Robert N. Beaudoin

The plaintiffs commenced a tort action and an accident benefits action arising from a 2013 motor vehicle accident.

The actions were ordered to be tried together before a jury in April 2020, but the trial was suspended due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Facing indefinite delays for civil jury trials, the plaintiffs moved to strike the jury notices.

The court granted leave to bring the motion and struck the jury notices, finding that the real and substantial prejudice caused by the delay outweighed the defendants' substantive right to a jury trial.

The court concluded that justice would be better served by proceeding to trial in a timely manner before a judge alone.

Following a jury trial for a motor vehicle accident claim, the plaintiffs were awarded $5,000, a fraction of the $1.5 million claimed.

The defendant had made a Rule 49 offer of $350,000 prior to trial.

The court considered the factors under Rule 57.01 and the impact of the Rule 49 offer.

The court fixed the plaintiffs' costs at $100,000 and the defendant's costs at $200,000, ordering the plaintiffs to pay the net costs of $100,000 to the defendant, less the amount of their judgment.

The plaintiffs sought damages for negligence related to a soil bearing capacity report.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found that the plaintiffs had discovered the material facts giving rise to their claim by October 2016, more than two years before commencing the action in January 2019.

The court rejected arguments that expert reports or ongoing discussions with the defendants and their insurer postponed the discoverability date, emphasizing that certainty of causation is not required and settlement negotiations do not extend limitation periods.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, and the action was dismissed as prescribed.

The defendant brought a threshold motion seeking a declaration that the plaintiff, Catherine McNamee's, claims for non-pecuniary general loss and health care expenses were barred under the Insurance Act, as her injuries did not meet the "permanent serious impairment of an important physical, mental or psychological function" threshold.

The court, after hearing evidence at trial, focused on the issue of causation.

The plaintiff had a significant pre-accident history of alcohol use disorder, depression, and chronic pain.

The court found Ms. McNamee's evidence regarding the severity of the accident and the resolution of her prior injuries to be unreliable.

Preferring the defendant's expert opinion, the court concluded that Ms. McNamee's injuries from the motor vehicle accident had resolved by Fall 2014 and that her subsequent decline in functioning and mental health issues were primarily due to unrelated life stressors and her pre-existing conditions, not the accident.

Therefore, the plaintiff failed to establish causation, and her claims did not meet the statutory threshold.

The defendant's motion was granted.

The defendant brought a threshold motion during a jury trial for a motor vehicle accident, seeking a declaration that the plaintiff's claims for non-pecuniary general damages and health care expenses were barred under the Insurance Act.

The plaintiff had a significant history of pre-existing neck and back pain.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that his current ailments were caused by the subject accident.

Furthermore, even if causation was established, the plaintiff failed to prove that his impairments substantially interfered with most of his usual activities of daily living.

The threshold motion was granted, barring the claims.

This endorsement rules on which questions regarding damages claims (future treatment costs, medication, income loss) for Catherine and John McNamee will be put to the jury.

The court found insufficient evidence to support several of the plaintiffs' claims for future care costs and income loss, declining to put those specific questions to the jury.

The ruling emphasizes the need for precise evidence and medical justification for future care costs and a clear evidentiary foundation for income loss claims to avoid speculation.

The offender was found guilty of manslaughter after luring the victim to an apartment over a drug debt.

The offender and two young persons assaulted and forcibly confined the victim, who subsequently fell to his death from a balcony while attempting to escape.

The court weighed the offender's high moral blameworthiness, his instigation of the assault, and his lack of genuine remorse against his family support and rehabilitative efforts.

The court imposed a sentence of 7 years imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

Le défendeur, S.C., a été reconnu coupable de distribution d'images intimes sans consentement, de harcèlement criminel, d'extorsion et de méfait à l'égard de données informatiques contre la victime, M.D. Les infractions ont eu lieu après la séparation du couple, S.C. utilisant des photos intimes et des menaces pour extorquer de l'argent et harceler M.D. La cour a considéré les facteurs aggravants, notamment l'impact financier et psychologique sévère sur la victime, l'abus de confiance et le harcèlement continu du défendeur, même après sa condamnation et en violation des conditions de libération.

