Suzanne M. Stevenson

The defendant appealed a master’s order refusing to compel answers to discovery refusals and production of additional financial documents in a fatal motor vehicle accident action involving dependency claims under the Family Law Act.

The appeal challenged the master’s refusal to require the surviving spouse to answer questions about post‑accident income and dividends and to produce corporate and financial documents sought by the defendant’s expert.

The court held that the master applied the correct relevance test and did not commit a palpable and overriding error in determining that questions relating to post‑accident investment income were irrelevant to the dependency claim in the circumstances of a single‑income household.

The court also upheld the master’s discretionary decision to deny several production requests as premature or unnecessary, particularly where the materials had not been pursued during discovery or involved non‑parties.

The appeal was dismissed and the discovery rulings were upheld.

The applicant brought a motion to change a 2003 consent judgment, seeking an increase in spousal support due to her inability to work from medical issues and the respondent's increased income.

The court found a material change in circumstances based on the respondent's increased income and the applicant's lack of income.

However, the court imputed an income of $25,000 to the applicant, finding insufficient expert evidence to prove she was medically unable to work as a licensed paralegal.

The court also found insufficient evidence that the parties' 30-year-old son remained a dependent of the respondent.

Applying the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, the court increased spousal support to $1,950 per month and ordered the respondent to continue providing health coverage, but dismissed the applicant's other claims.

The plaintiff sought an interlocutory injunction against former key employees and contractors who started a competing business.

The plaintiff alleged breach of fiduciary duty and breach of confidence.

The court found that the plaintiff established a strong prima facie case that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties and duties of confidence by using the plaintiff's confidential information and business opportunities.

The court granted the interlocutory injunction for six months, finding that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm and the balance of convenience favoured the plaintiff.

The plaintiff vendor brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant purchasers for failing to close a real estate transaction.

The defendants argued there was an oral collateral agreement making the purchase conditional on financing.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, noting the written agreement explicitly excluded collateral agreements and the defendants failed to provide sufficient evidence of the alleged oral condition.

Summary judgment was granted, and the defendants were ordered to pay damages for the difference in the subsequent sale price and carrying costs, plus costs.

The defendants brought motions to strike the plaintiff’s Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim alleging fraud, negligence, defamation, breach of contract, and numerous other causes of action arising from a physician assessment and subsequent complaints to the professional regulator and review board.

The court held that the pleading failed to set out material facts supporting the alleged causes of action and instead consisted largely of bald allegations and inflammatory assertions.

Claims relying on materials from professional discipline proceedings were barred by s. 36(3) of the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991, and the regulatory bodies and their officials were protected by statutory immunity absent properly pleaded bad faith.

The court also found the claim constituted an improper collateral attack on the outcomes of the regulatory complaint and review process.

The entire claim was struck without leave to amend.

In an undefended civil trial arising from historic childhood sexual assaults by an uncle against two nieces, the court found liability for sexual assault and battery and held that causation flowed from that tort without requiring findings on the remaining pleaded torts.

Relying on expert psychological evidence, the court awarded substantial non-pecuniary, aggravated, punitive, future care, past care, and loss of earning capacity damages for enduring trauma, PTSD-related symptoms, anxiety, depression, and functional impairment.

A family member's derivative claim under s. 61 of the Family Law Act failed for lack of evidence.

The plaintiffs also received prejudgment interest and substantial indemnity costs.

Following a motor vehicle accident involving an uninsured driver who struck a pedestrian, the driver and her spouse sought a declaration that the spouse’s automobile insurer was required to indemnify them after the spouse added the vehicle to his existing policy the day after the accident.

The insurer alleged the addition was obtained through intentional misrepresentation, including false statements about ownership and the failure to disclose the prior accident.

The court found the spouse had no insurable interest in the vehicle and that both individuals engaged in a scheme to deceive the insurer by backdating coverage and concealing material facts.

Under s. 233 of the Insurance Act, their right to recover indemnity was forfeited due to fraud and false statements.

The action was dismissed and the uninsured motorist insurer was required to respond to the personal injury claim.

Following a motion concerning jurisdiction, the successful party sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis in the amount of $17,178.02, alleging misconduct by the opposing parties and excessive motion preparation requirements.

The responding parties argued that costs should be limited to the jurisdiction issue and capped at a substantially lower amount.

Applying the principles governing costs and the factors under Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held that substantial indemnity was not justified and that the claimed costs were excessive and duplicative.

The court fixed costs at a reduced amount it considered fair and reasonable for an unsuccessful party to have expected to pay.

The plaintiff sought an interim injunction and preservation order against former employees who started a competing realty tax business, alleging breach of non-competition and non-solicitation agreements.

The court found a serious issue to be tried but concluded the plaintiff failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, as any lost sales or market share could be compensated in damages.

The balance of convenience favoured the defendants.

The court dismissed the motion for an interim injunction and forensic inspection but ordered the defendants to preserve any documents and devices belonging to the plaintiff.

The defendants brought a motion challenging the jurisdiction of the Ontario Superior Court over a dispute concerning alleged misappropriation of assets from a family business operating in China.

The plaintiff alleged that corporate assets and funds had been transferred from China to Ontario and sought an accounting and compensation.

Applying the presumptive connecting factors framework from Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, the court held that the defendants’ domicile in Ontario established a prima facie basis for jurisdiction.

