Pierre Sauvé

The appellant appealed a stay of proceedings order rendered by the Quebec Court of Appeal proprio motu, which set aside his conviction for armed robbery but deprived him of an acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding that the evidence could not allow a reasonable jury properly instructed to find the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The stay of proceedings was set aside and an acquittal was entered.

The applicant sought reconsideration of an order refusing leave to appeal after a provincial court of appeal set aside his conviction on fresh evidence but entered a stay of proceedings for abuse of process rather than an acquittal or new trial.

The majority held that, in exceptional circumstances, the Court may reconsider a leave refusal under Rule 7 despite Rule 51(12).

It further held that a stay order made under s. 686(8) of the Criminal Code is ancillary and divisible from the judgment setting aside the conviction, and is therefore appealable by leave under s. 40(1) of the Supreme Court Act notwithstanding s. 40(3).

Leave to appeal was granted.

The appellants were charged with conspiracy to commit murder.

At their first trial, the judge refused to order the disclosure of a police informer's identity.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial and directed the Crown to disclose the informer's evidence, name, and whereabouts, and to make him available.

Before the second trial, the Crown produced a hooded man claiming to be the informer but refused to disclose his name or whereabouts.

The trial judge entered a stay of proceedings due to non-disclosure and unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal quashed the stay and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the stay but holding that the Crown had breached the binding disclosure order.

The Court directed that the trial proceed, giving the Crown the option to either fully comply with the disclosure order or apply to vary it based on new evidence regarding the informer's safety.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury on the application of reasonable doubt to the issue of credibility, particularly where the Crown's case hinged on an accomplice's testimony and the accused denied participation.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, adopting the dissenting reasons of Fish J.A. at the Quebec Court of Appeal.

L'Heureux-Dubé J. dissented, finding no error in the jury charge.

The accused was charged with major narcotics offences while awaiting trial for another indictable offence.

He was denied bail initially but released on review.

The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, challenging the constitutionality of the bail provisions.

The Court held that the 'public safety' component of s. 515(10)(b) and the reverse onus provisions in ss. 515(6)(a) and (d) are constitutionally valid.

However, the Court struck down the 'public interest' component of s. 515(10)(b) as unconstitutionally vague, violating the right not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause under s. 11(e) of the Charter.

The appellant appealed his conviction for conspiracy.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal.

The Court found that while the trial judge's charge to the jury regarding the evidence of conspiracy was erroneous, it did not cause prejudice to the appellant because the essential evidence was direct and given by a co-conspirator.

The jury was adequately instructed on the weaknesses of that testimony, and the verdict would have been the same regardless of the error.