Ronald Carr

The Ministry of Natural Resources and the Regional Municipality of Halton appealed an order of the Ontario Municipal Board granting a $60,000 costs premium to the respondent.

The Board had relied on a Court of Appeal decision that was subsequently overturned by the Supreme Court of Canada, which held that a risk premium cannot be exacted against an unsuccessful party.

The Divisional Court found that the Board's rules focus on the conduct of a party, not the result achieved or the risk assumed by counsel.

The appeal was allowed and the costs premium was set aside.

The interim receiver of a bankrupt company sought to distribute funds from operating assets to a secured creditor.

The pension plan administrator opposed, claiming priority under a statutory lien for unpaid pension contributions pursuant to s. 57(5) of the Pension Benefits Act.

The Ministry of the Environment also opposed, arguing funds should be retained for environmental remediation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, holding that the pension administrator is not a secured creditor under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act because the unpaid contributions are not a debt due to the administrator.

The Court also held that the MOE was an unsecured creditor regarding the operating assets and that the BIA's specific provisions for environmental claims governed.

The Ministry of Natural Resources and the Regional Municipality of Halton sought leave to appeal two Ontario Municipal Board decisions regarding a quarry site plan amendment and a substantial costs award.

The moving parties alleged a reasonable apprehension of bias and various evidentiary errors by the Board member.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motions for leave to appeal on the merits and bias issues, finding no good reason to doubt the correctness of the Board's decisions.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal solely on the issue of whether the Board erred in law by awarding a $60,000 premium in its costs order, noting that the Board's rules focus on misconduct rather than the result achieved or risks assumed by counsel.

The applicant brought a motion to set aside a judgment but failed to file any materials other than a notice of motion and notice of appeal.

The applicant also failed to attend the hearing, providing only a doctor's note stating he missed school due to a motor vehicle accident.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding the applicant's conduct to be an abuse of process, and awarded costs of $450 to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a disposition order of the Ontario Review Board detaining him in a minimum secure unit.

He argued the Board erred by admitting a police summary of his prior criminal activity and that the disposition was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board has wide latitude to receive hearsay evidence and did not rely heavily on the summary.

The Court also held the disposition was reasonable, supported by the evidence of the treating psychiatrist, and represented the least onerous restriction consistent with public protection.

The appellant, a shell company, brought a motion to review an order requiring it to post security for costs pending its appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no error in the single judge's conclusion that the appellant had no assets to satisfy an adverse costs award and that the appeal had little to no merit.

The appellant was ordered to post security within ten days, failing which the appeal would be dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding they breached their contract with the respondents by failing to perform their obligations in good faith during the notice period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that the appellants breached the contract by assisting a third party in taking the respondents' business away.

The court also dismissed the appellants' argument regarding insufficient proof of damages, as well as the respondents' cross-appeal concerning the damages calculation and the dismissal of a conspiracy claim.

The appellants appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal in its court and transferred it to the Divisional Court, awarding costs thrown away to the respondents.

The respondent, a judgment creditor of a deceased's estate and his company, brought an action claiming relief under the oppression remedy provisions of the Business Corporations Act.

The trial judge found that the transfer of the company's assets to other companies controlled by the deceased's widow, and the assumption of a mortgage, constituted oppression and ordered the appellants to pay the judgment debt.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding the mortgage, which was a legitimate charge against the company's assets.

The Court also held that the respondent, as a contingent creditor, did not have a reasonable expectation that the company would be managed to ensure his debt was paid in priority to others, including tax authorities.

The appeal was allowed and the action dismissed.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding that the parties had agreed to buy and sell an interest in Prince Diamonds, with all material terms concluded and an implied term that the transaction would be structured to be as tax neutral as possible.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was evidence to support the trial judge's findings of fact and inferences.

The appellants appealed a judgment of the Superior Court, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias based on comments made by the trial judge during a costs endorsement.

The trial proceeded undefended after defence counsel advised she was instructed not to attend.

The Court of Appeal found that the impugned comments, while unfortunate, were made after judgment was granted and in response to a request for solicitor and client costs, and tended to support rather than attack the defendant's interests.

The test for reasonable apprehension of bias was not met, and the appeals were dismissed.

The plaintiffs appealed an order dismissing their motion to amend their statement of claim to add a claim for negligent misrepresentation.

The motion was brought 13 years after the action was commenced and long after the relevant limitation period had expired.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that where a limitation period has passed, a plaintiff must show special circumstances to amend a pleading, rather than merely showing an absence of non-compensable prejudice to the defendant.

The court found no special circumstances and noted that the defendant would likely suffer real prejudice given the passage of time.

The appellants appealed an order enforcing an agreement.

The appellants conceded there was an agreement on all essential terms.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge reasonably and properly applied the evidence relating to the territorial ambit of the restrictive covenant to resolve the one outstanding issue.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to appeal a discretionary costs judgment awarded after the case was removed from the trial list due to the plaintiffs' failure to produce relevant documents.

The court found that the costs order was amply supported by uncontradicted evidence and reflected a careful analysis of costs thrown away.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $4,500.

The defendant sought leave to appeal an order removing their counsel due to a disqualifying conflict of interest arising from a law firm merger.

The motions judge had applied a strict 'bright line' test, disqualifying the firm because an ethical wall was not erected prior to the merger.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's decision, as it failed to apply the balancing approach mandated by Rule 2.05(4) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and ignored evidence that the motion may have been brought for tactical purposes.

The respondent successfully sued the appellants for negligence after a real estate venture failed due to soil contamination.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial judge's decision.

The Court found no duty of care existed, as the appellants never undertook to provide legal advice and advised investors to seek their own.

Furthermore, there was no evidence that the failure to obtain legal advice caused the respondent's loss, and the claim was barred by the six-year limitation period.

The appeal was allowed and the action dismissed.

The appellants, a corporation and its undisclosed principal, breached an agreement to purchase land after the real estate market collapsed.

The trial judge assessed damages at the date of closing and held a third-party corporation and its principals liable on an undertaking as to damages given during an interlocutory injunction.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the damages assessment against the appellants, finding the sealed contract rule inapplicable.

However, the Court allowed the third parties' appeal, concluding that the injunction did not cause the appellants' damages, which resulted instead from the market collapse and their deliberate refusal to close.

The appellant moved for a stay of the trial judge's orders pending appeal, which required him to vacate a farm property and permitted the estate to auction inventory.

The underlying dispute involved an estate settlement where the appellant agreed to vacate the property in exchange for a retirement lot and funds to build a house.

The Court of Appeal applied the RJR-MacDonald test and dismissed the motion for a stay, finding no serious issue to be tried and that the balance of convenience favoured the respondents.

The respondents' cross-motion to permit the auction to proceed was granted.

The appellant appealed the motions judge's refusal to approve his proposal in bankruptcy.

The respondent, who became a creditor through the appellant's misappropriation of funds, opposed the proposal.

The other creditors were related to the appellant and assigned their debts to third parties after the Notice of Intention was filed, specifically to circumvent the voting restrictions in the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motions judge reasonably concluded the assignments were made to circumvent the Act.

This was a costs endorsement following the dismissal of an appeal in a municipal election Charter challenge.

The successful respondent did not seek costs either in the Court of Appeal or on the motion for leave to appeal.

Applying the ordinary rule that costs follow the event, the court nevertheless made no order as to costs because the successful respondent did not ask for them.

The costs order in the Divisional Court was left undisturbed.