated on consent.

The parties, who share equal residential parenting time of their four-year-old son, brought competing motions regarding his enrollment in Junior Kindergarten.

The mother sought to enroll the child at a school near her residence, where the child had already established a connection through his half-sister.

The father sought enrollment at a school near his residence, citing financial and transportation difficulties.

The court applied the best interests of the child test and ordered that the child be enrolled in the mother's proposed school, finding that the established routine and connection to the school would provide stability and reduce inconvenience for the child.

The Children's Aid Society sought a protection finding and an order of Crown wardship for a child apprehended at birth due to the mother's substance abuse and mental health issues.

The mother passed away shortly after the child's birth.

The father, who had separated from the mother, sought to parent the child.

The Society argued the father lacked parenting capacity based on observations during supervised access and a parenting program.

The court found the child in need of protection but dismissed the request for Crown wardship, finding the Society's concerns about the father's parenting abilities were overstated and did not justify the most intrusive order.

The court ordered the child placed in the father's care for 10 months subject to a supervision order with terms and conditions, emphasizing the principle of the least disruptive course of action.

The parties resolved their appeal by entering into minutes of settlement to proceed by way of a motion to change.

The court determined the costs of the appellant's motion for a stay pending appeal and the appeal itself.

Finding divided success on the motion to stay and noting the appellant's unreasonable conduct in denying court-ordered access, the court awarded the appellant modest costs of $5,000, payable by the respondent in monthly installments.

The Children's Aid Society apprehended a newborn child at birth due to concerns about the mother's mental health, history of abusive relationships, and lack of support.

The Society and the father sought an order finding the child in need of protection and placing the child in the joint custody of the father and paternal grandparents.

The mother opposed the order and sought the return of the child.

The court found the child in need of protection due to the risk of physical and emotional harm in the mother's care.

The court concluded that a supervision order would be inadequate and granted joint custody to the father and paternal grandparents, with supervised access for the mother.

The appellant father brought a motion to stay a trial judgment that ordered a week-about parenting plan and child support, pending his appeal.

The trial judge had ordered the shared parenting plan based on the respondent mother obtaining suitable accommodation near the children's school.

Fresh evidence on the motion showed the mother had lost that accommodation, was living in unsuitable temporary housing, and had exhibited erratic behaviour during access visits.

Applying the three-part test for a stay, the court found the fresh evidence raised a serious issue for appeal and that a stay was in the children's best interests to prevent irreparable harm.

The motion was granted, staying the week-about plan and child support, and substituting a schedule of specified daytime access for the mother.

The appellant brought a motion to stay portions of a final parenting order pending appeal.

Pending full argument on the stay motion, the court addressed the respondent's interim parenting time.

The appellant raised concerns about the respondent's accommodation and a recent medical incident where the respondent appeared disengaged.

The court found insufficient evidence to require supervised parenting time but ordered that the children reside with the appellant, with the respondent having specified daytime parenting time on weekends.

The Children's Aid Society sought a disposition order following a finding that two young children were in need of protection due to severe neglect, unsanitary living conditions, and parental substance abuse.

The mother sought the return of the children to her care, with the support of the maternal grandmother.

The court found that the mother and grandmother had failed to demonstrate any meaningful rehabilitation or ability to integrate parenting instruction, and that returning the children would expose them to an unacceptable risk of harm.

The court ordered Crown wardship for the younger child with no access order, and granted custody of the older child to the paternal grandmother, finding these dispositions to be in the children's best interests.

Two child protection agencies sought Crown wardship of five children born to deaf parents.

The four older children had been in care for over five years, and the youngest was apprehended at birth.

The parents sought the return of all children.

The court found all five children to be in need of protection due to the parents' history of transience, inability to meet the children's significant developmental needs, and lack of a stable housing plan.

The court ordered Crown wardship for all five children without parental access, finding that the parents could not provide the necessary stability and that parental access would not be beneficial and meaningful or would impair adoption.

Sibling access was ordered.

A temporary care and custody hearing under s. 51 of the Child and Family Services Act considered the placement of three children following their apprehension from the mother.

The Society maintained a neutral position between the father and the maternal grandmother as potential caregivers for the two younger children, while the eldest child had been residing with the grandmother.

The court evaluated the best interests of the children, including sibling relationships, stability, caregiving capacity, and the least disruptive placement.

It found the father capable of safely caring for the two younger children and concluded that the grandmother’s responsibility for the eldest child’s significant needs made placement of all three children with her less appropriate.

Temporary care and custody of the two younger children was granted to the father, while the eldest child remained with the grandmother, all subject to Society supervision and access arrangements.