Court File and Parties
COURT FILE NO.: CV-19-00003
DATE: 20191002
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Douglas F. Bonesteel, James A. Finlay, Gayle MacGregor, Scott MacGregor, John L. Russell, George (Jordy) D. Speake
Applicants
– and –
The Corporation of the Municipality of Lambton Shores
Respondent
COUNSEL:
Eric K. Gillespie, for the Applicants
Analee Baroudi, for the Respondent
HEARD: May 31, 2019
REASONS
Carey J.:
Overview
[1] The applicants brought an application to determine whether the municipal election for the Municipality of Lambton Shores held on October 22, 2018, was valid. They seek to have the entire election declared invalid and “proper” by-elections directed. The applicants set out nine distinct issues upon which they rely as the grounds for their application.
[2] The respondent municipality contests the application on all of the grounds raised and submits that the applicants have not met the burden of proof that rests upon them in their application.
[3] The applicants are all persons who were entitled to vote in the said municipal election held in October of 2018. The incorporated Municipality of Lambton Shores, the municipality whose responsibility it was to administer the election, did so issuing “PIN” numbers to eligible voters and using alternative voting only. Alternative voting in the election constituted use of personal home computers, telephone or computers at the local library, the municipal office or by using portable computers – electronic voting. The application asserts that electronic voting permits neither recounts nor verification of the results. The respondent Lambton Shores submits that the alternative methods of voting used in this election were used by 194 Ontario municipalities in the 2018 election. The respondent municipality argues that this application is grounded in the applicant voters’ dislike of telephone and internet voting and speculation about the risks in these methods as opposed to traditional paper ballots inserted into ballot boxes. The municipality says the dislike of the method of voting is not a basis for invalidating this election under s. 83 of the Municipal Elections Act, 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 32 (“MEA”).
[4] The applicants submit that each of the grounds raised represents a violation of the MEA and that together they call into question the validity of the 2018 election. They argue that every successful candidate won by a margin substantially less than the number of votes they allege were improperly or illegally cast or improperly or illegally denied as a result of the actions of the municipality.
[5] This application has been conducted on the basis of affidavit evidence filed by both parties, as well as examinations conducted by the lawyers of various of the affiants. Neither party filed factums and the arguments were made orally before the court. Counsel for the respondent municipality provided the court with a written summary of her oral submissions. The use of that summary was a subject of comment by counsel for the applicants during oral argument. I am satisfied that the summary was appropriately used and filed and its use was not contrary to the summary procedure mandated under s. 83(3) of the MEA. I would have been content to receive a similar summary from the applicants had one been prepared.
Applicable Law
[6] This application is authorized and regulated by s. 83 of the MEA which reads in its entirety:
(1) A person who is entitled to vote in an election may make an application to the Superior Court of Justice requesting that it determine,
(a) whether the election is valid;
(b) whether a person’s election to an office in the election is valid;
(c) if a person’s election to an office is not valid, whether another person was validly elected or is entitled to the office;
(d) if an election is not valid or a person’s election to an office is not valid, whether a by-election should be held.
Time
(2) The application shall be commenced within 90 days after voting day.
Summary procedure
(3) The application shall be dealt with in a summary manner, without application records or factums.
Service
(3.1) The applicant shall serve a copy of the application on the clerk or secretary of the municipality or local board to which the application relates within 5 days after the day the application was made under this section.
No other avenue
(4) A proceeding to determine a matter described in clause (1) (a), (b), (c) or (d) may be commenced only under subsection (1).
Compensation
(5) If the court orders that a by-election be held, it may make such order as it considers just against a person whose act or omission unlawfully affected the result of the election, for the compensation of candidates at that election.
Effect of procedural irregularities
(6) The court shall not determine an election to be invalid if,
(a) an irregularity described in subsection (7) occurred at the election but did not affect the result of the election; and
(b) the election was conducted in accordance with the principles of this Act.
Same
(7) Clause (6) (a) applies to the following irregularities:
An irregularity on the part of the clerk or in any of the procedures before voting day.
Failure to have a voting place open at the appointed location and time.
Non-compliance with a provision of this Act or of a regulation, by-law, resolution or procedure made, passed or established under this Act, dealing with voting, counting of votes or time requirements.
A mistake in the use of forms, whether prescribed or not.
