SCC 2000

The appellant, a gay and lesbian bookstore, challenged the constitutionality of Customs legislation that authorized the interception and prohibition of obscene materials.

Customs officials had repeatedly delayed, confiscated, or prohibited materials imported by the bookstore, often misclassifying non-obscene gay and lesbian erotica as obscene.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the Customs legislation infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter, it was largely justified under s. 1 as a reasonable limit to prevent the importation of harmful obscene materials.

However, the Court struck down the reverse onus provision in s. 152(3) of the Customs Act as it applied to obscenity determinations, ruling that the burden of proving obscenity must rest on the Crown.

The Court also found that while the legislation itself did not violate s. 15(1) equality rights, its systemic misapplication by Customs officials had discriminated against the gay and lesbian community.

The appellants conceded infringement of the respondents' patent relating to clothes-washing machines but denied its validity.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, adopting the reasons from the companion appeal, Whirlpool Corp. v. Camco Inc., which upheld the validity of the patent.

The appellants appealed a finding that they infringed the respondents' patent for a dual action washing machine agitator with flexible vanes.

The appellants argued the patent was invalid due to double patenting, asserting that an earlier patent already covered the invention or rendered it obvious.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, affirming the validity of the patent and the finding of infringement.

In doing so, the Court established that 'purposive construction' is the proper approach to patent claims construction for both validity and infringement analyses.

The appellant owned patents for an electro-magnetotherapy device that used 'circuit means' to control electromagnetic waves.

The respondents developed a competing device that achieved similar therapeutic results but used a 'microcontroller' instead of circuit means.

The appellant sued for patent infringement, arguing the respondents took the substance of the invention.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that patent claims must be interpreted using purposive construction, balancing fairness to the patentee with predictability for the public.

The Court found that the use of 'circuit means' was an essential element of the patent claims, and the respondents' substitution of a microcontroller was a fundamentally different technology.

Therefore, the respondents' device did not infringe the patents.

The accused were charged with multiple offences related to a cocaine-trafficking ring.

The Crown's case relied heavily on wiretap evidence obtained via an ex parte authorization supported by a lengthy police affidavit.

At trial, cross-examination revealed errors in the affidavit regarding confidential sources, leading the trial judge to reject the entire affidavit, exclude the wiretap evidence, and acquit the accused.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittals and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the accused's appeal, clarifying that the investigative necessity requirement for wiretaps means there must be no other reasonable alternative method of investigation.

The Court held that the affidavit met this standard and that the trial judge erred in applying the standard of review by globally rejecting the affidavit instead of excising the erroneous information and considering whether sufficient reliable information remained to support the authorization.

The appellant developer entered into an agreement to purchase land from a Crown corporation, subject to the respondent City granting subdivision and zoning.

The City granted the zoning, but later down-zoned the water lots after public objections to the developer's plans.

The developer sued for breach of contract, arguing the City breached an implied term not to rezone for a reasonable time.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the City did not have the statutory capacity to make such an implied term, and that it would be an illegal fetter on the municipality's discretionary legislative powers.

The Crown brought a motion to adduce fresh evidence on appeal, seeking to introduce a transcript of a discussion between the trial judge and two jurors that occurred ten days after the accused was convicted of first degree murder.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the motion, holding that the admission of the transcript would violate the jury secrecy provisions under section 649 of the Criminal Code.

The Court noted that the discussion did not occur in open court with the accused or counsel present, and admitting the evidence would risk converting the appeal into an improper inquiry into jury room proceedings.

The appellant school board appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal affirming a Superior Court judgment that granted the respondent union's application for judicial review of an arbitral award.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding that the arbitrator's award, which interpreted the collective agreement regarding the assignment of teaching staff, contained no patently unreasonable error.

The Court held that the arbitrator's approach was rational and based on the collective agreement and education legislation, meaning it could not be challenged before the courts.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault with a weapon, procuring, and theft.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal substantially for the reasons of the majority in the Quebec Court of Appeal, with LeBel J. dissenting.

The respondent leased a building to the federal government.

When the lease was expiring, the parties engaged in negotiations for a renewal but failed to reach an agreement.

The government then issued a call for tenders, which the respondent bid on but lost to a competitor.

The respondent sued in tort, alleging negligence in the conduct of the negotiations and in the preparation and evaluation of the tender.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the tort of negligence does not extend to pure economic loss arising from commercial negotiations, citing policy reasons against imposing a duty of care in arm's-length bargaining.

The Court also found no liability in the tendering process, concluding that while an implied contractual duty to treat all bidders fairly exists, the minor breach in this case did not cause the respondent's loss.

