Robert L. Maranger

The applicant spouse brought a motion seeking disclosure of medical records, a mental capacity assessment, and other orders under the Substitute Decisions Act relating to the respondent spouse’s alleged incapacity to manage his affairs.

The respondents opposed and cross‑applied for dismissal of claims against adult children and for partition and sale of the matrimonial home.

The court found that two professional assessments and counsel’s representations established that the respondent spouse was mentally competent to instruct counsel and manage his affairs.

The applicant’s motion was dismissed, the claims against the adult children were struck, and the court ordered partition and sale of the matrimonial home as no prejudice to Family Law Act rights was demonstrated.

The respondent to a prior support order brought a motion to vary a consent order governing child and spousal support, arrears, life insurance obligations, and costs.

The consent order had established a mechanism requiring an independent business valuator to annually determine the payor’s guideline income to avoid further litigation.

The court held that varying the order would require determining income in a manner inconsistent with the parties’ agreed mechanism and found no justification to depart from it.

Arguments relying on the principles in Boston v. Boston regarding equalized assets were rejected because income from a business does not deplete the capital asset.

The motion to vary was dismissed, while the opposing party’s cross‑motion succeeded, fixing arrears based on expert reports and ordering security for support due to the payor’s persistent non‑compliance.

The applicant brought a motion in a family law proceeding seeking further financial disclosure relating to the respondent’s real estate transactions and financial dealings.

The respondent brought a cross-motion seeking to vary an earlier interim order by relaxing a non-dissipation order, ordering the immediate sale of all property, and reducing interim spousal support based on a lower asserted income.

The court found substantial evidence that the respondent had previously underreported income and exercised significant control over assets, justifying strict disclosure and asset preservation measures.

The court ordered the respondent to provide a detailed accounting tracing proceeds from several property sales and rejected the requested variation to the interim support and asset restrictions.

The respondent’s cross-motion was dismissed and the disclosure order granted.

Following a successful Rule 21 motion striking the plaintiff’s action arising from a motor vehicle collision with a cow on a roadway, the municipal defendants sought costs.

The plaintiff had alleged that the cow’s owner failed to confine the animal and that the municipalities failed to ensure proper confinement on private land.

After reviewing written submissions and the factors under Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court determined a reasonable and fair cost award.

Emphasizing that cost awards should reflect what is fair and reasonable for the unsuccessful party to pay, the court ordered a modest all‑inclusive amount.

The applicant sought to retroactively vary a divorce judgment requiring monthly spousal support and to rescind accumulated arrears exceeding $300,000.

The court held that a variation requires proof of a material change in circumstances and applied the definition from Willick v. Willick.

The evidence established that since 2005 the applicant’s income was minimal and he lacked the ability to pay ongoing support, justifying a reduction of support to zero effective January 2005.

However, due to inadequate disclosure and lack of evidence regarding earlier years, the court declined to vary the order prior to that date.

Arrears accumulated between January 2005 and October 2012 were eliminated, while earlier arrears remained owing.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed after a guilty plea to sexual assault in which the trial judge granted the accused an absolute discharge.

The Crown argued the sentencing judge erred by emphasizing rehabilitation and failing to properly consider denunciation and deterrence, and sought to introduce fresh evidence consisting of a victim impact statement and regional sexual assault statistics.

The court applied the Palmer criteria for fresh evidence and denied the application, finding the material was available at the time of sentencing and unlikely to affect the outcome.

On the merits, the court held the sentencing judge had considered the relevant principles and that the sentence, though unusual, was not demonstrably unfit.

Deference to the sentencing judge was warranted.

The defendant brought a motion to strike the plaintiff’s statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action, alternatively to dismiss it as vexatious and abusive, or for lack of jurisdiction.

The plaintiff sought to relitigate issues arising from the termination of his employment as a teacher in British Columbia in 1985 and had initiated numerous proceedings over several decades in multiple courts and tribunals.

The court found the pleading did not disclose any recognizable cause of action and consisted primarily of criticism of British Columbia courts and tribunals.

The court also held that the claim was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and that an Ontario court lacked jurisdiction over a dispute intertwined with British Columbia law.

The action was struck and dismissed.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident when he collided with a cow on a county road.

He sued the owner of the cow and the municipalities, alleging the municipalities failed to ensure the owner properly secured the cow on her private land.

The municipalities brought a Rule 21 motion to strike the claim against them.

The court granted the motion, finding no recognized duty of care, insufficient proximity, and broad policy considerations against making municipalities insurers for escaped animals.

The claim and cross-claim against the municipalities were dismissed.

The moving municipal defendants brought a Rule 21 motion to strike a negligence claim arising from a motor vehicle collision with a cow on a public roadway.

The plaintiff alleged that the municipalities failed to ensure that the cow’s owner properly secured the animal on private property.

The court held that the pleaded duty of care had never been recognized in law and that there was insufficient proximity between the plaintiff and the municipalities to ground such a duty.

The court further found strong policy reasons against imposing municipal liability for monitoring privately owned animals or fencing.

