Robert E. Charney

The applicant brought an application for judicial review of a private arbitration decision made under a LAWPRO policy.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application at the outset for prematurity and lack of jurisdiction.

The court noted that the proper route to challenge a private arbitration award is through an appeal or an application to set aside the award under the Arbitration Act, 1991, which must be brought before a single judge of the Superior Court.

The appellants appealed an order directing the liquidation of Tarn Financial Corporation under the oppression provisions of the Business Corporations Act.

The application judge found that the appellant had engaged in self-dealing and diverted corporate funds for personal benefit, and ordered liquidation as the only viable remedy to separate the parties.

On appeal, the appellants argued the judge should have ordered a forced buyout instead.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the application judge made no palpable and overriding error and properly exercised his discretion, as a forced buyout would leave the appellant in control of the valuation process and fail to ensure fair market value.

The applicant, a lawyer, sought judicial review of Legal Aid Ontario's decision refusing to enter his name on its duty counsel and certificate panels.

The applicant bypassed the statutory internal review and hearing processes, arguing that Legal Aid Ontario was biased and in a conflict of interest due to his ongoing wrongful dismissal lawsuit against them.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, holding that allegations of bias do not constitute exceptional circumstances justifying judicial intervention before administrative remedies are exhausted.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Independent Police Review Director dismissing his complaint against the police.

The applicant alleged he was the victim of a multi-year organized crime operation involving the police and government agencies, but refused to provide particulars of specific police misconduct.

The Director dismissed the complaint as frivolous and lacking an objective air of reality.

The Divisional Court held that the Director's decision was reasonable and the process was fair, as the complaint contained no specific allegations of police misconduct and lacked objective evidence.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant sought a contempt order against the respondent for failing to comply with an Ontario Labour Relations Board order to produce documents.

The respondent did not appear.

The Divisional Court adjourned the application, holding that because contempt is a quasi-criminal proceeding, the notice of application must be served personally on the respondent pursuant to Rule 60.11(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding the respondent $10,576 in damages and $10,500 in costs.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by providing oral rather than written reasons, making factual errors, demonstrating bias, and awarding costs exceeding the statutory limit.

The Divisional Court dismissed the substantive grounds of appeal, finding that transcribed oral reasons are sufficient and the factual errors were immaterial.

However, the court allowed the appeal on costs, finding the trial judge failed to provide sufficient reasons for exceeding the 15% limit under section 29 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The costs award was reduced to $7,420.

The moving party, a law firm representing the general contractor in a consolidated construction lien and breach of contract action, brought a motion for a charging order under s. 34 of the Solicitors Act for unpaid legal fees.

The motion was opposed by a subcontractor who had obtained a judgment against the general contractor and served a notice of garnishment on the property owners.

The court granted the charging order, finding that the law firm was instrumental in recovering funds for its client.

The court further held that the funds recovered were not trust funds under the Construction Lien Act, and therefore the solicitor's charging order took priority over the subcontractor's garnishment notice.

The plaintiff vendor brought a motion for partial summary judgment regarding a failed real estate transaction.

The defendant purchaser had demanded the return of his $60,000 deposit, alleging the vendor misrepresented the lot size based on an MPAC profile.

The vendor provided a registered survey confirming the lot size matched the Agreement of Purchase and Sale and accepted the purchaser's demand as an anticipatory breach.

The court found the lot size was correctly stated, the purchaser's conduct constituted an anticipatory breach, and ordered the $60,000 deposit forfeited to the vendor.

The court addressed three post-trial motions: a set-off dispute under a Pierringer agreement, the plaintiff's motion to vary judgment to include a common law negligence claim for an environmental order, and the defendant Thompson Fuels' motion to vary judgment based on alleged errors.

The court ruled that set-off from the Pierringer agreement would only apply if the settlement exceeded the plaintiff's total loss (100% of damages caused by defendants, not just the non-settling defendant's apportioned share).

Both Rule 59.06(1) motions were dismissed, as they sought to re-argue the case or correct judicial reasoning rather than accidental slips or omissions.

The offender was convicted of sexual interference relating to a single incident involving a child at a pool party.

The offender was in a position of trust as the only adult supervising the party.

The Crown sought 3 to 4 years imprisonment, while the defence sought time served.

The court considered the offender's prior record for sexual offences against a minor, the vulnerability of the victim, and the lack of mitigating factors.

After granting enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody, including time spent in lockdown, the court imposed a sentence of 28 months, resulting in time served plus one day, followed by two years of probation and ancillary orders.

The purchaser brought a motion for summary judgment for specific performance of an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) for a commercial property.

The vendor attempted to repudiate the APS, alleging various formal defects, lack of authority of its own signatory, and relying on an annulment clause to refuse to discharge a mortgage and construction lien.

The court found the APS valid, applying the indoor management rule to bind the vendor to its director's signature.