Failure to comply with the procedural requirements imposed under sections 41.1 and 41.2 for a ranked ballot election.
[7] While the MEA refrains from giving specific guidelines for setting aside an election, s. 83(6) has been interpreted by the Ontario Court of Appeal as restricting an application court’s discretion in cases of procedural irregularities: see Cusimano v. Toronto (City), 2012 ONCA 907 (Cusimano (C.A.)), at para. 22.
[8] In the same judgment, the Ontario Court of Appeal accepted the approach of the Supreme Court of Canada in interpreting similar language in the Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9 (CEA): see Cusimano (C.A.), at paras. 59-68. The first principle is that the purpose of an election statute is “to enfranchise all persons entitled to vote and to allow them to express their democratic preferences”: see Opitz v. Wrzesnewskyj, 2012 SCC 55, at para. 35.
[9] The second principle established by the case law is that a remedial by-election is not a perfect substitute because it disenfranchises all those electors who voted in the original election: see Opitz, at para. 48. Further, the Supreme Court of Canada unanimously held that the challenger(s) bears the burden of proving on a balance of probabilities that irregularities have affected the results of the election: see Opitz, at paras. 52 and 172.
[10] “Irregularities” has been defined as “serious administrative errors that are capable of undermining the electoral process — the type of mistakes that are tied to and have a direct bearing on a person’s right to vote”: see Opitz, at para. 24.
[11] “Affected the result” is concerned with whether someone who was not entitled to vote, voted. “Manifestly, if a vote is found to be invalid, it must be discounted, thereby altering the vote count, and in that sense, affecting the election’s result.” Conversely, the phrase could also include where a person entitled to vote was improperly prevented from doing so by an election official: see Opitz, at para. 25.
[12] With this judicial guidance, I will review the applicants’ application issue by issue as numbered one through nine in the application to determine whether the applicants have established that an irregularity has occurred and, if so, whether that irregularity affected the result of the election.
[13] If I do find irregularities that I have concluded affected the result of the election, I would be required to annul the results “if the rejected votes are equal to or outnumber the winner’s plurality.” This has been referred to as “the magic number test”: see Opitz, at para. 71.
[14] I accept that the onus on the applicants requires that there be more than speculation, suspicion and conjecture in the evidence on this application: see Kett v. The Corporation of the Township of Scugog, 2019 ONCSC 942, at para. 6. I also note that the “principles” of the MEA are not listed in the Act but must be inferred from its provisions. I accept that it is inappropriate to find that compliance with the mandatory provisions of the Act should be seen as a principle of the Act: see Cusimano v. Toronto (City), 2011 ONSC 7271 (Cusimano (Div. Ct.)), at para. 109. Rather, in determining whether an election is to be found invalid as a result of procedural irregularities, I am bound by the curative provision of s. 83(6) which has been interpreted for over 80 years as requiring a court to conclude:
[W]hether, upon the facts as they appear, there was a general endeavour to conduct the election upon the principles in accordance with which an election held under the Act ought to be conducted, and whether that endeavour was so far successful as fairly to call for the application of the section.
See Rex ex rel. Fennessy v. Wade and Plaunt, 1939 CanLII 54 (ON SC), [1939] O.R. 537 at p. 542, as quoted at para. 113 of Cusimano (Div. Ct.).
Review of the Issues Raised in the Application
Issue #1: Removal of Voters from the Voters’ List
[15] The application alleges that 1,131 names were removed from the voters’ list arbitrarily contrary to s. 25(1) and (2) of the MEA. The application asserts “attempts to obtain explanations regarding the removal of the 1,131 persons have been made but have been unsuccessful.”
[16] This is addressed in the affidavit of the clerk of the municipality who set out how the list can be corrected, and voters added to the list pursuant to s. 22 of the MEA. In cross-examination, she indicated that information was both added, deleted and changed during and after the election. I was not pointed to any evidence as to how many names were deleted from the list before the election or given any evidence as to the reasons why these individuals names were removed. Here, the onus was on the applicants to show that eligible voters had their names removed from the list and that these eligible voters were not permitted to vote. Not only was there no such evidence but two of the affiants (Kungl and Maurizio) both indicated the simple process that they went through to have their names restored to the list and that they were allowed subsequently to vote. Ms. Kungl indicated this was the first election where she did not receive a package in the mail about voting. Mr. Maurizio, after explaining how he was put back on the list, indicated his dissatisfaction with the type of voting by internet and/or telephone and that he did not trust this method of voting. He was not a regular computer user. I find the applicants have not satisfied their onus to show an irregularity on this issue.
