Thomas R. Lederer

The defendant was granted leave to appeal a motion judge's refusal to dismiss the plaintiff's action for delay.

The defendant sought costs of the motion for leave to appeal in the amount of $9,544.79.

The self-represented plaintiff argued she was impecunious and that the defendant shared blame for the delay.

The court rejected the plaintiff's impecuniosity argument, noting that excessive delay bears cost consequences regardless of financial circumstances.

However, the court found the requested amount too high based on proportionality and awarded costs to the defendant in the reduced amount of $3,500 inclusive.

The appellant lien claimants appealed an order refusing to confirm a Master's report under the Construction Lien Act.

The Master had found that the lien claimants were entitled to the full value of their claims from security posted by a mortgagee to vacate the liens, rather than just the deficiency in the holdback.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Master erred in principle by ignoring binding precedent (stare decisis) which limits recovery from posted security to the holdback deficiency.

The Court also upheld findings that the mortgagee was not an 'owner' at the relevant time, that holdbacks must be calculated individually for direct contractors rather than pooled, and that certain funds were not 'advances' made prior to the liens being vacated.

Two competing groups of plaintiffs, KMG and RGG, brought class actions against Barrick Gold Corporation for securities misrepresentations related to environmental violations at a Chilean mine.

The motion judge granted carriage to RGG, finding their broader claims and superior state of preparation were in the best interests of the class.

KMG appealed the carriage order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge articulated the correct test, did not err in law or principle, and committed no palpable and overriding factual errors in his assessment of the carriage factors.

The appellant courier company appealed a class action certification order, arguing the motions judge erred in certifying a common issue regarding whether its customs brokerage services were 'unsolicited' under the Consumer Protection Act.

The appellant contended that determining whether services were unsolicited required an individualized inquiry into each consumer's knowledge and intent.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the claim was systemic and based on standard form contracts that did not mention brokerage fees, meaning the issue could be determined on a common basis without individualized inquiries.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal denying her application for ODSP benefits.

She argued the Tribunal erred in law by ignoring evidence, misinterpreting the definition of a person with a disability, and failing to provide adequate reasons.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Tribunal correctly applied the legal test, reasonably weighed the evidence regarding her activities of daily living and employability, and provided adequate reasons that demonstrated its logical path.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a $4,000 costs order made in a family law proceeding.

The motion was brought before a three-judge panel of the Divisional Court.

The panel dismissed the motion, holding that motions for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court must be brought before a single judge, not a panel of three judges.

This rule applies regardless of whether the appeal is from an interlocutory order, a costs order, or an administrative tribunal.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the Ontario College of Teachers finding him guilty of professional misconduct for engaging in an inappropriate sexual relationship with a student.

The appellant argued that the Panel disregarded evidence, failed to resolve inconsistencies, and improperly drew an adverse inference from his refusal to answer questions during the investigation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Panel's findings of fact and credibility were entitled to considerable deference and were reasonably supported by the evidence.

The applicant was charged with speeding and brought a preliminary motion at trial arguing the proceeding was out of time under s. 76(1) of the Provincial Offences Act, claiming 'proceeding' meant 'trial'.

The Justice of the Peace dismissed the motion.

The applicant sought prerogative relief in the Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that interlocutory rulings in provincial offences proceedings should be challenged by appeal after trial, not by prerogative relief.

Furthermore, the court held that a 'proceeding' commences with the filing of a Certificate of Offence, not the trial itself, and thus the proceeding was commenced within the six-month limitation period.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) decision dismissing her nine applications on the basis of delay and having no reasonable prospect of success.

The applicant argued the HRTO failed to include all respondents she complained against.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the applicant failed to address why the HRTO's decisions were unreasonable and noting the HRTO correctly identified the named respondents.

The respondent submitted that the court should decline to hear the appeal based on the doctrine of mootness, as it had applied for a new building permit and appealed its refusal under s. 25 of the Building Code Act.

The Divisional Court exercised its discretion to hear the matter despite the lack of a live controversy, noting that the issue was important, had broader implications, and would clarify uncertainty in the law.

The appellants, federal inmates, sought to certify a class action against the Crown after correctional officers seized t-shirts they had designed to commemorate inmates who died in custody.