The court held the encumbrances were matters of conveyance, not title, and the vendor acted in bad faith.

Finding the property unique and damages inadequate, the court granted specific performance.

The defendants (owners) brought a motion under Rule 59.06(2)(c) for directions on carrying a previous judgment into operation.

The dispute centered on whether the owners were required to pay the notice holdback amount twice: once to the successful subcontractor lien claimants under the Construction Lien Act, and again to the general contractor for breach of contract.

The court held that the owners, having properly retained the holdback, were not required to pay twice.

Payments made to the subcontractors from the holdback trust fund are to be set off against the amount owing to the general contractor under the judgment.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment in a simplified procedure action for damages arising from an incident where the defendant pushed the plaintiff, fracturing his teeth.

At the hearing, the plaintiff sought an adjournment to cross-examine the defendant.

The court denied the adjournment, noting that Rule 76 prohibits cross-examination on affidavits for summary judgment motions.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding the evidentiary record inadequate, including the plaintiff's reliance on inadmissible apology evidence and insufficient proof of damages, concluding that a summary trial was the appropriate procedure.

The offender was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault after stabbing the victim with a kitchen knife during an alcohol-fueled altercation.

He also pled guilty to multiple breaches of his recognizance.

The court weighed the unprovoked nature of the attack and the use of a concealed weapon against the offender's lack of a prior criminal record and his efforts to address his severe alcohol addiction.

The court imposed a global sentence of 42 months imprisonment, reduced to 18.5 months after credit for pre-sentence custody, followed by two years of probation.

Following convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching against a minor, the Crown applied for a dangerous offender assessment under s. 752.1(1) of the Criminal Code.

The defence applied to stay the sexual assault and invitation to sexual touching charges under the Kienapple principle.

The court stayed the sexual assault and invitation to sexual touching charges, entering a conviction only for sexual interference, finding it more accurately described the offence against a child.

The court dismissed the Crown's application for a dangerous offender assessment, concluding there was no real possibility the offender would be found to be a dangerous or long-term offender given the lack of recent similar offences and a de-escalation in his criminal record.

The accused pled guilty to possession of cocaine and oxycodone for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought a 2.5-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court noted the serious nature of the drugs and the paramount principles of denunciation and deterrence, which precluded a conditional sentence.

However, considering the accused's significant rehabilitation, stable employment, and the fact that his past trafficking supported his own addiction, the court imposed a reformatory sentence of 18 months imprisonment followed by two years of probation.

The accused was charged with multiple firearm and personal liberty offenses.

The Crown's case for identification relied solely on grainy surveillance video footage.

The court, applying principles from R. v. Nikolovski, found that the video lacked sufficient clarity and quality to identify the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, especially considering the accused's changed appearance since the incident and the absence of corroborative evidence from a police search.

Consequently, the accused was found not guilty on all counts.

The plaintiff's residential oil tank leaked, causing a significant environmental spill into Sturgeon Lake.

The plaintiff sued the fuel distributor (Thompson Fuels), the regulatory authority (TSSA), and the tank manufacturer (Granby) for negligence.

The court found Thompson Fuels 40% liable for failing to conduct a mandatory comprehensive inspection before delivering fuel.

The plaintiff was found 60% contributorily negligent for improper installation, failing to maintain the tank, introducing water into the tank, and delaying reporting the leak.

Claims against the TSSA and Granby were dismissed.

The court also assessed the reasonableness of the extensive remediation costs and dismissed the plaintiff's claim for statutory contribution under the Environmental Protection Act.

The plaintiff, Parker Pad & Printing Ltd., sought partial summary judgment against its insurer, Gore Mutual Insurance Company, regarding coverage for water damage caused by significant rainfall.

The property insurance policy excluded "flood" (defined as the rising, breaking out, or overflow of any body of water) and seepage from natural sources through foundations.

The plaintiff also had a flood endorsement with an identical "flood" definition.

The court found that the pooling of rainwater did not constitute a "flood" as restrictively defined in the policy or endorsement, as it was not a pre-existing body of water.

Therefore, the damage was not covered by the flood endorsement and was excluded by the policy's seepage clause.

The motion for partial summary judgment was dismissed.

In a personal injury claim arising from a motor vehicle accident, the jury awarded the plaintiff general damages.

The defendants subsequently brought a threshold motion, arguing that the plaintiff's claim for non-pecuniary loss was barred because she failed to establish a permanent, serious impairment of an important physical, mental, or psychological function under the Insurance Act.

The court, applying the three-part Meyer v. Bright inquiry, found that while the plaintiff experienced intermittent pain, her impairment did not substantially interfere with her regular employment or most usual daily activities, considering her age and pre-accident lifestyle.

The court granted the defendants' motion, dismissing the plaintiff's claim for non-pecuniary damages.