Issue #2: Failure to Provide Notice Under the Act
[17] Paragraph 8 of the application baldly asserts a violation of s. 13(2) of the Act. Section 13 (Notice Provisions) is reproduced in its entirety. No other particulars are provided in the application. The affidavit of the clerk, Ms. Troyer-Boyd, sets out in para. 66 of her affidavit the notices that were issued, including through use of municipal website, newspapers and radio ads. I note that the section gives discretion to the clerk to give notice “in a form and manner and at a time that the clerk considers adequate to give reasonable notice or to convey the information, as the case may be.” None of the affidavits relied upon by the applicants indicate that any of the affiants did not know about the election. Rather, the theme that flows through the affidavits is an unhappiness with paper ballots not being provided for this election, and a distrust of the methods of voting that were available. I agree with the respondent municipality that no evidence of any irregularity had been provided with respect to notice, nor is there any evidence that the results of the election were affected by any failure to provide notice under the Act.
Issue #3: Failure to Permit Voting by Mail
[18] The application alleges under this heading that municipal by-law #20/2003 which was written to permit “Alternate Voting Methods” (specifically vote by mail) has not been repealed. Therefore, paper mail-in ballots were to have been made available as opposed to limiting municipal voting to internet and telephone only. However, the municipality failed to do so thereby violating its by-law. This impacted both advance voting and voting on election day.
[19] I do not have by-law #20/2003 in the evidence before me and I am, therefore, not in a position to interpret that by-law. The respondent asserts it was superceded by by-law #27-2017. I do not have before me any cases that would suggest that position is wrong or that a former by-law overtaken by a new one is required to be repealed. In any event, the bulk of the affiants in the applicants’ book of affidavits indicate that they were able to cast their votes despite their distaste for internet and telephone voting. Five affiants indicated they were able to vote but chose not to because of their distrust for internet and telephone voting. There is no evidence before me that the principles of the MEA were violated or that the results were affected by the use of internet and telephone voting.
[20] It was not challenged that one hundred and ninety-four municipalities across Ontario in the 2018 election resorted to the alternative methods of voting under s. 42 of the MEA. I agree with the respondent municipality that those unhappy with the choice made by Lambton Shores council can use political action to change that decision. In any event, even if I were to find that the clerk was obligated to provide mail-in ballots, I would be unable to find that the election results were affected, and the election was not carried out in accordance with the principles of the Act. Section 83(7) would expressly prohibit a finding that would result in the election being declared invalid under these circumstances.
Issue #4: Failure to Provide Voter Information Letters to Tenants
[21] The application alleges qualified tenants did not receive voter information letters which would contain the information that would be required for them to exercise their franchise.
[22] There are no specifics alleged. It is pointed out by the respondent that while there is no evidence of the municipality refusing to add anyone to the voter list, there is evidence that those who were requested were added (i.e. affidavit of Frank Maurizio).
[23] Previous court decisions have recognized that voters’ lists are imperfect documents that will require additions, corrections and deletions. This municipality had a mechanism as required under the Act to add names to the voters’ list. The absence of an individual’s name from the voters’ list does not automatically take away their eligibility to vote. The applicants have not shown an irregularity as alleged with respect to providing voter information letters to tenants.
Issue #5: Failure to Permit Scrutineers/Review
[24] On this issue, the application alleges the candidates were notified six hours after advance voting opened that the municipality would permit voting on computers located at county public libraries. As voting at libraries was not identified in the Lambton Shores Telephone/Internet Voting Election Policies and Procedures (“LSEPP”), it is alleged that this violated s. 42(3) of the MEA. The municipality responds that the cross-examination of both Lorie Scott and James Finlay, indicate that they were made aware by the clerk of the right to appoint scrutineers. Further, the clerk indicates in her affidavit that she made candidates aware that scrutineers could be appointed in writing as set out in the policies and procedures prepared for the Lambton Shores 2018 election in s. 10. The clerk also indicates she did not receive any questions from any candidate regarding the appointment of a scrutineer nor any written documents appointing scrutineers. The applicants have not satisfied me that there was any irregularity permitted by the municipality in the appointment of scrutineers.
