Ontario Court of Justice Provincial Offences Act matters - SCJ

The defendant was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing death, dangerous driving causing death, and operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100 mL causing death.

The charges arose from a fatal collision on Major Mackenzie Drive in Markham, Ontario on September 14, 2022, in which the defendant's vehicle crossed the centre line and struck an oncoming vehicle driven by an off-duty police officer, resulting in the officer's death.

The court found the defendant guilty on all counts.

The court rejected the defence argument that falling asleep at the wheel provides an absolute defence to dangerous driving, finding instead that the defendant's decision to drive while tired and under the influence of alcohol constituted a marked departure from the standard of care.

The court also found that the defendant's ability to drive was impaired by alcohol to any degree, satisfying the test for impaired driving.

The blood-alcohol analysis showing 80 mg/100 mL was admitted under the presumption of accuracy.

Following conviction on two counts of dangerous driving causing death and two counts of impaired driving/over 80 causing death arising from a motor vehicle collision that killed two young women, the court imposed a global sentence of six years custody on the impaired driving counts and five years custody on the dangerous driving counts, all running concurrently.

The court rejected both the Crown's submission for 7-8 years and the defence submission for 4 years, balancing denunciation and deterrence against the offender's youth, lack of criminal record, and strong rehabilitative prospects.

The court also imposed a 12-year driving prohibition and a non-communication order.

The court rejected the defence argument that the impaired driving counts should be stayed under the Kienapple principle, finding that impaired driving and dangerous driving address different aspects of road safety.

The applicant, a café and lounge, was charged with 14 counts alleging breaches of the Durham Region Smoke and Vape By-Law across six separate informations covering a three-year period.

The municipal prosecutor brought a joinder application to have all charges heard together in one trial.

The Justice of the Peace granted the joinder application, relying on a factum filed by the prosecutor without requiring affidavit evidence.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash the joinder order, arguing that the decision constituted a denial of natural justice because the JP relied on unsworn submissions.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding that the JP had jurisdiction to order joinder and that no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice had occurred.

The accused pleaded guilty to impaired driving causing death contrary to section 320(14)(3) of the Criminal Code.

On February 24, 2023, the accused drove his vehicle while impaired with his six-year-old daughter as a passenger for approximately 3.5 hours, ultimately colliding with another vehicle and killing the driver.

The accused's blood alcohol concentration was more than twice the legal limit.

The court imposed a sentence of six years less 99 days imprisonment, considering aggravating factors including the extended period of impaired driving, extremely high blood alcohol levels, and the presence of the accused's young daughter in the vehicle, balanced against mitigating factors including the guilty plea, genuine remorse, and significant rehabilitative efforts undertaken while on bail.

The Ontario Securities Commission appealed the acquittal of Stephan Katmarian on four counts of securities violations related to the promotion of Peblik Inc., a cryptocurrency token purportedly backed by the Thierry Mine.

The trial judge acquitted Katmarian on all counts.

On appeal, the Superior Court allowed the appeal on Count 1 (fraud), finding the trial judge erred in law regarding the element of deprivation by requiring proof of detrimental reliance rather than risk of deprivation.

The Court dismissed the appeals on Counts 2 (misleading statements to the Commission), 3 (unregistered trading in securities), and 4 (distribution without prospectus).

The Court entered a conviction on Count 1 and remanded for sentencing.

The defendant, Shawn Norris, was charged with dangerous driving causing bodily harm and death, and impaired driving causing bodily harm and death, following a head-on collision.

The court found the defendant's driving objectively dangerous and a marked departure from a reasonable standard of care, considering his erratic driving over several kilometers, including crossing a median and swerving into oncoming traffic.

Despite arguments of tire deflation or a sudden physical event, the court found no evidentiary support for these.

The court also found the defendant's ability to drive was impaired by a combination of voluntarily consumed drugs (methadone, lorazepam, trazadone, venlafaxine), noting he "double dosed" on methadone and took unprescribed Lorazepam, and was aware of the drugs' potential impairing effects.

The court concluded that the only reasonable inference for the driving was drug impairment and that the mens rea presumption was not rebutted.

