Russell M. Raikes

The defendant, charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking, applied to re-open a voir dire concerning the reasonable and probable grounds for her arrest and sought disclosure of a Confidential Informant's (CI) handler notes.

The application was based on recently disclosed CI notes and arguments regarding CI handling protocols and the CI's status as a material witness.

The court dismissed the application, finding no new significant evidence to cast doubt on the CI's reliability or to justify re-opening the voir dire or disclosing the CI's identity under the innocence at stake exception.

The applicant father sought to vary a child support order, claiming overpayment and seeking relief from arrears and a retroactive adjustment, arguing that each parent now had one child in their custody.

The respondent mother opposed, asserting arrears were still owed and ongoing support should continue.

The court found a material change in circumstances as of September 2014 when one child entered a residential program, and again in August 2015 when that child moved to live with the father.

The court retroactively adjusted child support, finding a modest overpayment by the father, but declined to order repayment due to the mother's low income and the father's delay in bringing the motion.

All child support arrears were reduced to zero, and ongoing child support was suspended effective January 1, 2016, given the split custody and equalized incomes.

The Acuity defendants moved for summary judgment and sought to exclude the plaintiff's expert evidence from Vincent Rochon regarding the origin and cause of a warehouse fire.

The defendants argued Rochon was not qualified to opine on electrical code/CSA standards, lacked independence and impartiality due to his prior involvement with the insurer's sister company (REI) and the initial site investigation, showed bias, and presented an unreliable "novel science" theory (ricocheting quartz fragments).

The court found Rochon qualified, willing, and able to fulfill his duty as an expert, and that his ricochet theory was not "novel science" but an application of existing scientific principles.

The motion to exclude Rochon's evidence was dismissed, with the court noting that concerns about the investigation's shortcomings or the plausibility of Rochon's theory could inform the weight of the evidence at the summary judgment motion or trial.

The respondent was successful at trial after the applicant reneged on a settlement agreement and misled the court by denying its existence.

The court permanently stayed $8,200 in prior costs awards made against the respondent, finding it would be an undeserved windfall for the applicant.

The court awarded the self-represented respondent $7,500 in substantial indemnity costs for the trial, finding the applicant's conduct constituted bad faith under Rule 24(8) of the Family Law Rules.

The trial addressed custody and access for three daughters following a contentious marital breakdown.

The applicant mother sought custody of all three, while the respondent father sought custody of all three or a continuation of the interim order.

The court found that the mother's actions contributed significantly to the damaged relationship with the two older daughters, B.M. and J.M.1, and dismissed her alienation claim against the father.

Custody of the youngest daughter, D.M., remained with the mother, while custody of B.M. and J.M.1 was awarded to the father.

Access for the older daughters to the mother was scaled back, with mandatory counselling for all parties and children to facilitate relationship repair.

The applicant father brought a motion seeking interim joint custody with primary residence of the children with him, citing the children's unhappiness with the respondent mother.

The respondent mother opposed the motion and brought a cross-motion for a further Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) report.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion, expressing significant concerns about potential parental alienation by the father and the manipulation of the children.

The court granted the order for a further OCL report and urged both parties to seek counselling and improve communication.

The parties, married in 1998 and separated in 2016, sought interim orders regarding parenting, child support, s. 7 expenses, and the matrimonial home.

The court granted primary residence of the five daughters to the applicant mother, establishing a shared care schedule for the younger children and allowing the 16-year-old to determine her own access with the respondent father.

The respondent was ordered to pay child support of $2,422 monthly and contribute 86% to s. 7 expenses.

A 45-day window was set for the applicant to buy out the respondent's interest in the matrimonial home, failing which the property would be listed for sale.

Ancillary relief included designating the applicant and children as beneficiaries of health/fringe benefits and the applicant as the sole beneficiary of the respondent's life insurance.

The applicant, Dominic Mazza, charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking cocaine, brought an application to exclude evidence of cocaine found in his vehicle.

He argued his arrest was unlawful, the subsequent search of his vehicle was unlawful, and his Charter right to counsel was violated by its suspension and subsequent denial.

The court found that the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, rendering the arrest and incidental search unlawful.

The court also found that the initial suspension of the right to counsel was unjustified, and the subsequent failure to facilitate counsel after the suspension was lifted constituted a further violation.

Applying the R. v. Grant factors, the court determined that the seriousness of the Charter-infringing conduct and the impact on the accused's rights outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits, leading to the exclusion of the cocaine evidence.

The plaintiffs, Eric and Louise Brown, sought damages from the defendants, Gary and Kim Cassidy, for costs to remediate mold and water damage discovered after purchasing their property.

The claim was based on fraudulent misrepresentation and latent defect.

The court applied the doctrine of caveat emptor, finding that the defendants had disclosed previous water issues and their remediation, and were unaware of any ongoing water leakage or mold contamination.

The defects were deemed latent, but the plaintiffs failed to prove the defendants' knowledge, willful blindness, or recklessness.

The claim regarding the rear deck was dismissed as a patent defect or lacking evidence of unsafety.

Consequently, the plaintiffs' claim was dismissed.

The plaintiff moved for directions to pre-emptively dismiss or stay the defendant Dr. Shah's motion for summary judgment and to prevent cross-examination of the plaintiff's expert witnesses.

The plaintiff argued the case was complex, the defendant had no realistic prospect of success, and the process was burdensome and raised access to justice concerns.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion, finding that the summary judgment motion was not an abuse of process and that the defendant had the right to complete the evidentiary record, including cross-examining experts.