Public Libraries
[25] The respondent responds that the libraries were not voting places or voter help centres but simply places where members of the public could use the computer technology to vote free of charge as if they were casting their vote from home.
[26] The application also raises the fear of viruses on the computer. The evidence before the court confirms that all of the candidates were informed through a training session that if a computer had a virus and a vote was accordingly not accepted, an error message would be sent telling the individual how to remedy the error. There was no evidence in this application that any eligible votes cast were not accepted. I find there was no evidence of an irregularity caused by the use of library computers or that the use of library computers affected the results of the election. There was no onus on Lambton Shores to show that public library computers were sanitized before votes were cast. The onus was on the applicants to show irregularity and they did not.
Nursing Homes
[27] Paragraph 13 of the application complains that municipal staff attended at nursing homes and assisted residents to vote on the internet without contacting candidates to allow for the scrutineers to be present during the voting period contrary to s. 16(1) and 47(5) of the Act. It also complains that pin numbers to enable the voting were not sent to residents via first class Canada Post but rather brought into the nursing homes by municipal staff at the time of voting, allegedly violating s. 6(4) of the LSEPP.
[28] Section 42(7) requires voting places to be provided at institutions where there are more than 20 beds occupied by persons who are disabled, chronically ill or infirm, or in a retirement home in which there are more than 50 beds occupied. At Exhibit F to the clerk’s affidavit (at page 21 of 35), election officials had two locations listed under retirement home or institution – Country Manor and North Lambton Lodge. The dates and hours for this assistance are indicated as TBD which I take to mean “to be determined”. The procedures manual was signed December 29, 2017, and provided to every candidate when his or her nomination was filed and posted on the elections page of the municipal website (affidavit of the clerk, para. 22-24). When questioned by the applicants’ counsel, the clerk indicated that staff who attended were sworn and trained (transcript of the cross-examination on an affidavit of Stephanie Troyer-Boyd taken on April 25, 2019, at p. 26, question 60). The clerk’s affidavit asserts that:
The onus for appointing a Scrutineer in writing is on the candidate. The Clerk did not receive any questions from any candidate regarding the appointment of a scrutineer, nor did I receive any written documents by any of the candidates appointing scrutineers.
See clerk’s affidavit, at p. 7, para. 34.
[29] In para. 14 of the application, it is asserted that some voters did not receive a voter information package and received their pin numbers and passwords from the municipal office without being required to produce identification.
[30] The only evidence in this application on this issue was one voter who was not asked for identification but clearly was who she said she was. I note this is a small community where people tend to know each other. Another voter, Frank Maurizio, who attended to have his name put on the voters’ list indicated he was placed on the list after providing both his date of birth and driver’s licence. The thrust of his affidavit was that he did not feel comfortable with the alternative way of voting and had concerns about privacy. His views were similar to those expressed by the other affiants and those who produced unsworn material in the applicant’s book of affidavits.
[31] Many of the contributors to that book of affidavits chose not to vote because of their dislike and distrust of the process. There is no requirement set out in the MEA that identification be produced. There was no evidence in this application of anyone who was ineligible to vote being permitted to vote. I find there was no irregularity shown in this aspect of the voting.
Security of Voting
[32] Paragraph 15 alleges that because candidates were not provided with confirmation of voters’ lists set at “zero votes” before voting began it was impossible for scrutineers to provide “assurance the vote was not pre-determined before citizens cast their ballots.” This allegation is contained in the affidavits of several affiants (MacGregor, Bonesteel and Speake). The respondent relies on p. 15 of the Policies and Procedures (Exhibit F to the clerk’s affidavit) which sets out the protocol followed.
[33] While the MEA authorizes the clerk’s office to require proof of identity in certain circumstances and with some restriction, the Act does not make proof of identity mandatory. This allows for a common-sense approach to adding people who are well known to the members of the clerk’s office assisting with the voters’ list. Section 7(2) of the Telephone/Internet Voting Election Policies and Procedures for the 2018 Ontario municipal elections for the Municipality of Lambton Shores which was provided to all candidates (Exhibit F), the procedure for generation and display of the confirmation report containing all candidate names running for an office and confirming zero votes for all candidates before the electronic election begins.