The claim and a related cross‑claim against the municipalities were dismissed.

The applicant sought an order compelling a cottage owners association to modify a trail on Crown land that had been improved pursuant to work permits issued by the provincial natural resources ministry.

The applicant alleged that the association had effectively constructed an unauthorized road rather than improving an existing trail, threatening the semi-closed status of a remote lake and potential vehicle access.

The court held that the appropriate remedy would have been judicial review of the ministry’s permitting decisions rather than an equitable order against the association.

The evidence demonstrated the association complied with the permits and that the trail was restricted to ATVs and snowmobiles, with no evidence of use by cars or trucks.

The application was therefore dismissed.

On a Rule 21 motion, the moving parties sought to stay or dismiss a negligence and breach of contract action for want of court jurisdiction.

The court applied the essential character framework and considered whether the dispute arose from collective agreement administration or from alleged promises and representations made outside that framework.

The court held that the pleaded claim, including alleged negligent misrepresentation and reliance relating to disability litigation steps and a missed limitation period, was arguable as a civil negligence claim not confined to labour board exclusivity.

The motion to stay or dismiss was therefore refused, and directions were set for further submissions.

The defendants, a lawyer and her law firm retained by a union, brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing a negligence claim arising from the plaintiff’s lost opportunity to sue for long‑term disability benefits.

The moving parties argued that their retainer was limited to advising the union on accommodation and grievance matters and did not include pursuing litigation against the disability insurer before the limitation period expired.

The plaintiff argued that a solicitor may owe a duty of care even absent a formal solicitor‑client relationship where a relationship of proximity and reliance exists.

The court held that the evidentiary record did not permit a full appreciation of the factual circumstances surrounding the meetings and communications between the plaintiff and the lawyer.

As a result, whether a duty of care arose could not be determined without trial.

The plaintiff bank brought a summary judgment motion against a corporate borrower and its principals following default on credit facilities.

The corporate defendant did not dispute the indebtedness.

The primary issue was whether the individual defendants were personally liable under a forbearance agreement after prior guarantees were released.

The court interpreted the commercial contract as a whole and concluded that the individuals were jointly liable for the monthly forbearance fee and for failing to convey assigned tax credits, as expressly contemplated by the agreement.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the bank against both the corporation and the individual defendants.

In a first-degree murder prosecution involving the deaths of four female family members, the Crown sought to call expert evidence concerning the sociological phenomenon of so‑called honour killings.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the proposed expert opinion evidence.

Applying the framework in R. v. Mohan and R. v. Abbey, the court considered whether the proposed evidence related to a proper subject of expert opinion, whether the witness was qualified, whether the evidence was logically relevant to motive, and whether it survived a cost‑benefit analysis balancing probative value against potential prejudice.

The court found the proposed expert highly qualified and concluded that cultural evidence about honour killings could assist the jury in understanding the alleged motive without usurping the jury’s fact‑finding role.

The evidence was therefore ruled admissible.

The offender was convicted of multiple offences including trafficking in cocaine and conspiracy to traffic as part of a mid-level drug operation known as Project Bulldawg.

Despite strong family support and evidence that the offender was an addict-trafficker, the court emphasized denunciation and deterrence given the kilogram-level quantities and prior trafficking record.

The court imposed a global sentence of 5 years imprisonment, reduced to 4 years after crediting 12 months for strict pre-trial bail conditions, along with a DNA order and a lifetime weapons prohibition.

The appellant mother appealed a summary judgment order making her child a Crown ward.

The motion judge had found no genuine issue for trial regarding whether it was in the child's best interests to return to the mother's care, given the mother's health issues and inability to provide a stable environment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence of the Society's efforts to assist the family and no adequate plan from the mother to care for the child.

Fresh evidence filed on appeal did not raise a triable issue.

The landlord appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board dismissing its application to evict the tenants.

The landlord had applied for eviction under s. 51(c) of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 to conduct extensive renovations.

The Board dismissed the application on the basis that the landlord failed to establish it required the unit for demolition.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Board erred in law by failing to address the application based on renovations.

The Court substituted its own decision, granting the eviction order on consent terms, including three months' rent compensation.

The applicant sought judicial review of a ruling by the Commissioner of the Cornwall Public Inquiry denying a publication ban on the identity of one of its employees.

The Divisional Court determined the appropriate standard of review was reasonableness simpliciter.

The court found the Commissioner did not err in concluding the employee's identity was relevant to the inquiry's mandate, nor did he act unreasonably in applying the Dagenais/Mentuck test to deny the publication ban.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The tenant appealed a decision of the Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal (ORHT) dismissing his request for a review of a rent default order.

The tenant had missed the original hearing due to misdirection by ORHT staff, who told him the hearing would be postponed.

The Vice-Chair acknowledged this but placed the onus on the tenant to prove the original order was inappropriate.

The Divisional Court held this was a jurisdictional error and a denial of natural justice, as the tenant had a right to a hearing in the first instance.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted for a hearing de novo.