CITATION: R. v. Tenny, 2015 ONSC 1471
COURT FILE NO.: CV-14-6022
DATE: 2015/03/26
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF ONTARIO
Respondent
- and -
ALFRED M. TENNY
Applicant
COUNSEL:
Sylvia Davis, for the Respondent
Gatlin Smeijers, for the Applicant
HEARD: February 25, 2015
REASONS FOR DECISION
ellies j.
[1] Alfred Tenny applies under s. 140 of the Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33 ("POA") for an order prohibiting the Provincial Offences Court from continuing a proceeding against him under the Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.19 ("EPA").
[2] Mr. Tenny lives in the United States of America. The central issue in this application is whether s. 26(3) of the POA authorizes the service of a summons there by registered mail.
[3] For the following reasons, I conclude that it does. By necessary implication, s. 26(3) authorizes service anywhere outside of Ontario, including the United States of America. This interpretation of s. 26(3) accords with the context, the object and the scheme of the statute in which the section is found. It also clearly reflects the intention of the legislature, in my view.
BACKGROUND
[4] The facts in this matter are straightforward.
[5] Mr. Tenny is the sole officer and president of 1449817 Ontario Inc., a company incorporated in the province of Ontario. The company is the registered owner of a property located in the District of Timiskaming, upon which a waste processing and waste generator business was located. The business ceased operating in or around 2007.
[6] In 2008, Mr. Tenny and the company were charged with failing to comply with a provincial officer's order to clean up chemical waste materials which had remained on the property after the business stopped operating. Both Mr. Tenny and the company were convicted of those offences in 2012. The court that sentenced them ordered that they remove and dispose of all waste materials on the property by June 30, 2013. According to the Crown, they failed to do so. As a result, on April 22, 2014, both Mr. Tenny and the company were charged under s. 186(2) of the EPA with failing to comply with the court order. These are the proceedings underlying the issue in this application.
[7] In order to compel Mr. Tenny's attendance on the present charges, a summons was issued under s. 24 of the POA. The summons was sent to Mr. Tenny by registered mail addressed to his last known addresses in the United States, pursuant to s. 26(3) of the POA. Subsequently, Mr. Tenny and the Crown agreed that Mr. Tenny could bring this application without attorning to the jurisdiction of the court.
ISSUES
[8] Two principle arguments are made on behalf of Mr. Tenny, namely:
(1) that section 26(3) of the POA does not expressly authorize service on an individual outside of Ontario, as it must; and
(2) that, in the alternative, if s. 26(3) expressly authorizes service outside of Ontario, it does not expressly authorize service outside of Canada.
ANALYSIS
I. Whether Section 26(3) of the POA Authorizes Service Outside of Ontario
[9] The first three subsections of s. 26 of the POA read:
- (1) A summons issued under section 22 or 24 shall,
(a) be directed to the defendant;
(b) set out briefly the offence in respect of which the defendant is charged; and
(c) require the defendant to attend court at a time and place stated therein and to attend thereafter as required by the court in order to be dealt with according to law.
(2) A summons shall be served by a provincial offences officer by delivering it personally to the person to whom it is directed or if that person cannot conveniently be found, by leaving it for the person at the person's last known or usual place of abode with an inmate thereof who appears to be at least sixteen years of age.
(3) Despite subsection (2), where the person to whom a summons is directed does not reside in Ontario, the summons shall be deemed to have been duly served seven days after it has been sent by registered mail to the person's last known or usual place of abode.
[10] There are two parts to counsel's submission that s. 26(3) does not authorize service of a summons anywhere outside of Ontario:
(1) that section 26(3) must expressly authorize service outside of Ontario as legislation involving the imposition of penal sanctions; and
(2) that section 26(3) refers only to the temporal elements of service outside of the province, and not to the manner in which such service is to be effected.
[11] I propose to break these arguments down a little further for the purpose of my analysis.
A) Express v. Implied Statutory Authority
[12] The Crown and Mr. Tenny agree that the proceedings against Mr. Tenny under the EPA are penal in nature. They both submit that "express" statutory authority is required to authorize service of a summons on a person[^1] outside of Canada with respect to such proceedings. The Crown argues, however, that s. 26(3) provides the necessary express authority. As I will explain below, I agree that s. 26(3) provides authority for service outside of Ontario. However, if, by using the word "express", the parties mean that service ex juris cannot be authorized implicitly, then I disagree.
