Sopinka

The police stopped a car for speeding and, after the driver could not produce documentation, conducted a computer check.

While waiting, the officer questioned the passenger and noticed garbage bags full of new clothing with price tags in the back seat and trunk.

The driver and passenger were charged with possession of stolen property.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the passenger had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle or the bags.

Although the search violated the driver's section 8 Charter rights, the evidence was admitted under section 24(2) because the breach was minimal, the evidence was reliable, and its exclusion would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellants faced citizenship revocation proceedings for allegedly concealing their involvement in WWII atrocities.

Due to delays in the Federal Court Trial Division, a senior Department of Justice official met privately with the Chief Justice of the Federal Court to express concern.

The Chief Justice then spoke to the Associate Chief Justice handling the cases, who subsequently expedited the schedule.

The appellants successfully moved for a stay of proceedings on the basis that this ex parte communication compromised judicial independence.

The Federal Court of Appeal set aside the stay.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appellants' appeal, holding that while the appearance of judicial independence was significantly compromised, a stay of proceedings was not the appropriate remedy.

The Court directed that the cases proceed before a different judge, balancing the affront to judicial independence against society's pressing interest in seeing alleged war criminals brought to justice.

The appellants sought an extension of time and a re-hearing on the issue of costs following an appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada granted the applications and awarded costs of the appeal, the application to extend time, and the re-hearing to the respondent.

The appellant appealed the rejection of his citizenship application.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, quashed the Registrar's decision, and directed that the application be dealt with in accordance with its reasons for judgment.

The Court declared certain words in section 5(2)(b) of the Citizenship Act inoperative and ordered that several other sections of the Act and Regulations be read without reference to section 5(2)(b).

The accused, a stockbroker, was convicted of fraud after a jury trial.

The trial judge instructed the jury that 'proof beyond a reasonable doubt' should be understood in its 'ordinary, natural every day sense'.

The Court of Appeal set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial, finding the jury charge insufficient.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that trial judges must explain the concept of reasonable doubt to juries.

The Court provided a model charge, emphasizing that reasonable doubt is inextricably linked to the presumption of innocence, is not an ordinary everyday concept, and must be based on reason and common sense rather than sympathy or prejudice.

The trial judge's failure to properly define the standard of proof was a fundamental error that could not be saved by the curative proviso.

The appeal concerned the constitutional validity of federal toxic-substances provisions and an interim order limiting PCB releases after a prosecution for alleged discharge into a river.

The majority held that environmental protection through prohibitions against toxic substances is a legitimate criminal law purpose and that Part II of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act created a valid scheme targeting toxic substances through prohibitions backed by penal sanctions.

The dissent concluded that the scheme was fundamentally regulatory rather than prohibitory and could not be sustained under either the criminal law power or the national concern branch of peace, order and good government.

The appeal was allowed and the matter was remitted to the summary conviction court.

The accused, a senator, was charged with accepting a benefit in consideration for exercising influence in connection with government business, contrary to s. 121(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge acquitted the accused, finding that the Crown failed to prove a 'corrupt' state of mind.

The Court of Appeal upheld the acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that s. 121(1)(a) does not require a 'corrupt' state of mind.

The Crown need only prove that the accused intentionally committed the prohibited act with knowledge of the relevant circumstances.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault after having intercourse with his intoxicated second cousin.

At trial, the accused claimed actual consent, while the complainant testified she was too drunk to remember but would not have consented.

The trial judge did not instruct the jury on the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, finding the defence had an 'air of reality'.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the combined evidence of the accused's belief in consent, the complainant's lack of memory, and the absence of violence provided sufficient plausible evidence to give the defence an air of reality, obligating the trial judge to put it to the jury even though it was not raised by defence counsel.

The appellant assisted an undercover police officer in purchasing cocaine by locating a seller, negotiating the price, and passing the money and drugs between the parties.

He was acquitted of trafficking at trial, but the Court of Appeal entered a conviction.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the issue was whether a person who assists a purchaser of narcotics can be convicted of trafficking as a party under s. 21(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Court held that while a mere purchaser cannot be convicted of trafficking, a person who acts as an agent for the purchaser or assists the purchaser in buying drugs aids and abets the seller by facilitating the transaction.

The appeal was dismissed and the conviction upheld.

The appellant municipality sought dismissal of a bodily injury action on the basis that the respondent failed to comply with the 15-day notice requirement in municipal legislation after a sidewalk fall.

The appeal turned on whether art. 2930 of the Civil Code of Québec, which preserves the three-year prescriptive period for bodily injury claims notwithstanding contrary provisions, applies to municipalities and overrides s. 585 of the Cities and Towns Act.

The Court held that art. 2930 is a mandatory provision of public order, applies to legal persons established in the public interest, and takes precedence over the municipal notice regime insofar as that regime hinders bodily injury claims.

