Ontario Court of Justice Provincial Offences Act matters - SCJ

The applicants, facing charges under the Conservation Authorities Act, brought an application for certiorari and prohibition after the trial justice recused himself due to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Halton Region Conservation Authority brought a motion to strike the application.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the motion to strike, finding that there was no decision left to quash via certiorari following the recusal, and that an order of prohibition was unwarranted as issues of standing and jurisdiction should be dealt with by the trial court.

The applicant sought an order of mandamus compelling a justice of the peace to proceed with the respondent's trial for a speeding infraction.

The justice of the peace had previously ruled that the court lost jurisdiction over the respondent because administrative adjournments during the COVID-19 pandemic were not properly recorded on the offence notice.

The Superior Court found that the justice of the peace erred, as the respondent had attorned to the court's jurisdiction by appearing via a representative, and the administrative adjournments complied with COVID-19 directives.

The application for mandamus was granted.

The applicant, charged with offences under the Taxation Act, 2007, sought an order prohibiting the Ontario Court of Justice from proceeding with his trial pending his appeal of a dismissed certiorari application.

The applicant argued that his notice of appeal automatically stayed the trial proceedings and suspended the lower court's jurisdiction.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that an appeal does not automatically stay proceedings and that the lower court retained jurisdiction to consider the Crown's joinder application.

The respondent was charged with speeding.

A justice of the peace ordered the prosecutor to disclose the entire user manual for the speed measuring radar device used by the police officer.

The Ontario Provincial Police brought an application for certiorari to quash the disclosure order, arguing a third party records hearing was required.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding that while the justice of the peace erred by not making a specific finding that the manual was first party disclosure, there was no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice because the entire manual (except for one section on legal requirements) was obviously relevant and constituted first party disclosure.

The applicant municipality brought an unopposed application for certiorari and mandamus to set aside a guilty plea accepted by a Justice of the Peace.

The respondent had originally pleaded not guilty to a careless driving charge, and a trial commenced before a different Justice of the Peace.

The court held that the second Justice of the Peace exceeded her jurisdiction by accepting a guilty plea during a trial over which she was not presiding, contrary to sections 30 and 46 of the Provincial Offences Act.

The application was granted, the guilty plea was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the original Justice of the Peace to continue the trial.

The applicant, charged with driving with a hand-held communication device, sought a stay of proceedings and an order for certiorari to compel the disclosure of the charging officer's disciplinary records.

A Justice of the Peace had previously denied the disclosure request.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding that certiorari is rarely available for pre-trial rulings and the refusal did not constitute a jurisdictional error.

Furthermore, the court held that the disciplinary records were not obviously relevant to the charge and should be sought through an O'Connor application rather than as first-party disclosure.

The Crown brought a certiorari application to quash a Justice of the Peace's order that quashed an information charging the respondent with speeding.

The information contained an obvious typographical error regarding the year of the offence.

The Justice of the Peace quashed the information on his own motion at the first appearance, without allowing the Crown to make submissions or considering the mandatory amendment provisions under the Provincial Offences Act.

The Superior Court held that the Justice of the Peace exceeded his jurisdiction by failing to observe natural justice and mandatory statutory provisions.

The court granted the certiorari application, extended the time for service, and issued mandamus remitting the matter back to the Provincial Offences Court.

The Crown brought a motion to quash a Notice of Appeal and Judicial Review Application commenced by the defendant's wife in her personal capacity.

The defendant was on trial for offences under the Conservation Authorities Act.

The wife, acting as his agent, had unsuccessfully sought standing as a party to the litigation and a mistrial based on reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court granted the motion to quash, finding no statutory jurisdiction for an interlocutory appeal under the Provincial Offences Act, and that the wife had no standing to bring an appeal in her personal capacity.

The request for judicial review was also quashed as the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction without a request for urgency.

The Crown brought an application before the Superior Court of Justice to quash subpoenas issued by the defendant for three witnesses in an ongoing Provincial Offences Act trial.

The court confirmed that a Justice of the Peace lacks jurisdiction to quash a subpoena, which must be done via certiorari in the Superior Court, though a trial justice may excuse a witness whose evidence is irrelevant.

Applying the test of whether the witnesses were likely to give material evidence, the court quashed the subpoenas for the conservation authority's head and solicitor, finding their proposed evidence irrelevant or a fishing expedition.

The court declined to quash the subpoena for the hydrology expert who had already testified, leaving it to the trial justice to manage his recall and document production.

The self-represented applicant's motion under the Provincial Offences Act was dismissed.

The respondents sought costs on a substantial indemnity scale, arguing the applicant's conduct was vexatious and caused unnecessary delay.

The applicant argued that under s. 142(5) of the Provincial Offences Act, no costs should be awarded.

The court held that it retains broad discretion under the Courts of Justice Act to award costs to discourage frivolous and meritless litigation.

The court awarded costs to the respondents on a partial indemnity basis, fixing them at $4,500 for the municipality and $10,000 for the conservation authority.

The appellant, Wal-Mart Canada Corporation, appealed its conviction under the Occupational Health and Safety Act for failing to keep a floor free of hazards or obstructions.

An employee tripped over an empty skid in an aisle while moving merchandise backwards with a manual skid jack, fell, and hit his head.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's finding that the empty skid constituted a hazard or obstruction under section 11 of Regulation 851.

