Robert Levan

The defendant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of breath sample results, alleging violations of section 10(b) of the Charter regarding the right to counsel in the context of language comprehension.

The defendant, whose first language was Punjabi, expressed difficulty understanding English and stated he understood only approximately 90 percent of what duty counsel told him.

Police officers failed to offer Punjabi-speaking duty counsel or interpretation services despite these clear indications of language barriers and despite such services being readily available in the jurisdiction.

The court found a serious breach of section 10(b) rights and excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in dismissal of the charge.

The accused was charged with failing to remain at the scene of an accident with intent to escape civil or criminal liability contrary to s. 252(1) of the Criminal Code, driving while suspended contrary to s. 53 of the Highway Traffic Act, careless driving contrary to s. 130 of the Highway Traffic Act, and driving without insurance contrary to s. 2(1)(a) of the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was operating the vehicle involved in the accident.

The court rejected the accused's testimony as unreliable and found that circumstantial evidence—including the accused's ownership of the vehicle, his proximity to the scene, his appearance shortly after the incident while sweating, and the removal of licence plates—established guilt on the fail to remain charge, driving while suspended, and driving without insurance.

The careless driving charge was dismissed due to insufficient evidence regarding the manner of driving.

The defendant was charged with refusing to comply with an approved screening device demand under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of the police stop on private property and argued that his Charter rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10 were breached.

The court found that the police officer had authority under both the Highway Traffic Act and common law to conduct a random stop in the parking lot for highway safety purposes.

The court rejected the defendant's argument that he should have been given an opportunity to consult counsel before providing a breath sample, as the "forthwith" requirement in s. 254(2) is a constitutional prerequisite.

The court found the defendant guilty of refusing to provide a breath sample, as he clearly and repeatedly refused to comply with the lawful demand.

The offender was sentenced for two counts of sexual touching of his 14-year-old daughter under section 151 of the Criminal Code, one count of inviting his daughter to touch his body with her mouth for a sexual purpose under section 152, one count of sexual intercourse with his daughter under section 155, and one count of breaching a non-contact condition of his recognizance under section 145(3).

The sexual offences occurred between June 18, 2013 and July 30, 2013, with the breach occurring between August 5, 2013 and October 28, 2013.

The offender had a prior criminal history of sexual offences against children dating back to 1987.

The court imposed a global sentence of five years in penitentiary for the sexual offences, minus credit for pre-trial detention, plus 60 days consecutive for the breach of recognizance.

The defendant brought a Charter application challenging the admissibility of statements made during police interrogation.

The defendant claimed that the police violated his right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter by failing to provide a reasonable opportunity to contact his lawyer of choice before questioning him.

The Crown argued there was no breach or, alternatively, that any breach should not result in exclusion of evidence.

The court found that the police failed to afford a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel of choice by placing only a single phone call and waiting less than half an hour on a Saturday night.

The court further found that any purported waiver of the right to counsel was invalid because the defendant was not provided with the required Prosper warning.

The court excluded the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation and refusing to provide a breath sample following a traffic stop on September 2, 2012.

A police officer observed the defendant's vehicle exhibiting poor driving behavior on the Queen Elizabeth Way and conducted a traffic stop.

The officer observed various indicators including glassy eyes, an odour of alcohol on the defendant's breath, unsteadiness on her feet, and difficulty putting on high-heeled shoes.

The defendant admitted to consuming one glass of wine approximately two hours earlier.

The officer arrested the defendant for impaired operation without administering an approved screening device.

The defendant challenged the arrest on Charter grounds, alleging the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds and that her detention was arbitrary.

The court found, by the barest of margins, that the officer did not have objectively tenable grounds to make the breath demand and dismissed both charges.

The Crown applied to admit a videotaped statement made by the complainant, Ms. Jacqueline Lawton, to Peel Regional Police on August 5, 2012, pursuant to the rule of past recollection recorded.

The witness testified that she had blurred and groggy memories of the events due to consuming vodka and medication, but recalled certain details such as the windshield being smashed and her subsequent actions.

The court found that the witness did not have a genuine loss of memory but rather a selective memory, deliberately choosing not to recall certain events.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving over 80 milligrams percent.

He brought an application for a judicial stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a violation of his right to trial within a reasonable time.

The case was approximately 15 months old at the scheduled trial date.

The court found that the combined institutional and Crown-attributable delay exceeded 12 months, which was well in excess of what is constitutionally tolerable.

Although the allegations were serious and created heightened public interest, the excessive delay, combined with significant prejudice to the accused's security of the person, warranted a stay of proceedings.