[34] When Lorie Scott, one of the candidates and affiants in this application, was presented for cross-examination on her affidavit that said among other things that candidates were not made aware of when or where a scrutineer could attend to verify this procedure, counsel for the applicants objected to the contents of the manual being put to Ms. Scott as “irrelevant”. Given that a manual provided to the candidates contained the information that the application and Ms. Scott allege was not provided, the relevance seems obviously manifest to this court. I am not satisfied that any irregularity has been shown in this regard by the applicants.
Issue #6: Failure to Maintain Voter Secrecy
[35] Section 49 of the MEA mandates that every person present in a voting place or at the counting of the votes shall help to maintain the secrecy of the voting. The application suggests this section was violated by having individuals improperly assist with seniors voting.
[36] Section 45 of the MEA not only provides for voting places in retirement homes and homes for the disabled, s. 45(8) permits the Deputy Returning Officer (DRO) for a voting place to attend on an elector who is a resident of the institution or retirement home to allow him or her to vote. There was no evidence on this application of individuals improperly assisting with seniors voting or otherwise failing to maintain the secrecy of the voting. There is thus no evidence of an irregularity in the election pursuant to issue #6.
Issue #7: Failures to Comply re: Retirement Home and Libraries
[37] As indicated previously in this decision, the libraries were not designated voting places but rather their computers were made available to those who perhaps did not have access to their own computer at home and wished to vote by the internet. The previously referred to procedures manual provided to all candidates notice as required under s. 13(1) of the MEA. The procedures and forms required under s. 42(3) are contained in the voting manual which was approved by the clerk/returning officer of the Municipality of Lambton Shores on December 29, 2017, in compliance with s. 42(4) which mandated that s. 42(3) be complied with on or before December 31 in the year before the year of the election (see also Exhibit J to the affidavit of Stephanie Troyer-Boyd).
[38] The applicants have shown no irregularity relating to this issue.
Issue #8: Failure to Maintain Privacy
[39] The application alleges violation of s. 23(3) and (4) of the MEA by distributing private information to third party commercial vendors used to manage the voters’ list and conduct the election. The application alleges that there is no provision in the MEA that allows the clerk to send voters’ information to parties other than parties listed in the Act. The respondent argues that it is routine and necessary for third party companies to play a role in elections whether it be by mail services or ballot counting services. They point out that this occurs with a vote by mail: see Kett, at para. 11. The respondent says that it is disingenuous for the applicants to take issue with disclosure of personal information to third parties through the use of telephone and internet voting when, if there had been mail-in ballots as some of the applicants would have preferred, similar third-party disclosure would have taken place.
[40] I agree with the respondent that requiring the clerk to obtain individual consent for each voter on the voters’ list to the council’s chosen method of voting before organizing and then conducting the election would have been a completely unworkable situation.
[41] I find that there is no prohibition in the MEA against contracting a third-party company to assist with conducting the election. I agree with the respondent that municipalities are required to balance competing interests such as accessibility and voter anonymity. There is no evidence in this application that in trying to ensure the enfranchisement of eligible voters that the privacy of those voters was not maintained in an acceptable manner. The clerk’s affidavit indicates at para. 70 to 72 that she and all election officials took an oath of secrecy and forms of those oaths were attached to her affidavit. I accept that there were no facts to substantiate the allegations that would amount to a failure to maintain privacy. The applicants’ counsel referred the court to affidavits at tab 2, 8, 12, 13, 14, 18, 21 and 23 contained in the applicants’ book of affidavits (Bright, Hickingbottom, L. Maurizio, Mears, Northmore, Rivers, Sharen, and Steadman). While all of these affidavits express concerns about the privacy being violated by such things as the pin numbers being mailed to them and not being given an alternate to internet or telephone voting, none of the affidavits contain evidence that people’s privacy rights were violated or that any violation of privacy acted to enfranchise an unentitled person. The affidavit of Nancy Steadman at tab 23 of the applicants’ affidavit of documents in fact proposes to disenfranchise some people in municipal elections by allowing only one vote per owner/person of voting age in the family. This was apparently a rule imposed on a “referendum on vehicles conducted by the municipality several years ago” that allowed one vote per cottage lot. The affidavit suggests that voting be tied to property ownership and payment of taxes (see para. 16).
