COURT FILE NO.: CR-18-4484
DATE: Released Orally 20200925
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
– and –
Ngoue-Ngameleu and Mbeh
Accused
Ed Posliff, for the Federal Crown
Ken Golish, for the Accused, Paul Ngoue-Ngameleu
Ben Strickland, for the Accused, Henadez Makia Mbeh
HEARD: August 13, 2020
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
carey J.:
Overview
[1] The defendants are truck drivers who crossed into Canada at Windsor from Detroit via the Ambassador Bridge on September 21, 2017. They were eventually referred for a secondary inspection by Canadian Border Service Agency (CBSA) officers.
[2] When the truck appeared to be bypassing the secondary arear and heading towards Huron Church Road, CBSA officers intercepted it and escorted it to secondary inspection area. It was there that upon entering the cab and pulling back the curtain to the sleeping cab area, that CBSA officers discovered three adults and eight children. One of the adult females made a claim under the IRPA, and all eleven people were later sent back to the United States.
[3] The two accused were arrested by the CBSA officers. At trial, they entered not guilty pleas to indictments under section 128, 131 and 129(1)(d) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C., 2001 c. 27 (IRPA). The charges are related.
[4] Count 1, under s. 128 alleges that both accused “did directly withhold material facts relating to a relevant matter that could have induced an error in the administration of Immigration and Refugee Protection Act”. Specifically, this is in relation to the 11 named people who “were concealed in the vehicle they were operating, thereby committing an offence contrary to section 127(a) of the IRPA pursuant to s. 128”.
[5] Count 2 alleges that the two accused “did knowingly induce, aid or abet or attempted to induce the named 11 people “to contravene section 124(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, thereby committing an offence pursuant to section 131 of the Immigration and Refugee and Protection Act”.
[6] Count 3 alleges that the two accused “did knowingly obstruct or impede an officer in the performance of the officer’s duty under section 129(1)(d) of the IRPA.
[7] Both the accused testified at their trials that they were not aware of the eleven people in the sleeping portion of their vehicle.
[8] On September 26, 2018, the accused waived their preliminary hearings and were committed for trial at the Superior Court of Justice on the three counts alleging contravention of the specified provisions of IRPA.
Defence Motion for No Case to Answer
[9] At the conclusion of their trial, both defendants moved on the basis that there was “no case to answer”, on the charges before the court. They argued that the appropriate legislation and the facts of this case would be under section 160 of the Customs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (2nd Supp.). That section specifies that it is an offence to violate certain named sections of that Act:
160(1) Every person who contravenes section 11, 12, 13, 15 or 16, subsection 20(1), section 31 or 40, subsection 43(2), 95(1) or (3), 103(3) or 107(2) or section 153, 155, 156 or 159.1 or commits an offence under section 159 or knowingly contravenes an order referred to in subsection 107(11)
(a) Is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and liable to a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to both that fine and that imprisonment; or
(b) Is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to a fine of not more that five hundred thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to both that fine and that imprisonment.
[10] They further argued that the particular contravention that would be appropriate is found in section 11 of the said Act:
11(1) Subject to this section, every person arriving in Canada shall, except in such circumstances and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed, enter Canada only at a customs office designated for that purpose that is open for business and without delay present himself or herself to an officer and answer truthfully any questions asked by the officer in the performance of his or her duties under this or any other Act of Parliament.
(3) Subject to this section, every person in charge of a conveyance arriving in Canada shall, except in such circumstances and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed, ensure that the passengers and crew are forthwith on arrival in Canada transported to a customs office referred to in subsection (1).
[11] Further, the defendants argued that count 1 and count 3 are both duplicitous and lacking in particulars in terms of who was induced or obstructed or impeded and how he or she was induced, obstructed or impeded. They say that impeding and obstructing must be interpreted as referring to physical conduct especially when read in conjunction with one another. They argued that count 2 does not allege an offence known to law. The defendants relied on no case law that has held that the Customs Act is the appropriate Act to deal with bringing undeclared persons across the Canadian border as opposed to undeclared goods.
