Stephen Schwartz

The appellants, Jordan Rudiger Zukowski and Rudi Heinz Edwin Zukowski, appealed an order granting summary judgment to the respondent, MarshallZehr Group Inc., regarding the enforceability of a personal guarantee for a project financing loan.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge’s refusal to permit cross-examination of the respondent’s representative and no reviewable error in the finding that the respondent did not act in bad faith.

The court held that the issues raised were properly resolved on the record and that the personal guarantee was valid and enforceable.

The court voided six promissory notes and struck out related mortgages registered by the plaintiffs against the defendants' properties, finding that the notes were materially altered without consent, contrary to the Bills of Exchange Act.

The court also declined to grant equitable mortgages or certificates of pending litigation, citing the plaintiffs' inequitable conduct and failure to meet statutory tests.

The decision addresses issues of forged notes, after-acquired property, corporate personality, and the application of the Family Law Act to matrimonial homes.

This consolidated trial addressed multiple disputes between Raymond Nicolini (through Sayward Investments Inc., InSite Construction Management Inc., and King Station Facility Inc.) and Vilson Da Silva (through Leblon Carpentry Inc., Leblon Drywall Inc., and his wife Daenn Monteiro Loureiro).

The court found that Da Silva, Loureiro, and Leblon Carpentry breached a 2019 loan agreement with Sayward, owing $38,909.29.

A 2020 advance from Sayward to Leblon Carpentry and Da Silva was determined to be a loan, not a joint venture, with $203,735.20 owing.

The mortgage on the matrimonial home was held to secure only the 2019 loan, not the 2020 loan, due to lack of spousal consent.

The drywall contract between InSite and Leblon Drywall was found to have a price of $1,330,742, and Leblon Drywall was deemed overpaid, leading to the dismissal of its breach of contract claim.

The parties were found to have mutually terminated the drywall contract, releasing each other from claims for deficiencies and overpayments.

Claims of oppression and conspiracy brought by InSite were dismissed, as InSite was not a proper complainant for oppression and the lien claim lacked a predominant purpose to injure.

The plaintiffs, Pilbro III Inc. and E.D. Carpenters Ltd., sought leave to bring a motion to compel the defendants to answer refused questions from examination for discovery.

This motion was brought after the action had been set down for trial and past multiple court-ordered deadlines for interlocutory motions.

The court dismissed the motion, emphasizing the need to combat the "culture of complacency" in civil litigation and enforce scheduling orders, despite acknowledging the defendants' own delays in providing undertakings.

The case involved three interrelated motions within the receivership of ProjectCo, the entity responsible for the St. Michael’s Hospital redevelopment.

Unity Health Toronto sought to lift a stay of proceedings to terminate the Project Agreement due to ProjectCo's defaults.

The Bank of Montreal, as Administrative Agent for the Lenders, sought an order to assign ProjectCo's rights to enforce a Tower Interim Completion (TIC) payment and to dismiss Unity's motion.

Unity also sought to dismiss the Lenders' TIC application for lack of standing.

The court granted Unity's motion to lift the stay and to dismiss the Lenders' TIC application, and dismissed the Lenders' assignment motion.

The court found Unity would be materially prejudiced by the stay's continuation, while the Lenders' prejudice was contractually prescribed.

The Lenders lacked standing for the TIC application, and no legal or equitable assignment of ProjectCo's rights to enforce the TIC payment existed.

This decision addresses the issue of costs following a second oppression remedy application and a cross-motion.

The applicant, Michelle Gojkovich, was largely successful in her motion, which sought the appointment of a monitor and other relief, while the respondents' cross-motion to disqualify the applicant's counsel was dismissed.

The court awarded the applicant $60,000 in partial indemnity costs, payable jointly and severally by John Rody and Organic Products Consulting Inc., explicitly exempting Buhbli Organics Inc. from liability.

The court also reiterated an earlier order for John Rody to reimburse Buhbli Organics Inc. for legal fees paid on his behalf.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal where the trial judge's liability finding was upheld, but the damages award was set aside for a new hearing.

Due to divided success on appeal, the parties agreed to bear their own appeal costs.

The court varied the trial judge's costs order, reducing the amount payable by the appellant to the respondent by one-third (from $251,706.10 to $167,804.07), reflecting the partial success on appeal and the uncertainty regarding the original offer to settle.

The costs of the new damages hearing were left to the discretion of the presiding judge.

The applicant brought a motion within an ongoing oppression remedy application to join a related corporation, Buhbli Brands Inc., as a respondent and to appoint a monitor over the respondents' businesses.

The respondents brought a cross-motion to dismiss the applicant's motion and disqualify her counsel, alleging the applicant unlawfully accessed the individual respondent's email accounts and obtained privileged communications.

The court found that the applicant's counsel acted appropriately by segregating unread privileged documents and notifying opposing counsel.

Finding no prejudice to the respondents, the court dismissed the cross-motion, joined the related corporation on a go-forward basis, and appointed a monitor to oversee the businesses.

The appellant (vendor) appealed a trial judgment finding it breached an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) for development lands and awarding the respondent (purchaser) over $11 million in lost expected profits.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding of liability, confirming the vendor's breach for wrongly asserting the purchaser failed to pay a further deposit and that the purchaser was ready, willing, and able to close without tendering.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on damages, ruling that the trial judge erred by departing from the normal measure of damages for real estate breaches (difference between contract price and market value on closing date).

The Court clarified that the remoteness test determines the *type* of loss, not the *measure*, and that market value inherently accounts for development potential.

A new hearing was ordered to assess damages using the normal measure.