[13] It is well established that statutory authority is required for the service of a summons outside of Canada in connection with penal proceedings taking place within Canada. This was the ruling in Re Shulman and The Queen (1975), 1975 CanLII 1397 (BC CA), 23 C.C.C. (2d) 242 (B.C.C.A.), in which Robertson J.A. wrote, at p. 247:
... in penal proceedings ... a summons cannot properly be served on a person outside Canada without such service being authorized by a statute, and that in the absence of proper service the court has no jurisdiction over the person, even though it may have jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the complaint.
[14] It will be seen from the excerpt set out above that the court in Shulman made no reference to service of a summons outside of Canada being "expressly" authorized by a statute, but only to such service being "authorized" by a statute. The word "express" crept into our jurisprudence when the ratio in Shulman was transplanted into Ontario.
[15] In R. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (Delaware), 2007 ONCA 749, 230 C.C.C. (3d) 72, the issue was whether s. 26(4) of the POA, as it was written at the time, authorized service ex juris on a corporation outside of Ontario via registered mail. The Crown in Reynolds argued that the principle in Shulman was no longer good law. In the course of rejecting the Crown's argument, the Court of Appeal referred to that portion of the decision in Shulman that I have set out above and continued, at para. 6:
Given our conclusion that the proposition set out in Re Shulman is still good law, the remaining issue is whether s. 701.1 of the Criminal Code, when read together with s. 26 of the POA, creates the necessary express statutory authorization for service outside of Canada. In our opinion, it does not. In our view, on a proper reading of ss. 701.1 and 703.1 of the Criminal Code it is clear that the only authority provided in the Criminal Code for service of a summons is authority to serve the summons within Canada. Section 26(4) of the POA provides an additional means of service but it does not in any way expand on the express provisions of the Criminal Code relating to where a summons may be served. [Emphasis added.] [Footnote omitted.]
[16] And so it came to be that the word "express" found its way into our jurisprudence about service ex juris in proceedings of a penal nature. I do not believe, however, that by using that word in Reynolds, the Court of Appeal intended in any way to add to or to modify the principle articulated in Shulman. There is no discussion by the Court of Appeal in Reynolds about extending the ratio in Shulman to require express, as opposed to implicit, statutory authority. In fact, in Shulman, the court searched for both express and implied authority for service of the summons in question outside of Canada. At p. 247 of the decision in Shulman, Robertson J.A. wrote on behalf of the court:
This brings me to the question whether the service in Sydney of the summons here was authorized by the Code. There is in the Code no provision that expressly authorizes service of a summons ex juris. I cannot find in it one that does so by implication.
[17] For these reasons, it is my view that, by using the word "expressly", the Ontario Court of Appeal in Reynolds meant to convey that the statute authorizing service ex juris must do so clearly and unambiguously, but not necessarily expressly.
B) Strict Construction of Penal Statutes
[18] As I mentioned, the parties agree that the underlying proceedings are penal in nature: see R. v. Wigglesworth, 1987 CanLII 41 (SCC), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 541, at pp. 560-561. I also agree. However, as I will explain, the nature of the underlying proceedings does not preclude the court from finding that service outside of Ontario may be provided for in s. 26(3) by necessary implication.
[19] I do not need to cite authority for the well-established principle that penal statutes must ordinarily be interpreted strictly and, where there is any uncertainty or ambiguity in the legislation, it must be interpreted in favour of the accused. However, the principle of strict interpretation may be relaxed in favour of a more liberal interpretation in at least two situations, both of which obtain here, namely:
(1) where the statutory provision in question relates to a procedural issue, as opposed to creating a substantive offence; and
(2) where the statute in question relates to regulatory, as opposed to purely criminal, proceedings.
Procedural v. Substantive Statutory Provisions
[20] There is a distinction made in the jurisprudence between statutory provisions purporting to create an offence by proscribing certain conduct and those pertaining to purely procedural aspects of penal proceedings. As Dickson J. wrote in Marcotte v. Canada (Deputy A.G.), 1974 CanLII 1 (SCC), [1976] 1 S.C.R. 108, at p. 115, with respect to the former:
If one is to be incarcerated, one should at least know that some Act of Parliament requires it in express terms, and not, at most, but implication.