Crown Position on Defence Motion
[12] The Crown argues at the outset that the application was brought without written notice of a change from their position in the form 17 Pre-Trial Conference Report. In particular, paragraph 7 of the form 17 sets out pre-trial motions on the indictment including motions to quash committal for trial, quash an indictment or quash counts in the indictment relying on section 581(1) and 581(3) of the Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
[13] In addition, counsel for the Crown argues that the Customs Act governs the entry of goods, into Canada from outside of Canada. Both goods and persons are defined in the Act.
[14] Section 11 of the Customs Act requires an entrant into Canada to report to a Customs office designated for that purpose. Section 5 of the Customs Act authorizes a designation of Customs offices inside or outside Canada “for business relating to customs”. Section 12 of the Customs Act requires that all goods that are imported be reported at the nearest Customs office designated for that purpose.
[15] The Crown argues that only the provisions of the Customs Act are applicable here, then “the eleven (11) foreign nationals secreted in the cab must be characterized as goods. People have not been chattels in this country for over 200 years”.
[16] Section 18 of the IRPA requires every person seeking to enter Canada to appear for an examination to determine whether they have a right to enter Canada or may become authorized to enter and remain in Canada. In practice, these examinations are conducted by CBSA officers, under section 20 of the IRPA, foreign nationals seeking to enter Canada under visa or another document. In this case, the 11 foreign nationals failed to comply with section 20 and the Crown alleges that the applicants assisted them in this contravention by concealing them in the cab of the truck and misrepresenting that they were the only occupants of the truck.
[17] The applicants also misrepresented to the primary inspection officer that they were the only occupants of the truck, says the Crown. It relies on section 41(a) of the IRPA that provides that foreign national is inadmissible for failing to comply with the IRPA through an act or a mission which contravenes directly or indirectly a provision of the IRPA.
[18] Section 99 of the IRPA makes a distinction between refugee claims made at point of entry and those made inside Canada other than at a point of entry. The Crown asserts that if the 11 foreign nationals had not been detected until they had cleared the Customs area and entered onto Huron Church Road, they would have been subject to the jurisdiction of the Refugee Board under section 100 of the IRPA. Because the accused were assisting the 11 foreign nationals, in surreptitiously gaining entry to Canada, the Crown argues that the two accused are guilty under section 131 of the IRPA for knowingly inducing, aiding or abetting the person to contravene any provision of the IRPA.
[19] The Crown also relies on section 601(1) of the Criminal Code that an objection to an indictment should be taken by motion to quash the indictment or the count prior to the accused entering a plea and after the plea, only by leave of the Court. The Crown relies on case law interpreting s. 601(3) and (4) to assert that “absent irreparable injustice to the accused, the amendment should be granted and not quashed”.
[20] The Crown argues that the three counts have sufficiently detailed and addressed the facts alleged in this case. That is with knowledge of the presence of the 11 foreign nationals, the two accused withheld the facts of the presence of the 11 foreign nationals from the primary inspection officer, assisted the said foreign nationals into Canada without reporting to CBSA officers and by not providing the identification of the foreign nationals who were in possession of passports identifying them as Nigerian citizens. This amounted to obstruction of BSO Murphy in the performance of their duties.
Ruling on the Defence Motion
[21] It is entirely plain and clear that the Customs Act is applicable in a general sense to goods being brought into Canada while the IRPA clearly deals with people. The importation of slaves into what is now Ontario, was prohibited by legislation in 1793. The possession of slaves already in Ontario was allowed until 1834 with the coming-into-force throughout the British empire of the Abolition of Slavery Act. The suggestion that the Customs Act is the appropriate legislation for controlling the bringing of people across international borders is entirely without merit.
[22] It is plain and obvious that the correct legislation for the alleged offences here is the IRPA. The fact scenario relied upon by the Crown fits within the three counts charged in this case. I do not find them lacking in detail or specificity nor find any of the counts duplicitous.
[23] The Crown must prove these counts beyond a reasonable doubt and must show that both accused were aware of the 11 foreign nationals. Under count 1, the Crown must show that the accused had knowledge of the foreign nationals and withheld these material facts from the CBSA primary inspection officer. Under count 2, the Crown must prove both accused were assisting the foreign nationals in a plan to avoid reporting immediately to a CBSA officer. Under count 3, the Crown must prove that both accused had knowledge of the 11 foreign nationals and failed to respond fully and truthfully at primary inspection thus obstructing BSO Murphy in the performance of their duties.
