Victor Mitrow

The respondent father brought motions for interim child support and production of police records.

The applicant mother brought a cross-motion to dismiss the respondent's motions and to prohibit him from bringing further motions pursuant to subrules 1(8), 14(21), and 14(23) of the Family Law Rules.

The court dismissed the respondent's motions, noting his claims for child support had already been dismissed on a final basis and the requested police records were irrelevant.

Finding that the respondent had a history of failing to obey court orders, including an unpaid civil judgment for assault, and had abused the court process by bringing meritless motions, the court ordered that the respondent is prohibited from bringing any further motions without prior leave of the court.

In a matrimonial proceeding involving ownership of a cottage property, the moving parties sought to add Legal Aid Ontario as a party because it had registered liens against the property to secure legal aid services provided to one spouse.

The court considered the test under Rule 7(5) of the Family Law Rules for adding a party.

It held that a person will generally only be added if they are a necessary party and if an order can be made for or against them, although the court retains a narrow discretion to add parties without a legal interest in exceptional circumstances.

Because no order could be made for or against Legal Aid Ontario, it had no involvement in the underlying matrimonial dispute, and no unusual or egregious circumstances existed, the court declined to add it as a party.

The applicant municipalities sought a declaration that their insurers had a duty to indemnify them for damages sought in two underlying actions relating to the expropriation of lands for a Toyota manufacturing plant.

The insurers argued the application was premature as the underlying actions involved substantial disputed facts and potential coverage exclusions, including whether the municipalities gained a personal profit or advantage, or if the claims were for restitution or statutory compensation.

The court dismissed the application, holding that unlike the duty to defend, the duty to indemnify must generally be determined after trial based on findings of fact, and the current record contained too many disputed facts to resolve the coverage issues prematurely.

On competing interim family law motions following separation, the respondent sought implementation of parenting schedule recommendations from a custody and access assessment, while the applicant sought an interim preservation order restraining dealings with certain corporate interests and RRSP assets.

The court considered whether an assessor’s report prepared for trial could be relied upon on an interim motion.

The court held that while caution is required, the contents of an assessment may be considered where it provides probative evidence and where the requested interim order does not substantially alter the status quo.

The parenting schedule was modestly reorganized to accommodate the father’s employment travel and the child’s educational needs, while balancing the child’s expressed preferences and parental care considerations.

An interim preservation order was also granted restraining dealings with specified corporate interests and RRSPs pending valuation to protect potential equalization claims.

The applicant brought a motion for summary judgment to prove a lost will and admit a copy to probate.

The deceased's original will could not be found, raising the presumption of revocation.

The court found the presumption was rebutted by evidence that the deceased was a severe hoarder, making it likely the will was lost in the clutter rather than intentionally destroyed, and by his established solicitor-client relationship.

The court admitted the copy of the will to probate and directed that a bequest to 'VON Woodstock' be paid to VON Oxford.

The moving party brought an application under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act seeking to modify an existing child support order while residing in another jurisdiction.

The court noted that the application lacked critical information, including details of the order sought to be varied, sufficient financial disclosure, and information about the applicable foreign child support law required by statute.

Because the payer resided in another jurisdiction, the governing legislation required application of that jurisdiction’s child support formula, but no evidence of that law was provided.

The court found the record insufficient to determine the requested variation and directed that additional financial documentation and legal information be obtained through the designated authority.

The proceeding was adjourned pending receipt of the required materials.

Following a trial regarding the closure of a church and distribution of its assets, the court determined the distribution of funds held in court to selected charities and assessed costs.

The court awarded the respondents substantial indemnity costs of $60,000 due to the reprehensible conduct of one of the applicants, who was found in breach of trust.

The court ordered $20,000 of the costs to be paid from the funds held in court, with the remaining $40,000 apportioned between the applicants, holding the primary litigator responsible for the substantial indemnity portion.

The applicant mother brought an ex parte motion seeking an order dispensing with service of a custody application on the child’s biological father, whose identity was unknown.

The court reviewed the framework under the Children's Law Reform Act governing custody proceedings where the father is unknown and service is sought to be dispensed with.

The court held that such applications must satisfy s. 62(5) of the Act, including establishing that no statutory presumption of paternity under s. 8 applies.

Because the applicant’s affidavit failed to address all presumptions of paternity, the evidentiary record was insufficient.

The motion was adjourned pending the filing of a supplementary affidavit confirming that no presumption of paternity exists.

In an undefended divorce application, the court addressed whether it could rely on a clearance certificate issued by the Central Registry of Divorce Proceedings where the certificate listed an incorrect application filing date and a clearance date that preceded the commencement of the proceeding.

The court reviewed the requirements under ss. 3(2) and 3(3) of the Divorce Act and the Central Registry of Divorce Proceedings Regulations, as well as r. 36 of the Family Law Rules.

The court held that a clearance certificate must accurately state the date the divorce proceeding was commenced and must have a clearance date on or after that date in order for the court to confirm exclusive jurisdiction.

Because the certificate showed a clearance date earlier than the filing date and an incorrect application date, it could not be relied upon.

The court ordered the Central Registry to issue a new clearance certificate reflecting the correct filing date and a clearance date on or after that date.