Following a summary judgment granting the plaintiff $567,767.25 and possession of a property, the plaintiff sought costs of $40,659.20 on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court found that the standard charge terms entitled the plaintiff to substantial indemnity costs and there were no special circumstances to depart from this agreement.

The court awarded the requested amount, noting the serious allegations made by the defendant justified the use of senior counsel.

The plaintiff, 1000249084 Ontario Inc., sought summary judgment for a mortgage debt and sale of a property.

The defendant, Payam Andazesgishahr, argued collusion between the plaintiff (owned by the son of his former business partner) and his former partner, and that the plaintiff acted in bad faith.

The defendant also argued the proceeding was deficient because his wife, Ima Tavakkoli, a co-resident in the matrimonial home, was not served.

The court found no genuine issue of collusion or bad faith, noting the plaintiff's actions were reasonable business decisions.

The court also dismissed the argument regarding the wife's non-service, finding she had actual knowledge of the proceedings and that the argument was a delay tactic.

The court granted judgment to the plaintiff for the mortgage amount and an order for possession, directing the title of the proceeding to be amended to add the wife as a defendant and staying the judgment for 30 days to allow her to seek relief.

The appellants appealed an order directing funds paid into court to be released to the respondent, which were secured by a mortgage.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding the order to be interlocutory rather than final.

The court reasoned that the order did not finally determine the substantive issues between the parties, such as claims of improvident realization or breach of duty, which remained subject to a separate, unscheduled application.

Following a successful oppression remedy application where the court ordered the winding up of the corporation, the applicant sought costs on a substantial indemnity scale.

The court agreed with the applicant's unopposed costs submissions and awarded costs of $158,297.43, payable by the individual respondent rather than the corporation.

The payment of the disbursement for an appraisal report was made conditional upon the applicant providing proof of personal payment.

This decision concerns an oppression remedy application under the Ontario Business Corporations Act.

Following a prior ruling that declared oppressive conduct and ordered the winding up of Buhbli Organics Inc., the court addresses the appointment of a liquidator.

The respondents opposed the appointment and sought a stay pending appeal, arguing the hearing should be deferred.

The court dismissed the respondents' arguments, finding the liquidator's appointment integral to the previous order, and proceeded to appoint MNP Ltd. as liquidator, rejecting the respondents' cost concerns as the rates were market-based.

The court also issued an order with specific powers for the liquidator, clarifying its role and limitations, and ordered a judgment for $170,000 against the respondents for non-compliance with a previous order.

The applicant and respondent were former romantic and business partners who co-owned a corporation.

Following the breakdown of their personal relationship, the respondent excluded the applicant from the business, denied her remuneration, and diverted corporate assets to his own consulting company.

The applicant sought an oppression remedy, requesting that the respondent be ordered to purchase her shares.

The court found that the respondent's conduct was oppressive and violated the applicant's reasonable expectations.

However, because the respondent could not afford to buy the shares and the business was entirely dependent on him, the court ordered the respondent to pay $170,000 in damages for the diverted remuneration and ordered the corporation to be wound up.

The defendants moved to dismiss or stay the plaintiff's action under Rule 21.01(3) due to pending related proceedings.

The court rejected arguments of res judicata and issue estoppel, finding no final determinations had been made.

It allowed the action to proceed against one defendant, Vilson Da Silva, as the claims were distinct and could not be brought in the existing lien action due to the Construction Lien Act.

However, claims against Leblon Carpentry were dismissed for lack of factual basis, and claims against Leblon Drywall were dismissed (without prejudice) as they were duplicative of an existing counterclaim in the lien action and contrary to the purpose of the Construction Lien Act.

To ensure judicial economy and avoid multiplicity of actions, the court ordered the transfer of a related Barrie action to Brampton and directed that all three interconnected actions be tried together or sequentially.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's proceeding for an oppression remedy and fraudulent conveyance, the respondents sought substantial indemnity costs based on an offer to settle and unproven allegations of fraud.

The court found that Rule 49.10 did not entitle the respondents to substantial indemnity costs and that the allegations of fraudulent conveyance did not carry the moral opprobrium required for an elevated costs award.

The court also rejected the applicant's request for equitable set-off.

Costs were awarded to the respondents on a partial indemnity basis fixed at $18,550.

The applicant, the largest creditor of a bankrupt sports medicine clinic, brought an application under s. 38 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the oppression remedy provisions of the Business Corporations Act.

The applicant alleged that the individual respondents flipped the bankrupt's assets and goodwill to a new corporation without paying fair market value, constituting a fraudulent conveyance or transfer at undervalue.

The court dismissed the application, finding no evidence that any assets with realizable value were conveyed to the new corporation prior to bankruptcy, nor any evidence of the business's going concern value.

The plaintiff advanced two loans to the corporate defendant for construction projects.

The first loan was secured by a collateral mortgage on the personal defendants' residence.

The plaintiff alleged the second loan was also secured by the same mortgage via an oral agreement, and sought summary judgment for outstanding amounts including a profit-sharing agreement.

The defendants argued the second advance was an unsecured joint venture investment and brought a motion to discharge the mortgage upon paying the remaining interest on the first loan into court.

The court dismissed both motions, finding that significant credibility issues regarding the nature of the second advance and the alleged oral agreement required a full trial.

Following an order enforcing the plaintiff's mortgage against the proceeds of sale of a mortgaged property, the plaintiff sought costs of $33,342.15 on a substantial indemnity basis as provided in the mortgage.

The defendants argued the plaintiff was not entitled to costs for a prior motion to set aside a default judgment that was settled and deemed abandoned.

The court held that under Rule 37.09(3), the plaintiff was entitled to costs of the abandoned motion.

The court found the claimed costs were proportionate and reasonable, awarding the full amount sought.