[24] It is open to the Crown to argue on the evidence heard that both accused must have had direct knowledge of the facts that the Crown alleges or that these accused were wilfully blind to the facts. The direct evidence of either accused’s knowledge of the facts that the Crown alleges, can argue that these accused were wilfully blind to these facts.
[25] For these reasons, the defence application that they have no case to answer is dismissed.
Summary of the Evidence
[26] The two defendants before the court were co-driving a tractor trailer with a load of pralines from Washington State. Both drivers had FAST cards, the equivalent for commercial drivers of Nexus cards, and were in the FAST lane with their truck when they were referred to secondary by the CBSA Border Services Officer Murphy at the Ambassador Bridge. The evidence is clear that instead of going to the secondary referral area, the vehicle headed towards Huron Church Road where it was stopped before exiting the Customs area and eventually redirected to the secondary referral line. The Crown says that the truck attempted to avoid going to secondary and was heading to Huron Church Road when it was stopped in traffic and eventually redirected to the secondary line where eventually it was inspected and CBSA officers discovered the three women and their collective eight children, all Nigerian nationals. The officers testified that the 11 people were only apparent to them when the curtain to the sleeper cab was opened.
[27] There is no issue that the people were found in the sleeping cab which is only accessible through the front of the truck – there is no side entrance. Both accused testified that they did not have any idea that the people were some two to three feet behind them in the sleeping cabin of the truck.
[28] Paul Ngoue-Ngameleu (Paul), who was driving the truck when it crossed into Canada indicated he had been a long-haul trucker since 2016. He, along with his friend and co-driver, Mr. Handez Makia (Hendez) Mbeh, were from Cameroon. He was a French speaker and gave his evidence through French interpreters. Mr. Mbeh was raised with English and did not use an interpreter.
[29] The accused, Paul, said the two drivers took turns in 12-hour shifts and would sleep in the sleeping compartment. Paul testified that they travelled from Montreal with a load for Oregon and after delivering that, he got instructions to pick up the fruit in Washington State. He said there was one key to the truck and there was no automatic fob for locking the truck doors.
[30] His testimony was that their last truck stop before the Canadian border was in Dexter, Michigan, and that Mr. Mbeh was driving on the way there and he was sleeping in the back. His partner woke him up shortly before they arrived at the truck stop. He testified about steps taken to get their paperwork in order. He said that the truck stop was run by Pilot and they ate in a Subway restaurant when they were approached by a man who asked them where they were from and they said Africa. The man said he was a Nigerian tourist. They told him they were working truck drivers going to Montreal and that was the end of the conversation. The man left and they went to wash up.
[31] When they left Dexter, Paul was driving. He gave evidence about speaking at the window with the CBSA officer. He testified that the truck engine was loud but was turned off when they were speaking to the officer.
[32] He testified the officer asked him if he knew how to get to secondary but gave him his papers back and he thought everything was okay, so he headed for the highway. It was only when he was signalled by a CBSA officer that he realized that he was to report to secondary. He said that the first time he saw any of the occupants of the cab who were behind him and his co-driver was in court when the surveillance video was shown as part of the Crown’s case.
[33] In cross-examination he denied any knowledge of any unauthorized people in the cab or of hearing anyone. He denied that he was trying to, in the words of the CBSA, “run the port.”
[34] Mr. Mbeh also gave evidence. His evidence differed from his co-accused in that he said he was delayed in the truck doing paperwork ten or fifteen minutes and that he saw two people approach his colleague outside the truck stop, not inside at the Subway restaurant. He said that he showered at the truck stop and that his co-accused was already in the truck when he returned to it. He testified that during the trip from Dexter to Detroit/Windsor, the cab was loud, and he had his earphones in his ears listening to music. At no time, he said, was he aware of anyone being in the closed sleeper compartment which had its doors secured together.
[35] He said that he knew they were supposed to go to secondary and he was attempting to re-direct his friend when someone from the CBSA appeared directing them to secondary.
