Scott Turton

The defendant appealed a master's order granting leave to amend a statement of claim to include relief for recognition and enforcement of a Russian arbitration award under the International Commercial Arbitration Act.

The appellant argued the amendment introduced a new cause of action after the limitation period and relied on a prior decision setting aside default judgment.

The court held that the master's decision correctly found the amendments merely particularized an existing claim referencing the arbitration award and did not introduce a new cause of action.

The prior decision setting aside default judgment was limited to procedural deficiencies in the pleadings and did not extinguish the underlying claim.

The appeal was dismissed and the master's order upheld.

The plaintiff contractor sued a corporation and its director for breach of contract arising from unpaid plumbing and drainage services.

The parties had orally settled the debt by reducing the amount owed and arranging repayment through a loan amortization schedule, but no written settlement agreement or personal guarantee was executed.

The plaintiff alleged the director personally guaranteed repayment of the corporate debt.

The court found the evidence did not establish that the director promised a personal guarantee.

In any event, any such oral guarantee would be unenforceable under s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds because it was not in writing and signed.

The corporate plaintiff was ordered to pay $15,000 into court as security for costs.

The sole officer and director paid the amount with his own personal funds.

The defendant later obtained judgment against the plaintiff on its counterclaim and sought an order under the Creditors' Relief Act that the money paid into court be paid out to it as an execution creditor.

The motion judge granted the order.

On appeal, the Divisional Court set aside the order, finding that the funds were impressed with a Quistclose trust in favour of the director who advanced them for a specific purpose.

The funds never belonged to the execution debtor and were not available for distribution to its creditors.

The respondents moved to quash the appeal on the basis that the appellant sought to appeal an interlocutory order.

The order below dismissed the appellant's summary judgment motion without making any binding determinations of law under Rule 20.04(4).

The Court of Appeal held that the order was not final and quashed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order granting the respondent $60,526.99 for unpaid work.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the respondent adduced evidence supporting the outstanding amount and the appellants failed to raise a triable issue.

The Court also upheld the judgment against the various corporate entities controlled by the individual appellant, clarifying the specific amounts recoverable against each entity.

The appellant physician sued the respondent newspapers for breach of confidence and conversion after they published photographs taken during a cosmetic surgery.

In the civil proceeding, the respondents sought production of documents relating to disciplinary proceedings before the College of Nurses and the College of Physicians and Surgeons.

The motions judge ordered the documents included in the appellant's Affidavit of Documents.

On appeal, the Divisional Court set aside the order, holding that section 36(3) of the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991 prohibits the use of College documents in civil proceedings, meaning they are not required to be disclosed in an Affidavit of Documents.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding the respondents were entitled to a final payment under a Customer Agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that the building was 'complete and ready for occupancy' within the required 24-month period.

The Court rejected the appellant's argument that an occupancy permit was required, noting the Building Code Act does not mandate one as a condition of occupancy and the unilaterally imposed agreement terms did not explicitly require it.

The appeal regarding prejudgment interest and costs was also dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment regarding a 1995 trust agreement and a purported 1998 property transfer.

The appellants argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the mother's capacity to transfer the property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's findings of fact, which were supported by powerful evidence from a solicitor and a doctor.

Appeal from a judgment requiring a homeowner to pay outstanding lumber invoices used in the construction of his residence after dismissal of a construction lien claim.

The appellant argued the evidence did not prove the lumber was ordered or delivered, and further argued he was merely an undisclosed principal not liable for unauthorized acts of his project manager and related entities.

The court deferred to the trial judge's factual findings on delivery and ordering, and held the appellant was liable for earlier invoices within the agents' actual authority and for later invoices through ratification once the agency relationship had become disclosed though the principal remained unnamed.

The appeal was dismissed.