The court imposed terms to ensure the summary judgment motion proceeded as scheduled.

M.G. was convicted of invitation to sexual touching of his two-year-old daughter.

The court considered mitigating factors (age, no prior record, employment, learning disabilities) and aggravating factors (victim's age and vulnerability, abuse of trust, minimization of actions, aggressive post-disclosure conduct).

The primary sentencing objectives were denunciation and deterrence.

The court rejected the defence's request for an intermittent sentence and imposed a 22-month custodial sentence, followed by 12 months of probation with specific conditions, a 20-year SOIRA order, a DNA order, a communication prohibition during custody, and a 10-year s. 161 order prohibiting employment/volunteering with minors and internet communication with minors.

Ms. Faddoul, counsel for the Respondent, was removed mid-trial due to a conflict of interest arising from her failure to properly appeal a prior final order.

After the trial was adjourned for the Respondent to obtain new counsel, Ms. Faddoul sought to be reinstated as counsel.

The court dismissed her motion, finding that the conflict of interest persisted and that allowing her to continue would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice and unfairly prejudice the Applicant by virtually guaranteeing an appeal based on ineffective assistance of counsel.

The court emphasized that the right to counsel of choice is not unlimited and must be balanced against the integrity of the justice system.

The plaintiff, The Roman Catholic Episcopal Corporation of the Diocese of London in Ontario, moved to strike the jury notice served by the defendant, AXA Insurance Canada, pursuant to sections 108(2) and 108(3) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court determined that the core of both the plaintiff's claim and the defendant's counterclaim was for declaratory and/or other equitable relief, specifically concerning the validity and coverage of an insurance policy.

As claims for declaratory or equitable relief are mandated to be tried without a jury under section 108(2) of the Act, the court granted the motion and struck the jury notice.

The court also noted that while complexity was not argued, it would not have struck the jury notice on the discretionary grounds of mixed fact and law at this early stage without more evidence.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of opinion evidence from a former employee as a "participant expert" under *Westerhof v. Gee Estate*.

The court confirmed the witness's qualification and impartiality, allowing the evidence.

However, it imposed strict limitations, requiring the opinion evidence to be directly connected to the witness's observations and participation in the events at issue during their employment, and not to broader, temporally disconnected studies or activities.

Rebecca Steckly moved to set aside a default order granted to Nolan Steckly in an uncontested family law trial, which dealt with custody, access, equalization, and sale of the matrimonial home.

The court applied the three-part test under Rule 19.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure (by analogy to Family Law Rules 1(7)): timeliness, plausible explanation for default, and arguable defence on the merits.

The court found Rebecca met all three criteria, noting her lack of awareness of deadlines and consequences of default, and significant discrepancies in evidence regarding child care, finances, and spousal support.

The default order was set aside, and terms were imposed for filing materials and proceeding to a case conference, with interim custody/access terms maintained.

The respondent father moved for an interim order to expand access to his two-year-old son and to change the access exchange location.

The applicant mother opposed the expanded access and sought an order for the respondent to contribute to their 17-year-old son's hockey registration fees.

The court dismissed the father's request for expanded access, finding no material change in circumstances to warrant varying the existing consent order.

However, the court granted the father's request to change the exchange location to the parties' respective residences.

The court also ordered the father to contribute $1,000 to the hockey registration fees.

The defendant, Andrew Paxton, applied to quash search warrants for his vehicle and residence, and to exclude evidence found under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found the warrant for the vehicle valid due to compelling anonymous tips corroborated by police surveillance.

However, the warrant for the residence was deemed invalid due to insufficient connection between the drugs and the dwelling unit.

Despite the Charter breach for the residence search, the court applied the inevitable discovery doctrine under section 24(2) of the Charter, concluding that the evidence from the residence would have been discovered anyway after the lawful vehicle search.

Therefore, the application to exclude evidence was dismissed, and all evidence was admitted.

The applicant sought to vary spousal support upwards, arguing the respondent deliberately reduced his income and failed to disclose financial benefits to minimize support obligations.

The respondent sought to reduce spousal support due to retirement.

The court found the respondent's retirement and reduced income were part of a scheme to reduce spousal support, imputed income to him for several years, and found the applicant had not made sufficient efforts to become self-sufficient.

Spousal support was varied upwards for the applicant, and significant arrears were ordered.

The court determined costs following a trial on custody, access, and child and spousal support, and a motion under Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules.

The respondent, who was legally aided, sought costs for both the motion and the trial.

The applicant, who was self-represented, did not make submissions.

The court fixed costs for the Rule 1(8) motion at $2,800 inclusive of HST, and trial costs at $9,605 inclusive of disbursements and HST, finding the respondent to be the more successful party despite some divided success.

The applicant's obstinacy and "pick and choose" approach to court orders were noted as factors increasing the difficulty of the case.

Following the breakdown of a short marriage, the applicant sought an unequal division of net family property, repayment of certain loans, occupation rent, and an accounting for post‑separation rental income relating to three jointly owned properties.

The respondent argued that the parties had reached a binding settlement agreement during litigation under which she would receive one property and a payment from the proceeds of another after a severance of land.

The court found that the parties had indeed entered into a binding settlement agreement through email communications during the litigation.

The applicant breached that agreement by refusing to cooperate with the severance process and forcing the sale of the properties.

Because specific performance was no longer possible after the sales, the court ordered distribution of sale proceeds to approximate the settlement terms and dismissed the applicant’s remaining claims.