[36] Both accused were cross-examined by the co-accused’s lawyer to suggest that they were wrong in the areas where they differed.
Summary of the Findings
[37] The accused persons are both presumed innocent. This case is very much one that turns on the credibility of the evidence of the two defendants.
[38] In R. v. W.(D.)[D.W.], 1991 CanLII 93 (SCC), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742, at pp. 757-8, Cory J. noted the correct method of assessing credibility as follows:
Ideally, appropriate instructions on the issue of credibility should be given, not only during the main charge, but on any recharge. A trial judge might well [page 758] instruct the jury on the question of credibility along these lines:
First, if you believe the evidence of the accused, obviously you must acquit.
Second, if you do not believe the testimony of the accused but you are left in reasonable doubt by it, you must acquit.
Third, even if you are not left in doubt by the evidence of the accused, you must ask yourself whether, on the basis of the evidence which you do accept, you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by that evidence of the guilt of the accused.
If that formula were followed, the oft repeated error which appears in the recharge in this case would be avoided. The requirement that the Crown prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt is fundamental in our system of criminal law. Every effort should be made to avoid mistakes in charging the jury on this basic principle.
[39] In R. v. Toor, 2009 CanLII 81409 (ON SC) Justice Durno was dealing with charges under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act where the accused was a taxi driver who regularly took passengers to Windsor from the Toronto area in what was alleged to be a scheme to smuggle those people into the United States. The investigation was a complex one that involved numerous parties and authorized interceptions of communications. The Crown as in this case before the court, relied on the principle of willful blindness. Justice Durno thoroughly reviewed the principles and law in this area:
[120] Since there is no direct evidence of his knowledge, I have to consider circumstantial evidence. In doing so, I can only convict if satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no other rational explanation for the circumstantial evidence, but that Mr. Toor knew or was willfully blind that he was assisting in the smuggling of persons into the United States: R. v. Charemski (1998), 1998 CanLII 819 (SCC).
[121] To satisfy the requirements of willful blindness the Crown must establish Mr. Toor had 1) a subjective realization; 2) of the likely result of his actions, and 3) deliberately avoided actual knowledge while engaging in or pursuing the activity: R. v. Harding (2001),2001 CanLII 21272 (ON CA). Mr. Toor must have had a real suspicion in his mind that caused him to see the need for inquiry. His culpability rests on a finding of deliberate ignorance: R. v. Legace (2002), 2003 CanLII 30886 (On CA) at para. 26 and 28.
[122] In Sansregret, the Supreme Court approved of the following comments by Granville Williams (Criminal Law: The General Part, 2nd ed. 1961, at pp. 157-160):
Knowledge, then, means either personal knowledge or (in the license cases) imputed knowledge. In either event there is someone with actual knowledge. To the requirement of actual knowledge there is one strictly limited exception. Men readily regard their suspicions as unworthy of them when it is to their advantage to do so. To meet this, the rule is that if a party has his suspicion aroused but then deliberately omits to make further enquiries, because he wishes to remain in ignorance, he is deemed to have knowledge.
In other words, there is a suspicion which the defendant deliberately omits to turn into certain knowledge. This is frequently expressed by saying that he “shut his eyes” to the fact, or that he was “willfully blind.”
[123] Granville Williams provided the following cautionary notes regarding the dangers in considering willful blindness and its narrow application:
The rule that willful blindness is equivalent to knowledge is essential and is found throughout the criminal law. It is, at the same time, an unstable rule, because judges are apt to forget its very limited scope. A court can properly find willful blindness only where it can almost be said that the defendant actually knew. He suspected the fact; he realized probability; but he refrained from obtaining the final confirmation because he wanted in the event to be able to deny knowledge. This, and this alone, is willful blindness. It requires in effect a finding that the defendant intended to cheat the administration of justice. Any wider definition would make the doctrine of willful blindness indistinguishable from the civil doctrine of negligence in not obtaining knowledge.
