SCJ 2015

The accused was charged with second degree murder after fatally stabbing his father.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted that the accused was not criminally responsible due to mental disorder under s. 16 of the Criminal Code.

Psychiatric evidence established that the accused suffered from a psychotic disorder with hallucinations and persecutory delusions causing him to believe his father was possessed by the devil and turning into a serpent.

The court accepted the expert opinion that the accused was incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of his acts or knowing they were morally wrong at the time of the offence.

The presumption of criminal responsibility was rebutted on a balance of probabilities.

The accused was charged with multiple aggravated assaults involving a hammer.

Police officers recognized the accused from a police broadcast containing video and still photos of a suspect.

The officers detained the accused for investigative purposes and, after confirming his identity against the broadcast photos, arrested him.

The accused challenged the legality of the arrest, arguing the officers lacked reasonable and probable grounds.

The court found the officers had both subjective and objective grounds to arrest the accused, acting in good faith based on the broadcast and their observations.

The arrest was ruled lawful.

On a motion to change a separation agreement, the applicant sought amendments to provisions governing child support and post-secondary education expenses for children over the age of 18 pursuing education.

The court found no binding agreement had been reached at a prior case conference regarding the proposed amendments.

The court amended the agreement to require child support while a child over 18 attends post-secondary education on a full-time basis and imposed an age limit of 25 for such support where the child resides with a parent.

The court also replaced the existing post-secondary expense clause with a detailed budgeting and contribution framework requiring the child to contribute between one-third and two-thirds of expenses, with the remainder shared proportionally between the parents.

Given the mixed success of the parties, no costs were ordered.

Following a six‑day trial in which the plaintiffs successfully recovered unpaid legal fees and defeated a counterclaim alleging solicitor’s negligence, the court determined the issue of costs.

The plaintiffs had obtained judgment for $90,454.81 and dismissal of the defendant’s counterclaim seeking over $428,000.

The court considered the discretionary framework under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, Rules 49 and 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and the effect of a prior Rule 49 offer to settle for $60,000.

Finding the plaintiffs were entirely successful and that their settlement offer was more favourable than the ultimate result, the court awarded partial indemnity costs to the date of the offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

Costs were fixed in all‑inclusive amounts for both the main action and the counterclaim.

The appellant mother appealed a custody and access order granting her custody of the parties’ two children and providing the father with access.

The father argued the trial judge erred in concluding that an earlier ex parte order granting him temporary custody was obtained through incomplete disclosure and that the resulting status quo should not influence the best interests analysis under s. 24 of the Children’s Law Reform Act.

The appeal also alleged a reasonable apprehension of bias based on the trial judge’s questioning of witnesses.

The court held the trial judge was entitled to find that material facts were not fully disclosed on the ex parte motion and that the resulting temporary custody arrangement constituted an unlawful status quo.

No reasonable apprehension of bias was established and the custody determination based on the children’s best interests was entitled to deference.

The responding party brought a motion to set aside the registration in Ontario of a Pennsylvania child support order under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act.

The moving party argued he was not ordinarily resident in Ontario and that registration was contrary to public policy because the order was being enforced elsewhere and he was not in arrears.

The court reviewed the legal test for ordinary residence from leading authorities and considered the moving party’s routine of spending approximately three months each year in Ontario while maintaining property, licences, and other ties to the province.

The court held that a person may be ordinarily resident in more than one jurisdiction and found that the established pattern of returning annually to Ontario constituted ordinary residence.

None of the statutory grounds for setting aside the registration were established.

The applicant, a police officer charged with trafficking oxycodone, applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a breach of his s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay from the date of the charges to the hearing of the application was approximately 45 months.

The court applied the Morin framework and found that the majority of the delay was attributable to the applicant's actions, including changing counsel multiple times, and waiver by defence counsel.

The court concluded that the remaining institutional and Crown delay fell within acceptable guidelines and dismissed the application.

The applicant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration that a 1994 cohabitation agreement was not valid in determining financial and support issues arising from the parties' final separation in 2012.

The parties had separated for more than 90 days in 1995, triggering the agreement's disposition provisions, but later reconciled, married, and cohabited until 2012.

The court held that the agreement was discharged by the triggering event in 1995 and, because it was not reinstated or amended in writing upon reconciliation, it had no application to the 2012 separation.

The applicant's motion was granted and the respondent's cross-motion to enforce the agreement was dismissed.

A custody and access dispute concerning a child with developmental delays was tried following a period during which the father retained the child after the mother’s hospitalization arising from a mental health episode.

The court considered extensive evidence from educators, child protection workers, and the Office of the Children’s Lawyer regarding school attendance issues, alleged parental alienation, and the ability of each parent to meet the child’s special needs.

Numerous abuse allegations made by the father against the mother were investigated and found unsubstantiated.

Applying the best interests test under the Children’s Law Reform Act, the court found the father had repeatedly failed to meet the child’s educational, medical, and developmental needs and had attempted to alienate the child from the mother.

The mother was found capable of providing a more stable and child‑focused environment.

The moving defendants sought summary judgment dismissing claims arising from alleged transfers of corporate funds intended to defeat enforcement of a foreign judgment against a related company.

The plaintiff alleged that the defendants participated in a scheme to transfer and dissipate assets through affiliated corporations to hinder creditors.

The court found that the evidentiary record raised serious credibility concerns and that the moving defendants’ evidence was internally inconsistent regarding their knowledge of the transactions.

