Victor Mitrow

The parties brought cross-motions for interim parenting orders regarding their two youngest children.

The applicant mother sought primary care of the youngest child with conditions on the respondent father's parenting time, citing concerns about his admitted history of sexual addiction and inappropriate behaviour.

The respondent sought equal parenting time on a week-about basis.

The court granted the applicant primary care of the youngest child, finding it consistent with the status quo and the child's best interests.

The court expanded the respondent's parenting time but imposed conditions prohibiting him from keeping pornographic material where the child may be and from discussing his mental health or sexual behaviour with the child.

Parenting time for the older child was ordered to be in accordance with his wishes.

The respondent mother brought a motion seeking supervised parenting time for the applicant father and a police assistance order, alleging family violence and harassment.

The court found the father's conduct constituted family violence but determined that supervised parenting time was excessive at this stage.

The court reduced the father's parenting time, ordered strict conditions for access exchanges, granted a police assistance order to prevent overholding, and corrected procedural errors in previously issued ex parte restraining orders.

The Children's Aid Society brought a status review application regarding a First Nations child who had been placed in the joint care of the parents under a supervision order.

The court found no ongoing protection concerns requiring Society supervision and terminated the supervision order.

In determining the appropriate parenting order under s. 102 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, the court evaluated the competing plans of the parents.

The court awarded primary care and sole decision-making responsibility to the father, noting his ability to provide stability and the mother's history of relationships with violent partners, while granting the mother specified parenting time and decision-making responsibility for education.

In a high-conflict parenting dispute, the applicant father brought a motion to enforce his parenting time after the 12-year-old children refused to see him.

The respondent mother sought to stay the motion and proceed with oral questioning.

The court found it had jurisdiction under the amended Divorce Act to order reconciliation counselling as an incident of a parenting order.

The court ordered the parties and children to engage in reconciliation counselling to re-establish the relationship between the children and the applicant, dismissing the respondent's request for further litigation at this stage.

Following an undefended trial where the applicant was awarded damages for assault and battery, the applicant sought costs.

The court fixed costs at $15,000 all inclusive, finding the fees and time spent reasonable given the respondent's tortious conduct.

The court also ordered that the applicant be reimbursed from the respondent's share of the net sale proceeds of their jointly-owned property for half of a Legal Aid lien incurred by the respondent for his criminal defence.

The applicant father and respondent mother brought urgent motions regarding parenting time, school enrollment, and interim support following their separation.

The court ordered an interim interim parenting schedule of four days with the father and three days with the mother during the school year, and week-about during the summer.

The child was ordered to attend public school in the father's catchment area for the remainder of the school year.

As a condition of adjourning the motions, the mother was ordered to pay $5,000 in four installments, to be credited towards any future support orders.

The applicant father brought a motion in a high-conflict parenting dispute seeking to terminate the children's current counselling and commence reconciliation counselling to re-establish his parenting time.

The respondent mother agreed to terminate the current counselling but proposed trauma therapy before reconciliation counselling.

The court found no basis to delay reconciliation counselling and ordered the parties to immediately engage in reconciliation counselling with a newly appointed therapist pursuant to section 28 of the Children's Law Reform Act.

The respondent mother brought a motion seeking primary residence of her five-year-old child, who was currently in the temporary custody of the applicant paternal grandmother pursuant to an ex parte order.

The court declined to change the child's primary residence on an interim basis, citing the principle of maintaining the status quo pending a full investigation by the Office of the Children's Lawyer.

However, the court found it in the child's best interests to increase the mother's parenting time to alternate weekends and a week-about schedule during the summer.

The grandmother was ordered to facilitate most of the transportation due to the mother's circumstances.

The applicant sought to vary an existing child support order under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act, 2002, specifically to reduce monthly arrears payments and terminate the support obligation for two adult children.

The court found that the applicant failed to establish a material change in circumstances since the previous final order that fixed arrears.

The application was dismissed as it essentially sought to relitigate issues already decided, and the applicant's income had not decreased.

The applicant sought an interim restraining order against a respondent, Christopher Lee Sommerville, under the Children's Law Reform Act, alleging sexual abuse of children and criminal ties.

The court dismissed the request for a restraining order, finding insufficient evidence to establish reasonable grounds for fear for safety.

However, the court, in the children's best interests, issued a contact order under s. 28(1)(c)(i) of the Act, prohibiting the respondent from direct or indirect contact with the children or the applicant, while an investigation by the Children's Aid Society was ongoing.

The applicant father brought an urgent motion for the return of the parties' three-year-old child, whom the respondent mother had withheld, alleging the father's substance use posed a risk.