[124] The Supreme Court of Canada has described willful blindness as arising where notwithstanding the suspicions, the accused refused to ascertain the true state of affairs and chose instead to remain willfully blind because to make inquiries would fix him with knowledge of the commission of the offence: R. v. Hinchey (1996), 1996 CanLII 157 (SCC). The Court of Appeal found willful blindness arises where it is established that the offender had a real suspicion in his mind that caused him to see the need for inquiry, yet no inquiry was made. Culpability rests on a finding of deliberate ignorance: R. v. Legace (2003), 2003 CanLII 30886.
[125] Where willful blindness is in issue, the question is not whether the accused should have been suspicious, but whether the accused was in fact suspicious: R. v. Malfara 2006 CanLII 17318 (ON CA). Even if inquiries are made the question remains whether he or she still harboured a real suspicion and refrained from making additional inquiries because he or she preferred to remain deliberately ignorant of the truth: R. v. Neimi (2006), 2006 CanLII 13949 (ON CA), at para. 77.
Mr. Ngoue-Ngameleu
[40] Having reviewed all of the evidence in this case, I reject the evidence of Paul Ngoue-Ngameleu that he was unaware of the 11 Nigerian nationals secreted a few feet behind him in the cab of the truck he was driving and in charge of at the time that truck was driven into Canada. I do not accept his evidence for the following reasons:
I find his evidence that he must have left his truck unlocked and the three adults and eight children entered his truck without his knowledge and assistance to be incredible. He is an experienced international truck driver in charge of a truck and trailer with a valuable cargo of commercial goods. I cannot accept that he would leave it unlocked and available to be entered by either these 11 people alone or with the assistance of others, or by anyone.
It is extremely hard to envision three mothers putting themselves and their children in the hands of a driver they have not met, assisted by only people who are not familiar with the truck or its capacity. The driver’s version of a brief casual conversation with one man in the restaurant is contradicted by his co-accused. Mr. Mbeh testified that when he exited the vehicle after 10-15 minutes, he locked the passenger side door on exiting. He said there was no conversation with anyone in the restaurant.
I find it incredible that the driver of the truck could enter and then drive for at least an hour through Michigan to the Ambassador Bridge without being aware of three adults and eight children mere feet behind him separated by an albeit heavy curtain. He did not testify as to any hearing disability or that he was wearing earphones.
Mr. Ngoue-Ngameleu’s evidence of how he exited and re-entered the truck at the truck stop in Michigan with Mr. Mbeh was strongly denied by Mr. Mbeh. While I must caution myself that Mr. Mbeh is a co-accused and has ample reason to lie to assist himself on these charges, the fact is he tells a very different story and that story needs to be carefully examined before it is rejected as either evidence against Mr. Ngoue-Ngameleu or in the context of evidence capable of raising a reasonable doubt as to his own culpability.
The driver’s evidence of being confused about going to secondary is inconsistent with the experience that he has had driving through this port of entry. There was no evidence that he had made this mistake before. It seems extremely coincidental that the one time he misunderstands instructions of the CBSA it happens to be when there are 11 undeclared people in the truck he was driving.
[41] I conclude that Mr. Ngoue-Ngameleu intentionally drove his truck towards Huron Church Road in an attempt to exit the customs area. I conclude that this is strong evidence of his knowledge of the foreign nationals in the cab and it was an attempt to get them past the Customs area and onto Huron Church Road where even if apprehended, they would be in a different position in terms of claiming refugee status. Accordingly, I reject his evidence about lack of knowledge of the occupants in the cab.
[42] Accordingly, I find him guilty of count 2 of the indictment.
[43] I will hear submissions as to whether there should be stays or convictions on counts 1 and 3 at the completion of reading these reasons.
Mr. Henadez Makia Mbeh
[44] The evidence against Mr. Mbeh is exclusively circumstantial. The declarations to the CBSA and conversations with BSO Murphy, were entirely with the driver, Paul Ngoue-Ngameleu. Mr. Mbeh’s evidence, which was not contradicted was that he was resting after completing his portion of the day’s driving and had his earphones firmly in his ears. He testified that the cab was noisy, and he was listening to music on the way to Canada after turning over the wheel of the truck to Mr. Ngoue-Ngameleu.