[21] Courts have been willing to apply a more liberal construction, however, to procedural aspects of penal legislation. For example, in CanadianOxy Chemicals Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), 1999 CanLII 680 (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 743, the Supreme Court of Canada was called upon to determine whether the provisions of s. 487(1) of the Criminal Code, which permitted a search warrant to be issued to search for "evidence with respect to the commission of an offence", also permitted a warrant to be issued to search for evidence of a possible defence. In holding that it did, the Supreme Court rejected the submission that the provision should be given a restrictive meaning. Major J. found, at para. 18, that s. 487(1) of the Criminal Code was not the type of penal provision to which the rule of strict construction should apply.
[22] In this case, we are not dealing with a section that purports to create an offence, for example, with the section of the EPA under which Mr. Tenny has been charged. We are, instead, dealing with a purely procedural provision. Mr. Tenny's liberty is at stake only to the extent that the substantive charge is made out, not because he is compelled to answer to the charge by some method other than personal service.
Regulatory v. Purely Criminal Proceedings
[23] The rule of strict construction is also not applied with the same vigour to regulatory statutes as it is to purely criminal statutes. As Ruth Sullivan writes in Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 6th ed. (Markham: LexisNexis, 2014), at §15.24:
Penal legislation is legislation that creates offences punishable by fine, imprisonment or forfeiture of a right or privilege. This includes all offences found in the Criminal Code. Whether it includes regulatory offences is more doubtful. In Merk v. Local 771, [2005 SCC 70](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2005/2005scc70/2005scc70.html), [2005] 3 S.C.R. 425, at para. [33], responding to the argument that the provision to be interpreted should receive a strict construction, Binnie J. wrote:
In my view, with respect, this approach is of limited value when interpreting a regulatory statute such as The Labour Standards Act. If it is concluded in all the relevant circumstances that the legislature intended a broad approach, that is the approach that will be adopted.
[24] As Sullivan also points out, at §15.20, all Canadian jurisdictions have enacted legislation similar to that contained in s. 64(1) of the Legislation Act, 2006, S.O 2006, c. 21, Sch. F, which reads:
- (1) An Act shall be interpreted as being remedial and shall be given such fair, large and liberal interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects.
[25] Sullivan writes, in the same paragraph:
In the clearest possible language, this statutory directive abolishes the distinction between strict and liberal construction and requires all legislation, penal legislation included, to be interpreted in a purposeful manner, regardless of the impact on private rights or freedom.
[26] The decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal in R. v. Atchison, 2006 ABCA 258, 274 D.L.R. (4th) 188, cited in Sullivan at §12.22, provides a good example of the more purposive approach courts take to the interpretation of regulatory statutes. The appellant in Atchison had been charged with failing to yield to a pedestrian in a crosswalk, contrary to s. 41 of a regulation made under Alberta's Traffic Safety Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. T-6 ("TSA"). The complainant was crossing the street on his skateboard when he was struck by the appellant's vehicle. The issue in the case was whether the definition of "pedestrian" provided in the TSA included a person on a skateboard. Section 1(1) of the TSA contained the following definitions:
(gg) "pedestrian" means
(i) a person on foot, or
(ii) a person on or in a mobility aid;
(v) "mobility aid" means a device used to facilitate the transport, in a normal seated orientation, of a person with a physical disability...
[27] Looking only at the plain meaning of the definition of pedestrian or mobility aid, a person on a skateboard was not a pedestrian. Nonetheless, by examining the scheme and object of the legislation in question, the Alberta Court of Appeal held that a pedestrian under the TSA included a person on a skateboard, even though this was not specified in the legislation: see para. 9.
[28] The Court in Atchison was dealing with a regulatory provision that helped to define an offence; the type of provision that normally attracts a strict construction. The provision at issue in the case at bar is not only of a regulatory nature, but is also procedural, rather than substantive, in nature.