Derek Summers appealed his criminal conviction for driving while disqualified, arguing that it should be stayed under the Kienapple principle due to a prior conviction for driving while suspended under the Highway Traffic Act arising from the same incident.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the two offences had sufficient legal disparities in elements, mens rea, penalties, and gravamen to preclude the application of the Kienapple principle, thereby upholding Parliament's intent to deter criminal driving behaviour.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent, Dhanbir Shergill, on a charge of careless driving under the Highway Traffic Act, following a fatal collision involving a TTC bus he was driving.

The trial judge had dismissed the charge, relying on an inapplicable legal principle and misapprehending critical evidence regarding pedestrian right-of-way and the bus's movement.

The Superior Court found that the trial judge erred in relying on the Globocki principle and in failing to consider key evidence from witnesses and accident reconstruction.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered, as the appellate court deemed it inappropriate to enter a conviction without a proper assessment of evidence by a trier of fact.

The defendant, Rakesh Patel, was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing death after hitting a seven-year-old girl on her bicycle in a crosswalk.

The court found that Patel drove through a red light due to substantial inattentiveness and distraction, which constituted a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable prudent driver.

Despite arguments that his actions were a momentary lapse due to stress, the court concluded that his prolonged inattention over 9-10 seconds, covering a significant distance, merited criminal fault.

Patel was found guilty of dangerous driving causing death.

The applicants sought an order in the nature of certiorari to challenge a justice of the peace's ruling that a charge under the Conservation Authorities Act was not statute-barred.

The applicants argued that the two-year limitation period commenced earlier than determined by the justice, rendering the charge out of time.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding that the justice's ruling was made within jurisdiction and was not so obviously wrong as to warrant intervention during the ongoing trial.

The court emphasized that certiorari should be granted rarely in such circumstances, especially when an appeal is available post-trial, and that the policy considerations favour a non-interventionist approach to avoid fragmenting proceedings.

The respondent, Orrell Higgins, was charged with dangerous driving causing bodily harm, criminal negligence causing bodily harm, and impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm following a collision where his vehicle accelerated into a transport truck without braking, seriously injuring his passenger.

The court examined the objective standard for dangerous driving (marked departure) and the more stringent standard for criminal negligence (marked and substantial departure, wanton disregard).

While acknowledging the objectively dangerous driving and inattention, the court found that the Crown did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct constituted a "marked departure" or "wanton disregard" required for criminal liability.

Regarding impaired driving, despite a projected blood alcohol concentration (BAC) range of 63-94 mg/100ml, the court had reasonable doubt about actual impairment due to individual variability in alcohol effects.

Consequently, the respondent was found not guilty of all charges.

The accused, Bradley Sippel, was charged with criminal negligence causing death, dangerous driving causing death, and two counts each of criminal negligence causing bodily harm and dangerous driving causing bodily harm, following a collision that killed one cyclist and injured two others.

The Crown alleged excessive speed and failure to safely pass the cyclists.

The defence claimed a sudden loss of awareness or blackout.

The court rejected the accused's explanations, finding his testimony evasive and fabricated.

The court concluded that the accused's pattern of excessive speeding, failure to slow down in a school zone, and deliberate decision to maintain speed and delay evasive action constituted a marked and substantial departure from the standard of care, demonstrating a wanton and reckless disregard for public safety.

Sippel was found guilty on all counts.

The applicant, City of Thunder Bay, sought an order for certiorari to quash a Justice of the Peace's decision to set aside four certificates of offence issued to the respondents for Highway Traffic Act violations.

The Justice of the Peace had quashed the certificates, deeming them "too vague" or "not specific" regarding the location of the alleged offences.

The Superior Court found that the certificates were complete and regular on their face, as the location was sufficiently identified by highway number and district, and the accused were served at the roadside, thus having knowledge of the location.

The court also noted that the prosecution could have sought amendments at trial and that there was no application to quash the charges.

The application for certiorari was granted, and the Justice of the Peace's orders were set aside.

The defendant, Kyle Hazelton, was charged with criminal negligence causing death, dangerous driving causing death, and failing to stop at the scene of an accident, all stemming from an incident on July 18, 2013, that resulted in the death of Scott Shannon.