The defendants failed to rebut the presumption or demonstrate that China was a clearly more appropriate forum under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

The court therefore held that Ontario had jurisdiction and adjourned the defendants’ summary judgment motion.

The defendant physician appealed an order of a master compelling him to attend an examination under Rule 39.03(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure in advance of a motion to strike the statement of claim in a medical negligence action.

The defendant argued that the motion to strike raised only legal issues concerning pleading sufficiency and therefore evidence was irrelevant.

The court held that once the defendant asserted in his factum that he was unable to respond to the allegations, his ability to respond became a relevant issue on the Rule 25.11 motion.

The plaintiffs therefore had a prima facie right to examine him on that issue under Rule 39.03(1).

The court found no error in the master’s reasoning and upheld both the examination order and the costs award.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment to recognize and enforce a $99,925 Maryland judgment obtained against the defendant in 2004.

The defendant opposed the motion, arguing the action was time-barred under the Limitations Act.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the issue of discoverability—specifically when the plaintiff knew or ought to have known the defendant resided in Ontario—raised genuine issues of material fact and credibility that required a trial.

The moving party brought a motion under Rule 54.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to oppose confirmation of a report and certificate of assessment that awarded legal fees to a solicitor for representation before the Ontario Review Board.

The dispute centred on whether the assessment officer had jurisdiction to assess the solicitor’s accounts where the existence of a retainer and responsibility for payment—between Legal Aid Ontario and the Attorney General—were contested.

The court held that a bona fide dispute regarding the retainer deprived the assessment officer of jurisdiction under the Solicitors Act to proceed with the assessment.

As the retainer issue had not been resolved through civil litigation, the assessment process was improper.

The report and certificate of assessment were therefore set aside.

The defendant insurer brought a motion for the determination of a question of law prior to trial regarding whether the plaintiff was entitled to simple or compound interest on arrears of weekly income benefits under s. 24(4) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (OMPP legislation).

Applying the modern principle of statutory interpretation and reviewing legislative history, including the Kruger Report, the court found that the legislature intended to impose a penalty on insurers for late payments.

The court concluded that interest payable under s. 24(4) is compound interest.

The defendant lawyer brought a motion to strike a negligence claim commenced by a former criminal client.

The plaintiff alleged negligent representation during his criminal trial, which resulted in convictions for mischief and forcible confinement followed by an absolute discharge.

The court held that the civil action constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the criminal convictions because proving causation would require relitigating the criminal trial and determining whether the plaintiff would have been acquitted.

Applying abuse of process principles articulated in Supreme Court and appellate jurisprudence, the court found the action undermined the integrity and finality of the adjudicative process.

The claim was dismissed in its entirety and costs were awarded to the defendant.

The applicant brought a corporate law application under multiple provisions of the Business Corporations Act, the Courts of Justice Act, and the Rules of Civil Procedure.

In a supplemental endorsement, the court addressed the timing of service of the Notice of Application following an earlier endorsement.

The court amended paragraph 2 of the prior endorsement and extended the time for service of the Notice of Application by 90 days from September 1, 2012.

The order was made in circumstances where the respondents did not appear.

Following reasons dismissing most aspects of a motion to strike, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The responding parties were largely successful on the motion, though one claim for unjust enrichment was struck with leave to amend.

The court applied Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the principles from Boucher regarding fair and reasonable costs.

While the successful parties sought substantial indemnity or partial indemnity costs exceeding $19,000, the court found those amounts excessive for a short motion and fixed costs at $11,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike portions of an amended statement of claim against a corporate officer personally.

The plaintiff sought damages related to her termination of employment and pleaded tort claims for intentional or negligent infliction of nervous shock and punitive damages against the officer.

The court held it was plain and obvious that the tort claims had no reasonable prospect of success because allowing them would circumvent contractual exclusion and entire agreement clauses contained in the employment agreement.

Applying principles from Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence concerning limitation of liability clauses and privity, the court found the exclusion clause extended to the officer acting within the scope of employment.

The claims against the officer were struck in their entirety without leave to amend.

The plaintiff, a judgment creditor of the estate of John Sr., brought two actions alleging that the transfer of a farm property and certain trademarks by the estate to family members and their companies were fraudulent conveyances intended to defeat its claims.

The plaintiff relied on the Fraudulent Conveyances Act and the Assignments and Preferences Act, pointing to several 'badges of fraud'.

The court dismissed the actions, finding no fraudulent intent.

The court accepted that the farm property transfer and a related mortgage were legitimate transactions to secure and repay loans made by the son's companies for farm improvements, and that the family genuinely believed the Reliable lawsuit lacked merit at the time of the transfers.

A natural gas distributor applied to quash a municipal by-law imposing a pavement degradation fee on entities excavating city roads, arguing the fee was ultra vires under the City of Toronto Act, 2006 and O. Reg. 595/06.

The applicant contended the fee impermissibly targeted gas distributors, was unrelated to permit issuance costs, and improperly related to the transportation of natural resources.

The municipality argued the fee formed part of a broader regulatory scheme governing road excavation and utility cuts and was authorized as a permit-related charge.

The court applied a broad and purposive interpretation of municipal powers and held the fee was reasonably connected to a regulatory scheme managing road infrastructure and excavation permits.

The application to quash the by-law was dismissed.