C) The Modern Principle of Statutory Interpretation
[29] The Alberta Court of Appeal arrived at its conclusion in Atchison by applying what has come to be known as the "modern principle" of statutory interpretation: see para. 8. This principle was first described by Elmer A. Driedger in his seminal text, The Construction of Statutes (Toronto: Butterworths, 1974), at p. 67, and has been repeated many times since in the case law:
Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context, in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.
[30] The modern principle of statutory interpretation was adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, another case in which the court looked beyond the plain meaning of the text of a statute in order discern its true meaning.
[31] In Rizzo, the issue was whether employees terminated by virtue of their employer's bankruptcy were entitled to the same termination and severance pay under the Employment Standards Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 137 ("ESA"), to which employees were entitled where their employment was terminated by their solvent employer. The Supreme Court disagreed with the ruling of the Ontario Court of Appeal that the language of the ESA limited such payments to situations in which the employment relationship was terminated by the employer, not by an act of law. Writing on behalf of the Court, Iacobucci J. held, at para. 23, that the Court of Appeal had relied too much on the plain meaning of the words of the provisions in question and, in so doing, had failed to "pay sufficient attention to the scheme of the ESA, its object or the intention of the legislature; nor was the context of the words in issue appropriately recognized." Thus, by applying the modern principle of statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court concluded that employees whose employment was terminated by virtue of the bankruptcy of their employer were entitled to the same termination and severance payments as that to which other employees were entitled, even where the text of the legislation might indicate otherwise.
[32] In my view, looking only at the text of s. 26(3), it is clear that the section fails to state expressly that service of a summons may be made by registered mail. To state that proposition expressly, the section would have to read along these lines:
Despite subsection (2), where the person to whom a summons is directed does not reside in Ontario, the summons may be served by registered mail and, where served in that manner, the summons shall be deemed....
[33] The section does not read this way. However, the modern principle of statutory interpretation requires a court to look beyond the text of a provision and to examine the context and the purpose of the legislation. As Sullivan writes, at §12.23:
Legislative silence with respect to a matter does not necessarily amount to a gap in the legislative scheme. Sometimes a matter that has not been dealt with expressly can be dealt with by necessary implication.
[34] I believe that to be the case here. As the Crown submits, the object and scheme of the POA is to establish a speedy, efficient and convenient method of dealing with offences under provincial legislation: see R. v. Jamieson (1981), 1981 CanLII 3223 (ON CA), 64 C.C.C. (2d) 550 (Ont. C.A.), at pp. 551-552. A provision providing for service upon an individual via mail furthers this object and fits within the legislative scheme by avoiding the extraordinary expense of personal service in connection with a provincial offence upon an individual who may reside thousands of kilometres outside of Ontario. By requiring that the mail be registered, such a provision strikes a proper balance between saving money and ensuring that the summons comes to the attention of the individual defendant in the same way that personal service does under s. 26(2).
D) Temporal v. Geographical Application
[35] I turn now to the second part of counsel's argument that s. 26(3) does not authorize service anywhere outside of Ontario. On behalf of Mr. Tenny, counsel submits that s. 26(3) refers only to the temporal aspect of service ex juris, and not the geographical or territorial aspects of such service. He relies on the reasons of my colleague, Gans J., in the decision from which the appeal was taken to the Court of Appeal in Reynolds.
[36] In R. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (Delaware) (2004), 2004 CanLII 16871 (ON SC), 182 C.C.C. (3d) 126 (Ont. S.C.), the accused corporations were charged with fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud under the Criminal Code. Summonses were sent by mail to each of the applicants at the addresses set out in their corporate filings. In doing so, the police officer who sent the summonses relied upon s. 701.1 of the Criminal Code, which provides that service of a summons may be made in accordance with provincial offences laws, and s. 26(4) of the POA, which read as follows at the time:
(4) Service of summons on a corporation may be effected by delivering the summons personally,
(a) in the case of a municipal corporation, to the mayor, warden, reeve or other chief officer of the corporation or to the clerk of the corporation; or
(b) in the case of any other corporation, to the manager, secretary or other executive officer of the corporation or the person apparently in charge of a branch thereof,
or by mailing the summons by registered mail to the corporation at an address held out by the corporation to be its address, in which case the summons shall be deemed to have been duly served seven days after the day of mailing.
