CITATION: R. v. Curle, 2015 ONSC 1999
COURT FILE NO.: CR-15-0019-AP
DATE: 2015-03-27
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
Her Majesty The Queen
Célia Jutras, for the Crown
- and -
Allan Curle,
The Applicant being self-represented
Applicant
HEARD: March 25, 2015, at Thunder Bay, Ontario
Mr. Justice F. Bruce Fitzpatrick
Reasons On Application for Relief in the Nature of Certiorari
[1] Allan James Curle brings an application seeking an order in the nature of certiorari, setting aside the decision of Justice of the Peace Bernard Caron made on January 16, 2015 and for other declaratory relief.
[2] The Crown opposes the application arguing the Superior Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction to entertain this application.
[3] The proceedings for which Mr. Curle seeks an order in the nature of certiorari and other relief were commenced by information under Part III of the Provincial Offences Act (the “POA”). Mr. Curle was convicted of driving while suspended contrary to s. 53(1) of the Highway Traffic Act and for obstructing a conservation officer contrary to s. 96(b) of the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act.
[4] The Crown relies on subsection 141 and in particular subsection 141(3) of the POA which provides:
Certiorari
- (1) A notice under section 140 in respect of an application for relief in the nature of certiorari shall be given at least seven days and not more than ten days before the date fixed for the hearing of the application and the notice shall be served within thirty days after the occurrence of the act sought to be quashed. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33, s. 141 (1).
Filing material
(2) Where a notice referred to in subsection (1) is served on the person making the decision, order or warrant or holding the proceeding giving rise to the application, such person shall forthwith file with the Superior Court of Justice for use on the application, all material concerning the subject-matter of the application. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33, s. 141 (2); 2000, c. 26, Sched. A, s. 13 (5).
Motion to continue proceeding
(2.1) Where a notice referred to in subsection (1) is served in respect of an application, a person who is entitled to notice of the application under subsection 140 (2) may make a motion to the Superior Court of Justice for an order that a trial in the proceeding giving rise to the application may continue despite the application and the Court may make the order if it is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to do so. 2000, c. 26, Sched. A, s. 13 (3).
Where appeal available
(3) No application shall be made to quash a conviction, order or ruling from which an appeal is provided by this Act, whether subject to leave or otherwise. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33, s. 141 (3).
[5] Mr. Curle argues that s. 141 of the POA does not apply to him and a statutory right of appeal of his convictions are only available to a “man or a woman consenting to act in the capacity of, or otherwise enter into an association with, a class of person or entity created by statute and subject to the statutes allegedly engaged in this matter”. Mr. Curle argues as “he is a man not wishing to act in such a capacity and risk being deemed by state actors to have implicitly waived my dominion and duties under God and those fundamental rights and freedoms state actors are to recognize as being available to a man acting in no statutory capacity or association, no right of appeal is available to me”
[6] Mr. Curle is mistaken about how the law applies to him. His arguments mirror those used by persons identified by other courts in this province and elsewhere as “Organized Pseudo-legal Commercial Argument” (OPCA) litigants. I do not believe it necessary to make a finding that Mr. Curle is an OPCA litigant as urged by the Crown in order to dismiss out of hand the persuasive value of Mr. Curle’s position.
[7] Recently the issue of OPCA litigants, was reviewed in the decision of my sister Justice Rady in O’Brien v. Murchland [2013] O.J. No. 3293. Justice Rady was faced with a litigant relying on arguments like those advanced by Mr. Curle before me today. Justice Rady eloquently and accurately describes at paragraph 14 of the decision the kinds of arguments made by litigants such as this as “attempting to create a dual persona or aspect by identifying a distinction between himself as a human being as opposed to a legal person”. In my view, Mr. Curle is attempting to persuade me that he is just such a person such that he can self-determine what laws of the land apply to him and which do not. This argument lacks merit, is spurious and has been rejected by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Klundert, 2008 ONCA 767, 93 O.R. (3d) 81; leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada refused, [2008] S.C.C.A. No. 522, 260 O.A.C. 398.
[8] Mr. Curle did have a statutory right of appeal of the decisions that relate to him under the POA. Whether or not this right of appeal is still now available to him because of time issues as the result of his decision to commence this meritless application is another matter, and one I am not deciding today. I accept the argument of the Crown that s. 141(3) of the POA applies to this application and this application is dismissed
__________”original signed by”
The Hon. Mr. Justice F. Bruce Fitzpatrick
Released: March 27, 2015
CITATION: R. v. Curle, 2015 ONSC 1999
COURT FILE NO.: CR-15-0019-AP
DATE: 2015-03-27
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
Her Majesty The Queen
- and –
Allan Curle,
Applicant
REASONS ON APPLICATION
Fitzpatrick J.
Released: March 27, 2015
/mls