SCC 2001

The Crown appealed from a Quebec Court of Appeal decision ordering a new trial for the respondents on charges of conspiracy to import cocaine.

The Court of Appeal had found an appearance of interference by the Crown with the trial judge's judicial independence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, agreeing that there was an appearance of interference.

The Court also dismissed the respondents' cross-appeals seeking a stay of proceedings, finding no basis to distinguish the matter from Tobiass and upholding the order for a new trial.

The respondent, a Mohawk of Akwesasne, crossed the international border from the United States into Canada with goods intended for trade with other First Nations and claimed an aboriginal right exempting him from paying customs duties.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the claimed aboriginal right to bring goods across the St. Lawrence River for the purposes of trade was not established.

The evidence did not demonstrate that such trade was an integral, defining feature of the pre-contact Mohawk society.

The appeal was allowed, and the respondent was required to pay the applicable customs duties.

The accused was charged with multiple counts of sexual offences involving children.

Prior to jury selection, he applied to challenge potential jurors for cause, arguing that the nature of the charges gave rise to a realistic possibility of juror partiality.

The trial judge rejected the application and the accused was convicted.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the accused failed to establish a widespread bias in the community arising from the nature of the charges that would be incapable of being set aside by jurors despite trial safeguards.

Trinity Western University (TWU), a private Christian institution, applied to the British Columbia College of Teachers (BCCT) for permission to assume full responsibility for its teacher education program.

The BCCT denied the application, arguing it was contrary to the public interest because TWU's Community Standards, which prohibited 'homosexual behaviour', were discriminatory.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the BCCT had jurisdiction to consider discriminatory practices, its decision was unjustified.

The Court found that the BCCT failed to properly reconcile the equality rights of public school students with the freedom of religion of TWU students.

Absent concrete evidence that training teachers at TWU fosters discrimination in public schools, the freedom to hold religious beliefs must be respected.

The appeal was dismissed, upholding the order of mandamus directing the BCCT to approve the program.

The Crown appealed a manslaughter verdict arising from a homicide prosecution where the trial judge instructed the jury that intense anger might reduce murder to manslaughter by negating intent.

The Court held that anger is not a stand-alone defence and may reduce murder to manslaughter only through the statutory defence of provocation when all required elements are established.

The impugned charge improperly suggested that anger short of provocation could negate the mens rea for murder.

The subsequent recharge on provocation did not cure that error.

A new trial on second degree murder was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for harassment, arguing that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was violated due to trial scheduling delays and restrictive bail conditions.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the British Columbia Court of Appeal's disposition that warranted intervention, despite expressing concern over the length of the delay.

The Crown appealed as of right from a judgment of the Manitoba Court of Appeal that set aside the accused's conviction for sexual assault and entered an acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal that the verdict was unreasonable based on the principles in Yebes and Biniaris.

The appellant appealed her conviction, arguing that her trial counsel's decision to consent to the admission of hearsay evidence was a mistake that led to a miscarriage of justice.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the majority of the Newfoundland Court of Appeal that the experienced trial counsel's decision did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The Supreme Court of Canada adjourned the hearing of the appeal after learning that a summary judgment had been filed in related Kansas proceedings, which significantly changed the nature of the issues.

The parties were given 60 days to file supplemental materials.

After both parties filed supplemental factums, the Court dismissed the appeal.

The accused was convicted of first degree murder.

Years later, he applied to the Minister of Justice for a review based on fresh evidence.

The Minister referred the matter to the Court of Appeal under s. 690 of the Criminal Code for an opinion on whether the evidence was admissible, and if so, to determine the appeal.

The Court of Appeal concluded the evidence was inadmissible and did not proceed to determine the appeal.

The accused sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Crown brought a motion to quash the application for leave.

The Supreme Court granted the motion, holding that the Court of Appeal had only provided an advisory opinion under s. 690(c), which is not a final judgment from which an appeal lies.

The accused was charged with importing heroin and using a false passport after being threatened by a man in Belgrade who said he would harm her mother if she did not comply.