The court concluded that the record suggested the defendants may have benefited from the transfers and that key factual issues, including knowledge and participation in the alleged scheme, required assessment at trial.

Summary judgment was therefore inappropriate and the claims were allowed to proceed to trial.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of codeine following a traffic stop.

The accused brought an application to exclude the drug evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, arguing the stop was arbitrary and based on racial profiling, and the subsequent arrest and search were unlawful.

The court found the arresting officer's testimony regarding the reason for the stop and his observations of the drugs to be untruthful.

Concluding that the accused's ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights were seriously breached, the court excluded the drug evidence.

During a criminal trial for historical sexual offences, the accused sought to question character witnesses about whether he had a disposition to commit sexual assault or acts of violence.

The Crown objected, arguing that character evidence from lay witnesses must be limited to evidence of general reputation rather than personal opinions about specific traits or conduct.

The court held that questions about sexual morality or peaceful disposition would elicit impermissible opinion evidence and had minimal probative value in the context of private historical allegations involving a child.

Relying on appellate jurisprudence regarding the limited value of such evidence in sexual offence cases, the judge concluded that the prejudicial effects and trial inefficiency outweighed any probative value.

The proposed questioning was therefore disallowed.

Following a family law trial addressing spousal support, child support, arrears, and equalization of net family property, both parties sought costs.

The court reviewed the trial findings, including that the respondent owed a substantial equalization payment to the applicant and that the applicant had been largely successful in the litigation.

Applying Rules 24(1) and 24(11) of the Family Law Rules and considering settlement offers, the court concluded the applicant achieved substantial success and had beaten the respondent’s settlement offer.

The court also considered the reasonableness of counsel’s rates, the limited complexity of the matter, and the conduct of the parties.

Costs of $18,000 inclusive of disbursements were awarded to the applicant.

Addendum to a prior family law judgment correcting calculation errors relating to child support and equalization.

The court corrected the monthly table child support payable based on the payor’s income and recalculated retroactive support for a 40‑month period, resulting in reduced arrears.

Adjustments were also made to reflect an overpayment of child support and to revise the total arrears owed.

The equalization payment between the spouses was correspondingly recalculated after deducting the corrected arrears and other expenses.

The court reaffirmed related orders regarding education fund contributions, pension valuation disclosure, and potential sale of the matrimonial home if the equalization amount remained unpaid.

The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff's action after the plaintiff failed to comply with a prior court order requiring him to pay outstanding costs.

The plaintiff, a self-represented litigant with a history of obstreperous behaviour, had accumulated significant unpaid costs orders and failed to provide any justification for his non-compliance.

The court found that the plaintiff's continued failure to obey court orders constituted wilful defiance and an abuse of process.

The motion was granted, the action was dismissed, and further costs were awarded to the defendants.

The parties filed costs submissions following an interim spousal support motion.

The party seeking support sought $15,000 in costs, claiming 68 hours of work at $350 per hour, while the opposing party argued each side should bear their own costs due to divided success.

The court found the party seeking support was the successful party but noted the issues were not complex and the time claimed was disproportionate to the amounts in issue and the parties' financial means.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules and the principle of proportionality, the court fixed the costs award at $4,500 inclusive of disbursements.

The plaintiff lender brought a motion for summary judgment to recover amounts owing under a loan agreement and to enforce security granted under a general security agreement over a boat.

The defendants admitted the essential elements of the loan, default, guarantee, and security but filed a counterclaim alleging the lender failed to provide business advice and improperly demanded loan repayment.

The court held that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial, finding that the admissions in the pleadings established the debt and the validity of the security interest.

The lender was granted summary judgment for the outstanding loan balance with interest and an order for possession of the collateral.

The defendants’ counterclaim and cross‑motion for summary judgment were dismissed.

The insured sought a declaration that his home insurer was required to defend and indemnify him in a personal injury action arising from a cycling accident with a pedestrian.

The insurer had denied coverage by letter and the insured commenced an action nearly three years later.

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court considered whether the claim was barred by the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The insured argued that an additional policy condition created ambiguity and delayed the limitation period until the underlying action was resolved.

The court rejected that interpretation, holding the condition applied only to indemnification claims and not to the duty to defend.

The action against the insurer was therefore commenced out of time.

Accused charged with multiple assaults against their children sought disclosure of third‑party records held by a child protection agency.

The defence argued the records were likely relevant to the credibility and reliability of the child complainants because they contained allegations made by the children against other individuals.

Applying the likely relevance test from O’Connor and related authorities, the court held that speculative requests for third‑party records are impermissible but found sufficient case‑specific evidence that similar allegations had been made and at least partially recanted or determined unfounded.

The court concluded the threshold for stage‑one production was met and ordered the records unsealed for judicial review before determining whether disclosure to the defence should occur.

A judgment creditor brought proceedings concerning a mortgaged property subject to power of sale, fearing the mortgagee and borrower were not independent and that the property might be sold below fair market value, leaving the judgment unsatisfied.

The parties ultimately resolved the underlying dispute on terms ensuring the property would be sold through a public process.

Both the judgment creditor and the mortgagee sought costs against each other.

The court held that the borrower’s failure to meet obligations caused the dispute between creditors and that ordering costs between them would not alter their legal priorities or economic exposure.

No order as to costs was made, leaving creditors free to seek recovery of enforcement costs from the borrower and the property.