[37] Gans J. allowed the Crown's application and quashed a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice in which it was held that service of the summonses in question was lawful. Gans J. held that s. 701.1 of the Criminal Code was not intended to permit service of a summons on a corporation domiciled outside of Canada: see para. 48. With respect to the provisions of the POA, he wrote, at para. 57:
The deemed service provision found in s. 26(4)(b) of the POA, or in 26(3) for that matter, is not meant to do anything more than create a rebuttable presumption in favour of the mailing authority... The section speaks only to the temporal element of service, i.e. when it shall be deemed to have been effected, and not to the place where service is accomplished. Support for this conclusion can be found in the provincial legislation of those provinces that specifically differentiate between methods of service inside and outside the province. [Footnotes omitted.]
[38] Counsel for Mr. Tenny concedes that the reference to s. 26(3) by Gans J. is obiter. That subsection was not in issue in Reynolds. However, counsel argues that the rationale in Reynolds should be persuasive. He contends that the wording of s. 26(4) as it read at the time Reynolds was decided was even stronger than the wording of present s. 26(3). Former s. 26(4) used the words "[s]ervice... may be effected", which he submits is more explicit than the "deemed to have been duly served" language used in s. 26(3) and yet, Gans J. and the Court of Appeal held in Reynolds that s. 26(4) failed to satisfy the principle in Shulman.
[39] I disagree. In my view, the reason former s. 26(4) failed as authority for service ex juris was because it lacked language that the current version of s. 26(3) contains. In particular, there was no reference whatsoever in former s. 26(4) to the territorial or geographical area to which the section purported to apply. The only reference to anything of that nature was simply to the address of the corporation, without providing any indication of the legislature's intentions as to whether that area was to include any area outside of Ontario.
[40] That is not true with respect to s. 26(3). Section 26(3) refers specifically to service of a summons on a person who does not reside in Ontario. To my way of thinking, that fact is sufficient to distinguish this case from the decision in Reynolds.
[41] This fact is also sufficient to distinguish the other case relied upon by counsel for Mr. Tenny, namely Caterpillar Financial Services Corp. v. Boale, Wood & Company Ltd. (sub nom. Worldspan Marine Inc., Re) 2014 BCCA 419, 66 B.C.L.R. (5th) 94. In Worldspan, the British Columbia Court of Appeal held that the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("CCAA"), did not apply outside of Canada. As counsel concedes, the Court in Worldspan compared the CCAA to the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, and noted that the latter specifically referred to "any kind of property, whether situated in Canada or elsewhere", whereas the former was silent on the issue: see para. 25. As I have pointed out, s. 26(3) does contain a reference to the geographic area to which it purports to apply.
Conclusion on This Issue
[42] In my opinion, s. 26(3) implicitly, and clearly, provides authority for service of a summons on an individual who resides outside of Ontario. The section would be superfluous if it did not. I have been taken to no other provision in the POA or any other legislation that would authorize service via registered mail. Unless the authority to serve a summons in this way is contained in s. 26(3), there would be no point to deeming service to have occurred a fixed number of days after the summons was sent. By necessary implication, therefore, s. 26(3) is the authorizing provision for service ex juris.
II. Whether s. 26(3) of the POA Authorizes Service Outside of Canada
[43] Counsel for Mr. Tenny argues, in the alternative, that s. 26(3) does not authorize service outside of Canada. He advances two bases for this argument:
(1) Crown sovereignty; and
(2) the difference in wording between s. 26(3) and s. 26(4).
A) Crown Sovereignty
[44] First, counsel submits that, even if s. 26(3) provides for service outside of Ontario, it is not the same as providing for service outside of Canada. He submits that the Crown has jurisdiction and sovereignty only over the other provinces and territories within Canada.
[45] Again, I am unable to agree. I have been provided with no authority for the proposition that the legislature of Ontario has any more jurisdiction or sovereignty in, for example, Manitoba, than it does in the United States.