The court also upheld the finding that the appellant failed to establish the defence of due diligence on a balance of probabilities, noting the absence of safety sweep logs for the backroom area.

The appeal was dismissed.

The self-represented applicant brought a motion seeking certiorari, mandamus, and Charter relief to overturn a Justice of the Peace's interlocutory decision refusing to dismiss charges under the Conservation Authorities Act and the Building Code Act.

The applicant argued the charges for building an unauthorized deck were statute-barred and constituted double jeopardy because he was previously acquitted of charges relating to a solar panel array on the same property.

The Superior Court dismissed the motion, finding the deck construction was a separate incident, the Green Energy Act did not provide an exemption, and there was no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice to justify prerogative relief mid-proceeding.

The self-represented plaintiffs in a malicious prosecution action brought a motion to dismiss or stay a related Provincial Offences Act property standards prosecution, alleging it was an abuse of process and a SLAPP proceeding.

They also sought permanent restraining orders against the municipal defendants.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the request for a stay was res judicata as it had been previously dismissed by another judge.

The request for permanent restraining orders was also dismissed because such relief requires a full adjudication of rights and was not pleaded in the statement of claim.

The respondent was charged with careless driving.

During a court appearance where the respondent intended to plead guilty to an amended charge, the justice of the peace noticed the informant's name was missing from the information and quashed it on her own motion.

The Crown applied for certiorari and mandamus.

The Superior Court found the justice of the peace committed jurisdictional errors by raising the motion herself, failing to consider whether an amendment would prejudice the respondent, and refusing to allow extrinsic evidence to cure the defect.

The application was allowed, the order quashing the information was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Provincial Offences Court.

The applicants, who were charged under the Conservation Authorities Act, brought an application for certiorari to quash a justice of the peace's decision that their charges were not statute-barred.

The applicants requested an adjournment of their certiorari application, which was granted.

The respondent brought a motion under section 141(2.1) of the Provincial Offences Act for an order that the trial continue despite the pending certiorari application.

The court granted the respondent's motion, finding that it is generally inappropriate to interrupt ongoing proceedings with judicial review applications and that continuing the trial was in the interests of justice.

The applicant sought orders in the nature of mandamus directing a justice of the peace to render a sentencing decision within a reasonable time and to accept proposed guilty pleas in several Provincial Offences Act matters.

The justice of the peace had accepted a guilty plea in one matter but reserved sentencing for approximately nine and a half months, and reserved for nearly a year whether to accept guilty pleas in four other matters despite joint submissions between the prosecution and defence.

The court held that the delay in sentencing risked infringing the accused’s right under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to be sentenced within a reasonable time.

It further found that the refusal to accept the proposed guilty pleas lacked a legal basis and did not reflect a proper judicial exercise of discretion.

Orders of mandamus were issued directing the justice of the peace to deliver the sentencing decision and to accept the proposed guilty pleas and enter convictions.

The applicant municipality sought judicial review after a justice of the peace quashed a certificate of offence for a Highway Traffic Act charge on the court’s own motion during an early resolution proceeding.

The issue was whether the justice of the peace committed a jurisdictional error by quashing the certificate without a motion from the defendant.

The court held that under s. 36 of the Provincial Offences Act, objections to defects on the face of a certificate must be raised by the defendant through a motion to quash, and that the justice of the peace had no authority to initiate such a motion where the defendant was present.

The decision to quash the certificate was therefore a clear error of law and contrary to established precedent.

Orders of certiorari and mandamus were granted, restoring the proceeding and directing that a new early resolution meeting be scheduled.

The appellant appealed municipal enforcement actions arising from construction of a structure without a building permit, including an order to comply and a subsequent stop work order issued under the Building Code Act.

The initial order to comply and related prosecution were withdrawn, but a later stop work order and new charges under municipal bylaws, the Planning Act, and the Provincial Offences Act remained.

The appellant sought broader relief including injunctions preventing further enforcement actions and a stay or transfer of provincial offences proceedings.

The court treated the matter as an appeal of the stop work order and rescinded that order due to procedural irregularities leading to its issuance.

However, the court declined to grant injunctions or interfere with ongoing provincial offences prosecutions, holding that those proceedings were the proper forum to determine whether the structure had been unlawfully erected.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed in the Ontario Court of Justice after pleading guilty to stunt driving under the Highway Traffic Act.

The parties had made a joint submission proposing a $2,000 fine and probation without a driving suspension.

The sentencing judge rejected the joint submission and instead imposed the fine together with a 12‑month driving suspension, concluding the proposed sentence was manifestly inadequate given the admitted conduct of driving approximately 190 km/h and weaving through traffic.

On appeal, the court held that the sentencing judge properly recognized the high threshold for rejecting joint submissions and provided counsel an opportunity to make further submissions.

The court found no error of law and declined to interfere with the sentence.

The prosecuting municipality sought certiorari and mandamus under s.140 of the Provincial Offences Act to set aside a justice of the peace’s order quashing a certificate of offence for speeding under s.128 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The justice had ruled that the certificate disclosed no offence because the word “speeding” was not used in the offence description.

The Superior Court held that the certificate sufficiently described the offence by referencing the statutory provision and factual particulars, satisfying s.25 of the Provincial Offences Act.

Alternatively, even if deficient, the justice was required to permit amendment under s.34 absent prejudice.

The justice erred in quashing the certificate on her own initiative and misapprehended the amendment power under the Act.