[45] As earlier reviewed, he says he stayed in the truck for 10-15 minutes after their arrival at the last truck stop where presumably the passengers entered the vehicle. He described exiting the truck after his co-accused as he was completing his paperwork. He described seeing his partner speak to a person. He says that he ate and showered at the truck stop and put back on the clothes he had been wearing. Mr. Ngoue-Ngameleu was back in the truck when he returned. He, like his co-accused, is entitled to the presumption of innocence until his guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. There is no evidence of his actual knowledge. There was no evidence from the three adult passengers or of any attempt to get this evidence. He was not in charge of the truck, and there was no evidence that he was responsible for the last-minute attempt to exit the Customs area onto Huron Church Road. In fact, he says he tried to stop it. I have rejected the evidence of Mr. Mbeh’s co-accused as not worthy of belief. I am unable to reject Mr. Mbeh’s evidence as similarly not worthy of acceptance. While at first blush, improbable, I find that his story that he had no knowledge of the 11 individuals in the sleeping compartment could reasonably be true in these circumstances. I have a reasonable doubt as to his knowledge of the presence of the 11 people in the sleeping compartment of the cab.
[46] As in Toor, I must consider if there is any evidence that Mr. Mbeh was wilfully blind to evidence that should have aroused his suspicion. There is not evidence that the curtains of the cab were pulled back and opened after the 11 people entered the sleeping cab. There is evidence from both the accused and the driver that the cab was noisy and that the Henadez was wearing earphones to listen to music. There is a complete lack of evidence that children were crying or making noise on the trip. I cannot presume that they were loud enough to be heard over cab noise and through earphones. There was no evidence of the occupants and their presence found outside of the sleeping cab area. There was nothing found on either defendant linking them to any of the 11 people. I find nothing to indicate a basis for a suspicion that Mr. Mbeh “shut his eyes” to the facts.
[47] Even if I had found that he must have had knowledge or was wilfully blind of the 11 individuals that would not end the question of his guilt.
[48] In relation to count 1, there needs to be evidence that Henadez Makia Mbeh withheld material facts relating to a relevant matter that could have induced an error in the administration of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. He was not the driver of the vehicle at the time and did not seem to have interaction with the CBSA. Is his silence, if he knew of their presence, a “withholding of material facts relevant to a material matter?” He was effectively off duty, a passenger in the truck at the relevant times. He was not a co-pilot, there was no second set of steering wheel and foot pedals. When and where was the knowledge gained? Was he obliged if he had knowledge to speak up?” Was he obliged to reveal his knowledge and thus incriminate himself in the commission of an offence? I have not considered these questions in light of my finding that his knowledge has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
[49] On count 2, the evidence of this case reveals no interaction between Mr. Mbeh and the 11 people named in the indictment. The only evidence that could be implied is, again, as in count 1, his silence at the border when he was not the driver but a resting passenger. Again, there is no evidence, even presuming he had knowledge, and as in facts in count 1, there is no evidence that Mr. Mbeh assisted in or consented to the driver taking the passengers across the border. The driver did not provide that evidence, of course, as he also denied knowledge of the 11 passengers.
[50] Finally, in relation to count 3, again there is no evidence he was aware of the presence of the 11 foreign nationals or consented to their presence. Even if I presume, he did have knowledge, what did he do to knowingly obstruct the CBSA officer?
[51] While his story may be suspicious, I cannot conclude that his story cannot reasonably be true in the circumstances. I know nothing about the relationship between the two drivers or what the motivation for the actions of Mr. Ngoue-Ngameleu was or whether he was to be remunerated for his assistance of the 11 people or when he got involved in this matter.
[52] Accordingly, Mr. Mbeh will be acquitted on all 3 counts.
[53] As to the other charges against Paul Ngoue-Ngameleu, there will be findings of guilt.
[54] The parties are content to make submissions on the other two charges then.
Original Signed by “Justice T.J. Carey”
Thomas J. Carey
Justice
Released: Delivered Orally on September 25, 2020
COURT FILE NO.: CR-18-4484
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
– and – Paul Ngoue-Ngameleu and Henadez Makia Mbeh
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Carey J.
Released: Delivered Orally on September 25, 2020