The Crown alleged that Hazelton intentionally or negligently accelerated his truck while Shannon was holding onto the driver's side, causing his death, and then failed to stop.

The defence argued that the Crown's inferences were speculative and that the key witness's evidence was unreliable.

The court found the Crown's evidence insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly regarding the reliability of witness observations, the nature of the acceleration, and Hazelton's knowledge of the accident.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges under the Environmental Protection Act for operating a waste disposal site without a Certificate of Approval and disposing of waste contrary to their Waste Management System Approval.

The core issue was whether the respondent's approval for "collection, handling and transportation" implicitly included storage.

The court found that storage was not authorized and that the trial judge erred in her interpretation of the approval and the application of due diligence.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a stay of proceedings was ordered, as further proceedings were deemed not in the interests of justice.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Deputy Registrar of Motor Vehicles suspending his driver’s licence under the Highway Traffic Act after he failed to complete required remedial driving lessons and a reassessment following concerns about his driving record and attention-related issues.

The court first granted leave under s. 6(2) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act due to urgency, finding that the suspension threatened the applicant’s livelihood as a self‑employed tow truck driver and delay before the Divisional Court could cause a failure of justice.

On the merits, the court held that the statutory scheme permitted the Deputy Registrar to require remedial lessons and a further driving assessment.

Applying a reasonableness standard of review, the court found the suspension justified given the applicant’s extensive accident history, the occupational therapist’s recommendations, and his withdrawal from the remedial program.

Technical defects in the Notice of Suspension, including reference to a repealed subsection, did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The applicants sought certiorari to quash a provincial offences information alleging contraventions of s. 122(1)(c) of the Securities Act, arguing that the Ontario Court of Justice exceeded jurisdiction when it refused to quash a second information sworn without obtaining new prosecutorial consent.

The court held that the impugned ruling concerned the validity of the information and therefore fell within matters for which certiorari relief is barred where an appeal route exists under s. 141(3) of the Provincial Offences Act.

In any event, the court found the justice properly determined that the second information merely split an existing count to reflect statutory amendments and introduced no new offences.

The original consent to prosecute therefore remained valid.

The certiorari application was dismissed.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings and an order requiring state-funded counsel under ss. 7 and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms following denial of Legal Aid funding, commonly known as a Rowbotham application.

The accused faced charges under the Highway Traffic Act for willfully failing to stop for police, which carried a possible minimum custodial sentence.

Although the Crown conceded that the accused had exhausted Legal Aid appeals and was indigent, it argued that counsel was not essential to ensure a fair trial.

The court held that the charges were regulatory in nature, the trial would be brief with discrete issues, and the accused demonstrated an ability to understand and participate in proceedings.

The court concluded that representation by counsel was not essential to a fair trial and dismissed the application.

The appellant elevator maintenance contractor appealed convictions under the Technical Standards and Safety Act, 2000 and Ontario Regulation 209/01 arising from an elevator failure that injured several individuals.

The trial judge convicted the appellant on several strict liability offences relating to inspection failures, unsafe operation of an elevating device, and failure to maintain proper log books, and imposed substantial fines.

On appeal under the Provincial Offences Act, the appellant argued jurisdictional error due to a lost original Information, misinterpretation of regulatory obligations, improper application of the Kienapple principle, and an excessive sentence.

The Superior Court held that reliance on a duplicate Information did not deprive the court of jurisdiction, that the evidence supported the convictions, and that the trial judge properly rejected the due diligence defence.

The court also found no error in the refusal to stay certain counts or in the quantum of the fines.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed after pleading guilty to truancy under s. 30(5) of the Education Act.

The sentencing court had suspended sentence and imposed a period of probation.

The appellant sought to have the sentence set aside and requested an absolute discharge due to concerns that the conviction record could negatively affect future opportunities.

The Superior Court found that the matter had been commenced under the Provincial Offences Act and should have been tried in Provincial Offences Court rather than Youth Criminal Justice Court.

The court set aside both the conviction and sentence and directed that the matter be sent to Provincial Offences Court.