Thomas R. Lederer

The self‑represented plaintiff sought damages against a bank after a cheque issued jointly to the plaintiff and a contractor’s corporation was deposited into the corporation’s account.

The plaintiff alleged the bank had wrongfully negotiated the cheque contrary to advice that both payees must attend in person.

The court found no evidence that the bank made such a representation and held that under the Bills of Exchange Act a cheque payable to joint payees may be negotiated where it bears the endorsement of the absent payee and the funds are deposited to the present payee’s account.

The evidence showed the plaintiff voluntarily endorsed the cheque and delivered it to the contractor as part of an arrangement to obtain insurance proceeds.

The bank’s conduct was consistent with both the governing law and its policies, and any dispute regarding the funds was between the plaintiff and the contractor.

The defendants appealed an order of a Master granting leave to amend a statement of claim in a solicitor’s negligence action.

The appellants argued the amendments introduced new causes of action related to defamation and republication that were statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that the original pleading already contained the material facts necessary to ground the negligence claim based on the solicitor’s alleged failure to commence proceedings, including defamation claims arising from a police association news release and subsequent publications.

The amendments merely clarified and expanded on the same negligence theory rather than introducing new causes of action.

Applying the liberal amendment principles under Rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court dismissed the appeal.

The applicant sought rectification and enforcement of an agreement for the purchase of internment rights in a cemetery development.

The respondent argued that the signed document was merely a memorandum of understanding and that a formal agreement subject to legal review had not yet been concluded, requiring the matter to proceed to trial.

The court examined the parties’ post‑execution conduct, including payment and acceptance of a deposit, commencement of due diligence, engagement of consultants, marketing of burial plots, and planning applications.

These actions demonstrated that both parties treated the May 13, 2014 document as the binding formal agreement.

The court held that references within the document to a future “formal agreement” were the result of mutual mistake and ordered rectification.

The City of Toronto appealed a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board finding that it had jurisdiction to determine whether site plan control applied to the respondent's proposed interior alterations.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Board's jurisdiction under s. 114(7) of the City of Toronto Act, 2006 is limited to resolving disputes about what types of features or design elements should be included in a site plan application, not the threshold question of whether site plan control applies at all.

The standard of review was determined to be reasonableness, and the Board's interpretation was found to be unreasonable as it undermined the overall legislative scheme.

The tenant appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board which found that he had abandoned his rental unit.

The Board had concluded that rent was in arrears because the September 2010 rent cheque was paid by a third party rather than the tenant.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Residential Tenancies Act permits rent to be paid on behalf of a tenant by a third party.

Since the rent was paid, the statutory precondition for abandonment was not met, and the matter was remitted to the Board to determine a remedy.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Master's refusal to recuse herself from a construction lien reference due to alleged bias.

The Divisional Court considered whether the application was premature, as it challenged an interlocutory order before the underlying proceeding was completed.

Applying the factors from Air Canada v. Lorenz, the court weighed the potential hardship to the applicant against the adverse consequences of delay, waste, and fragmentation.

The court concluded that the adverse consequences of delay outweighed the possible hardship to the applicant, particularly given the statutory framework of the Construction Lien Act designed for speedy resolution.

The application was dismissed for prematurity.

The appellant appealed a garnishment order requiring it to pay the respondent creditor.

The appellant argued it was indebted to an arms-length intermediate party, not the debtor, and that the motions judge erred in considering late affidavits.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the motions judge's conclusion that the debtor was in fact an employee of the appellant, nor any error in the exercise of discretion to admit the affidavits.

The appellant tenant appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board dismissing his request for a review of an eviction order.

The tenant had failed to attend the initial hearing and requested a review, citing a substance abuse problem as the potential reason for his absence.

The Board dismissed the review without holding a hearing.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Board breached the principles of natural justice by failing to conduct a further inquiry or hearing into the tenant's reasons for non-attendance, particularly given the quasi-constitutional status of the Human Rights Code.

The matter was remitted to the Board for a new review hearing.

The applicant pharmacist sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, which confirmed an order requiring him to complete a communication skills program following a patient complaint.

The applicant argued he was not given notice that the tone of his response to the complaint would be considered, and that the ordered program was not a specified remediation program under the Regulated Health Professions Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Board's decision reasonable, as the committee was entitled to consider the applicant's response without further notice, and the ordered program was sufficiently specified.

The appellant, an Aboriginal man who suffered abuse at a training school as a youth, appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying him compensation.