She raised the common law defence of duress, successfully arguing that the strict immediacy and presence requirements of section 17 of the Criminal Code violated section 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that it is a principle of fundamental justice that only voluntary conduct should attract criminal liability.

The Court found that section 17's requirements were too restrictive, infringed section 7, and could not be justified under section 1.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed and the acquittal upheld.

The plaintiffs contracted HIV from blood and blood products supplied by the Canadian Red Cross Society (CRCS) between 1983 and 1985.

They alleged the CRCS was negligent in its blood donor screening procedures.

The trial judge found the CRCS breached its standard of care by using a 'good health' questionnaire rather than symptom-specific questions, but dismissed one plaintiff's action for failing to prove causation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the negligence findings and reversed the causation dismissal by applying a presumptive causal link.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the CRCS's appeals, holding that while the Court of Appeal erred in applying a presumptive causal link, causation was established under the material contribution test because the CRCS's failure to implement adequate screening measures materially contributed to the plaintiffs contracting HIV.

The Attorney General for Saskatchewan brought a motion seeking an order directing the Saskatchewan Indian Gaming Authority Inc. to serve it with an application for leave to appeal.

The Court held that under the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada and the Constitutional Questions Act, the Attorney General is considered a party and must be served.

The motion was granted with costs.

The appellant, a Canadian citizen, faced extradition to the United States on charges of telemarketing fraud.

At his committal hearing, he unsuccessfully sought to exclude affidavit evidence from co-conspirators who were awaiting sentence.

On appeal, he sought to adduce fresh evidence consisting of public threats made by the American prosecutor that fugitives resisting extradition would face harsher prison conditions, including sexual violence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to adduce fresh evidence and the appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Court of Appeal should have admitted the fresh evidence.

The Court found that the prosecutor's threats constituted a shocking abuse of process that tainted the judicial phase of the extradition proceedings, and entered a stay of proceedings.

The appellant, a Canadian citizen, resisted extradition to the United States on charges of fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud.

The extradition judge had granted a stay of proceedings based on statements made by an American judge and prosecutor, which the Court of Appeal subsequently set aside.

Relying on the reasons given in the companion case of United States of America v. Cobb, the Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and reinstated the order staying the extradition proceedings.

The appellants, Canadian citizens, faced extradition to the United States for telemarketing fraud.

During the extradition process, an American judge and prosecutor made threatening statements indicating that uncooperative fugitives would receive maximum sentences and face sexual violence in prison.

The extradition judge stayed the proceedings, finding these threats violated the principles of fundamental justice.

The Court of Appeal set aside the stay, ruling the judge should have deferred to the Minister of Justice's surrender decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and reinstated the stay, holding that the extradition judge has jurisdiction under the Charter and common law to remedy abuses of process that directly taint the committal hearing, without waiting for the executive phase.

The appellant, a Canadian citizen, appealed his committal for extradition to the United States on drug trafficking charges, arguing that his mobility rights under section 6(1) of the Charter were violated and seeking further disclosure of the Canadian investigation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that section 9(3) of the Extradition Act does not confer expanded Charter jurisdiction on the extradition judge to consider mobility rights, which are only engaged at the ministerial surrender stage.

The Court found that the appellant received adequate disclosure and that the Minister of Justice reasonably exercised his discretion in ordering the surrender, properly considering the appellant's constitutional rights.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault to the Supreme Court of Canada as of right.

The sole issue was whether the curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code could be invoked to uphold the conviction.

The Court agreed with the majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal that the proviso properly applied and dismissed the appeal.

The Crown appealed as of right from a decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal, which had set aside the accused's conviction for sexually assaulting the complainant and entered an acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no reason to interfere with the majority judgment of the Court of Appeal.

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of the Education Quality Improvement Act, 1997, which created a new governance and funding model for Ontario school boards.

The appellants argued the legislation violated denominational education rights under s. 93(1) of the Constitution Act, 1867 by removing local taxation powers and limiting financial control.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the legislation did not prejudicially affect denominational rights, as it only regulated secular aspects of education and provided fair and equitable funding.

The Court also held that the delegation of taxation powers to the Minister of Finance was constitutional as it was express and unambiguous.