The Court also held that the Minister of Justice’s commentaries may assist with interpretation but are not binding.

The Crown applied for a rehearing on the issue of whether there should be a transition period for the operation of the Court's prior judgment requiring a warrant to effect an arrest in a dwelling.

The Supreme Court of Canada granted the application and stayed the operation of that aspect of the judgment for six months from May 22, 1997, with national effect, though it did not apply to the disposition of the present case.

The appellants appealed a decision regarding the issuance of search warrants under the Competition Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, adopting the reasons of the Federal Court of Appeal which held that the Act does not provide for an appeal from the issuance of search warrants.

The appellant was charged with sexual assault.

During the investigation, a police officer made a tape recording of an initial interview with the complainant but subsequently lost it.

The trial judge entered a stay of proceedings due to the Crown's failure to disclose the tape.

The Court of Appeal set aside the stay and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that where the Crown loses evidence, it must provide a satisfactory explanation.

If the explanation satisfies the court that the evidence was not destroyed or lost due to unacceptable negligence, the disclosure obligation is discharged, provided there is no abuse of process or actual prejudice to the accused's right to make full answer and defence.

The appellant arrested the respondent's cargo following a breach of contract dispute.

The arrest was later set aside, and the respondent counterclaimed for damages for wrongful arrest, including loss of interest on security and loss of working capital.

The Federal Court of Appeal awarded damages for both.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal in part, upholding the award for loss of interest as a valid exercise of discretion over costs, but overturning the damages for loss of working capital because damages for wrongful arrest require a finding of bad faith or gross negligence, which was absent.

The appellant Indian band surrendered a portion of its reserve to the Federal Crown in 1966 for full market value to be used as a municipal airport, with a stipulation that the land would revert to the band if it ceased to be used for public purposes.

Following 1988 amendments to the Indian Act that brought lands surrendered 'otherwise than absolutely' into the definition of 'reserve' for taxation purposes, the band levied property taxes on the respondent municipality.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that despite the sui generis nature of native land rights, the true intention of the parties was an absolute surrender for sale.

The Court concluded that the lands were not 'designated lands' under the Indian Act and thus not subject to the band's property tax jurisdiction.

The United States requested the extradition of the respondent, a Canadian citizen, on charges of attempting to launder money and conspiracy to launder money following a failed FBI sting operation.

The respondent argued his conduct would not constitute an offence in Canada because the money was not actually the proceeds of crime, making the offence impossible.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the respondent's conduct would amount to a criminal attempt and a criminal conspiracy under Canadian law, as factual impossibility is not a defence to these inchoate offences.

The Court also dismissed the respondent's cross-appeal regarding disclosure, finding that the limited disclosure provided was adequate for an extradition hearing.

The plaintiff sued her physician for the costs of raising her daughter, who was born with congenital injuries caused by maternal chickenpox.

The plaintiff alleged that had the physician properly advised her of the risks, she would have terminated the pregnancy.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding that the plaintiff would not have aborted the pregnancy even if fully informed.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, holding the trial judge applied the wrong test for causation.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the trial judge's decision, affirming the modified objective test for causation in medical malpractice cases.

The appellant airlines purchased liquor abroad and stored it in customs bonded warehouses in Ontario for use on domestic and international flights.

The provincial liquor authorities charged markups and gallonage fees on the liquor.

The airlines sought restitution of the fees and a declaration that the provincial liquor monopoly was constitutionally inapplicable to their federal aeronautical undertaking.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the liquor was subject to the federal Importation of Intoxicating Liquors Act and that the provincial monopoly applied, as providing liquor is not an integral part of an aeronautical undertaking.

However, the Court ordered the provincial authorities to make full restitution of the gallonage fees wrongfully collected under an inapplicable licensing regime.

The appellant, Hickman Motors Ltd., acquired depreciable property from its subsidiary upon the subsidiary's winding-up.

The appellant held the assets for five days, during which they produced leasing revenue, before transferring them to a newly incorporated subsidiary.

The Minister of National Revenue disallowed the appellant's claim for capital cost allowance (CCA) on the basis that the assets were not acquired for the purpose of producing income.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the assets produced revenue and were therefore acquired for the purpose of producing income.

The Court distinguished the 'purpose of producing income' test for CCA from the 'reasonable expectation of profit' test, finding that the appellant satisfied the requirements of s. 20(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act and the relevant regulations.

The appellant filed an access to information request for copies of weekend sign-in logs for employees of the Department of Finance.

The Minister disclosed the logs but deleted the employees' names, identification numbers, and signatures, claiming they constituted personal information.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the names prima facie constituted personal information, they fell within the exception in s. 3(j) of the Privacy Act because the number of hours spent at the workplace relates to the position or functions of the individual.

The Court ordered the disclosure of the requested information.