The Board had weighed the abuse he suffered against his extensive subsequent criminal record and concluded compensation was not reasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board made no error of law in considering his criminal record under s. 17(1) of the Compensation for Victims of Crime Act, and that Gladue principles do not strictly apply to civil compensation determinations.

The moving parties sought direction on whether a motion for leave to appeal a costs order arising from a trial of an issue in an oppression remedy application should be brought in the Court of Appeal or the Divisional Court, and whether the order was final or interlocutory.

The court determined that the appeal lies to the Divisional Court pursuant to s. 255 of the Business Corporations Act, as the costs order was ancillary to the oppression remedy.

The court also held that the costs order was a final order.

An extension of time to perfect the motion for leave to appeal was granted.

The appellant, a registered car dealer, appealed a decision of the Licence Appeals Tribunal directing the revocation of his registration.

The tribunal based its decision partly on the appellant's continuing assertion of innocence regarding a sexual assault conviction and the negative credibility findings made by the criminal trial judge.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the tribunal erred in law by treating the appellant's exercise of his right to assert innocence and appeal his conviction as aggravating factors.

The matter was remitted to a differently constituted tribunal for a fresh hearing.

The moving party sought an extension of time to appeal an order granting probate of his late mother's will, claiming he had not been served with notice of the underlying motion.

The responding party produced emails sent by the moving party to the court office the day before the hearing, demonstrating he was aware of the date.

The court found the moving party had notice and dismissed the motion to extend time.

The appellants appealed a trial decision fixing the fair value of the respondents' shares in a hotel business following the exercise of dissent rights under the Business Corporations Act.

The respondents cross-appealed the trial judge's valuation of the hotel itself.

The Divisional Court dismissed the cross-appeal, finding no error in the hotel valuation.

However, the Court allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in law by rejecting the only expert evidence on share valuation and substituting her own unsupported asset-based calculation.

The Court varied the judgment to impose the en bloc share value of $1,240,500 established by the appellants' expert.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) decision which held that the OLRB had jurisdiction under the Colleges Collective Bargaining Act to determine the date of a strike vote.

The union argued that the union had the exclusive right to set the date and that the OLRB's power to supervise the vote did not include setting the date.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the OLRB's interpretation of its home statute was reasonable and that the plain meaning of the authority to supervise and manage a vote included the right to set the date.

The plaintiff appealed the dismissal of its motion to certify a global class action against an Ontario accounting firm for negligence and negligent misrepresentation in an audit report.

The Divisional Court (majority) upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the conclusion that joinder was the preferable procedure and that Ontario lacked a real and substantial connection to the claims of the foreign investors.

The appeal and a motion for leave to appeal costs were dismissed.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal and certified the class action.

The applicant sought judicial review of a university tribunal's decision upholding her required withdrawal from a family medicine residency program.

She argued that the university's unilateral decision to amend her schedule, deleting a four-week geriatric medicine rotation and continuing her in family medicine, was procedurally unfair.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the schedule change was a substantive academic decision within the university's discretion, made to better support the struggling student and ensure patient safety.

The court found no procedural unfairness or legitimate expectation that the schedule would not change.

The appellant appealed an order extending a Mareva injunction that froze its shares in a Toronto-based company.

The injunction was originally granted ex parte to secure an international arbitration award against the Kyrgyz Republic.

On appeal, fresh evidence was admitted showing the underlying arbitral award had been set aside by a Russian court.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and set aside the injunction on the basis of the fresh evidence.

The Court also found that the respondent had breached its duty of full and frank disclosure on the original ex parte motion by failing to disclose material facts regarding a foreign court's ruling on the arbitral tribunal's lack of jurisdiction.

The applicants, two environmental organizations, brought an application challenging the validity of Ontario Regulation 176/13 made under the Endangered Species Act, 2007.

They argued the Minister failed to meet a mandatory condition precedent under s. 57(1) of the Act and that the regulation was inconsistent with the Act's purposes.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Minister had properly formed the required opinion that the regulation would not jeopardize the survival of species at risk, and that the regulation's balancing of environmental protection with economic considerations was consistent with the broader purposes of the Act.

The respondents were successful in defeating the applicant's motion for leave to appeal a costs order.

The respondents sought costs of $5,950 for the leave motion, while the applicant argued for $2,250.

The court found the respondents' request too high and the applicant's offer too low, fixing costs at $3,500 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and taxes.