The mother also sought an interlocutory order for primary care.

The court addressed the father's motion and the mother's responding material, including issues of inadmissible hearsay evidence.

An interim, without prejudice, parenting order was issued, granting the mother unsupervised parenting time, including overnights, and the father supervised parenting time in the presence of the paternal grandmother.

The mother's motion for primary care was adjourned to a later date, and the balance of motions were dismissed with costs reserved.

This was an undefended trial where the applicant sought general and special damages for physical injuries and loss of income resulting from a brutal assault by the respondent.

The respondent was served but failed to file an answer or appear.

The court also addressed the sale of a jointly-owned residence.

The judge awarded the applicant $60,000 in general damages and $8,700 in special damages, taking into account significant aggravating factors of the assault.

The order also provided for the payment of damages from the respondent's share of the proceeds from the sale of the jointly-owned property, with the property sale issue remaining before the court for further directions.

This was an undefended trial addressing divorce, equalization payments, and the applicant's claim for occupation rent.

The respondent's pleadings were struck, and she did not appear at trial.

The court granted the divorce, calculated the equalization payment as zero (for res judicata purposes), and quantified the applicant's payments for the respondent's benefit as lump sum spousal support.

The claim for occupation rent was dismissed without prejudice, allowing the applicant to raise it if the respondent ever pursues a spousal support claim in the future.

The applicant mother brought a motion to terminate or supervise the respondent father's access to their child following allegations of sexual abuse.

The father brought a cross-motion seeking to enforce the existing final order, make-up access, and a finding of contempt against the mother.

The Children's Aid Society investigated and did not verify the allegations.

The court found the evidentiary record insufficient to make findings of sexual abuse and ordered that the father's unsupervised access continue, including limited overnight access.

The court also appointed the Office of the Children's Lawyer to represent the child and dismissed the balance of both motions.

The applicant sought ongoing and retroactive child support in an undefended trial following the respondent's failure to file an answer or provide complete financial disclosure.

The court found the respondent to be intentionally underemployed and imputed his income at $59,500 based on his previous earnings.

Applying the DBS factors, the court ordered retroactive child support from July 1, 2017, citing the respondent's blameworthy conduct in failing to pay support or provide financial disclosure.

The court calculated retroactive arrears at $31,294 and ordered ongoing child support for the eligible children based on the imputed income.

The applicant children's aid society sought an order to commit a youth to a secure treatment program for 180 days due to severe substance abuse and mental health issues.

The youth's parents supported the application, while the youth opposed it.

The court found that the youth suffered from a mental disorder that grossly impaired their capacity to make reasoned judgments, and that the youth had attempted to cause serious bodily harm to themselves through severe drug use and resulting emaciation.

The court granted the application, finding that secure treatment was the only effective and least restrictive method available to prevent further serious bodily harm.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's motion for a stay pending appeal of an access order, the respondent sought costs.

The court reviewed the offers to settle made by the appellant and found they did not comply with the strict requirements of Rule 18(14) of the Family Law Rules, as they were conditional or included predeterminations of costs.

However, considering the parties' reasonable behaviour and the factors under Rule 24(12), the court awarded the successful respondent costs fixed at $5,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The applicants (paternal grandmother and father) brought an urgent motion for an interim parenting order for their two-year-old child.

The urgency arose because the mother had unilaterally taken the child to Prince Edward Island, which the court previously ordered her to return from.

The court considered the father's extensive criminal record, including assault convictions, and the mother's wrongful self-help actions, as well as questions regarding the mother's parenting abilities.

The court made an interim parenting order granting the paternal grandmother care and control for part of the week and the mother for the remainder, with the father having supervised daytime access.

The motions were adjourned to a case conference to address the mother's future housing arrangements.

The respondent mother brought an urgent motion to reinstate alternate weekend access with her child, which the applicant father had unilaterally suspended due to alleged COVID-19 concerns and the child's purported fears.

The court found the father's reasons for suspending access suspect, emphasizing that court orders must be obeyed and that a parent cannot delegate access decisions to a child.

The motion was granted, reinstating access and ordering make-up weekends.

The respondent's Form 14B motion was deemed a motion to change, and the applicant's answer was struck, though he retained the right to seek child support.

The paternal grandmother and father brought an urgent motion for the return of a two-year-old child after the mother unilaterally relocated with the child from London, Ontario to Prince Edward Island.

The mother brought a cross-motion for interim custody and permission to reside in PEI.

The court applied the Plumley test for interim mobility and found no compelling circumstances to justify the move, noting the child's habitual residence was London and the move would undermine the child's relationship with the applicants.

The mother was ordered to return the child to London pending further interim orders.