Thomas J. Carey

The respondent father, a nurse practitioner, brought an emergency motion to enforce a shared parenting order after the applicant mother unilaterally suspended his in-person access due to COVID-19 concerns.

The mother argued the father's employment and recent travel recklessly exposed the children to the virus.

The court granted the father's motion and dismissed the mother's cross-motion, finding no evidence that the father failed to adhere to appropriate safety protocols.

The court emphasized that COVID-19 and a parent's status as an essential healthcare worker must not be weaponized in parenting conflicts.

The defendant, Prudential Select Realty Inc., brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim against it.

The plaintiff alleged that Prudential Select was responsible for the wrongful conduct of its agent, Mr. Singh, who sold a property to the plaintiff in his personal capacity before completing his own purchase of the property.

The court found that Mr. Singh acted as a principal in the transaction, without the involvement or knowledge of Prudential Select, and that Prudential Select did not receive any commission.

Applying principles of vicarious liability, the court determined there was no genuine issue for trial against Prudential Select, as Mr. Singh's actions were not connected to his authorized employment with the brokerage.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, and the claim against Prudential Select was dismissed with costs.

This decision addresses the quantum of costs following a successful trial for the applicant.

The applicant sought over $105,000 in total costs, while the respondent argued for a limit of $25,000, citing financial hardship and proportionality.

The court, applying Rule 57 factors and the principle of proportionality, awarded the applicant $40,000 for fees and $7,500 for disbursements plus HST, finding the applicant's requested amount excessive despite the reasonableness of counsel's hourly rate and the applicant's success at trial.

In this family law trial, the applicant mother sought child support for her 20-year-old son, K.R.G., asserting he was a "child of the marriage" due to mental illness and inability to withdraw from her charge.

She also requested a higher income imputation for the respondent father and a greater proportion of s. 7 expenses.

The respondent father, self-represented, contended that K.R.G.'s issues stemmed from drug and alcohol abuse enabled by the mother, not a disabling mental illness, and that his income was lower than claimed.

The court found no admissible medical evidence to support K.R.G.'s involuntary disability and concluded that the mother's actions enabled his unproductive lifestyle, thus K.R.G. was not a child of the marriage for support purposes.

The court accepted the father's declared income of $42,000 and determined the mother's income potential was similar.

Child support was ordered for the younger child, R.M.G., based on the father's $42,000 income, with s. 7 expenses split equally.

No costs were awarded.

The defendants were successful in defending a summary judgment motion brought by the plaintiffs and sought full indemnity costs of $5,509.03.

The plaintiffs argued for costs of $750.

The court found that full indemnity costs were not warranted as the matter was relatively straightforward.

Considering the factors in Rule 57.01, the court awarded the defendants costs on a partial indemnity basis fixed at $3,500, payable forthwith.

The applicant sought an order of possession for his property, which was initially expected to be unopposed by the respondent.

The respondent, who is the alleged complainant in criminal charges against the applicant, appeared unrepresented.

After amicus counsel was appointed for the respondent, the court expressed significant concerns about its jurisdiction to grant the order, the lack of a cited statutory or rule basis for the application, and the potential for civil proceedings, especially with costs sought, to intimidate an unrepresented complainant in a domestic/sexual assault case.

The court viewed such an application as potentially an "end run" around the criminal court's jurisdiction.

For these reasons, the court declined to make the requested order and adjourned the matter.

The applicant sought an order requiring the respondent school board to consent to the assignment of a 99-year parking lot licence to a prospective purchaser of the applicant's property.

The respondent refused, arguing the agreement was effectively a lease that violated the subdivision control provisions of the Planning Act.

The court found the agreement was a valid licence, not a lease, and fell within the exception in s. 50(9) of the Planning Act for structures.

The application was allowed, and the respondent was ordered to consent to the assignment.

The mother brought a motion to change seeking ongoing spousal support and child support for two children, including a contribution to the adult daughter's student loan debt.

The court reduced and ordered a termination date for spousal support, noting the mother's ability to increase her income and the father's post-separation efforts.

The court dismissed the claim for the adult daughter's student debt, finding she was employed full-time, had not consulted the father before incurring the debt, and was inappropriately recruited by the mother to support the claim.

Child support for the minor son was updated based on the father's income.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment claiming the proceeds of a life insurance policy based on a separation agreement.

The agreement required the deceased to designate his former spouse as the irrevocable beneficiary of any employment-related life insurance policy in trust for their children to secure child support.

The deceased later changed jobs and designated his new spouse as the beneficiary of his new employer's policy, but had also purchased a separate policy naming the children as beneficiaries.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues for trial regarding whether the support obligation was frustrated when the deceased lost his previous employment, whether the separate policy satisfied the intent of the agreement, and whether the former spouse came to court with clean hands.

Supplementary reasons establishing the timeline and procedure for the parties to make written submissions on costs following the release of the main judgment.