Le défendeur, qui s'est représenté lui-même et n'a pas accepté la responsabilité de ses actes, ne s'est pas présenté pour la détermination de la peine.

La Couronne a requis une peine de trois ans d'emprisonnement.

La cour a imposé des peines concurrentes de deux ans moins un jour d'emprisonnement, suivies de trois ans de probation, une interdiction d'armes de 10 ans, une ordonnance de non-communication avec la victime M.D. et une ordonnance de prélèvement d'ADN.

The Plaintiffs sought leave under s. 12 of the Evidence Act to call more than three expert witnesses at trial and an order to abridge time for service of their expert reports.

The Defendant opposed, citing late service and duplication of expert evidence.

The court applied factors for granting leave, emphasizing the "gatekeeper" role of the trial judge and the policy behind s. 12 of the Evidence Act, which applies to all experts offering opinion evidence, including participant experts.

The court found significant duplication among the proposed psychiatric, psychological, and occupational therapy experts and that several reports were served late without adequate justification.

The motion was largely denied, limiting the Plaintiffs to one expert per specialty for opinion evidence and restricting the scope of a physiotherapist's testimony to observations rather than future recommendations for litigation purposes.

The plaintiffs were successful on a motion for partial summary judgment and successfully defended a cross-motion to dissolve an interim injunction regarding a commercial lease dispute.

The plaintiffs sought substantial indemnity costs of over $40,000, relying on an offer to settle and the defendant's conduct.

The court found the plaintiffs' offer to settle was reasonable but noted that both parties expended excessive and unnecessary time on the motions.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs and fixed costs on a partial indemnity basis at $25,000.

The accused, Liban Gure and Daniel Jean-Charles, were charged with manslaughter and aggravated assault following the death of an 18-year-old who fell from a 16th-floor balcony.

The Crown alleged the victim was beaten over a drug debt and fled to the balcony in fear for his life.

The court found that Gure initiated the assault and participated in the confinement and beating that caused the victim's fatal flight, rendering him guilty of manslaughter as a co-principal.

However, due to the unreliability of the Crown's key witnesses, the court was left with a reasonable doubt regarding Jean-Charles's participation and acquitted him.

The plaintiff tenants brought a motion for partial summary judgment seeking a declaration that a 2009 Minutes of Settlement amended their commercial lease and bound the defendant landlord, who purchased the property in 2012.

The landlord argued it was not bound because the tenants signed an estoppel certificate that did not fully detail the amendments.

The court granted the tenants' motion, finding that the estoppel certificate referenced the Minutes of Settlement, the landlord failed to exercise due diligence by not requesting a copy, and the landlord did not detrimentally rely on the certificate.

The defendants brought a motion seeking costs thrown away on a substantial indemnity basis for a late trial adjournment and an order suspending pre-judgment interest.

The trial was adjourned due to the plaintiff's counsel's failure to comply with timetable orders, including providing proper witness statements and an ever-changing witness list, which rendered the original four-week trial estimate unrealistic.

The court found the plaintiff and his counsel responsible for the adjournment, awarded the defendants $100,000 in costs thrown away on a partial indemnity basis, and suspended pre-judgment interest from the original trial date until the new trial date.

The applicant father sought to enforce an access order and brought a motion for assessment and directions, while the respondent mother brought a cross-motion for a restraining order and reports.

The court dismissed the respondent's cross-motion and provided directions to implement the access order.

This endorsement specifically addresses the costs of that motion, finding the applicant partially successful and awarding him $2000 in costs, payable after trial from the proceeds of the matrimonial home.

The court found the respondent's actions frustrated the previous access order.

The court, on its own motion, considered dismissing the plaintiff's action under sub-rule 2.1.01 of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure for being frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

Despite being given notice and a 15-day period to provide written submissions, the plaintiff failed to respond.

Consequently, the action was dismissed.

