SCC 2000

The respondent, a lawyer, was convicted of six counts of breach of trust for converting trust money to his general account.

He was sentenced to two years' incarceration.

Prior to his appeal, Bill C-41 came into force, introducing the conditional sentencing regime.

The Court of Appeal reduced his sentence by one day and imposed a conditional sentence.

The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the respondent was entitled to the benefit of the new sentencing provisions, and that the Court of Appeal's imposition of a conditional sentence was not disproportionately lenient given the mitigating factors.

The accused, an employer, was convicted of sexual assault and common assault against a young employee.

At trial, he was sentenced to one year of incarceration for the sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal substituted a six-month conditional sentence, applying new sentencing provisions enacted after the trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that while the accused was entitled to the benefit of the new conditional sentencing regime, a conditional sentence was unfit given the gravity of the offence and the abuse of a position of authority.

The original sentence of incarceration was restored but stayed as the conditional sentence had already been served.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault and invitation to sexual touching against his step-granddaughter and sentenced to nine months' imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal substituted a nine-month conditional sentence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, finding that a nine-month conditional sentence was unfit given the gravity of the offences and the accused's high moral blameworthiness.

The original nine-month sentence of incarceration was restored but stayed since the accused had already served the conditional sentence in its entirety.

The Crown appealed a 21-month conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for historical convictions of indecent assault and gross indecency against a child.

The Supreme Court of Canada, applying the principles from R. v. Proulx, dismissed the appeal on equal division.

The majority found that the trial judge's decision to impose a conditional sentence was not demonstrably unfit and adequately addressed denunciation and deterrence through strict conditions like house arrest.

The dissenting judges argued the sentence overemphasized restorative objectives and failed to adequately reflect the gravity of the offences and the moral blameworthiness of the offender.

The Crown appealed a decision substituting a conditional sentence for an 18-month custodial sentence imposed after guilty pleas to dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The Court held that Bill C-41 and the conditional sentencing provisions were enacted to reduce incarceration and promote restorative justice, but conditional sentences remain punitive sanctions distinct from probation and generally should include restrictive conditions such as house arrest.

The Court interpreted s. 742.1 purposively, holding that the sentencing judge need not first fix an equivalent jail term before considering community service of the sentence, and that community safety is a threshold inquiry focused on the specific offender's risk of reoffending and potential harm.

While conditional sentences may satisfy denunciation and deterrence in appropriate cases, the sentencing judge's decision to impose jail here was not demonstrably unfit.

The appeal was allowed, the custodial sentence restored, and its service stayed because the respondent had already completed the conditional sentence.

The appellant suffered a lung injury in a mining accident and subsequently suffered a second lung injury during biopsy surgery intended to assist in the diagnosis and treatment of the work injury.

The appellant brought an action in negligence against the doctors and the health board.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, affirming the lower courts' decisions that the action was barred by workers' compensation legislation.

The respondent employee suffered a back injury in the course of her employment and subsequently received substandard medical treatment from a doctor, leading to an action in negligence.

The Workers' Compensation Board issued a certificate barring the action under section 11 of the Workers' Compensation Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, adopting the dissenting reasons of Donald J.A. in the court below, and restored the Board's certificate barring the action.

The appellants brought a motion to introduce fresh evidence of legislative fact, including statistics, newspaper articles, and reports, in a constitutional appeal regarding school boards.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the motion, holding that the traditional Palmer test for fresh evidence applies to legislative facts, albeit with less stringent admissibility requirements.

The Court found that the appellants failed to meet the due diligence requirement for much of the evidence, the newspaper articles were controversial opinions rather than legislative facts, and the reports were either untested or too tentative to affect the result.

The appellants, representing French linguistic minority parents in the Summerside area, requested a local French language school for their children under s. 23 of the Charter.

The French Language Board approved the request, but the Minister of Education refused, offering instead to bus the children to an existing French school 28 to 46 kilometres away.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Minister's decision was unconstitutional.

Where numbers warrant, s. 23 grants the minority language community the right to management and control over their educational facilities, including their location.

The Minister's discretion is subordinate to the Charter and the minority's right to preserve and promote its language and culture.