The applicant, Stepping Stone, sought leave to intervene on an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada prior to leave to appeal being granted.

The Court noted that under the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada, applications for leave to intervene are normally considered only after leave to appeal has been granted, except in exceptional circumstances.

Finding no exceptional circumstances, the Court adjourned the motion to intervene pending the disposition of the application for leave to appeal.

The appellant pleaded guilty to explosives and weapons offences arising from possession of an arsenal capable of causing mass destruction, against a background of significant mental illness and prior weapons-related conduct.

The appeal concerned whether a conditional sentence could lawfully be imposed where the offender would reside in a locked psychiatric treatment unit under psychiatric supervision.

The majority held that the dangerousness inquiry under s. 742.1 focuses on the risk posed while serving the sentence in the community, taking account of proposed conditions, and that the risk here was no greater than under penal incarceration.

The majority also held that s. 742.3 permits a conditional sentence requiring residence in a secure psychiatric facility as a genuine community-based alternative to incarceration.

The appeal was allowed and the trial judge’s sentence restored.

The respondent challenged the constitutionality of third-party spending limits in the Canada Elections Act and obtained an interlocutory injunction restraining their enforcement during a federal election.

The Attorney General of Canada applied to the Supreme Court of Canada for a stay of the injunction.

The Court granted the stay, holding that the balance of convenience favours maintaining duly enacted legislation pending a complete constitutional review, as it must be assumed to serve a valid public purpose.

The appellant was convicted of assault and extortion following a jury trial where the complainant and the accused gave contradictory versions of events.

The trial judge's charge to the jury, given prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Lifchus, described reasonable doubt as a 'real' or 'serious' doubt and asked the jury to assess 'all of the evidence' to determine guilt.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the jury charge defective.

The charge failed to clearly explain that the standard of proof is higher than a balance of probabilities but less than absolute certainty, and it failed to properly instruct the jury on how to handle conflicting evidence in accordance with W. (D.).

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder.

He appealed the conviction, arguing that the trial judge's charge on reasonable doubt misled the jury.

The trial judge did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court's decision in Lifchus.

The majority of the Court of Appeal held that the charge was in substantial compliance with Lifchus and dismissed the appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the charge, read as a whole, did not give rise to a reasonable likelihood that the jury misapprehended the correct standard of proof.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder based on circumstantial evidence.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge's pre-Lifchus jury charge on reasonable doubt, which included references to 'moral certainty', was flawed.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's instructions were in substantial compliance with the principles set out in Lifchus and did not give rise to a reasonable likelihood that the jury misapprehended the correct standard of proof.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after shooting the victim in the back of the head while he slept.

At trial, the appellant argued self-defence based on an overwhelming fear of the victim, supported by psychiatric evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury on self-defence, the expert evidence, and character evidence, and erred by allowing the Crown to ask if he would submit to a blood test and a Crown psychiatric assessment.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while errors were made, they caused minimal prejudice and the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code applied because the evidence was overwhelming and the verdict would inevitably have been the same.

The Musqueam Indian Band surrendered reserve land to the Crown for leasing.

The land was subdivided, serviced, and leased to individuals for 99 years.

The leases provided for rent reviews, stating rent should be 6 percent of the 'current land value' of 'unimproved lands'.

The parties disagreed on whether 'current land value' meant fee simple value off-reserve or leasehold value on-reserve, and whether 'unimproved' meant unserviced.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that 'current land value' refers to the hypothetical fee simple value of the land on the reserve, which requires a 50 percent discount from comparable off-reserve land to account for Indian reserve features.

The Court also held that 'unimproved' means unserviced, so servicing costs must be deducted from the land value.

The accused was charged with sexual assaults on two young male children.

At trial, he sought to introduce expert psychiatric evidence, including penile plethysmograph test results, to show he lacked the distinctive personality traits of someone who would commit such offences.

The trial judge excluded the evidence, finding it did not meet the Mohan criteria for admissibility, and convicted the accused.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the trial judge properly exercised his gatekeeper function in excluding the novel scientific evidence due to its lack of reliability and failure to establish a standard profile for the distinctive group of offenders.

The accused was acquitted of trafficking in cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime.

The Crown appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the admissibility of co-conspirator hearsay evidence under the Carter test.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the accused's appeal, confirming that the trial judge made two clear misdirections in formulating the Carter test.

The Court held that the Crown met the heavy burden of establishing with reasonable certainty that, had the jury been properly charged, the verdict would not necessarily have been the same.