The court, on its own initiative, dismissed the plaintiff's action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.01 of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure.

This decision was made after the plaintiff failed to provide written submissions within the prescribed 15-day period following notice that the court was considering such an order. interesting_citations_summary: > This case illustrates the court's inherent power and the application of Rule 2.1.01 to summarily dismiss actions deemed frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process, particularly when a plaintiff fails to respond to a notice of intent to dismiss.

It highlights the procedural mechanism for judicial gatekeeping to prevent unwarranted litigation. final_judgement: "The action is dismissed as being frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the process of the Court." winning_degree_applicant: 5 winning_degree_respondent: 1 judge_bias_applicant: 0 judge_bias_respondent: 0 year: 2019 decision_number: 4311 file_number: "CV-19-80261" source: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2019/2019onsc4311/2019onsc4311.html" cited_cases: legislation: - title: "Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, sub-rule 2.1.01" url: "https://www.ontario.ca/laws/regulation/900194" case_law: [] keywords: - Dismissal of action - Frivolous - Vexatious - Abuse of process - Rules of Civil Procedure - Rule 2.1.01 - Ontario Superior Court areas_of_law: - Civil Procedure - Civil Litigation --- # Court File and Parties **Court File No.:** CV-19-80261 **Date:** 2019-07-16 **Superior Court of Justice - Ontario** **Re:** Samad Hoveyda, Plaintiff **And:** Mark Albert Robert Kairallah Habib, Defendant **Before:** Mr. Justice Robert N. Beaudoin **Counsel:** Joseph Obagi, for the Defendant **Heard:** By Requisition --- # Endorsement [1] On June 26, 2019, I directed the Registrar to give notice to the Plaintiff by way of Form 2.1A that the Court was considering making an order under [sub-rule 2.1.01 of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure R.R.O. 1990](https://www.ontario.ca/laws/regulation/900194), dismissing this action.

No written submissions have been received by the Plaintiff within the 15 day period prescribed in rule 2.1.01(3). [2] I accordingly dismiss this action as being frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the process of the Court.

I further direct the Registrar to provide a copy of this Endorsement by mail to the Plaintiff and the Defendants. --- Mr. Justice Robert N. Beaudoin Date: July 16, 2019

The litigation guardian sought approval of a settlement for three minor plaintiffs following the death of their mother in a 2009 airplane crash.

The court had previously approved the settlement but required the draft order to be revised to comply with s. 121 of the Courts of Justice Act regarding foreign money obligations.

The court rejected the second draft order, finding it merely inserted formulaic statutory language without properly specifying the Canadian dollar equivalent or confirming whether the funds had already been received in trust.

The court directed counsel to file an amended affidavit and submit a further revised draft order.

The defendant, Victor Vallance Blais LLP, brought a motion under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the plaintiff's action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The plaintiff, Deirdre Moore, claimed pecuniary damages for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional suffering.

The court found that the statement of claim lacked material facts to support these claims and constituted a re-litigation of a previously dismissed action by the same plaintiff against the same defendant.

The motion was granted, and the action was dismissed without requiring further submissions from the plaintiff.

The defendant law firm, Victor Vallance Blais LLP, brought a motion under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the plaintiff, Deirdre Moore's, action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The plaintiff's claims for defamation and intentional/negligent infliction of emotional suffering stemmed from the defendant's inquiries regarding proper service of a statement of claim in a separate action.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to plead material facts capable of supporting her claims, concluding that the alleged facts could not give rise to any claims with a chance of success.

The action was summarily dismissed without requiring further submissions from the plaintiff.

The defendant lawyer brought a requisition under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the plaintiff's action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The plaintiff's claim arose from an aborted real estate transaction and alleged that the defendant lawyer was involved in the issuance of a municipal order to comply.

The court found that the defendant lawyer owed no duty of care to the plaintiff vendor and that the action appeared frivolous on its face.

The court ordered a stay of the proceeding and directed the Registrar to issue a notice to the plaintiff that the court is considering dismissing the action.