Shawn Porter

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the police officer failed to comply with the immediacy requirement for a breath demand under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the evidence clearly showed the officer formed a reasonable suspicion and made the demand immediately.

The appellant appealed from a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision upholding his conviction for criminal harassment.

He argued that the trial judge's refusal to grant adjournments to allow him to retain counsel resulted in a miscarriage of justice, and that the trial judge failed to adequately assist him as a self-represented accused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant had ample opportunity to retain counsel during a four-month adjournment and that the refusal of further adjournments was justified to prevent extending the complainant's ordeal.

The court also found no error in the sentence imposed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for manslaughter and sexual interference, as well as his 12-year net sentence and increased parole ineligibility.

The convictions arose from the death of a 13-year-old girl who overdosed on drugs supplied by the appellant at his home, where he also sexually assaulted her while she was comatose.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the appellant's actions in supplying and encouraging the use of lethal drugs substantially contributed to the death, and that his conduct constituted criminal negligence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court upholding the 15-year sentence for manslaughter and the order for increased parole ineligibility due to the egregious circumstances and the appellant's diagnosis of psychopathy.

The appellant appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that set aside her acquittal.

The appellant argued her s. 10(b) Charter rights were breached because she misunderstood her right to contact her own lawyer rather than duty counsel at the roadside.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that an unexpressed desire to speak to one's own lawyer, which is not conveyed to the investigating officer, cannot result in a s. 10(b) breach.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for certiorari to quash his committal for trial on a charge of first-degree murder.

The appellant conceded there was evidence for second-degree murder but argued there was insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was some evidence, including animus, threats, and luring the victim to an ambush, capable of supporting the inference of planning and deliberation.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for certiorari to quash his committal on a charge of first-degree murder.

He conceded there was evidence for second-degree murder but argued there was insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was some circumstantial evidence—including animus, threats, preparation, luring to an ambush, and obtaining a gun—capable of supporting the preliminary justice's conclusion that the murder was planned and deliberate.

The appellant appealed her conviction and sentence for theft involving a breach of trust while employed by a trustee-in-bankruptcy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the circumstantial evidence supported the trial judge's finding of culpability and that the W. (D.) framework was properly applied.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, setting aside the six-month custodial sentence and substituting a six-month conditional sentence, noting the appellant was a first offender, the primary caregiver for two disabled children, and that the employer had made the affected clients whole.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and his sentence of life imprisonment with 16 years of parole ineligibility.

He argued that his statements to police, which led to the discovery of his wife's cremated remains and forensic evidence in his home, were obtained in violation of his Charter rights under s. 10(b) and s. 7.

He also challenged the trial judge's use of his after-the-fact conduct to infer murderous intent and the assessment of expert bloodstain evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no Charter breaches and no errors in the trial judge's reasoning.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, and the parole ineligibility period was reduced to 13 years to accord with the parity principle for domestic murders.

The appellant sought to vary the remaining 3.5 months of his conditional sentence to allow him to leave house arrest two days a week for business purposes.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence and allowed the appeal, varying the sentence to permit the appellant to leave his residence on Mondays and Thursdays in the company of his spouse to examine job sites.

The appellant was convicted of multiple offences, including possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, following a traffic stop.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge failed to give adequate reasons, improperly rejected allegations of racial profiling, and erred in evidentiary rulings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons adequate and no evidence of racial profiling.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the two-year sentence to two years less 20 days to preserve the appellant's right to appeal his deportation under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The appellant pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm and assault with a weapon against her child and was sentenced to nine months in prison and three years' probation.

The trial judge declined to impose a conditional sentence, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence.

On appeal, the appellant introduced fresh evidence demonstrating significant progress in family reunification and support from the Children's Aid Society for a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, set aside the custodial sentence, and substituted a nine-month conditional sentence to be served in the community, finding it appropriate in the changed circumstances.

The appellant appealed convictions for indecent assault arising from a jury trial on multiple sexual offence counts involving family members.

The appeal turned on whether the trial judge properly admitted similar fact evidence from an additional witness and whether the evidence on each count was admissible across all other counts.

Applying the post-trial framework in the Supreme Court authorities on similar fact evidence, the court held that the issue had been defined too broadly as credibility and that the alleged acts lacked the necessary persuasive degree of connection across all counts.

The prejudicial effect of the impugned evidence outweighed its probative value on several counts.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual touching, and indecent assault involving multiple complainants.

He argued the trial judge provided insufficient reasons, reversed the burden of proof, and erred in admitting similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for all counts except count 14, finding the trial judge's reasons were sufficient and the burden of proof was not reversed.

However, the court found the trial judge erred in admitting similar fact evidence for count 14 due to a lack of persuasive similarity, and entered an acquittal on that count.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that grounds existed.

The Court further noted that even if grounds were lacking, the evidence obtained from the search would be admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant's sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed a conviction entered by a Justice of the Peace, which was previously dismissed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in law, necessitating a new trial.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial but expressed hope that the Crown would not proceed given the nature of the charge and the evidence.

The appellant was convicted of multiple offences, including possession of stolen property and break and enter, based solely on his thumbprint found on a pop can inside a stolen vehicle two weeks after its theft.

The trial judge relied on the doctrine of recent possession to convict.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the prerequisites for the doctrine were not met, as there was no evidence the appellant possessed the stolen goods or when the pop can was placed in the vehicle.

The convictions for the property offences were quashed and acquittals substituted.

The sentence for a breach of undertaking conviction was reduced to time served.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge, alleging no error in principle but arguing the sentence was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found that given the many aggravating factors, the sentence was not manifestly unreasonable.

Fresh evidence provided no basis to interfere.

Leave to appeal was granted but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

On consent, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and varied the sentence to time served.

The appellant, a general contractor, was convicted of six counts of fraud relating to home renovation contracts and sentenced to nine months' imprisonment and restitution.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in admitting evidence from each count as similar fact evidence on the other counts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the temporal connection and interconnectedness of the events made the evidence highly probative of fraudulent intent.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, and a 12-month conditional sentence was substituted, as the court found the trial judge erred in characterizing the commercial relationship as a breach of trust and overemphasizing general deterrence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual exploitation, gang sexual assault, and forcible confinement.

He argued the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding DNA evidence, in refusing to declare a mistrial after the Crown mentioned the complainant's virginity, and that the Crown's closing address was inflammatory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion, noting the relevance of the virginity evidence to the aggravated sexual assault charge, and concluding the Crown's closing address was not inflammatory.