The motion judge refused certification, finding that the inmate grievance process under the Corrections and Conditional Release Act was the preferable procedure for resolving the dispute.

On appeal to the Divisional Court, the appellants argued the motion judge erred in her preferability analysis.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge correctly applied the framework from AIC Limited v. Fischer and made no error in principle in concluding that the grievance process could provide meaningful redress and access to justice.

The prospective appellant sought leave to appeal an order requiring its representatives to re-attend an examination and pay costs.

The appellant argued the underlying contempt motion was a nullity because it was brought on the civil motion list rather than in Bankruptcy Court.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's conclusion that the motion was properly brought in both emanations of the Superior Court.

The defendants sought leave to appeal a motion judge's decision refusing a sealing order for Minutes of Settlement from prior litigation between the parties.

The motion judge had found insufficient evidence to justify sealing the documents under the Sierra Club test.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding that there was reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision, particularly in light of Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence establishing settlement privilege as a class privilege.

The court also granted an interim sealing order pending the appeal and awarded costs to the moving parties.

The moving party, a disbarred lawyer, brought a motion for a stay of the enforcement of an order made by an Appeal Panel of the Law Society of Upper Canada pending her appeal to the Divisional Court.

The Appeal Panel had ordered her disbarment for professional misconduct involving the misappropriation of client funds.

Applying the RJR MacDonald test, the court found that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the balance of convenience and the need to protect the reputation of the legal profession weighed against granting a stay.

The motion was dismissed.

The husband sought leave to appeal an interlocutory family law order that dismissed his motion for temporary sole custody of the parties' special needs children and granted the wife's motion regarding the transfer of the matrimonial home.

The husband argued he was denied procedural fairness and that the motion judge erred in calculating his share of the home's equity.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order, noting the husband had failed to follow court directions regarding the children's lawyer and that the financial calculations were appropriate.

The appellant, a union member, appealed a summary judgment decision that dismissed his action challenging two internal union disciplinary convictions.

The Divisional Court found no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the court's jurisdiction over internal union affairs is limited to ensuring compliance with the union constitution, good faith, and natural justice.

The court rejected the appellant's arguments regarding lack of evidence and bias, finding them without merit.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and claimed attendant care and housekeeping benefits for services provided by his former wife, daughter, and a lawn care company.

The insurer denied the claims on the basis that the caregivers did not sustain an 'economic loss' as required by s. 3(7)(e) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

A FSCO arbitrator and Director's Delegate upheld the denial, finding that mere loss of time did not constitute an economic loss.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court held that the standard of review was reasonableness, despite the concurrent jurisdiction of courts and arbitrators under the Insurance Act, and found the Delegate's interpretation of 'economic loss' as requiring a financial or pecuniary loss to be reasonable.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an interest arbitration award that established a new job classification system and wage grid for the bargaining unit.

The union argued the panel's adoption of the employer's proposed wage grid violated s. 11(6) of the Canadian Human Rights Act by reducing male wages to achieve pay equity, and failed to apply the replication principle.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the panel's decision was reasonable.

The panel was tasked with creating a completely new classification system, not correcting an existing one, and reasonably concluded that s. 11(6) did not apply or was not breached.

The panel also reasonably applied the replication principle by considering objective market forces and economic realities.

The appellants sought to appeal an order directing the sale of a property and the equal division of the net proceeds between the deceased father's estate and the respondent daughter.

The appellants did not object to the sale itself, only the distribution of proceeds.

Counsel sought a ruling on whether the appeal should be heard by the Divisional Court or the Court of Appeal.

The court declined to issue a declaratory order but considered whether to quash the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The court held that because the order for sale and distribution was made under the Partition Act, the appeal properly lies to the Divisional Court pursuant to section 7 of that Act.

The applicant sought leave to appeal an order staying her Ontario application regarding an estate dispute pending the determination of a related proceeding in California.

The deceased lived in California and executed her will there, but held significant assets in Ontario.

The applicant sought rectification of the will to include a residue clause in her favour, and also claimed the Ontario assets were held in trust for her.

The motion judge stayed the Ontario proceedings, finding that the rectification issue should be determined in California first.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decision and no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order.