The parties separated after a 27-year marriage during which the applicant primarily raised their children and assisted in building the respondent's financial advising business.

The applicant, now disabled by fibromyalgia, sought spousal support and equalization of net family property.

The court ordered spousal support at the high end of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, retroactive to the date of separation, finding the applicant's delay in seeking support was reasonably explained by her health and financial circumstances.

For equalization, the court accepted the applicant's expert valuation of the respondent's business, which included significant value for the goodwill in his book of business, and ordered an equalization payment of $278,316.85.

The applicants brought an application under section 83 of the Municipal Elections Act to declare the 2018 municipal election in Lambton Shores invalid.

The applicants alleged nine distinct irregularities, primarily focusing on the municipality's exclusive use of internet and telephone voting, the removal of names from the voters' list, and privacy concerns.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding no evidence of any irregularities that led to the disenfranchisement of eligible voters or the enfranchisement of ineligible voters.

The court concluded that the municipality complied with the Act and that the applicants' complaints stemmed from a personal distrust of electronic voting rather than actionable statutory breaches.

Following a decision in favour of the defendant, the court determined the quantum and scale of costs.

The defendant sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing the plaintiffs' actions were improper.

The court rejected this characterization, finding the plaintiffs acted within the boundaries of the law.

Costs were awarded to the defendant on a partial indemnity scale, fixed at $11,850 inclusive of HST, as submitted by the plaintiffs.

Following a successful motion by the defendants to stay the action pending the outcome of a hospital board hearing, both parties sought costs.

The defendants sought $18,358.12, while the plaintiffs sought substantial indemnity costs based on prior offers to settle.

The court found the defendants' bill of costs to be excessive given the relative simplicity of the issues and fixed costs at $7,500 payable to the defendants.

The respondent husband sought full indemnity costs of nearly $100,000 following a family law trial regarding spousal support and equalization.

The applicant wife argued for a lower amount, noting her positions were not patently unreasonable and she recovered an order more valuable than the respondent's offer to settle.

The court agreed that costs should be payable on a partial indemnity basis, finding the applicant's positions arguable and her conduct reasonable.

Costs were fixed at $50,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The applicant, K.K., charged with historical sexual assault, sought an order for the production of the complainant T.V.'s counselling records from Steven Kerr, pursuant to sections 278.5 and 278.7 of the Criminal Code.

The application was based on the complainant's admitted uncertainty regarding the details of the alleged assaults and the temporal connection between counselling and reporting to police, arguing that the records were likely to be relevant to her reliability and credibility.

The court conducted a two-stage analysis, first finding that the applicant had met the threshold for judicial review of the records.

However, after reviewing the notes, the court found them to be brief summaries lacking specific details of the allegations and consistent with the complainant's preliminary hearing evidence.

The court concluded that releasing the material would not assist the applicant's right to make full answer and defence and would only serve to discourage victims from seeking counselling.

The application was dismissed.

The plaintiffs sought damages for nuisance and statutory liability under the Municipal Act, 2001, alleging property damage from increased truck traffic.

Both parties brought competing summary judgment motions.

The court found the plaintiffs' claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, as it was discovered in February 2009, making the January 2018 action outside the two-year limitation period.

The court rejected the application of the ten-year Real Property Limitation Act and the "rolling" cause of action.

Additionally, the court held that the statutory duty of care under s. 44 of the Municipal Act, 2001, was owed to the travelling public, not adjoining landowners.

Consequently, the defendant municipality's motion for summary judgment was granted, and the plaintiffs' motion was dismissed.

The appellant father appealed an order for Crown wardship without access, arguing procedural unfairness because the trial judge proceeded with an unopposed trial after the father failed to file an answer to the Society's amended application.

The father argued that under the rules, he should have been deemed to rely on his original answer and was entitled to notice of the trial.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the child's best interests are paramount, the original joint answer was effectively moot, and any procedural error was purely technical and occasioned no substantial wrong.

The plaintiff brought a motion to amend his statement of claim against his insurer regarding property damage.

The defendant insurer opposed, arguing the amendments raised a new cause of action and would cause prejudice because it had already settled a subrogated claim related to the damage.

The court granted the motion, finding the amendments did not plead a new cause of action and any prejudice was due to the defendant's own actions in settling the subrogated claim without the plaintiff's input.

The order was made without prejudice to the defendant raising a limitations argument at trial.

The defendant brought a motion to determine the admissibility of documents created during fitness to practice proceedings by the College of Nurses of Ontario concerning the plaintiff.

The defendant argued that s. 36(3) of the Regulated Health Professions Act renders these documents inadmissible in civil actions.

The plaintiff contended this was re-litigation and that capacity investigations should be treated differently from discipline processes.

The court concluded that s. 36(3) applies broadly to fitness to practice proceedings, affirming the policy objective of separating college and civil proceedings to encourage expert participation without fear of civil action.

The motion was granted, and all documents created for the College's proceedings related to the plaintiff were declared inadmissible.