B) Differences Between Sections 26(3) and 26(4)
[46] Secondly, counsel for Mr. Tenny relies on a comparison of the wording in s. 26(3) with the wording in present s. 26(4), which deals with service upon a corporation. Section 26(4) was amended following the Court of Appeal's decision in Reynolds. It now reads:
(4) Service of a summons on a corporation may be effected,
(a) in the case of a municipal corporation by,
(i) delivering the summons personally to the mayor, warden, reeve or other chief officer of the corporation or to the clerk of the corporation, or
(ii) mailing the summons by registered mail to the municipal corporation at an address held out by it to be its address;
(b) in the case of any corporation, other than a municipal corporation, incorporated or continued by or under an Act by,
(i) delivering the summons personally to the manager, secretary or other executive officer of the corporation or person apparently in charge of a branch office of the corporation, or
(ii) mailing the summons by registered mail to the corporation at an address held out by it to be its address;
(c) in the case of corporation not incorporated or continued by or under an Act by,
(i) a method provided under clause (b),
(ii) delivering the summons personally to the corporation's resident agent or agent for service or to any other representative of the corporation in Ontario, or
(iii) mailing the summons by registered mail to a person referred to in subclause (ii) or to an address outside Ontario, including outside Canada, held out by the corporation to be its address.
[47] Counsel relies on the principle of statutory interpretation known as the "different word, different meaning" rule. He argues that in using the words "outside Ontario, including outside Canada" in s. 26(4)(c)(iii), the legislature must have intended to mean something different than it meant by using only the words "outside Ontario" in s. 26(3).
[48] The different word, different meaning rule, sometimes expressed as the "same word, same meaning" rule, results from the presumption against the tautological use of words in legislation. Every word in a statute is presumed to make sense and to have a specific function; if at all possible, courts should avoid an interpretation that renders any portion of a provision meaningless, pointless or redundant: see Sullivan, at §8.23.
[49] However, the presumption against tautology is easily rebutted: see Sullivan, at §8.28. Sullivan writes the following at §8.29:
The presumption can also be rebutted by suggesting reasons why in the circumstances the legislature may have wished to be redundant or to include superfluous words.
[50] In this case, I agree with the submission made on behalf of the Crown that the legislature included the words "including outside Canada" in s. 26(4) as a result of the Court of Appeal's decision in Reynolds. It will be recalled that Reynolds was decided in 2007. Section 26(4) was amended in 2009 through Bill 212, An Act to promote good government by amending or repealing certain Acts and by enacting two new Acts, 1st Sess., 39th Leg., Ontario, 2009 (assented to 15 December 2009), S.O 2009, c. 33.
[51] In my view, Crown counsel is correct in her submission that the words in question were added out of an abundance of caution on the part of the legislature in order to ensure that its intention to authorize service anywhere outside of Ontario was clear. No similar amendment to s. 26(3) was necessary, in my view, for two reasons.
[52] First, the decision in Reynolds affected only s. 26(4), not s. 26(3). As I have mentioned, the comments of Gans J. regarding s. 26(3) were strictly obiter.
[53] Secondly, by adding the words "including outside Canada" in s. 26(4), the legislature made even clearer the object and scheme of the POA, in general, and of s. 26, in particular. That section is intended to provide for service of a summons on individuals and corporations charged with a provincial offence in Ontario in the most efficient, inexpensive manner that will, at the same time, ensure as much as possible that the summons comes to the attention of the accused. Interpreting the words of s. 26(3) as meaning anywhere outside of Ontario fits within the scheme and object of the POA.
Conclusion on This Issue
[54] For these reasons, I conclude that s. 26(3) of the POA authorizes service of a summons via registered mail upon an individual who resides anywhere outside of Ontario, including outside of Canada.
CONCLUSION
[55] Section 26(3) of the POA provides the statutory authorization necessary to effect service of a summons via registered mail on an individual who resides outside of Canada.
[56] Therefore, the summons in this case was properly served upon Mr. Tenny.
[57] The application is dismissed.
Ellies J.
Released: March 26, 2015
CITATION: R. v. Tenny, 2015 ONSC 1471
COURT FILE NO.: CV-14-6022
DATE: 2015/03/26
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN THE RIGHT OF ONTARIO
Respondent
– and –
ALFRED M. TENNY
Applicant
REASONS FOR DECISION
Ellies J.
Released: March 26, 2015
[^1]: I use the term "person" as it is defined in the Legislation Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 21, Sch. F, s. 87, which includes corporations and the term "individual" as meaning "a natural person", such as Mr. Tenny.