[42] While this may be one person’s opinion out of the many contained in the applicants’ materials, it represents a viewpoint that is, with respect, completely contrary to the principles of the MEA which enfranchises residents of a municipality as well as property owners and anticipates that a person may have a residence in more than one municipality as in the case of students (s. 1(2.1) MEA).
[43] I agree with the respondents that the paramount principle of the election procedures established by the municipality should be the interest of enfranchising eligible voters. It is unfortunate that some people chose to not vote rather than use the telephone or internet as approved by the council. I can find no evidence to support this allegation as an irregularity that resulted in improper enfranchisement or disenfranchisement.
Issue #9: Failure to Investigate
[44] Section 89 of the MEA sets out offences relating to voting in paras. (a) through (m). Section 90(1) makes any of those offences that were committed knowingly, a corrupt practice. Other practices, including bribery, miscounting votes and neglect of duty, are all also defined as corrupt practices. Section 91 deals with ineligibility for elected office that may flow from a conviction for a corrupt practice. Paragraph 19 of the application alleges that “Contrary to s. 12(7) of the LSEPP complaints were filed with the municipality questioning the legality of electronic voting, advance voting and the municipality distributing personal information to third party private corporations.” It alleges these complaints were not investigated as required by the LESPP and s. 93 of the Act. It appears that the failure to investigate complaints, not the filing of complaints, is what is asserted.
[45] Section 93 reads as follows: “No person shall obstruct a person making an investigation or examination under this Act or withhold, conceal or destroy anything relevant to the investigation or examination.” I find that there is no section of the MEA that requires the municipality to investigate the types of complaints listed in para. 19. There was no evidence in this application of violations that would amount to offences under the MEA including obstruction of an investigation. There was no evidence of any irregularity that would require an investigation by the municipality or of an issue that could have affected the results of the investigation.
[46] Consequently, I find that the applicants have shown no irregularity in the conduct of the election as alleged under this issue.
Conclusion
[47] In the course of argument, the applicants’ counsel submitted that on the issue alone of the unexplained removal of 1,131 names from the voters’ list was in and of itself enough to invalidate the election. As I have indicated in these reasons, I found no evidence of irregularities in the conduct of this election, including removal of names from the voters’ list. I found compliance with the MEA by the municipality throughout the conduct of the election. I found only evidence of voluntary disenfranchisement, contained in the affidavits of those who chose not to vote rather than vote through the validly constituted voting procedures as passed by the Lambton Shores council and set up by the municipal clerk.
[48] The legality of the internet and telephone voting was previously upheld in this court by Justice Desotti: see 2656513 Ont. Inc. v. Municipality of Lambton Shores, 2018 ONSC 5753.
[49] It appeared from the tenure of the arguments and the content of the material in the applicants’ book of affidavits (which contained much material that was not in the form of sworn affidavits) that this application was essentially an attempt to re-litigate that decision. It was clear that the applicants disliked, distrusted and disapproved of the move towards the type of voting which will be in line with current technology and accessible to a greater number of eligible voters. The system put in place allows people regardless of their mobility to vote from the privacy of their own home without venturing out into what I note is the often harsh, unpredictable and travel inhibiting weather of the shores of Lake Huron.
[50] Any new technology or innovation is likely to be met with both resistance and inaugural glitches. While there was some evidence that people were uncomfortable with the new system and did not trust it, I found no evidence of irregularities that led to any disenfranchisement of eligible voters or enfranchisement of ineligible voters. There was nothing in the material before the court that would lead me to discount even one vote, let alone enough votes that would reach the magic number of being larger than any of the pluralities in the races that were contested in this election.
[51] The application is dismissed.
[52] If the parties are unable to agree to costs, I will receive submissions of no more than three double-spaced pages from both sides; within 30 days from the respondent; and within 15 days of receipt of those submissions by them, from the applicants.
Original signed by Justice Thomas J. Carey
Thomas J. Carey
Justice
Released: October 2, 2019
COURT FILE NO.: CV-19-00003
DATE: 20191002
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Douglas F. Bonesteel, James A. Finlay, Gayle MacGregor, Scott MacGregor, John L. Russell, George (Jordy) D. Speake
Applicants
– and –
The Corporation of the Municipality of Lambton Shores
Respondent
REASONS
Carey J.
Released: October 2, 2019