Court File and Parties

CITATION: Changoor v. I.B.E.W., Local 353, 2015 ONSC 2472

DIVISIONAL COURT FILES NO.: DC-417-14

DATE: 20150417

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO – DIVISIONAL COURT

RE: RIENZI CHANGOOR, Appellant (Plaintiff)

AND:

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL 353, Respondent (Defendant)

BEFORE: LEDERMAN, MOLLOY, and LEDERER JJ.

COUNSEL: Rienzi Changoor, in person David Rosenfeld, for the respondent

HEARD: April, 15, 2015, at Toronto

ENDORSEMENT

[1] The appellant, Rienzi Changoor, appeals the decision of Corbett J., dated August 1, 2014 in which he granted the respondent’s motion for summary judgment, dismissed Mr. Changoor’s action, and ordered Mr. Changoor to pay the respondent substantial indemnity costs of $15,000.

[2] Mr. Changoor is a member of the Respondent, Local 353 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (“the Union”). Mr. Changoor was twice found guilty by an internal Union Trial Board of violating the Union’s Constitution. The Constitution provides for four levels of appeal from decisions of the Trial Board. Mr. Changoor pursued appeals through all four levels, but was unsuccessful. Subsequently, he commenced an action in the Superior Court of Justice, seeking to reverse the two convictions.

[3] The Union brought a motion for summary judgment, requesting dismissal of Mr. Changoor’s action. At that time of the motion, Mr. Changoor was represented by counsel. The parties agreed that this was an appropriate case to be decided under the summary judgment procedure. The motions judge granted the motion and dismissed the action, for written reasons dated August 1, 2014.[^1]

[4] Absent an error of law, the decision of a motion judge under the summary judgment rule attracts deference. A decision as to whether there is a genuine issue requiring trial is a question of mixed fact and law. Where there is no extricable error of principle, findings of mixed fact and law should not be overturned on appeal unless there is a palpable and overriding error.[^2]

[5] The motion judge in this case provided thorough and careful reasons addressing each of the issues raised by Mr. Changoor. We find no error of principle and no error of fact or law.

[6] The motion judge correctly determined that this Court’s jurisdiction is restricted to determining whether the Union breached its constitution, acted in bad faith, or failed to comply with rules of natural justice and procedural fairness. He held (at para. 5) that “this limited jurisdiction respects the expertise, autonomy and independence of unions over their internal affairs, while maintaining judicial oversight over the fair application of the union’s own rules.” This is a correct statement of the principles of law that apply.[^3] Many of the issues raised by Mr. Changoor on the motion, and also on the appeal in this Court, were challenges to the findings of fact made by the Trial Board. The motion judge correctly ruled that deference to the decision of the domestic tribunal precludes a review on the factual merits of its decision.

[7] The motion judge reviewed Mr. Changoor’s allegations with respect to the Trial Board’s breaches of the Union Constitution, bad faith, breaches of natural justice and procedural unfairness. He considered each allegation carefully and rejected each of them as being unfounded, providing reasons for each decision. We find no error of fact or law.

[8] Mr. Changoor argued before us on appeal that there was “no evidence” before the Trial Board upon which it could possibly have reached the decisions it did. He advanced the same argument before the motion judge. In fact, there was evidence, and that evidence was accepted by the Trial Board. Mr. Changoor takes issue with that evidence, but as was found by the motion judge, the record clearly demonstrates that there was evidence. It was not the role of the motion judge, much less our role on appeal, to review the credibility or weight of that evidence, nor to second-guess the decision of the Trial Board on the facts. There is no merit to this ground of appeal.

[9] On the appeal, Mr. Changoor argued that the Trial Boards were biased because they were comprised of employees of the Union and were therefore not impartial. He relied on an article in a Union magazine or newsletter from 2007 describing a decision of the Union President in another unrelated appeal finding that a local trial board was not impartial because the board members were employees. This is not a matter that was addressed before the motion judge. There was no evidence placed before the motion judge as to the background of the individual members of the Trial Board and whether or not they were employees, nor was there any such evidence in the Appeal Record before us. The only issue of bias raised in the factum and argument before the motion judge was Mr. Changoor’s argument that two of the members were brothers. As noted by the motion judge, the Trial Board was established in accordance with the Constitution. Therefore, the standard for judging its conduct is actual bias, which was not established on the evidence. We agree.

[10] The motion judge concluded that the motion before him was “so obviously devoid of merit” and was “advanced on so many baseless grounds” that substantial indemnity costs were warranted, which he fixed at $15,000.00. We see no basis to interfere with this exercise of discretion by the motion judge.

[11] We find no merit in any of the grounds of appeal brought forward by Mr. Changoor. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. The costs of the appeal are fixed at $5000.00 payable by Mr. Changoor to the respondent Union in 30 days.

LEDERMAN J.

MOLLOY J.

LEDERER J.

Released: April , 2015

[^1] Changoor v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 353, 2014 ONSC 4558

[^2] Hyrniak v. Maudlin, 2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 7,; Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235

[^3] Clark v. Gilbert, [1996] O.J. No. 4415, para. 54 (S.C.J.); Berry v. Pulley, 2002 SCC 40, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 493, para. 47 (S.C.C.); Michael Lynk, “Denning’s Revenge: Judicial Formalism and the Application of Procedural Fairness to Internal Union Hearings”, 23 Queen’s L.J. 115; Re Rees and United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada, Local 527, 1983 1916 (ON SC), 43 O.R. (2d) 97 (H.C.J.); Paine v. University of Toronto (1981), 1981 1921 (ON CA), 34 O.R. (2d) 770, 131 D.L.R. (3d) 325.